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A. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 
1. Income Tax. 
The income tax rate brackets for trusts and estates are 
as follows for tax years beginning after December 31, 1993: 
Up to $1,500 
$1,500 - 3,600 
$3,600 - 5,500 
$5,500 - 7,500 
Above $7,500 
15 percent 
28 percent 
31 percent 
36 percent 
39.6 percent 
The election to pay additional 1993 taxes attributable to the 
rate increases in the 1993 Act in three installments, available to 
many taxpayers, is not available to trusts and estates. 
Rate compression creates an incentive not to accumulate income 
in a trust or estate. Timely distributions can eliminate the 
problem for estates, and for trusts. However, this presents a 
problem with respect to exemption equivalent trusts, generation 
skipping tax trusts, and trusts for disabled individuals. In those 
trusts, other considerations suggest that income should be 
accumulated. 
2. Estimated Taxes. 
The estimated tax payment rules have been changed. For 
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1993, a trust or estate 
with adjusted gross income (HAGI H) of not more than $150,000 will 
avoid underpayment penalties by making estimated payments equal to 
the lesser of (i) 90 percent of the tax shown as due on the return 
for the current year or (ii) 100 percent of the tax shown on the 
return for the preceding year. For trusts or estates with AGI of 
A-I 
$150,000 or more, 110 percent of the preceding year's tax must be 
paid. 
3. Estate and Gift Tax Rates. 
The reduction in rates was eliminated, retroactively to 
December 31, 1992. Thus, the highest rate is 55%, plus the 5% 
surcharge for amounts between $10,000,000 and $21,040,000. 
4. Medicaid Rules. 
The rules concerning Medicaid eligibility were changed 
with respect to transfers of assets and th~ treatment of trusts. 
The look-back period has been changed to 36 months, which runs from 
the date of application or institutionalization, whichever is 
later. The number of months of delay in eligibility is equal to 
the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets transfeTred 
after the look-back date, divided by the average monthly cost to a 
private patient of nursing facilities in the state. The period of 
delay begins with the first month during which the assets were 
disposed of. 
Transfers by co-owners are considered made by the applicant if 
the transfer reduces the applicant's interest in the asset. 
The term "Medicaid qualifying trust" has been eliminated. 
There is a 60-month look back rule for payments from trusts, rather 
than 36 months. That is probably an error. There does not appear 
a clear reason why a different time period would be used for 
A - 2 
transfers from revocable trusts, versus property transferred 
--~-l directly by the grantor. ~ 
=' 
Importantly, supplemental needs trusts created by persons 
9 other than the person applying for Medicaid are not taken into 
account for eligibility purposes. Thus, gifts from parent to 
child, with child creating a trust for parent, would seem usefUl. 
Presumably, a lapse of time between the two transfers would be 
helpful. The child's transfer would need to be incomplete for gift 
tax purposes by the child retaining a special power of 
appointment, for instance. An interesting issue is the effect of 
powers of withdrawal for Medicaid; the creation and lapse of a 
power would seem to transfer grantor status to the powerholder, 
even if protected by the "5 x 5" power of section 2514(e). Put 
another way, for state law purposes does. the person having a 
general power of appointment (i.e., a power of withdrawal, as 
above) become the grantor of the trust? 
Revocable trust assets are considered resources available to 
the individual, and payments from the trust to others are 
considered assets disposed of by the individual. 
With respect to irrevocable trusts created by the individual, 
the rules are stringent. The rules provide that if there are any 
circumstances under which payment from the trust could be made to 
or for the benefit of the individual, the portion of the corpus 
~ from which, or the income on the corpus from which, payment to the 
""=' 
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individual could be made shall be considered resources available to 
the individual, and payments from that portion of the corpus or 
, _0 
income to someone else will be a disposition. 
The provisions apply without regard to the purposes for which 
a trust is established, whether the trustees have or exercise any 
discretion under the trust, any restrictions on when or whether 
distributions may be made from the trust, or any restrictions on 
the use of distributions from the trust. 
Three types of trusts containing the assets of disabled 
individuals are not subject to these rules. The first is a trust 
in which after the beneficiary dies, the state will receive all 
amounts remaining in the trust upon the death of such individual up 
to an amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf 
of the individual under a state plan under this title. 
The second is for a trust, if the trust is comprised only of 
pension, Social Security, and other income to the individual (and 
accumulated income in the trust), if the state will receive all 
amounts remaining in the trust upon the death of such individual up 
to an amount equal to the total medical ass:i.stance paid on behalf 
of the individual under a State plan under this title, and the 
state makes medical assistance available to individuals (with some 
limitations) . 
The third exception is for a trust established and managed by 
a non-profit association, where a separate account is maintained 
A- 4 
for each beneficiary of the trust, but, for purposes of investment 
and management of funds, the trust pools these accounts, if 
accounts in the trust are established solely for the benefit of 
individuals by the parent, grandparent, or legal guardian of such 
individuals, by such individuals, or by a court, and to the extent 
that amounts remaining in the beneficiary's account upon the death 
of the beneficiary are not retained by the trust, the trust pays to 
the state from such remaining amounts in the account an amount 
equal to the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of 
the beneficiary under the state plan under this title. 
An important issue is the effect on ef·fective transfers under 
prior law. Arguably, a trust established under prior law which, 
for example, provides for the donor-now-Medicaid-recipient to 
receive all the income, is not grandfathered. 
A - 5 
B. Section 61 - Gross Income 
Healy v. Jones, (D.C. S.D. 1994) considered 
the meaning of "published" rates and rates "available to all 
standard risks," as used in Revenue Ruling 66-110 and Revenue 
Ruling 67-154, 1967-1 C.B .. The issue was said by the court to be 
one of first impression. The controversy arose from a split-dollar 
insurance plan which was described by the court in this way: 
This policy was acquired pursuant to a split-
dollar insurance agreement between Patrick and 
his employer. The split-dollar arrangement' 
involves the employer purchasing an insurance 
policy, containing a substantial investment 
element, on the employee's life. Rev. Rul. 
64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11. The particular 
agreement at issue is referred to as a 
collateral assignment arrangement. Id. Under 
the agreement at issue, the employee is 
required to pay the annual premiums on the 
policy. Id. However, the employer is 
required to loan him the .' amount of the 
premiums. Id. The employee assigns the 
policy to the employer as collateral security 
for the annual premium loans. Id. Upon 
Patrick's death, the employer receives the 
full amount of the premiums paid by it and the 
beneficiary, Carolyn,' receives the remainder. 
If Patrick's employment is terminated or the 
policy is terminated, the employer receives 
the cash surrender value of the pdlicy. 
From the employee's perspective, a split-
dollar arrangement converts a whole life 
policy into a term policy at no cost to the 
employee. Id. The employee receives an 
economic benefit in "an amount equal to the 1-
year term cost of the declining life insurance 
protection" which the employee receives as a 
result of the arrangement. Id. The employee 
must then include this amount as gross income 
on his tax return. 
A- 6 
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In their 1985 tax return, Plaintiffs reported 
the economic benefit using rate tables 
provided by the IRS for valuing ~plit-dollar 
life insurance policies. Plaintiffs 
subsequently sought to amend their 1985 return 
using a substantially lower rate table 
provided by Great West Life Assurance Company. 
Plaintiffs also used this lower rate table in 
computing their 1986 through 1988 tax returns. 
The lower rate table used by Plaintiffs 
provides a 2% commission on the first-year 
premium to the agent selling the policy. Most 
policies provide at 50% commission on the 
first year premium to the agent. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In pertinent part, Revenue Ruling 66-:-110, 1966-1 .C.B. 12, 
provides that: 
In that case where the current published 
premiums rates per $1,000 of. insurance 
protection charged by an insurer for 
. individual 1-year term life insurance 
available to all standard risks are lower than 
those set forth in Revenue Ruling 55-747, such 
published rates may be used in place of the 
rates set forth in that Revenue Ruling for 
determining the cost of insurance in 
connection with individual policies issued by 
the same insurer and used for "split dollar 
arrangements." 
The IRS contended the rates were not published because they 
were "not made known to the public through general circulation 
publications such as in Best's Flitcraft Co~pend which reports the 
premium rates of various insurance companies." The court rejected 
the contention because a representative of the company testified 
~ that "the rate on the particular policy at issue is published in 
~ 
Best's Flitcraft, as well as in a rate book sent to agents and 
A-7 
branch managers." He also testified that the rates were generally 
available. The IRS presented no contrary evidence. 
The case is important because standard term rates are 
typically used today instead of the P.S. 58 rates (for single life 
insurance) or the P.S. 38 rates (for survivorship insurance). It 
remains to be seen whether this is a unique attack by the IRS, or 
part of a larger effort. 
[With respect to the application of section 7872 to split-
dollar insurance, see F(2).] 
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C. Sections 170 and 664 -- Charitable Transfers 
1. New Substantiation Requirements. 
OBRA '93 added new section 170(f) (8) to the Code which 
disallows a charitable deduction for any contribution of $250 or 
more that is not substantiated by a written acknowledgement from 
the charity stating the money or other property contributed and any 
goods or services provided to the donor by the charity in 
consideration for the contribution. The provision has been 
interpreted by the IRS in News Release 93-121 (December 21, 1993) 
and in proposed regulations issued on May 26, 1994. The 
regulations deal primarily with payroll deduction contributions; 
the News R,elease is more general. Both are attached as Appendix A. 
2. Transfer of Farm and Cattle Operation to Charitable 
Remainder Unitrust. 
In PLR 9413020, the Service issued a number of favorable 
rulings in the context of the transfer of cattle ranching and 
farming operations to a charitable remainder unitrust ("CRUT"), 
over a 2 year period. The trustee was the charitable beneficiary. 
The key elements to the rUling were representations that the CRUT 
would not carryon the business of ranching or farming, but would 
liquidate the assets (e.g., cattle would be fed to keep them alive 
but not the fatten them for market), and that the trustee had no 
obligation to sell any of the transferred assets. The first 
representation would be important because a CRUT which has any 
unrelated business income for a tax year is not tax-exempt for that 
A- 9 
year. The second representation would be needed to prevent the IRS 
from asserting that the transferred assets were, in effect, sold by d 
the donor and then the proceeds contributed to the trust. 
3. Options. 
In PLR 9417005 the IRS revoked PLR 9240017 dealing with 
the transfer of an option to purchase real estate to a CRT. This 
ruling makes an already risky series of transactions. more suspect. 
4. Partnership as Donor and Beneficiary. 
PLR 9419021 approved a term of years charitable remainder 
unitrust with a partnership as donor and beneficiary. This is in 
accord~nce with its previous ruling policy. The IRS has, in the 
past year, refused to issue a favorable ruling allowing a gran-tor 
trust to be the beneficiary of a charitable remainder trust for the 
lifetime of the grantor. Favorable rulings have been issued where 
the beneficiary is disabled. 
-=:::::::.1 
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D. Section 408 - lRAs 
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~ 1. Spousal Rollover Via Trust. 
PLR 9350040 considered whether a surviving spouse who 
received IRA distributions through a trust could roll them over to 
her own IRA. The IRA beneficiary was a trust, which required the 
distribution to be allocated to a subtrust over which the surviving 
spouse had an unlimited power of withdrawal. The IRS allowed the 
rollover. 
'"'4 
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E. Sections 671-687 -- Grantor Trusts 
1. Section 675 (4) (C) '-- Power to Substitute Assets. 
Whenever it is important to have the grantor treated as 
the owner of a t'rust for income tax purposes (e.g., GRITs, GRATs, 
PRTs) section 675(4) (C) is often used. That section of the Code 
provides that the grantor is the owner of a trust if the grantor 
retains, in a nonfiduciary capacity, the power to reacquire trust 
property by substituting other property of an equivalent value. 
The IRS is not currently happy with this approach. In several 
letter rulings (e.g., 9335028, 9337011, 9352004, 9352007 and 
9413045), the IRS· has refused to rule on the issue, stating that 
the issue of whether an act could be exercised in a non-fiduciary 
capacity was a fact and circumstance inquiry. 
An example would be PLR 9335028 which states: 
Based on the information submitted and our 
examination of the terms o,f each of the 
_proposed trust instruments, we conclude as 
follows: 
1. The circumstances surrounding the 
administration of each of proposed trusts will 
determine whether A [the grantor] holds the 
power of administration in a nonfiduciary 
capaci ty. This is a question of fact, the 
determination of which must be deferred until 
the federal income tax returns of the parties 
involved here have been examined by the office 
of the District Director in which the returns 
are filed. Upon execution of each of the 
proposed trusts, provided that the 
circumstances indicate that A has a power of 
administration exercisable over the corpus of 
each trust in a nonfiduciary capacity, A will 
be treated as the owner of the two trusts 
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under section 675 and will be taxed on the 
income of X allocated to these trusts under 
section 671. Accordingly, A must include in 
computing taxable income, deductions, and 
credits, all items of income, deductions and 
credits against tax of the trusts. 
On the other hand, other rulings have been issued which do not 
raise the issue (e.g., 9345035, 9351005, 9352017, and 9416009). 
On this point, Treas. Reg. §1.675-1(b) (4) provides that: 
I f a power is exercisable by a person as 
trustee, it is presumed that the power is 
exercisable in a fiduciary capacity primarily 
in the interests of the beneficiaries. This 
presumption may be rebutted only by clear and 
convincing proof that the power is not 
exercisable primarily in the inte~ests of the 
beneficiaries. If a power is not exercisable 
by a person as trustee, the determination of 
whether the power is exercisable in a 
fiduciary or a nonfiduciary capacity depends 
on all the terms of the trust and the 
circumstances surrounding its creation and 
administration. 
(c) Authority of trustee. The mere fact that 
a power exercisable by a trustee is described 
in broad language does not indicate that the 
trustee is authorized to purchase, exchange, 
or otherwise deal with or dispose of the trust 
property or income for less than an adequate 
and full consideration in money or money's 
worth, or is authorized to lend the trust 
property or income to the grantor without 
adequate interest. On the other hand, such 
authority may be indicated by the actual 
administration of the trust. 
Another aspect of the issue is, who can have the power? Must 
it be the grantor? The Code uses the term "reacquire" which 
suggests only the grantor can have the power -- others could not 
"reacquire." Treas. Reg. §1.675-1(b) (4) provides that the grantor 
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is taxed on a portion of a trust as to which there is "[t] he 
~ 
existence of certain powers of administration exercisable in a ~ -.-
nonfiduciary capacity by any nonadverse party without the approval 
or consent of any person in a fiduciary capacity" and a power of 
administration includes a "power to reacquire the trust corpus by 
substituting other property of equivalent value,. "The IRS has, in 
previous letter rulings, not even required that the person with the 
power be nonadverse. 
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F. Section 1361 -- S Corporations 
1. Continued Use. 
Limited Liability Companies will often be used instead of 
S corporations' because LLCs are more flexible entities. 
Legislation has been introduced in Congress which would expand the 
categories of shareholders of S corporations. Especially 
beneficial could be the use of S stock to fund charitable remainder 
trusts. 
2. Second Class of Stock and Split-Dollar Life Insurance. 
PLR 9331009 holds that split-dollar 1if~insurance 
arrangements between a company and its shareholder-employees do not 
create more than one class of stock within the meaning of IRC Sec. 
1361(b) (1) (D). However, the ruling states "no opinion is expressed 
or implied concerning the application of section 7872." This 
presents the question whether the IRS is considering revocation of 
Revenue Ruling 64-328, which characterizes a split-dollar 
arrangement as a "life insurance plan" and not a loan from the 
employer to an employee. 
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G. IRC Sec. 2013 -- Previously Taxed Property Credit 
1 . Val ue of Annui ty . 
Estate of Benjamin Shapiro, 67 TCM 1067, involved the 
valuation of a trust annuity for section 2013 purposes, but it is 
of more importance with respect to zeroed-out GRATs. The· IRS 
conceded that there was a credit, but disagreed with the estate as 
to its amount. The trust· was valued at a little more than $1 
million; the estat'e valued the decedent's interest at about 
$943,000. The annuity was equal to roughly 30% of the original 
value of the trust clearly in excess of the trust's earning power 
under the IRS Tables. Treas. Reg. §20.2013-4(a) provides that a 
limited interest in property is valued for section 2013 purposes 
pursuant to Treas. Reg. §§20.2031-7 and 20.2031-10. Treas. Reg. 
§20.2031-7 (a) (2) provides that: 
The present value of an annuity *** which is 
dependent on the continuation or termination 
of the life of one person is computed by the 
use of Table A in paragraph (f) of this 
section. *** [However), [i)f the interest to 
be valued is dependent upon *** a term certain 
concurrent with one or more lives, see 
paragraph (e) of this section. 
The estate used Table A. The IRS disagreed for several reasons. 
:::i 
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Of interest here are the IRS arguments that (a) the decedent's ~ 
interest in the trust must ,be valued as a term certain concurrent 
·--'-1 
with one life rather than as a lifetime "annuity" because the 
payments would be limited by the decreasing trust assets and ~ 
therefore was not solely dependent on the continuation or 
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;;;;;;;j §20.2031-7(a) (2); and (b) Table A would not apply in any event 
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because the residuary trust was "underfunded" because the corpus 
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j was not large enough to support the annuity obligation in case 
decedent had lived to be age 109. These contentions are 
essentially the same. 
The Tax Court rejected the IRS position, as follows: 
Taking respondent's argument· to its 
theoretical conclusion, ANY TRUST created with 
corpus funds equivalent to the present value 
of a lifetime annuity obligation as computed 
under Table A would be deemed to be 
"underfunded" in that it wouid have 
insufficient funds to sustain the annual 
payments should the annuitant liv,e beyond his 
or her average' life expectancy. In this 
regard, respondent's argument contravenes the 
fundamental purposes and presumptions 
underlying the actuarial tables. 
Table A is premised on two actuarial 
presumptions: '( 1) the interest rate on the 
principal amount is assumed to be 10 percent, 
and (2) a person, at any given age, is assumed 
to die within a time consistent with the 
average mortality rate for that age. Sec. 
20.2031-7 (f), Estate Tax Regs. Table A does 
not expect or presume that a 91~year-old 
person will live for 18 more years; to the 
contrary, the table implicitly recognizes the 
possibility of any person reaching 109 years 
of age is extremely remote. 
* * * 
In essence, respondent argues that unless an 
annuity is "guaranteed" throughout an 
annuitant's extreme life expectancy, just as a 
commercial annuity is guaranteed, the 
computation of the annuity's present value 
must be made on a case-by-case basis using a 
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special actuarial factor supplied by the 
Internal Revenue Service; any computation of 
an unguaranteed, private annuity under Table A 
would be deemed invalid in respondent's view. 
Respondent's position, if it were correct, 
would vitiate the use of Table A as an 
administrative convenience and bright-line 
approach to valuation. Table A could not be 
used to determine the present values of all 
sorts of unguaranteed, privately funded 
annuities; they would all be subject to 
individuai analysis under ~ facts-and-
circumstances test. 
As noted, one of the principal purposes of the 
actuarial tables is to prevent every case from 
becoming a question of fact as to the most 
likely outcome of the case. Simpson v. United 
States, 252 U.S. 547 (1920). Although we have 
ignored the actuarial tables when their use 
will violate reason, Estate of McLendon v. 
Commissioner, T~C. Memo. 1993-459, and cases 
cited therein, absent an unreasonable result 
we will use the tables as the best. method of 
valuation. Estate of Lion v. Commissioner, 
438 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1971), affg. 52 T~C. 601 
(1969). In petitioner's case, we have found 
that the valuation of decedent's interest in 
his wife's residuary trust under Table A is 
not unreasonable. Moreover, respondent has 
failed to present any persuasive reason for 
ignoring the valuation result achieved under 
Table A. Accordingly, we reject respondent's 
argument that petitioner's Table A valuation 
is invalid because the residuary trust was 
incapable of sustaining the annuity payments 
in the event .decedent lived to be 109 years 
old. We have evaluated respondent's other 
arguments and find them similarly 
unpersuasive. 
We have found that petitioner properly 
.characterized decedent's interest in his 
wife's residuary trust as a lifetime annuity 
under both New York law and section 20.2031-7, 
Estate Tax Regs. We have also fo~nd that the 
value of the residuary trust on the date of 
Mrs. Shapiro's death exceeded the present 
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value of decedent's annuity as computed under 
Table A and that the trust was therefore 
sufficient to sustain the annuity obligation 
for decedent's life. 
The IRS, essentially, argued the position adopted in Revenue 
Ruling 77-454. The court soundly rejected the argument, or did it? 
By noting that the Tables apply always unless unreasonable, the Tax 
Court left open future challenges of this type. Of course, the 
annuity in question was sufficiently large 1;0 provide.comfort for 
a great many GRATs, but not all. 
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H. Sections 2031 and 2513 -- Valuation 
Valuation continues to be a most important issue in estate 
planning. In large part the benefit of family limited partnerships 
turn out to be, primarily, a help in valuation. 
1. Control Stock. 
In Estate of Charles Russell Bennett, 65 TCM 1816, the 
decedent owned all of the outstanding stock of a real estate 
development company. The estate valued the stock using a lack of 
marketability discount, but the IRS claimed that such a discount 
should never be allowed in a 100 percent ownership case. The IRS 
relied on Estate of Jephson v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 297 (1986), where a 
discount was not allowed when valuing the stock of two investment 
companies consisting of cash and marketable securities. 
The court allowed a 15 percent discount: 
Our holding that a lack of marketability 
discount is warranted is based on a totality 
of the facts presented. Here, we have a real 
estate management company whose assets are 
varied and nonliquid. We think that the 
corporate form is a quite important 
consideration here: there is definitely a 
difference in owning the assets and liability 
of Fairlawn directly and in owning the stock 
of Fairlawn, albeit 100 percent of the stock. 
We think some discounting is necessary to find 
a buyer willing to buy Fairlawn's package of 
desirable and less desirable properties. 
Thus, the line of cases in which we have 
recognized that difficulties arise in holding 
nonliquid assets in the corporate form, even 
in the lOa-percent ownership situation, is 
applicable in this case. 
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The court did not allow, however, a discount for costs 
associated with the liquidation of the company's real estate. The 
court noted that: 
I 
[b]oth parties have agreed that there was no 
reasonable prospect of liquidation in this 
case. When liquidation is only speculative, 
the valuation of assets should not take these 
costs into account because it is unlikely they 
will ever be incurred. Our goal of 
determining the price a willing seller could 
get from a willing buyer is not assisted by 
considering what a buyer might eventually 
realize from the sale of all of the 
corporation's assets. 
The court's holding on this issue is in line with the IRS position 
in TAM 9150001. 
TAM 9419001 disregarded the value stipulated in the company's 
Articles of Incorporation for certain preferred shares upon 
liquidation and redemption, without reference to Chapter 14 (the 
restrictions occurred in 1984; the death in July, 1990), because 
the preferred shares represented 99.86% of voting control. With 
voting control, the company did not need to .be liquidated nor the 
shares redeemed in order for the owner to benefit. 
2. Discounts and Penalties. 
In Estate of Jung, the issue was the valuation of a 20 
percent interest in a closely-held company, Jung Corp., for estate 
tax purposes on the decedent's death in 1984. In 1986 the company 
sold most of its assets to another corporation for over 
$59,000,000, and sold other assets worth almost $7,000,000. Thus, 
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the decedent's estate received more than $13,000,000 ($66,000,000 
x 20%). These sales were not foreseeable at the decedent death. 
The court determined that when the decedent died Jung Corp. 
was worth between $32,000,000 and $34,000,000 meaning that the 
decedent's shares were worth $6,400,000 to $6,800,000 before 
discounts. The court allowed a 35 percent discount for lack of 
marketability; no discount was allowed for a minority interest, 
because the court accepted an appraisal which used the discounted 
cash flow method. 
The court discussed use of the discounted cash flow (I'DCF") 
method, as discussed in a previously decided case: 
Peti tioner contends that in Northern Trust 
Co., Transferee v. Commissioner, 87 T.e. 349, 
(1986), affd. sub nom. Citizens Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 
1988), this Court approved the use of a 
minori ty discount when the DCF approach is 
used in valuation. Respondent tells us that 
the instant case provides us "with an 
opportunity to reconsider issues" in Northern 
Trust Co.! Transferee. 
In Northern Trust Co.! Transferee, stock of a 
closely held corporation was valueq. 
Grabowski [the appraiser] submitted an expert 
wi tnessreport and testified in that case. 
Grabowski used the DCF approach, and he used. 
the CAPM [capital asset pricing model] to 
determine the discount rate. After deciding 
on a value for the corporation, he applied a 
minori ty discount. 87 T. C. at 369. This 
court concluded tha t the DCF approach 
correctly determined the value of the stock. 
We also allowed both minor~ty and 
marketabili ty discounts. Id. However, in 
Northern Trust co.! Transferee, respondent did 
not content that no minority discount was 
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appropriate.· Rather, respondent merely argued 
for a lower minority discount that the 
discount for which the taxpayer contended. 
Id. Because the parties in Northern Trust 
Co., Transferee did not present to the Court 
the question of whether a minority discount 
could ·be allowed in conjunction with the DCF 
approach, the opinion in that case did not 
explore whether the DCF approach that 
Grabowski used in the case was calculated on a 
control basis rather than on a minority basis. 
See Estate of Fusz v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 
214, 215n.2 (1966). 
Thus, we do not accept respondent's invitation 
to reconsider our opinion in Northern Trust 
Co., Transferee v. Commissioner, supra, and we 
also conclude that that opinion does not 
require us to allow a minority discount in the 
instant case. 
In general, if the discounted cash flow method is used based 
on factors derived from publicly traded companies, as will usually 
be the case, the method values a business as a minority interest, 
with no further discount for a minority interest being appropriate. 
The court also held that the IRS abused its discretion by not 
waiving the addition to tax under section 6660 (old) (now section 
6662). That section provided fora waiver upon a showing that (I) 
there was a reasonable basis for the valuation and (2) the taxpayer 
acted in good faith in claiming that valuation. Here, in large 
part, the estate was saved because the IRS asserted a value which 
was substantially higher than the court's finding, and the estate 
did have an appraisal. The court noted: 
Also, it is evident that valuing decedent's 
interest is a difficult task. After all, in 
the notice of deficiency respondent overvalued 
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decedent's interest by about 89 percent. Even 
on brief, after having access to all the 
expert witness reports and other evidence of 
record (more than 3-1/2 linear feet of 
exhibits and almost 1,000 pages of 
transcript), respondent overvalued decedent's 
intere·st by about 82 percent. Thus, 
petitioner's valuation was much closer to the 
mark than was respondent's valuation. 
Of importance also is the court's discussion of Estate of 
Berg, in which penalties were approved by the Tax Court, but not by 
the Eighth Circuit: 
In Estate of Berg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 
1991-279, affd. in part and revd. in part 976 
F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1992), we held that 
respondent's discretion had not been abused in 
refusing to waive the section 6660 addition to 
tax. The Court of Appeals reversed on that 
issue~ The record in the instant case is far 
more favorable to petitioner than the record 
presented by the taxpayer in Estate of Berg. 
In Estate of Berg, the taxpayer did not 
commission an appraisal until more than 4 
years after the decedent's death; in the 
instant case petitioner did commission an 
appraisal promptly, and the value of the 
timely field estate tax return was based on 
that appraisal. In Estate of Berg, the estate 
tax return did not provide support for the 
claimed valuation, except for a reference to 
another opinion of this Court; in the instant 
case, Robinson's appraisal was deficient in 
terms of evidentiary standards, but provided 
some substantive support for the claimed 
valuation. In Estate of Berg, we agreed with 
respondent's determination of value; in the 
instant case, respondent oven-Talued the 
property by more than twice as much as 
peti tioner undervalued it. Thus, our 
conclusion in the instant case that 
respondent's discretion was abused is 
consistent with out conclusion in Estate of 
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Berg that respondent's discretion was not 
abused. 
3. Valuation of Interests in Jointly-Held Property. 
In TAM 9336002, the IRS ruled that the amount of the 
discount should be limited to the estimated cost of a partition of 
the property, which seems inconsistent with the results in the 
recently decided cases. The IRS stated: 
From the perspective of the owner of an 
undi vided interest in property, a lack of 
unity of ownership is a possible disadvantage 
if the owner wishes to sell the interest. If 
the seller's co-owners decline to join in a 
sale of the whole property, the seller of an 
undivided interest may be forced either to 
accept a reduced price for his interest or to. 
seek a partition. On the other hand, if all 
the co-owners were to join in the sale, the 
rationale for a discount would disappear 
because the owners' unity for disposition 
purposes would permit them to convey a 100 
percent interest in the property. In such a 
case, the purchaser would acquire the property 
free of the disadvantages associated with 
ownership of undivided interests, and there 
would be no reason for him to demand, or for 
the sellers to accept, a discount from the 
property's full fair market value. 
The definition of fair market value 
contemplates that the hypothetical buyer and 
seller will choose to act in their own best 
economic interests. The courts recognize that 
partitioning is an alternative that results in 
greater economic benefit to the owner of an 
undivided interest. In Estate of Frank Fittl 
v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1986-542 [CCH Dec. 
43,488(M)], the court held that the discount 
attributable to an undivided interest in real 
property should be limited to the cost of 
partition. See also, Kennedy v. Commissioner, 
804 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1986) [86-2 USTC 
<]I13, 699] . 
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The Fittl case involved the valuation of farmland. There the 
taxpayer's expert failed to take such a discount, so the court did 
not either. The Kennedy case is primarily concerned with a 
disclaimer. 
In Samuel J. LeFrak, 66 TCM 1297, a father gave interests in 
various buildings to his children, or to trusts for their benefit. 
The interest transferred to each child or.trust was .less than 10 
percent. After discussing the appraisal experts, the court 
discussed the applicable discounts: 
Discounts for Minority Interest and Lack of 
Marketability 
For gift tax purposes, the value of the 
fractional interest in the property 
transferred, and not the value of the property 
as a whole, must ultimately be decided. " 
Propstra v.United States [82-2 USTC Cj[ 
13,475], 680 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 1982); 
Bank of the West v. Commissioner. [Dec. 
46,073], 93 T.C. 462, 468 (1989); Zable v. 
Commissioner [Dec. 46,360(M)], T.C. Memo. 
1990-55; Filler v. Commissioner, [Dec. 
44,201(M), T.C. Memo, 1987-468, affd. sub nom. 
Robino, Inc. Pension Trust v. Commissioner 
[90-1 USTC Cj[ 50,059], 894 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 
1990). The fair market value of a fractional' 
interest in real property cannot as a general 
rule be derived by simply applying the 
percentage of the interest in the whole to the 
value of the entire property. See Propstra v. 
United States, supra; Estate of Campanari v. 
Commissioner [Dec. 14,685, 5 T.C. 488, 492 
(1945); Estate of Henry V. Commissioner [Dec. 
14,259], 4 T.C. 423, 447 (1944), affd. [47-1 
USTC Cj[ 10,558] 161 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1947); 
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Estate of Haydel v. Commissioner [Dec. 
47,678(M), T.C. Memo. 1919-507, affd. without 
published opinion 988 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 
1993). Accordingly, we must consider whether 
the proportional net value of the interests in 
the buildings should be further adjusted to 
arrive at the taxable value of the gifts. 
Whether a discount should be allowed in 
arriving at the final value of the gift is a 
question of fact. Estate of Newhouse v. 
Commissioner [Dec. 46,411], 94 T.C. at 249. 
Petitioners ask that· the value of the gifts be 
discounted because the donees received 
minority interests in the buildings and 
because the interests transferred were not 
readily marketable. Petitioners offered the 
expert report of Mr. Gregory Vlasak to support 
their contention concerning the appropriate 
amount of discount. Respondent contends that 
no discount is warranted, and, in the 
alternative, disputes the amount of discount 
calculated by petitioners' expert. 
Petitioners point out that each discount 
sought is conceptually distinct and is 
designed to measure a different factor 
reducing the value. Estate of Andrews v. 
Commissioner [Dec. 39,523], 79 T.C. 938, 952-
953 (1982). A minority disco\lnt for an 
interest in real property may be allowed on 
account of the lack of control which 
accompanies co-ownership. Estate of Campanari 
v. Commissioner, supra at 492-493. However, a 
holder of a fractional interest in real 
property has the power to' compel partition of 
property, which is not available with other 
types of shares ownership interests. Bittker 
& Lokken, Federal Income Taxation of Estates, 
Gifts, & Trusts, par. 135.3.4, at 135-41 (2d 
ed. 1993). Accordingly, Bi ttker and Lokken 
have suggested that the discount should 
reflect the cost of partition and the value of 
the interest secured thereby. Id. We have on 
several occasions considered the cost, 
uncertainty, and delays attendant upon 
parti tion proceedings as the basis for 
allowing a discount in value fractional 
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interests in- real property. Estate of 
Pillsbury v. Commissioner [Dec. 48,378 (M) ], 
T.C. Memo. 1992-425; Estate of Wildman v. 
Commissioner, [Dec. 46,218(M)] T.C. Memo 1989-
667; Estate of Youle V. Commissioner, [Dec. 
45,579(M)], T.C. Memo. 1989-138; Sels V. 
Commis·sioner, T.C. Memo 1986-501; see also 
Estate of Henry V. Commissioner, supra at 477. 
The marketability discount, by contrast, 
measures the diminution in value attributable 
to the lack of a ready market for the 
property. Ward v~ Commissioner, [Dec. 43, 
178], 87 T.C. 78, 106-107 (1986). 
Accordingly, we will consider each discount 
separately. 
* * * 
Mr. Vlasak estimated that a 40-percent 
discount for minority interest should be 
allowed in valuing the donated interests. 
Respondent criticizes Mr. Vlasak's analysis, 
and contends that no more than 15 percent 
should be allowed, if any. Respondent points 
out that, on their gift tax return, 
petitioners claimed only a 15-percent discount 
in valuing the gift for tax purposes, and that 
this Court in other cases generally has not 
allowed discounts of greater magnitude in 
valuing donative transfers of real estate 
interests. Estate of Campanari v. 
Commissioner [Dec. 14,685], 5 T.C. 488, 492 
(1945); Estate of Wildman v. Commissioner 
[Dec. 46, 218(M)], T.C. Memo 1989-667. 
Petitioners counter that this Court has 
allowed min6ri tyinterest discounts of the 
magnitude advanced by Mr. Vlasak, citing 
Harwood v. Commissioner [Dec. 40,985], 82 T.C. 
239, 269 (1984), affd. without published 
opinion 786 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1986), in 
which a 50-percent discount was allowed. We 
do not agree. The discount allowed in Harwood 
represents a combined reduction for both lack 
of marketability and minority interest and so 
does not furnish a basis for comparison solely 
as to minority interest. Id. at 268. 
Petitioners also cite Estate of Watts v. 
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Commissioner, [Dec. 42,521(M)], T.C. Memo. 
1985-595, affd. [87-2 USTC <]I 13,726] 823 F.2d 
483 (11th Cir. 1987), in which a 35-percent 
discount was allowed, but such discount also 
represents a combined·· figure for lack of 
marketability and minority interest. 
Accordingly, such cases seem to suggest that 
the discount urged by petitioners is 
excessive, but, as the question is one of 
fact, we must remind the parties that i:he 
amount of discount must be decided on . the 
basis of the record in the instant case, and 
not on what a court found reasonable in 
another case involving different evidence. 
The court allowed a 20 percent minority interest discount and 
a 10 percent lack of marketability discount. The result is 
contrary to TAM 9336002. Also of importance is the court's 
implication that .greater discounts would have been allowed had the 
real estate interests been subsumed within a partnership and the 
partnership interests transferred, assuming the holders of those· 
interests CQuld not liquidate the partnership~ That point could be 
different under section 2704. 
What is the value of jointly-held property included in a 
decedent's estate under section 2040? Only half the property is 
included. Does section 2040 mean that with two joint tenants one-
half of the entire value is included, or does section 2040 provide 
only for inclusion, with valuation being determined separately, and 
at a discounted value? 
4. Use of Actuarial Tables. 
Estate of Gordon B. McLendon, 66 TCM 946, involved the 
application of Revenue Ruling 80-80, 1980-1 C.B. 194, relating to 
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the use of the actuarial tables to value partial interests in 
property that depend upon the life expectancy of an individual who 
does not have a normal expectancy~ 
The Tax Court held that the decedent's actual life expectancy 
was sufficiently predictable as of March 5, 1986, the date of the 
private annuity, to require departure from the actuarial tables in 
computing the value of the remainder interest. Thus, the 
transaction resulted in a large taxable gift. The facts in 
McClendon were very disadvantageous to the taxpayer and are worth 
reading to review circumstances in which a private annuity should 
not be attempted. The court described him as "an increasingly sick 
man suffering from a virtually incurable diseas~" and found his 
life expectancy to be one year. The court's statement of the law 
is of interest: 
Use of Actuarial Tables 
The common theme of these cases is that the 
actuarial tables generally are to be respected 
unless the established facts show that the 
result under the tables is unrealistic or 
unreasonable. Consistent with the Estate of 
Jennings [10 T.C. 323 (1948)] line of cases, 
the proper inquiry in this case is whether the 
life tenant's actual life expectancy is so 
~xceptional that . a departure . from the 
actuarial tables is justified. While·the term 
rrexceptional" is difficult to define, Estate 
of Jennings and its progeny require proof that 
death is either imminent or predictable to a 
reasonable certainty within 1 year of the 
valuation date. 
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In private annuity cases it matters whether the transaction is 
d ul timately characterized as a gift, or as a transfer with a 
~ retained interest. Often the second argument -- that the assets 
i 
~. 
should be included in the estate because the annuity was 
essentially the income of the property -- is a "throwaway" for the 
IRS. But, if the case is settled, settlement on that basis 
produces an increase in basis. 
5. New IRS Valuation Handbook. 
On January 28, 1994 the IRS issued a new Valuation Guide 
for use in training appeals officers. The Table of Contents is 
attached as Appendix B. The text is worth review because (a) it is 
a good discussion of important valuation principles and techniques, 
(b) it contains good, albeit selective, references to other sources 
(e.g., SEC studies), (c) the cases cited are not representative, 
and thus provide insight into particular IRS bias, and (d) the 
examining agent, and appeals officer, will have read it. 
In general, the text supports settlement rather than 
litigation. 
6. Flower Bonds. 
Weld v. U.S., (U.S. ct. Fed. Cl. 1994) 
involved the valuation of flower bonds. The court held that the 
value is par plus accrued interest as of the decedent's date of 
death. The court rejected; as creative but wrong, the taxpayer's 
argument: 
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[p]laintiffs argue that a discount analysis is 
necessary to determine the value of flower 
bonds on the date of death because the estate 
will not receive the full. value of the bonds 
until nine months after the date of death. 
Under such a discount analysis, each monetary 
benefit that the estate. will receive during 
these nine months must be discounted from the 
date of its receipt back to·the date of death, 
using as the discount rate the pertinent 
Treasury bill interest rates in effect on the 
date of death. When this methodology is 
applied to the instant facts , on the 
respective dates of death the Bright and Weld 
flower fonds have a value that is less than 
par value plus accrued interest because the 
discount rate employed on the dates of death 
(i.e., the applicable Txeasury bill interest 
rate) was· significantly higher than the rate 
at which the flower bonds accrued interest 
during the nine-month period. 
* * * 
In sum, the tax laws, in effect, left 
plaintiffs with a choice. They could redeem 
the bonds in the payment of estate taxes for 
par value plus accrued interest on the dates 
of death or they could take advantage of the 
grace period and wait up to nine months and 
redeem the bonds for par value plus a slightly 
higher accrued interest. Plaintiffs selected 
the economically optimal choice and waited the 
full nine months before redeeming the flower. 
bonds and thereby secured the ~xtrainterest. 
But when valuing all assets. for estate tax 
purposes, the regulations focus on the fair 
market value on date of death, not on the 
amount of income that a bond owner potentially 
could receive . during the nine months' after 
death. Herein, on the respective dates· of 
death, the government stood willing to redeem 
the bonds for par value plus accrued interest 
in the payment· of estate taxes. That was the 
highest value plaintiffs could secure on those 
dates. It would be inconsistent with the 
controlling standards to ignore the existence 
of such a willing buyer and to designate the 
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fair market value on the date of death at an 
amount that is less than the amount that a 
willing buyer was prepared to pay. Thus, 
while the premise that plaintiffs would be 
unwilling to turn the bonds over to the 
government on the dates. of death in the 
payment of taxes owed is an appropriate 
premise for predicting the timing of 
plaintiffs' actions, it is not determinative 
when assessing the fair market value of the 
bonds on the dates of death. 
Underwriting Fees. 
Gillespie v. U.S., (2d Cir. 1994) dealt 
with the valuation of a large block of publicly held stock. The 
estate involved was that of Eugene Meyer of the Washington Post.· 
Because a large block of stock was in the estate, most .. of ,the 
shares were valued, and in fact sold, in an underwritten secondary 
offering. The court stated these facts: 
The proceeds received by the Estate from its 
underwriter, Salomon Brothers, Inc. 
("Salomon"), totaled $14,365,000, or $34 per 
share. In connection with this offering the 
Estate incurred expenses of $213,142, which 
included, inter alia, accounting fees, legal 
fees, printing fees, and registration fees, 
but did not include underwriting fees. 
Plaintiffs and Salomon agreed that, as an 
underwriting fee for the transaction, Salomon 
would be allowed to retain possession of the 
proceeds of the sale of the 422,500 shares 
until the 90th day following the sale and 
would make no payment to the Estate for the 
use of those funds during. the 90-day period. 
In seeking to place a value on the Estate's 
original 743,500 WPC shares for tax purposes, 
plaintiffs sought the opinion of Salomon ... as to 
the price, expense, and yield that could have 
been realized in a second offering immediately 
after Meyer's death (the "hypothetical 
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offering"). In an opinion dated November 22, 
1982, Salomon concluded that the·hypothetical 
offering would have yielded $25.3725 p~r share 
to the Estate. 
In its valuation, Salomon deducted presumed underwriting fees. 
The primary issue before the Second Circuit was the 
deductibility of the "estimated" underwriting fee, given that no 
actual underwriting .fee was paid, and the fees. The tourt found 
the relevant authority to be Revenue Ruling 83~30: 
Although there is 'no dispositive Treasury 
regulation, in 1983 the IRS issued a pertinent 
revenue ruling. In Revenue Ruling 83-30 (the 
"1983 Ruling"), the IRS ruled that, in 
determining the value of a block of stock too 
large to be sold on the open market without 
depressing the price, "th~ relevant figure is 
the price that the public would pay to the 
underwriter for the stock, and not the price 
that the underwriter would pay to the estate., 
Accordingly, underwriting fees should not be 
considered in determining ·the blockage 
discount." Rev. Rul. 83-30, 1983-1 C.B. 224, 
225 (1983). The 1983 Ruling went on to hold 
that " [u] nderwri ting fees, necessarily 
incurred in marketing a large block of stock· 
are deductible as an administration expense 
under section 2053(a) (2) of the Code, and are 
not considered in determining the blockage 
discount to be accorded in valuing the stock 
under section 2013." Rev. Rul. 83-30, 1983-1 
C.B. at 225. 
The court's conclusion was that: 
. Revenue Ruling 83-30, which held that 
underwriting fees incurred in a secondary 
offering of a large block of stock should be 
excluded from the calculation· of the fair 
market value of the stock for the purposes of 
computing the value of the gross estate, is 
neither unreasonable nor contrary to any 
statutory or regulatory provision. 
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The district court found, and no one disputes, 
that buyers would have been willing and able 
to pay for the Estate's WPC shares $27.125 per 
share, that is, the market price less the 
blockage discount. The court properly 
declined to allow a· fur_ther deduction for 
hypothetical underwriting fees and other sale-
related expenses in arriving at the fair 
market value of the stock. 
8. Lack of Marketability -- S Corporation; Preferred Shares. 
A unique ranch, . the largest single tract of land in 
Arizona, was valued by the Tax Court in Estate of star Simpson, 67 
TCM 1994-207. The ranch was owned by an S corporation. The issue 
arose in the context of a gift. The court allowed a 30% discount 
for lack of marketability (there was no true minority interest 
the family acted in concert at the father's direction). 
On another issue, the court valued preferred shares (in a 
di fferent company) which lacked any "equity kicker" such as a 
convertibility feature, by using the dividend rate and calculating 
a price for the shares which would make the dividend a market rate. 
A 10% discount for lack of marketability was allowed, but not 
a minority interest discount because the dividend rate had been 
derived from publicly traded comparables which already included a 
discount. 
9. Valuation of Art; Risks of Litigation. 
Estate of Robert C. Scull, 67 TCM 1994-211, provides an 
overview of art valuation in a complex case. Some works of art 
were sold at auction, others were so offered but not sold, and 
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others were merely appraised. In general, the court used the 
auction prices (without reduction for commissions paid) for those 
auctioned, and the appraised values for the others. Litigation was 
involved, having to do with a property settlement, which resulted 
in the decedent receiving a 65% interest in the collection; the 
court allowed, reluctantly, a 5% discount for risks of litigation. 
10. Residential Valuation. 
The Tax Court opinion in Estate of Calista B. Dowlin, TCM 
1994-183,may be reviewed for a discussion of expert opinion in 
residential valuation. The opinion does not deal with valuing one-
half of a residence owned by a husband whose wife owns the other 
half. That issue is of importance when creating personal residence 
trusts. 
11. General Discounts. 
Estate of Ray A. Ford, TCM 1993-580, involved the 
valuation of three real estate holding companies, one equipment 
holding company, and one operating company. The court allowed a 
10% lack of marketability discount for each corporation, and a 20% 
minority discount for those in which the decedent was a minority 
shareholder. The net asset method was used to value the holding 
companies. 
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I. Section 2032A -- Special Use Valuation 
1. Fixed Cash Rental. 
Children of a decedent whose farm was valued under 
section 2032A must continue to farm (i.e., use in a qualified use) 
the property for 10 years after the decedent's death. In general, 
when the children enter into a fixed cash rental arrangement with 
another party who assumes the "financial risks of farming," they 
cease to be in the farming business and became landlords. This 
triggers recapture of the estate tax savings. In Minter v. U.S., 
(8th eire 1994), the decedent's children entered 
into a .fixed cash rental to a family farming. corporation owned, 
after parent's death, by (directly or indirectly) the children. 
The court held: 
When we apply the test of substantial 
dependence on production to the undisputed 
facts in this case, we conclude the trustee's 
leases of the farmland to the family's farming 
corporation continued the use that qualified 
Mrs. Fisher's estate for preferential 
treatment when the estate tax return was 
filed. As the owners of the farmland and the 
family farming corporation, the sisters and 
their brother necessarily retained the 
financial risks of farming when their farmland 
was farmed by their corporation. The sisters' 
rent income, like their mother's rent income 
before them, depended on the farmland's 
producti vi ty and the variable risks of 
weather, disease, and fluctuating prices. 
Unlike landowners entering into leases with 
another farmer who takes on the risks and 
agrees to pay fixed rent whether the farming 
operation is profitable or not, the sisters 
assumed substantially the same risks under the 
trustee's leases as they would have incuired 
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by farming the land themselves. If the 
corporation's farming operation flourished, 
the sisters received their rent income; 
otherwise not. Indeed, the undisputed facts 
refute the Government's argument that the 
leases insulated the sisters from the risks of 
farming. During the period covered by the 
trustee's leases, the sisters each lost over 
$25,000 from the corporation's farming 
activities. 
2. General Points. 
PLR 9407015 breaks no new ground, but does illustrate two 
points. 
First, section 2032A, when properly elected, determines the 
value, for estate tax purposes, of the property for which the 
election is made. Rev. Rul. 83-81, 1983-1 C.B. 230. Thus, the 
section 2032A value is used in making the allocations required by 
a marital deduction formula clause. 
When the drafter anticipates use of section 2032A, the formula 
clause should use a pecuniary marital with a credit shelter 
residual disposition. Assume a decedent who owns a $1,000,000 
farm, but which has a value for section 2032A purposes of $400,000. 
The decedent has $150,000 of other assets. If a pecuniary credit 
shelter is used, requiring distribution based on date of 
distribution values, not all of the farm will be "needed" and thus 
some will pass to the marital share. But, if a pecuniary marital 
is used, the entire farm, and other assets, will pass to the 
residue because no pecuniary amount need be set aside. 
A- 38 
---, 
~ 
, 
~ 
~ 
Second, where a decedent creates a life estate for the family 
~ 
= with remainder to charity, section 2032A cannot be used because the 
charity is not a qualified heir under Section 2032A(e) (1). Rev. 
Rul. 81-220, 198.1-2 C.B. 175. 
.. 
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J. Section 2033 - Gross Estate 
1. Corporate Stock. 
The taxpayer decedent lost in Estate of.Ruth E. DuBois, 
67 TCM 1994-210~ The facts confronted by the Tax Court involved 
ownership of a certain corporation: 
Bell Estates (Corporation) is a California 
corporation, formed on January 7, 1957. the 
three incorporators were Edwin W. Lehmer, Jane 
Wood, and William D. Markee who were also 
named as the initial directors. 
On January. 8, 1957, decedent transferred 
property which she valued at $338,670 to the 
Corporation. In the estate tax return, the 
Corporation was valued, based upon 1,000 
"fictional shareS," at $2,658.1D per share, a 
value which respondent has not disputed. The 
Corporation never issued any shares of stock. 
The record does not disclose any minutes in 
respect of the issuance of stocik or the 
election of directors and/or officers. 
Decedent's last will and testament provided 
that her property be divided equally between 
her two sons, Edwin W. Lehmer and George H. 
Lehmer. 
The Corporation's tax return for its fiscal 
year ending August 31, 1964, was signed by 
decedent as secretary. 
The Corporation's tax return for its fiscal 
year ending August 31, 1965, was signed by 
Edwin W. Lehmer, as president. 
On the Corporation's tax returns for the 
fiscal years ending on August 31, 1969, 1973, 
1979, and 1983 through 1988, the question 
whether any corporation, individual, 
partnership, trust, estate or association 
owned 50 percent or more of its voting stock 
was answered, "No." 
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On the Corporation's tax returns for the years 
ending on August 31, 1979, and 1983 through 
1987, the decedent and her two sons were. 
reported as officers of the Corporation, each 
owning 33.33 percent of its stock. 
All returns other than those for the years 
ending August 31, 1964 and 1965, were signed 
by a tax return preparer, but the name or 
signature of the signing officer of the 
Corporation does not appear on the stipulated 
copies of the returns. Those returns contain 
no further relevant information. 
The issue was whether the decedent owned only one-third of the 
company, or all of it. The court rejected the estate's argument 
that it should be one-third only: 
Petitioner relies heavily on the statement of 
ownership of the Corporation on several of the 
Corporation's tax returns. However, tax 
returns do not establish facts. Roberts v. 
Commissioner [Dec. 32, 789], 62 TC. 834, 837 
(1974). Nor does the fact that decedent's 
will divided her property between her two sons 
constitute persuasive evidence that she gifted 
them an interest in the Corporation prior to 
her death. A will speaks only as of the date 
of death and, in any event, the provisions 
equally dividing the "property" does not 
answer the question of what property was being 
divided. Beyond the foregoing, we think it 
significant that decedent never filed any gift 
tax return covering the claimed gifts to her 
two sons. Wi th respect to the financial 
activities reflected on the Corporation's tax 
returns and the actions of Edwin W. Lehmer, as 
president of the Corporation, neither of these 
elements provides any persuasive evidence as 
to the ownership of the Corporation. 
The record herein is totally devoid of any 
other actions on the part of decedent, such as 
the issuance and transfer of certificates of 
shares of stock or transfers of stock on the 
books and records of the corporation, actions 
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which standing alone might not have been 
sufficient but in the totality of the picture 
herein might have buttressed petitioner's 
position. 
The clear point is the importance of proper, and consistent, 
records. 
2. Plan Benefits. 
The issue in Stack, .Admin v. U. S., 94-1 USTC 
-------, 
decided by the Eighth Circuit earlier this year was the 
construction of the following retirement plan beneficiary 
designation: 
In the event of my death, I [J. Fred McCarthy] 
hereby designate Milan E. McCarthy. (address 
inser:ted) , son, Mrs. Mary Francis Quinn 
(address inserted), daughter, or their. ~ssue 
per stirpes as the beneficiary ·or 
beneficiaries of whatever benefits are due me 
from the trust funds at the time of my death, 
and in the event the aforementioned 
beneficiary or beneficiaries shall predeceas~ 
me, I hereby designate to my estate as a 
contingent beneficiary or beneficiaries. 
Fred McCarthy died in 1981; Mrs. Quinn died in 1982. The plan 
proceeds were being distributed in 10 equal annual installments. 
Mrs. Quinn's estate contended, essentially, that the beneficiary 
designation created a life estate and that the unpaid balance of 
Mrs. Quinn's portion should not be included in her estate. 
Applying Minnesota law, the court disagreed and held the language 
was unambiguous. 
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K. Sections 2035-2038 -- Retained Interests 
1. Revenue Ruling 79-353 and the Power to Replace Trustee. 
In Estate of Wall v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 21, the Tax Court 
rejected the holding of Revenue Ruling 79-353, 1979-2 C.B. 325. 
That ruling had held that the grantor's unrestricted power to 
replace a corporate trustee causes the powers of that trustee to be 
attributed to the grantor for estate tax purposes. 
The court summarized the IRS position as follows: 
The underlying assumption of Rev. Rul. 79-353 
and respondent's argument is that even a 
corporate trustee will be compelled to follow 
the bidding of a settlor who has the power to 
remove the trustee; otherwise the settlor will 
be able to find another corporate trustee 
which will. act as the settlor wishes. In 
other words, says respondent, under these 
circumstances the settlor has the de facto· 
power to exercise the powers vested· in . the .... 
trustee.· But the Supreme Court has· said in 
Byrum, [1972)] that the section 2036 (a) (2) 
right connotes an ascertainable and legally 
enforceable power, as exemplified by the facts 
in United States v. O'Malley, 383 U. S. 627 
(1966). As the Supreme Court states in Byrum, 
"O'Malley was covered precisely by the statute 
[section 2036 (a) (2)] for two reasons: (1) 
there the settlbr had reserved a legal right, 
. set fOiLth in the instrument; and (2). this 
right expressly authorized the settlor, ' in 
conjunction' with others, to accumulate income 
and thereby 'to designate' the persons to 
enjoy it." United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 
at 136. . 
* * * 
In irrevocable trusts such as those under 
scrutiny, the trustee is accountable only to 
the beneficiaries, not to the settlor, and any 
right of action for breach of fiduciary duty 
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lies in the beneficiaries, not in the settlor. 
Bogert, supra, sec. 42, at 431-433. It also 
seems incontrovertible that the trustee's duty 
of sole fidelity to the beneficiary remains 
the same regardless of whether or not 
distributions are discretionary and whether or 
not limited by a standard such as one related 
to health, education, support in reasonable 
comfort, and the like. 
In the absence of some compelling reason to do 
so, which respondent has not shown, we are not 
inclined to infer any kind of fraudulent side 
agreement between Mrs. Wall and First 
Wisconsin as to how the administration of 
these trusts would be manipulated by Mrs. 
Wall. Instead, since the language of the 
trust indentures provides maximum flexibility 
as to distributions of income and principal, 
the trustee would be expected to look.to the 
circumstances of the beneficiaries to whom 
sole allegiance is owed, and not to Mrs. Wall, 
in order to determine the timing and amount of 
discretionary distributions. 
The IRS is very unhappy with this result. The now widely-
publicized "IRS Wish List," see Section W, contains a proposal that 
a new Code section be created to compel the Revenue Ruling 79-353 
position. The case is also significant for purposes of section 
2041. 
2. Limited Partnerships. 
PLR 9415007 confirms that limited partnership interests 
may be effectively given away with the transferor continuing to 
exercise control as general partner. The facts and rulings 
requested were these: 
The Transferor and his wife created the 
limited partnership (Partnership) in 1993. 
The Transferor initially contributed cash to 
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the Partnership in exchange for a 9.259 
percent general partnership interest and a 
90.278 percent limited partnership interest. 
The Transferor's wife initially contributed 
cash in exchange for a 0.463 percent limited 
partnership interest. Subsequently, the 
trustees of certain trusts for the benefit Of 
the Transferor's family and a custodian under 
a uniform gifts to minors act account invested 
addi tional . funds in .the . Partnership in 
exchange for limited partnership interests. 
The Transferor as general partner. has 
exclusi ve management control of the 
Partnership, including full discretion· to 
determine the amount and timing the 
distributions to the partners; provided, 
however, that if the general partner directs 
the distribution of partnership funds to the 
partners, distributions must be made to all 
partners at the same time in accordance with 
each partner's percentage interest in the 
Partnership (based on each partner's capital 
account) .. 
Under the terms . of. the partnership agreement 
and applicable state law, the Transferor as 
general partner has a fiduciary duty t.o the 
limi ted partners to manage and operate the 
Partnership in the best interests of the 
Partnership and its partners. In exercising 
the .powers granted· in the partnership 
agreement, the general partner is bound to act 
in accordance with this fiduciary duty. 
The partnership agreement provides that all 
items of income and deductions are· to be 
allocated in accordance with theprincipl~s of 
§704(b) and the regulations thereunder. 
During the term of the Partnership, no partner 
is entitled to demand a distribution or a 
return of his capital account. however, the 
partners have the right to sell their 
interests to third parties, subj ect to the 
right of first refusal granted to the other 
partners. 
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When the partnership is dissolved, its assets 
will be distributed to the partners on a pro 
rata basis in accordance with their respective 
partnership interests. 
The transferor proposes to make gifts of 
limi ted partnership interests .If the 
transferor desires to have a particular gift 
qualify for the $10,000 annual exclusion·under 
§2053 (b), he will make the transfer either 
outright or to a trustee of a trust that meets 
the requirements of §2503(c). 
You request that we rule as follows: 
1. The Transferor's proposed transfers 
(outright or to trusts qualifying under §. 
2503(c)) of limited partnership interests will 
constitute gifts of present interests for 
purposes of §2053 (b) . 
2. The value of the limited partnership 
interests gratuitously transferred will not b~ 
subject to the special valuation rules under 
§2701. 
3. Upon the death of the Transferor, the 
value of the transferred ~artnership interests 
will not be includible in the Transferor's 
gross estate under §§ 2036 and 2038 as a result 
of the Transferor's retained powers as general 
partner. 
All of the requested rulings were given. 
3. Gifts Within Three Years of Death . 
. The U. s. District Court for the Eas·tern District of 
Michigan rendered an incredible opinion in Estate of Collins v~ 
u.s., 94-1 USTC After first finding that the· decedent's 
attorney in fact was not authorized to make gifts under Michigan 
~ 
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law, because the power of attorney did not specifically: authorize ~ 
such, the court considered whether gifts made from a revocable 
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trust wi thin three years of death should be included in the 
decedent's estate under section 2035. The IRS position is that 
such gifts will be if the grantor is not the sole beneficiary of 
the trust, based on the Jalkut decision, discussed as follows: 
The seminal case on this issue is Estate of 
Jalkut v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 675· (1991), 
acq., 1991-2 C.B. 1. Pursuant to Jalkut, 
inclusion in the gross estate under §2038 is 
dependent on the terms of the trust 
instrument. If the decedent-settlor is the 
sole beneficiary of the trust, then transfers 
to donees are viewed as withdrawal of trust 
funds by the grantor and then direct gifts 
from the grantor to the donees. If the donees 
are potential beneficiaries of the trust, 
transfers to them are seen as direct transfers 
to them from the trust. In the first 
instance, the transferred amounts are not 
included in the gross estate under §2038,· 
while in the latter instance they are. 
Jalkut, 96 T.C. at 685-686. 
The trust provision was as follows: 
Section 3. During Grantor I s lifetime, the 
Trust shall be administered for the sole and 
exclusive benefit of Grantor pursuant to the 
following terms hereof, to wit: 
(a) Trustee shall distribute all net income 
of the Trust Estate ei ther to or for the 
benefit of Grantor at least quarter annually, 
or at such other or more frequent intervals as 
maybe convenient; (emphasis added). 
The court concluded that because distributions of income could 
be made for the grantor's benefit the "plain meaning" of the 
provision is that others were proper beneficiaries. In general, 
the court's interpretation would seem to be wrong. 
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L. Sections 2041 and 2514 -- General Power of Appointment 
1. Ascertainable Standards. 
The Tenth Circuit has reversed the Tax Court in Estate of 
Vissering v. Comm'r, 96 T.C. 749 (1991). The income beneficiary 
was a co-trustee and would receive principal "as may, in the 
discretion of the Trustees, be required for the continued comfort, 
support, maintenance, or education of said beneficiary." 
The Tenth Circuit, construing Florida law, stated that 
"comfort" standing alone may create a general power of appointment, 
but did not in this instance: 
However, there is modifying language in the 
trust before us that we believe would lead the 
Florida courts to hold that "comfort," in 
context, does not permit an unlimited "power of" 
invasion. The instant language states that 
invasion of principal is permitted to the 
extent "required for the continued comfort" of 
the decedent, and is part of a clause 
referencing the support, maintenance and 
education of the beneficiary. Invasion of the 
corpus is not permitted "to the extent 
"determined" or "desired" for the 
beneficiary's comfort but only to the extent 
that it is "required." Furthermore; "the 
invasion must be for the beneficiary's 
"continued" comfort, implying, we believe, 
more than the minimum necessary for survival, 
but nevertheless reasonably necessary" to 
maintain the beneficiary in his accustomed 
manner of living. These words in context 
state a standard essentially no different from 
the examples in the Treasury Regulation, in 
which phrases such as "support in reasonable 
comfort," maintenance in health and reasonable 
comfort" and "support in his accustomed manner 
of living" are deemed to be limited by an 
ascertainable standard. Treas. Reg. §20.2041-
1(c)(2). See, e.g., United states v. Powell, 
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307 F.2d 821, 828 (10th Cir. 1962) (under 
Kansas law, invasion of the corpus if "it is 
necessary or advisable for the 
maintenance, welfare, comfort or happiness" of 
beneficiaries, and only if the need justifies 
the reduction in principal, is subj ect to 
ascert·ainable standard); Hunter v. United 
states, 597 F.Supp. 1293, 1295 (W.D. Pa. 1984) 
(power to invade for "comfortable support and 
maintenance" of beneficiaries is subj ect to 
ascertainable standard). 
We believe that had decedent, during his life, 
sought to use the assets of the trust to 
increase significantly his standard of living 
beyond that which he had previously enjoyed, 
his co-trustee would have been obligated to 
refuse to consent, and the remainder 
beneficiaries of the trust could have 
successfully petitioned the court to disallow 
such expenditures as inconsistent with the 
intent of the trust instrument. The Tax court 
erred in ruling that this power was a general 
power of appointment includible in decedent's 
estate. 
The opinion renders unnecessary, in part, the new Florida 
statute on point. 
2. Life Estate. 
In Estate of Jane H. Duvall, 66 TCM 164, the Tax Court 
addressed the issue of whether, under Kentucky law, a life tenant 
has a general power of appointment. The Will creating the life 
estate had been construed by the federal district court for the 
Eastern District of Kentucky in 1965, as not creating a general 
power (thus denying a marital deduction). 
described by the court as follows: 
Respondent 
rationale 
does not 
and ~ppeal 
dispute 
of the 
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The IRS argument was 
the general 
intervenors' 
argument. Respondent, however, argues: (1) 
That in 1974 a decision was rendered by the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals in Melton v. Wyatt, 
517 s.w. 2d 242 (Ky. 1974), that effectively 
overruled the District Court's holding in 
Duvall v. United states, supra; (2) that 
Melton v. Wyatt, supra, would be applied by 
Kentucky courts retroactively; (3) that 
therefore Duvall v. United states, supra, must 
now be regarded by us as wrongly decided and 
that we should ignore or refuse to follow 
Duvall v. United states, supra, in 
interpreting the language of Mr. Duvall's will 
and in reaching our conclusion as to the 
nature of decedent's life estate in the 
remainder of Mr. Duvall's property; (4) that 
primarily because of the alleged change in 
Kentucky case law collateral estoppel does not 
apply; and (5) that Mr. Duvall's will 
established in favor of decedent a life estate 
in the remainder of Mr. Duvall's property that 
constituted a general power of appointment not 
limited by an ascertainable standard. 
We agree with the intervenors as to the proper 
interpretation of Mr. Duvall's will. In our 
opinion, respondent significantly misreads 
Duvall v. United states, supra, and Melton v. 
Wyatt, suora. The former decision was not 
overruled by the latter decision, and the 
decision of the District Court in Duvall v. 
United states, supra, provided significant 
guidance to us as to how Kentucky courts would 
interpret the language of Mr. Duvall's will. 
Prior to 1974, where the language of a will 
created a life estate in favor of a surviving 
spouse with a gift over, but where the 
language of the will was not clear as to the 
extent of the power to invade corpus that was 
given to the holder of the life estate, 
Kentucky state courts, in analyzing the nature 
of the life estate, would reach differing and 
not always consistent results. As explained 
in Melton v. Wyatt, supra at 243: 
The cases decided by this court in construing 
language in a will which would by the 
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application of ordinarily understood 
definitions import unlimited power of use and 
disposition with a gift over have evolved from 
denying the power to encroach upon the 
principal, to successive recognition of the 
power to encroach on the principal to the 
extent of providing for necessaries, to 
encroach on the principal to the extent deemed 
necessary, to unlimited power to encroach upon 
the principal for the personal use and benefit 
of the devisee and the unlimited power of use 
and disposition without the power to waste or 
give away the property. 
The court in Melton v. Wyatt, supra at 244, 
went on to hold that - language of unlimited 
power in a devise of life estate with a gift 
over should mean what it says and that such 
power to use AND DISPOSE of during the 
lifetime of the devisee of the life estate 
should be unlimited. *** [Emphasis added.] 
Thus, where the language of a will implied a 
testamentary intent to give the surviving 
spouse unlimited power over property subject 
to a life estate, the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals in Melton v. Wyatt, supra, at 244, 
held that the implied language of unlimited 
power should mean "what it says" and that 
"such power to use and dispose of during the 
lifetime of the devisee of the life estate 
should be unlimited." Id. 
Melton v. Wyatt, supra, however, in our 
opinion did not in any way change Kentucky law 
to the effect that where language of a will 
and the testator's intent are clear, where 
that language does not contain language of 
unlimited power, and where the language 
establishes only a limited power to invade 
corpus, that language will be recognized. 
Clarke v. Kirk, 795 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Ky. 
1990); Molloy v. Molloy, 727 S.W.~d 870, 872 
(Ky. ct. App. 1987). Where a will contains 
language that confers broad discretion merely 
to use and manage the life estate but does not 
contain language of disposition, the power of 
appointment will, under Kentucky law, be 
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regarded as a limited power of appointment. 
Molloy v. Molloy, supra, at 872. 
That is the case here, and that is exactly 
what the District Court held in Duvall v. 
United States, 246 F. Sup. 378 (E.D. Ky. 
1965).· After commenting on a number of cases 
involving upclear testamentary language, some 
of which were also commented on and reversed 
by Melton v. Wyatt, 517 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. 1974), 
the District Court in Duvall v. United States, 
. supra, distinguished those cases (and thereby 
the issue involved in and the holding of 
Melton v. Wyatt, supra) by concluding that Mr. 
Duvall's will was not unclear, that it was 
"explicit," that the will gave to decedent a 
power to invade corpus only to the extent 
necessary for decedent's "health, education, 
support, and maintenance." Duvall v. United 
States, supra. 
In further support of our reading of Duvall v. 
United States, supra, and of our conclusion 
that Melton v. Wyatt, supra, did not overrule 
Duvall v. United States, supra, we note that 
the opinion in Melton v. Wyatt, supra, does 
not even refer to Duvall v. United States, 
supra. 
Footnote 3 of the opinion quotes KRS 391.160 enacted in 1974 
which limits, absent direction in the instrument to the contrary, 
a life tenant's invasion to health, educatron (including college 
and professional education), and support in accustomed .manner of 
living) . 
The court discusses the statutes as follows: 
Further, it would appear that if language 
similar to the language of Mr. Duvall's will 
is to be regarded as ambiguous and unclear as 
to the extent of the beneficiary's power of 
appointment, under this statute (at least with 
respect to Kentucky wills whose effective date 
is after enactment of the statute) the 
A-52 
3. 
beneficiary would be regarded as having a 
power of appointment over the remainder of the 
property that is limited by the demands of the 
decedent's health, education, s~pport, and 
maintenance an interpretation consistent 
with that of the District Court in Duvall v. 
United states, 236 F.Supp. 378 (E.D. Ky. 
1965), and with our interpretation herein. 
Distributions From Marital Trust. 
TAM 9337001 involved facts similar to those presented in 
Estate of Hartzell v. Comm'r, Tax Court Docket No. 27300-92. The 
trustees were authorized to distribute from the marital trust 
amounts of principal to the surviving spouse "as my trustees shall, 
after consultation with her, deem necessary or advisable in 
addition to the net income, for her care, support, maintenance, and 
comfort." In 1989, 1990 and 1991 the trustees made distributions 
as annual exclusion gifts to the spouse's grandchildren and great-
grandchildren. Those distributions were approved by the spouse. 
The IRS ruled that distributions to descendants for estate planning 
purposes were not for the benefit of the spouse, and so were not 
authorized. 
A way to solve this difficulty would be to allow the spouse to 
withdraw 5% of the martial trust annually. Such a withdrawal right 
could be problematic with a spendthrift spouse or a second 
marriage. Conditioning the withdrawal right on the spouse using 
the funds to make gifts would probably be challenged by the IRS as 
tantamount to the spouse having an inter vivos special power. Such 
are not allowed in QTIP trusts. What if the spouse could withdraw 
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the lesser of 5% of the trust property or the amount the spouse ~ ~ 
gave away in the previous year through annual exclusion gifts? --' 
There would be no condition on the exercise, rather the amount ~ =------,; 
subject to the spouse's withdrawal right would be limited. 
=~ 
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M. Section 2042 - Life Insurance 
1. Corporation Owns Policy on Shareholder's Life. 
TAM 9349002 dealt with the inclusion of life insurance 
proceeds on the life of a shareholder where the corporation owned 
the policy. The decedent owned 49.5 percent of the stock of a 
closely-held company, with the other shares owned mostly by B. A 
few employees owned the rest. The ruling discussed the buy-sell 
and related arrangements: 
After the Third amendment, the buy-sell agreement 
provided that, if either Decedent or B survived the other 
by thirty days, the Company stock held by the first to 
die of Decedent or B would be acquired by the surviving 
shareholders to the extent insurance proceeds were 
available. To the extent such proceeds were not 
available, or if neither survived the other by thirty 
days, the Company was to redeem the stock. The amount to 
be paid on the purchase of redemption of the stock was 
the greater of (1) the amount of insurance proceeds 
available, or (2) the amount otherwise calculated under 
the agreement. Any amount in excess of the insurance 
proceeds was to be paid by the Company over a period of 
four years pursuant to a promissory note containing the 
terms set forth in the agreement. 
* * * 
.The amended buy-sell agreement named a corporate 
trustee to be the applicant, owner, and beneficiary of 
policies of insurance on the lives of each of Decedent 
and B except that the company was to be the owner to the 
extent of each policy's cash surrender value. The 
trustee was precluded from exercising any powers of 
ownership by canceling a policy, assigning ownership, 
changing the name of the beneficiary, borrowing against 
a policy, or otherwise changing the nature or value of 
any policy. 
The amended buy-sell agreement provided that, upon 
termination of the trust, any unmatured policy was to be 
transferred to the Company subject to the right of the 
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insured to purchase the policy for the then interpolated 
terminal reserve (cash surrender value) . 
In 1989, when Decedent was age 54, the trust acquired an 
increasing premium term policy on Decedent's life ($500,000 face 
value) and the company paid the premium. Under the terms of the 
policy there would be "no cash values until after insured's age 
71." 
Subsequently in 1989, Decedent, and three of the small 
shareholders entered into "STOCK PURCHASE AND REDEMPTION AGREEMENT" 
(the "redemption agreement") wherein it was agreed that the Company 
would purchase Decedent's shares by delivery of a promissory note 
having a face value of $300,000 payable over a thirty month period. 
The agreement also provided that Decedent would receive a cash 
payment of $150,000 at closing in exchange for her covenant not to 
compete for a period of two years. The agreement, signed by B as 
President, was contingent on the execution by B of a repurchase 
agreement with respect to B' s shares in another jointly owned 
company engaged in a similar line of business. No insurance 
policies were involved with respect to the repurchase of B's shares 
in the other company. 
On December 15, 1989, Decedent surrendered her shares to 
Company in exchange for a promissory note in the amount of 
$300,000. The note provided for 30 equal monthly payments of 
~ 
-; 
principal and interest with the final payment due on June 15, 1992. ~ 
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Decedent died on September 27, 1991, at age 55 (age 56 as of 
her nearest birthday) when the balance due under the promissory 
note was about $96,000 Upon the death of Decedent the trustee 
distributed a.portion of the insurance proceeds to the estate (in 
an amount equal to the balance due on the promissory note) and the 
balance to B and the other shareholders. 
In effect, the insurance was security for the payment of the 
purchase price. The IRS concluded: 
The policy was structured so that its cash 
surrender value would be zero until several 
years after the trust terminated. Thus, the 
Decedent would have been able to acquire the 
policy by paying the then unexpired (pro-rata) 
portion of the annual premium regardless of 
the actual value of the policy at the 
completion of the redemption. 
Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1 (c) (4) states in part: 
A decedent is considered to have an "incident 
of ownership" in an insurance policy on his 
life held in trust if, under the terms of the 
policy, the decedent (either alone or in 
conj unction with another person or persons) 
has the power (as trustee or otherwise) to 
change the beneficial ownership in the policy 
or its proceeds, or the time or manner of 
enj oyment thereof, even though the decedent 
has no beneficial interest in the trust. 
The IRS found that the decedent did possess an incident of 
ownership: 
When the insured cannot initiate the acts 
associated with the incidents of ownership but 
can only consent to or veto the exercise of 
the incidents of ownership by another, the 
courts have held that the veto power itself 
constltutes an incident of ownership over the 
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policy. The Second Circuit held that where 
the insured must consent before the actions of 
others effectively alter a revocable trust, 
the insured holds incidents of ownership in a 
life insurance policy held by the trust. 
Estate of Karagheusian v. Commissioner, 233 
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956). Similarly, the Court 
of Claims held that where the 
beneficiary/owner of an insurance policy had 
the power to change the beneficiary, but the 
power could be exercised only with the consent 
of the insured, the insured held incidents of 
ownership in the policy for federal estate tax 
purposes. Estate of Goldstein v. United 
States, 122 F.Supp 677 (ct. CI. 1954). It is 
immaterial whether the decedent may initiate 
changes, or whether he must merely consent to 
them. It is the power and not the 
substantiality of the power that we must look 
to. Schwager v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 781 
(1975) . 
* * * 
Analysis of the terms of the amended buy-sell 
agreement indicates that the duties of the 
"trustee" thereunder are limited to acquiring 
the policies of insurance on the lives of B 
and the Decedent; receiving premium payments 
from the Company and forwarding those payments 
to the insurer, and distributing any proceeds 
paid under the policies to the actual 
beneficiaries thereof. In as much as the 
"trustee" was precluded from exercising any of 
the "powers of ownership" of the policy, it is 
apparent that the "trustee" acted more as an 
agent for the shareholders rather than as an 
independent ·trustee. 
The IRS also ruled that the proceeds would be included in the 
gross estate because the decedent had a reversionary interest in 
the policy: 
Taxpayer argues that the Decedent did not have a 
reversionary.interest in the policy immediately prior to 
A- 58 
-, 
----' 
~ 
g 
~-~ 
-\ 
." -~ 
~ 
, .. , 
~ 
death. Taxpayer contends that a reversion cannot exist 
in property that was never held by the Decedent and, even 
if it could, no reversion exists in this case because the 
policy would not have automatically returned to the 
Decedent. 
Taxpayer relies on Estate of Leder v. Commissioner, 
893 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1989), Estate of Headrick v. 
Commissioner, 918 F.2d 1263 (6th Cir. 1990), and Estate 
of Perry v. Commissioner, 927 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1991), 
for the proposition that Decedent did not "transfer" a 
policy of insurance on Decedent's life. We believe 
taxpayer's reliance is misplaced. While those cases did 
. reject a "constructive" (or "beamed") transfer doctrine 
in the application of section 2035(d) (2), they did not 
deny the validity of that doctrine. 
In Leder for example, the court recognized the 
existence of a transfer, stating, in part: 
This typical example of a constructive 
transfer is where the decedent purchases 
a life insurance policy on himself or 
herself, pays all the premiums, and 
designates his or her children or spouse 
as the owners and beneficiaries. In 
these situations courts construing 
section 2035(a) view the decedent's 
actions as acts of.transfer, because the 
decedent's "beamed" the policy proceeds 
to the children or spouse by paying the 
policy premiums and creating in the 
children or spouse all of the contractual 
rights to the insurance benefits. [Bel, 
452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 406 u.s. 919 (1972)]. 
It is clear that in Leder, as in the other cases 
ci ted by the taxpayer, the decision· did not hinge on 
whether the insured had transferred a policy of insurance 
but on the technical issue of whether the insured had 
transferred an interest in the policy that would have 
caused inclusion of the proceeds under section 2042 of 
the Code if the interest had not been transferred. In 
addition, in those cases the trustee or other third party 
transferee who purchased the policy ostensibly had a much 
greater degree of independence in the selection and 
acquisition of trust assets. 
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In this case the Decedent, along with the other 
shareholders, caused the Company to transfer assets to 
the trustee who was directed to acquire a policy of 
insurance on the life of each of the two major 
shareholders. Whether the arrahgement is viewed as a 
transfer of the assets or as an ,interest free loan, the 
result is a·constructive transfer of an insurance policy. 
Similarly, we disagree with the taxpayer's analysis 
of the Decedent's potential right to re-acquire the 
policy. 
Taxpayer, citing Estate of Smith, 73 T.C. 307 
(1979), in result only, 1981-1 C.B. 2, suggests that no 
reversion exists if return of the policy is contingent on 
events over which the insured has no control. We believe 
the absence of control is relevant only with respect to 
the value of the insured's right (the probability of 
reverter) and has no relevance with respect to the 
existence of that right (the possibility of reverter). 
2. When Is a Policy Transferred. 
In Estate of O'Daniel v. United States, 6 F.3d 321 (5th 
Cir. 1993), the taxpayer won a strange ohe~ 'The facts are worth 
quoting in detail. 
'Pioneer began negotiations for a merger with the' 
Pillsbury Company that would result in Pillsbury's owning 
the insurance policies. During the neqotiations, there 
were discussions about Pillsbury's selling the life 
insurance policies to O'Daniel. The general counsel for 
Pioneer, Norvell Plowman, testified that he met with 
Jerry Levin, an officer of Pillsbury, during a lunch 
meeting in Minneapolis, at which they agreed that 
Pillsbury would sell the life insurance policies to 
O'Daniel at the closing date of the merger. Levin 
testified by deposition that there was such an agreement, 
al though he did not state whether the agreement was 
struck at the lunch meeting in Minneapolis, or on a 
different day. No written agreement regarding the sale 
of life insurance policies from Pillsbury to O'Daniel was 
ever executed either before or after the merger. 
On June 29, 1979, Pioneer merged with Pillsbury. On 
the morning of the merger, O'Daniel and Levin reconfirmed 
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that 0' Daniel would own the insurance policies at the 
time of the closing. One week after the Pillsbury-
Pioneer merger, on July 8, 1979,O'Daniel and his wife 
signed a trust agreement (the "life insurance trust"), 
which provided that O'Daniel transferred the life 
insurance policies to his wife as trustee. 
On May 29, 1980, change of ownership forms were 
signed that switched ownership of the NORTHWESTERN policy 
from Pioneer to O'Daniel. One day later, O'Daniel signed 
a change of beneficiary form on the NORTHWESTERN policy, 
requesting that the beneficiary be changed to his wife as 
trustee of the life insurance trust. On July 24, 1980, 
NORTHWESTERN loaned $48,996.78 to O'Daniel on the 
NORTHWESTERN policy. On September 24, 1980, O'Daniel 
signed an insurance form requesting that ownership of the 
NORTHWESTERN policy be transferred from him to his wife 
as trustee. Between May and September 1980, the 
insurance company records for all twelve policies were 
changed to reflect a change in ownership from Pioneer to 
O'Daniel, a change in beneficiary from Pioneer to the 
life insurance trust, and finally a change in ownership 
from O'Daniel to the life insurance trust. 
O'Danie1 died on September 18, .1982. 
The issue was whether O'Danie1 transferred· all incidents of 
ownership in the policies more than three years before his death. 
The. court first determined that under applicable state law 
(Arkansas) the oral agreement of Pillsbury to sell the policies to 
O'Danie1 was unenforceable. Even so, the Fifth Circuit went on as 
follows: 
Even though the oral agreement was unenforceable, it 
still was valid for the purpose of the incidents-of-
ownership test. In Camp v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 962 
(1930) the Board of Tax Appeals held that when land is 
sold pursuant to an agreement violating the statute of 
frauds, any subsequent income arising form the land is 
taxable to the buyer, not to the seller. By analogy, an 
oral agreement although unenforceable under the statute 
of frauds, can transfer all incidents of legal ownership 
from Pillsbury to O'Daniel .within the meaning of §2035.· 
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The loR. S. is a third party and cannot assert the statute 
of frauds to void the contract. 
The district court may have erred technically in 
characterizing the oral agreement as "enforceable." 
Nonetheless, the agreement was valid for the purpose of 
determining .. the value of Estate. 
The Fifth Circuit dismissed the contentions of the IRS: 
The government makes two arguments why 0' Daniel 
still retained incidents of ownership in the policies 
despite the signing of the trust agreement on July 8, 
1979. First, the government argues that O'Daniel failed 
to pay a gift tax on his gift of the insurance policies 
to the trust on that date. Despite the fact that the 
policies had a cash value of over $100,000, O'Daniel did 
not report any such gift on his gift tax return for the 
appropriate quarter (the quarter ending September 30~ 
1979). Although O'Daniel's failure to pay a gift tax may 
help prove a gift was never made, it does not establish 
that the gift was made later rather than sooner. 
Second, the government argues that O'Daniel withdrew 
the cash surrender values on all policies in 1980. This 
withdrawal, the government argues, was an exercise of 
O'Daniel's incidents of ownership over the policies. The 
Estate replies that the withdrawal took place in 
O'Daniel's capacity as the agent for his trust, rather 
than for his own personal benefit. 
* * * 
Even if 0' Daniel acted illegally in withdrawing 
money from the insurance policy, however, he did not 
exercise incidents of ownership within the meaning of 
§2042. Incidents of ownership connote the legal power to 
exercise ownership, not the decedent's practical ability 
to do so. As the Tax Court stated in Estate of Bartlett, 
54 T. C . 1590 , 1598 , 197 0 WL 2411 ( 197 0) , 
While the insured could possibly have cashed 
in some of the policies or could have 
exercised a second assignment with notice 
thereof to the insurers, any such action on 
his part would have constiiuted a breach of 
the trust agreement and would have amounted to 
fraud against the bank, as assignee and 
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trustee. "Incidents of ownership" are to be 
measured by a "general, legal power to 
exercise ownership without regard to the 
owner's ,ability to exercise it at a particular 
moment." Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 
U.S. 678, 684 [85 S.ct; 1238, 1241, 14 L.Ed.2d 
159] (1965). 
Even though O'Daniel possessed and exercised the 
practical ability to withdraw the cash value of the 
insurance policies, he did not see a legal incident of 
ownership over the policies during the three years before 
his death. Therefore, the proceeds of the twelve key man' 
life insurance policies should have been excluded from 
his estate. 
To summarize, the court held that O'Daniel's statement that 
ownership was transferred, in the trust agreement, was sufficient. 
Should practitioners follow ·O'Daniel by treating insurance 
transfers as occurring on the date an insurance trust -- with 
appropriate recitations -- is executed, rather than waiting for the 
formal transfer (which may take a few days, or many months)? 
3. Defective Insurance Trust; Bail-Out. 
How can you bail-out of a bad life insurance trust. That 
issue was dealt with in PLR 9413045. The facts were as foliows: 
[I]n 1985, the taxpayer and his spouse each 
created a life insurance trust. The A trust 
was created by the taxpayer as grantor, and 
designated his spouse as Trustee. The B trust 
was created by this spous'e as grantor, and 
designated the taxpayer as trustee. Both 
trusts were irrevocable. Life insurance 
policies insuring the life of the taxpayer 
were transferred to the A trust and policies 
insuring the life of the spouse were 
transferred to the B trust. 
In 1989, the spouse, 
trust, purchased a 
as trustee of 
second-to-die 
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the A 
life 
insurance policy insuring the lives of both 
the taxpayer and herself, the spouse. On the 
same date, the taxpayer, as trustee of the B 
trust, purchased a second-to-die life 
insurance policy on the lives of the taxpayer 
and his spouse. 
The taxpayer and his spouse, as trustees of 
the A and B trusts, have the right to change 
the beneficiaries on the policies in their 
respective trusts and to pledge or assign the 
policies or their proceeds as collateral. In 
addi tion, the trustees have various powers 
over the trusts including the power to 
distribute trust income and principal, to sell 
trust assets, and to merge the trusts with 
other trusts. Thus, the taxpayer/trustee has 
incidents of ownership over the second-to-die 
policy held in the B trust of which the 
taxpayer is the trustee. Similarly, the 
spouse, as trustee of the A trust, holds· 
incidents of ownership over the second-to-die 
policy in the A trust. 
Thus, there are reciprocal trusts, each with polices included 
in the spouses' estates. To solve the problem, a new trust was 
proposed, with a third-party as trustee. Thetaxpayer~ and spouse 
would have no rights in the new trust except a section 675 (4) 
power, and the right to be reimbursed for income taxes if the trust 
were a grantor trust. (The trust was, of course, designed to be a 
grantor trust.) The new trust would then purchase the policies, 
for fair market value (interpolated terminal reserve plus unexpired 
premiums), from the "bad".trusts. 
The IRS first concluded that, after the purchase, there would 
be no inclusion of the policies in the taxpayers' or the spouse's 
estates, under section 2035, even if death occurred within 3 years 
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of the purchase. And, the IRS concluded that the section 675(4) 
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~ power (without the approval or consent of any person in a fiduciary 
capaci ty, to reacquire all or any part of the trust corpus by 
substituting other property of an equivalent value in place of such 
reacquired trust corpus, in this instance) . would not cause the 
policies to be included in the taxpayer's or spouse's estate, 
citing Estate of Jordahl, 65 T.C. 92 (1975), acq. 1977-1 C.B. 1. 
Interestingly, Jordahl itself dealt with the power to substitute 
assets in a fiduciary capacity; the distinction is not relevant, 
according the IRS. The right to receive reimbursement for income 
taxes if the trust were a grantor trust waS not section 2036 
retained right. 
Ominously the IRS refused to rule on whether the new trqst 
would be a grantor trust because, it stated,. the area. is "under 
extensive study." Thus, it could not rule on whether the sale 
constituted a transfer for value under section 101(a) (2). 
Traditionally these sort of defective insurance trusts have 
been handled by the insured purchaSing the policy, and then 
transferring it to a proper life insurance trust. That, of course, 
requires the insured to make a gift to the new trust, and to 
survi ve three years. Many commentators have suggested that an 
al ternati ve would be a sale to a grantor trust, claiming that 
Swanson, ___________ , stands for the proposition that a sale to a 
I 
~ grantor trust is the equivalent of a sale to the grantor (insured) 
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and is outside the transfer for value rules. However, in Swanson 
the grantor trust status of the trust was clear. Unless the 
insured is very likely to die within three years, the potential 
income tax risk would seem to outweigh the transfer tax savings. 
4. Indirect Incidents of Ownership. 
PLR 9421037 finds no incidents of ownership over an 
insurance policy on an employee's life in an employer who can, by 
firing the employee, terminate (indirectly) the employee's interest 
in the trust which owns the policy. 
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N. Section 2053 - Debts and Administration Expenses 
1. Expenses in Selling Residence. 
TAM 9342002 involved the deductibility of the expenses of 
sale of the decedent's residence. The decedent's child was the 
only beneficiary of the estate .. The IRS auditing agent argued that 
the sale was unnecessary because there was sufficient cash in bank 
accounts which were joint with the decedent's child. 
The National Office found otherwise: 
Although the decedent had created the joint· 
accounts and had contributed all of the 
property held in the accounts, the jointly 
held property passed to A [the child] outside 
of the decedent's will and' was beyond the 
jurisdiction of the probate court. Therefore, 
A, in his capacity as executor, had no 
authority to apply the cash in the bank 
. accounts for the payment of the· expenses 
allocable to the probate estate. 
Because there were no cash assets in the 
probate estate, a sale of some probate assets 
was necessary to obtain the proceeds to pay 
the decedent's debts, the expenses of 
administration of the estate, and those taxes 
payable from the probate estate. 
Consequently, to the extent that the sale of 
the residence was necessary for the settlement 
and the distribution of the estate, the costs 
incurred thereon· are allowable deductions as 
administration expenses within the meaning of 
section 2053(a) of the Code. 
2. Interest. 
In Axtell v. United States, (D. C. Wy. 
1994), the court considered the deductibility of interest paid to 
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a third-party lender on a loan used by the estate to pay the 
federal estate tax. The court recited these facts: 
The plaintiff in this c~se 'is the 
representative and beneficiary of the estate 
of Paul W. Axtell. Paul Axtell died on March 
19, 1979. His estate originally elected to 
defer payment of estate taxes pursuant to 
Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") §6166. Section 
6166 allows for a deferral 'of e'state taxes 
when the estate consists largely of interest 
in a closely held business. See 26 U.S.C. 
§6166 (1986). 
In 1985, in order to avoid the high interest 
expense on the outstanding estate tax, the 
Axtell estate obtained a third party loan from 
the Wyoming Farm Loan Board to pay down the 
estate tax liability. As a result of the 
Internal Revenue Service's ("IRS") allowance 
of interest deductions as credits against the 
estate tax and interest still owing, the 
estate tax and interest was fully paid as of 
December 16, 1988. In the years 1986 through 
1989, the estate made, and the IRS allowed, 
refund claims based on IRC §2053 
administrative expense deductions for loan 
interest paid during those years. When the 
Axtell estate made a refund claim based on the 
same interest payments in 1990, however, the 
IRS disallowed the claim as untimely under IRC 
§6511. 
Section 6511(a) requires an estate to file a claim for refund 
within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from 
the time the tax was paid, whichever is later. Here that period 
had expired. The court stated the estate's problem very well: 
When an estate borrows funds from a private 
lender to satisfy its estate taxes, the 
interest on the loan remains deductible as an 
administrative expense deduction under IRC 
§2053(a) (2). HiDD v. United States, 72-1 
U.S.T.t. 84,678, 84,680 (D.S.C. 1971); Estate 
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of Sturgis, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) en 87,415 at 2155 
(1987). As with interest on deferred estate 
tax payments, interest on a private loan for 
the purpose of paying federal estate tax 
generally does not meet the Treasury 
Regulation 20.2053-1 (b) (3) test for the 
allowance of estimated administrative 
expenses, and therefore the interest may only 
be claimed once the interest has actually been 
paid. 1 
However, unlike an estate which "borrows" 
money from the IRS by deferring payment for 
the estate tax, and which, as a result, does 
not fully pay the estate tax until the last 
installment is paid, an estate which borrows 
money from a private lender to pay its federal 
estate tax pays its tax liability in full. 
Consequently, where an estate borrows funds 
from a private lender, the section 6511 (a) 
limitations period may expire before the 
estate has made all of the interest payments 
which might otherwise be allowed as 
administrative expense deductions. In other 
words, by operation of the section 6511 (a) 
limitations period, the treatment of an estate 
which defers payment of the estate tax and an 
estate which borrows money from a private 
lender may be quite different even though both 
estates are paying interest on their tax 
payment. An estate that makes deferred 
payments to the IRS will be able to submit an 
lThe question remains open, however, whether an estate can 
avoid this rule in a particular case by demonstrating that the 
possibili ty of the interest not being paid is remote. Compare 
Spillar, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) at 2381 (even the remote possibility of 
nonpayment of interest prevents claiming a deduction as estimated 
future administrative expense); with Estate of Graegin, 57 T.C.M. 
(P-H) en88,477 at 2447 (1988) (allowing estate's deduction of 
estimated future administrative expense for interest to be paid 
because amount of interest is certain and co-executor intends to 
pay the interest). Regardless of whether an estate may be able to 
meet the 20.2053-1(b) (3) requirements with respect to a claim for 
estimated future interest on a private loan used to pay the estate 
tax, such a claim was not made in this case and need to be 
addressed by this Court. 
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administrative. refund claim for all interest 
paid because it will not fully pay the estate 
tax until the last payment is. made. In 
contrast, an estate that borrows money and 
pays the estate tax liability in full will be 
unable to tile a claim for administrative 
refund- once the section 6511 (a) limitations 
period expires, even though it may continue to 
pay interest on the loan after that time. 
The estate advanced two arguments. First, that the amended 
Forms 706 consti tuted protective claims. The court disagreed 
because the forms, as filed, did not contain sufficient information 
to allow the IRS to commence an examination of the claim. In a 
footnote the court noted that amended Forms 706 could, in certain 
instances, constitute protective claims: 
That is not to say, however, that a Form 706 
could never constitute a valid protective 
claim. In order to do so the taxpayer must 
apprise the IRS of its intention to take 
future interest expense deductions and must 
detail the factual· basis for the claim, 
including as estimation of anticipated future 
interest payments and the years in which those 
payments will be made. 
Second, the estate argued that section 6511 (a) was 
unconstitutional. Although recognizing the unfairness involved, 
the court held as follows: 
The Court recognizes that the limitations 
period at issue in this case, IRC §6511 (a) , 
prevents estates that elect to take loans from 
private lenders to payoff their estate tax 
liabilities from claiming the administrative 
expense deduction for interest paid on their 
loan more than two years after the payment of 
the estate tax in full and more than three 
years after the filing of the estate tax 
return. The Court also recognizes that this 
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result is inconsistent with the treatment of 
those estates that .elect .to defer payment of 
the estate tax to the IRS, because those 
estate are able tc deduct all interest paid to 
the IRS. 
The Court concludes, however, that this uneven 
treatment is not unconstitutional.· Section 
6511 (a") serves the rational purpose of 
establishing a time limit by which taxpayers 
must bring an administrative claim for refund 
against the iRS. Tying the limitations period 
for an administrative claim to the tie when 
the tax is paid in full or when the tax "return 
is filed is certainly a rational manner in 
which to accomplish the legitimate purpose of 
finality and closure. Moreover, taxpayers in 
the same situation as the estate in this case 
unilaterally elect to take private loans to 
pay their estate tax fully, knowing that the 
section 6511 (a) may prevent theni. from 
deducting all interest paid on their loans as" 
administrative expenses. Finally, as 
mentioned above, a taxpayer would easily avoid 
this result by making a protective claim for 
the deduction of future interest payments. 
The planning point is to note that interest "is deductible even 
in the non-6166 situation, if properly claimed. 
3. City Inheritance Taxes. 
TAM 9422002 determined that city inheritance taxes are 
"not deductible as administration expenses based on section 
2053(c) (1) (B), which specifically precludes the deduction, and the 
legislative history"from 1924. 
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o. Sections 2055 and 2522 - Charitable Deduction 
1. Qualified Reformation. 
Wells Fargo Bank v. United states, 1 F.3d 830 (9th Cir.), 
involved a special rule under section 2055 (e) (3), which permits a 
charitable deduction for a qualified reformation, for wills 
executed before January 1, 1979. The decedent's will was executed 
in 1971; a third codicil was executed in 1982 which changed an 
annuity payable, and then stated "I confirm and republish" the 1971 
will. The issue was whether the Codicil republished the Will, so 
that the Will became executed after January 1, 1979. The court 
relied upon a 1974 amendment of the special rule which deleted 
certain language regarding "republishing" and held that the 
decedent's will was executed before January 1,1979. 
The opinion is also interesting bec'ause the court held' that 
the decedent's will could be reformed, because the chari table 
remainder was ascert~inable. In pertinent part the will provided 
as follows: 
1. My said Trustee shall pay from the income 
or from the principal,if necessary, of said 
trust to my trusted employee, JAMES M., FULLER, 
the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) 
per month for the term of his natural life. 
2. I direct that my house located at li44 
Crestline Drive, Las Posi tas Estates, Santa 
Barbara, California, be held and maintained by 
my said Trustee during the lifetime of said 
JAMES M. FULLER. There shall be paid from my 
Trust all taxes, all expenses of maintenance, 
repairs or improvements ,on said house. 'The 
use of said house as to maintained shall 'be 
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provided for my said employee, JAMES M. 
FULLER, for the term of his natural life. 
3. Further I direct my said Trustee to pay 
from the income or, if necessary, from the 
principal of said Trust all unusual and 
exceptional expenses of said JAMES.M. FULLER, 
such as hospital, medical, dental bills and to 
pay all income taxes due from said JAMES M. 
FULLER to the United states of America and to 
the State of California.during the period of 
his life. 
The primary purpose and intent in creating 
this Trust is to provide for said JAMES M. 
FULLER, and the rights and interests of 
remainderman are subordinate and incidental to 
that purpose. The provisions of this Trust 
shall be liberally construed in the interest 
and for the benefit of said JAMES M. FULLER, 
however, the Trustees shall consider JAMES M. 
FULLER's independent income and other 
resources outside the Trust Estate in .reaching . 
such decisions covered by this paragraph. 
The language did not grant unlimited power to the trustee, 
according to the court because: 
A house may sometimes need improvements in 
order to remain ,in substantially the same 
condition of usefulness, as when a drain must 
be installed to prevent flooding, yet such an 
expense is no less ascertainable than that 
which will be necessary to maintain the life 
tenant in "comfort," cf. Thaca, and is about 
the same as "upkeep." Cf~. Bowers v. South 
Carolina Nat' 1 Bank v. Greenville, 228· F. 2d 4. 
(4th Cir. ,1955). For example;. Mr. Fuller 
needed a handrail to move about the house. 
The handrail was probably an improvement 
rather than maintenance, but it was no more 
than necessary to maintain the house for his 
use, and no less ascertainable than his 
comfort. Nothing about the phrase 
"improvement" suggests unlimited subj ecti ve 
power in Mr. Fuller .to improve the house 
beyond what would be necessary to so maintain 
A-73 
~ 
it. Cf. Salisbury v. United states, 377 F.2d 
700, 704-05 (2nd Cir. 1967). The Government 
argues that discretion to invade the corpus 
for "improvements" destroys ascertainability, 
under In re McCord's Estate, 516 F.2d 832, 836 
(6th Cir. 1075), cert. denied sub. nom. U. S. 
Braton v. United States, 423 U.S. 995 (19785), 
but there the testatrix's "primary objective" 
was the "betterment of the condition under 
which my daughter is living," ide at 833, 
suggesting change, while here, the phrase "as 
so maintained" suggests stability. 
As for the trustee's power to invade principal 
to pay Mr. Fuller's federal and state income 
taxes, this bequest is no more unascertainable 
in amount than invasion of principal for the 
beneficiary's future "comfort," or to cover 
those "reasonably necessary" expenses 
occasioned by accident or illness. The amount 
of Mr. Fuller's income taxes would have 
nothing to do with such untrammeled standards 
as his "happiness," "desire," or "pleasure." 
Cf. Ithaca, Comm's of Internal Revenue, 
Merchants, Henslee. We agree with the Second 
Circuit that a power to invade principal for 
income taxes does not give the life 
beneficiary "significant volitional power" 
over the charitable remainderman, and, so 
doesn't lack the objectivity necessary of 
present ascertainability. Schildkraut's 
Estate v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 368 F.2d 
40, 47 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 
, 959 (1967). The instrument at issue in the 
-, Revenue Ruling cited by the government, Rev. 
Rul. 71-221, unlike Mrs. Wand's will, involved 
a power to invade for any kinds of taxes, and 
numerous and indeterminate life beneficiaries. 
2. Disclaimer to Private Foundations. 
Rulings continued to be issued in~olving disclaimers to 
private foundations. See, e.g., PLRs 9350032 and 9350033. 
The issue involved is how much, if any, control the 
disclaiming party may have over the distribution of the funds from 
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the private foundation. In general, the rulings will allow the 
disclaiming party to be involved in the foundation so long as 
someone else makes distribution decisions. If a grandchild's 
private foundation is the intended beneficiary, the grandchild's 
parent can be the disclaiming party. 
3. Section 2055(a) versus Section 170(c) . 
TAM 9404002 is important as an illustration of the 
differences between organizations described in section 170(c) and 
those described in section 2055(a). Section 170(c) provides as 
follows: 
(c) CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION DEFINED. - For purposes of 
this section, the term "charitable contribution" means a 
contribution.or gift to or for the use of --
(1) A State, a possession of the United 
States, or any political subdivision of any of 
the foregoing, or the United States or the 
District bf Columbia, but only if the 
contribution or gift is made for exclusively 
public purposes. 
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, 
fund, or foundation --
(A) created or organized in the Uni teq 
States or in any possession thereof, or under 
the law of the United States, any State, the 
District of Columbia, or any possession of the 
United States; 
(B) organized and operated exclusively 
for religious, charitable, scientific, 
literary, or educational purposes, or to 
foster national or international amateur 
sports competition (but only if no part of its 
activities involve the provision of athletic 
facilities or equipment), or for the 
prevention of cruelty to children or animals; 
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(C) no part of the net earnings of which 
inures to the benefit -of any, private 
shareholder or individual; and 
(D)· which is not cii:;5qualif;ied for tax 
exemption under section 510 (c) (3) by reason of 
attempting to influence legislation, and which 
does not participate in, or intervene in 
(including the publishing or distributing of 
statements), or political campaign on behalf 
of (or in opposition to) any candidate for 
public office. 
A contribution or gift by a corporation to a trust, 
chest, fund, or foundation shall be deductible by reason 
of this paragraph only if it is to be used within the 
United states or any of its possessions exclusively for 
purposes specified in subparagraph (B). Rules similar to 
the rules of section 501(j) shall apply for purposes of 
this paragraph. 
(3) A post or organization of war veterans, 
or an auxiliary unit or society of, or trust 
or foundation for, any such post. or 
organization --
(A) organized in the United states or-any 
of its possessions, and 
(B) no part of. the net earnings of which 
inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual. 
. (4) In the case of a contribution or gift by 
-, an individual, a domestic fraternal society, 
order, or association, operating under the 
lodge system, but only if such contribution or 
gift is to be used exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, literary, or 
educational purposes, or for the prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals. 
(5) A cemetery company owned and operated 
exclusively for the benefit of its members, or 
any corporation chartered solely for burial 
purposes as a cemetery corporation and not 
permi tted by its charter to engage in any 
business not necessarily incident to that 
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purpose, if such company or corporation is. not 
operated for profit and no part of the net 
earnings of such company or corporation inures 
to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual . 
For purposes of this section, the term "charitable 
contribution" also means an amount treated under 
subsection (g}as paid for the use of an organization 
described in paragraph (2), (3), or (4). 
Section 2055(a) reads differently: 
(a) IN GENERAL. - For purposes of the ta~ imposed by 
section 2001, the value of the taxable estate shall be 
determined by deducting from the value of the gross 
estate the amount of all bequests, legacies, devises, or 
transfers --
(I) to or for the use of the United States, 
any State, any political subdivision thereof, 
or the District of Columbia,. for exclusively 
public purposes; 
(2 }to or for the use of any corporation 
organized and operated exclusively for 
religious , charitable, scientific, literary, 
or. educational purposes, including the 
encouragement of art, or to foster national OT 
international amateur sports competition (but 
only if.no part of its. activities involve the 
provision of athletic facilities or 
equipment), and the pr~vention of cruelty to 
children or animals, no part of the net 
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any. 
private stockholder or individual, wpich is 
not disqualified for tax exemption under 
section 501(c} (3) by reason of attempting to 
influence legislation, and which does not 
participate in, or intervene in (including.the 
publishing or distributing of statements), any 
political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public 
office; 
(3) to a trustee or trustees, or a fraternal 
society, order, or association operating under 
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the lodge system, but only if such 
contributions or gifts are to be used by such 
trustee or trustees, or by such fraternal 
society, order, or association, exclusively 
for religious, chari table, scientific, 
literary, or educational purposes, or for the 
prevention of cruelty to children or animals, 
such trust, fraternal society, order, or 
association would not be disqualified for tax 
exemption under section 501(c) (3) by reason of 
attempting to influence legislation, and such 
trustee or trustees, or such fraternal 
society, order, or association, does not 
participate in, or intervene in (including the 
publishing or distributing of statements), any 
political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public 
office; or 
(4) to or for the use of any veterans' 
organization incorporated by Act of Congress, 
or of its departments or local chapters or 
posts, no part of the net earnings of Which 
inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual. 
For purposes of this subsection, the complete termination 
before the date prescribed for the filing of the estate 
tax return of a power to consume, invade, or appropriate 
property for the benefit of an individual before such 
power has been exercised by reason of the death of such 
individual or for any other reason shall be considered 
and deemed to be a qualified disclaimer with the same 
fuJI force and effect as though he had filed such 
qualified disclaimer. Rules similar to the rules of 
. section501(j) shall apply for purposes of paragraph (2). 
In . the TAM, a transfer to a foundation was involved. The 
foundation's governing instrument provided: 
At all times, and from time to time, Trustee 
and the Administrative Committee shall use and 
apply all of the principal and income of 
Foundation exclusively for religious, 
chari table, .li terary, scientific, or 
educational purposes, or for the prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals. 
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No gift may be made by Trustee to any 
organization, or directed by the 
Administrati ve Committee to be made to an 
organization, other than to the type of 
organization to which a charitable 
contribution as defined in sectlon 170 (c) , 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or any amended 
statute of similar import, may be made. 
The IRS concluded that the Foundation's purposes were limited 
to those described in section 2055(a), thus a charitable estate tax 
deduction would be allowed. Rev. Rul. 76-307, 1976-2 CB 56, cited 
by the Service, requires a governing instrument to limit the 
charitable beneficiaries to organizations to those described in 
section 170 (c) and 2055 (a) (or 2522, g~ft tax, or 2106, tax on 
nonresident noncitizens). In general, charitable transfers: should 
be made to organizations described in section 170(c), 2055(a)~ and 
.2522 (a); if the transfer is to be limited to public charities, 
excluding thereby private foundations, then reference should' be 
made tO,section 170(b) (1) (A) as well. 
4.= Calculation of Charitable Deduction; Tax Apportionment. 
The IRS national office disagreed with the district 
office in TAM 9419006. The decedent died with a marital trust 
included in her estate under section 2044; the trust became a 
chari table remainder uni trust. The facts as relate to tax 
apportionment were these: 
Under §2207A and the terms of the decedent's 
will, the marital trust was burdened with the 
estate taxes generated by the inclusion of the 
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trust in the decedent's gross estate. The 
trust instrument contains no provision 
regarding the apportionment of federal estate 
taxes to be paid by the trust. The applicable 
state X apportionment statute provides as 
follows with respect to the apportionment of 
transfer taxes in the case of successive 
interests passing in trust: 
If both a present interest and a future 
interest in property are involved, a tax shall 
be apportioned entirely to the principal~ 
This shall be the· case even if the future 
interest qualifies for an estate tax 
chari table deduction, even if the holder of 
the present interest also has rights in the 
principal, and even if the principal is 
otherwise exempt from apportionment. 
The estate calculated the charitable deduction by determining 
the net amount passing to the unitrust, before payment of estate 
taxes, subtracting the share of taxes attributable to the unitrust, 
and' using the uni trust remainder factor. The district office 
advocated another approach: 
Upon audit of the return, the district office 
took the position that pursuant to the 
estate's methodology, because the estate tax 
liability was paid "off the top" of the trust 
corpus, the lifetime beneficiary's unitrust 
interest (which is the lesser of trust income 
or percentage of the value of the trust) was 
necessarily reduced proportionately. Thus, 
the estate's method for apportioning the 
estate tax effectively placed the burden of a 
portion the estate tax liability generated by 
the unitrust on the interest of the lifetime 
unitrust beneficiary. 
The district argues that this approach 
conflicts with the state X statute which 
specifically provides that any estate tax is 
to be apportioned "entirely to the principal." 
The district contends that, under the statute, 
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the unitrust/income beneficiary is exonerated 
from paying any tax, and the entire tax burgen 
is borne by beneficiary of the trust principal 
- the charitable remainderman. This result 
could be obtained, even though the taxes are 
paid currently, if for example, the lifetime 
beneficiary received an additional payment 
each month to compensate for the reduced 
unitrust/income payment resulting from the tax 
payment. The charitable deduction would be 
computed by subtracting the value of the' 
unitrust interest from the value of the trust 
corpus and from the amount so obtained, 
subtract the estate taxe~ allocab).e to the 
trust. The balance is the amount of the 
charitable deduction. 
The IRS agreed with the estate, upon review of court decisions 
(not in State X) which appeared to say that tax created by the life 
interest is charged .to the trust corpus. 
5 . Val ue of .Property Passing to Chari ty . 
The Tax Court confronted several difficult issues in 
Estate of Foy Pro"ctor, 67 TCM 1994-208: 
(1) the fair market value of the Channing 
Ranch to be included in decedent's gross 
estate for purposes of section 2031 (a); (2) 
whether an option to lease the surface rights 
of the Channing Ranch for grazing purposes, 
granted to Mrs. Hays for the duration of her 
life, diminishes the fair market value of the 
Channing Ranch, and, if so, the amount of such 
diminution; and (3) whether such option causes 
the devise of the Channing Ranch to Texas T.ech 
Uni versi ty (Texas Tech) to lapse under the 
terms of decedent's will. 
In pertinent part, the decedent's estate plan gave his 
Channing Reach to charity (Texas Tech University), but subject to 
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an option· in certain persons to lease the Ranch for grazing 
purposes. The option was designed to be at fair market value: 
The special devise contained in Section 5.1 
hereof shall be subject to a continuing option 
in favor of J.D. (Junior) Hays and wife, Beth 
Hays, or the survivor of them to lease said 
Channing Ranch for grazing purposes, for a 
term or terms not to exceed the duration of 
the life of the survivor of them, plus six 
months. Such lease shall be negotiated and 
renegotiated from time to time between J. D. 
(Junior) Hays and wife, Beth Hays, or the 
survivor of them, and Texas Tech University to 
provide for lease terms conforming to the fair 
market value of the use of said land for 
grazing purposes, and for such terms and 
restrictions as are appropriate to the 
maintenance and preservation of the market 
vqlue of said land for grazing purposes. 
* * * 
It is the intent hereof that Texas Tech 
University shall receive, upon my death, the 
full fee title to said premises, and that the 
terms of the optional lease available to J.D. 
(Junior) Hays and wife, Beth Hays, or the 
survivor of them, shall be such as conform to 
the market value of the grazing use of the 
premises, and shall not operate to reduce the 
commercial value of the premises as a ranch 
property. 
In addition, the decedent provided that the devise would lapse 
if no charitable deduction were allowed: 
The special devise in favor of Texas Tech 
University contained in Section 5.1 hereof is 
made in the good faith, belief and expectation 
that the value of the subject matter thereof 
will be deductible from my gross estate for 
the determination of the United states estate 
tax liability of my estate, as provided in 
section 2055(a) (1), Internal Revenue Code. 
Should it be finally determined by competent 
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authority that the expected deduction is not 
allowed, whether under Section 2055(a) (1), or 
other provision of applicable law, the special 
devise made in this Section 5 hereof to Texas 
Tech University shall lapse. In such event, I 
give and devise the surface interest in and to 
my said Channing Reach,exclusive of my record 
interest in and to the oil, . gas and other 
minerals in and under and that may be produced 
therefrom, to J~D. (Junior) Hays and wife, 
Beth Hays, or the survivor of them, subject, 
however, to payment by the devisees of so much 
of the death taxes assessed upon my estate,as 
may exceed the amount of death taxes which 
would have been assessed upon my estate had I 
not owned such surface interest in said 
Channing Ranch. This contingent devise of the 
surface interest in such Channing Ranch to 
J.D. (Junior) Hays and wife, Beth Hays, or the 
survivor of them, shall not entail personal 
liability of the devisees for such taxes, but 
shall constitute a lien upon the subject 
matter. Should the devise to Texas Tech 
University given in this Section 5 hereof be 
defeated by the contingency contemplated in 
this Subsection 5.3 hereof, my record interest 
in and to the oil, gas and other minerals in 
and under and that may be produced from said 
land shall be a part of the residue of my 
estate to pass as provided in Subsection 6.1 
hereof. 
The reason the devise of the Ranch was handled in this way was 
described by the drafting attorney in a letter to a trust officer, 
quoted by the court: 
Though Section 5.2 of the will gives to Beth 
Hays a continuing option to lease the Channing 
Ranch for grazing purposes for a term or terms 
not to exceed the duration of her life plus 
six months, it contains restrictions intended 
to insure that the option will not be 
construed as repugnant to the fee given to 
Texas Tech University in Section 5.1, in 
either a legal or economic sense. *** 
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Section 5.3 of the will subjects the gift to 
. Texas Tech University appearing in Section 5.1 
thereof to a condition subsequent which will 
defeat· such gift, "should it be finally 
determined by competent authority that the 
expected deduction is not allowed, whether 
under Section 2055(a) (1) or other provision of 
applicable law; that is, should it be so 
determined that the value of the gift to the 
University is not 'deductible from the 'value of 
Foy Proctor's gross estate for determination 
of federal estate tax liability of the estate . 
. TO insure that such adverse authoritative 
determination will not be made, the gift to 
the University is recited several times to be 
of the fee simple title vesting upon the death 
of the testator as provided by Section 37, 
Texas Probate Code, and the option to lease 
gi ven to Beth Hays is so restricted as to 
provide for a rental conforming to the fair 
market value of the premises for grazirig 
purpose,s, and for a rental and other terms not 
impairing the market value of the premises for 
grazing purposes. In order to effectuate the 
intent of the testatbr, it is essential that· 
the option not be construed as a gift of a 
life interest in land, and that, the gift to 
the University not be' construed as a remainder 
interest in land. 
* * * 
The structure of the will and its dominant 
intent is to avoid the creation of a 
charitable remainder trust. An additional 
argument that his result has been' achieved may 
be made with reference to the exclusion of 
family farms in the statutory restriction upon 
the deductibility of remainder interests in 
charitable trusts. The emphasis of the will 
is upon avoiding the creation of a trust which 
is a chari table remainder trust inei ther an 
economic or a legal sense regardless of the 
application of the family farm provision. 
[Emphasis added.] 
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Texas Tech sought to intervene in the case, to protect its 
interest, as did the residuary takers, Mrs. Hays and Ms. Baker, 
which the court allowed: 
~-
In the instant case, Texas Tech, Mrs. Hays,' 
and Ms. Baker contend that intervention should 
be permitted for the following reasons: (1) 
Because, according to the terms of decedent's 
will, our decision regarding the deductibilty 
and fair market value of the Channing Reach 
subject to Mrs. Hays' lifetime lease affects 
whether the devise of the Channing Ranch to 
Texas Tech lapses, all three of the moving 
parties have a direct and immediate interest 
in the subject matter of his proceeding; (2) 
because petitioner has a fiduciary duty to 
deal impartially with all beneficiaries of 
decedent's estate, petitioner is not able to 
adequately protect the interests of Texas 
Tech, Mrs. Hays, and Ms. Baker due to the fact 
that their respective interests in the subject 
matter of the instant case are adverse; (3) 
permitting intervention will not result in new 
issues of law or fact to, be decided by the 
Court, and therefore, intervention will not 
unduly delay the adjudication; (4) permitting 
intervention will allow a more complete 
presentation of issues to be resolved in the 
instant case; and (5) petitioner has not 
objected to the parties' motions to intervene, 
but rather, has invited the parties to 
intervene. 
We granted the motions to intervene of Texas 
Tech and Mrs. Hays and Ms. Baker. In so 
doing, we limited the scope of intervention to 
(1) the issue of the fair market value of the 
Channing Ranch to be included in decedent's 
gross estate for purposes of section 2031(a), 
and (2) respondent's adjustment to the value 
of the charitable contribution deduction for 
the Channing Ranch claimed by petitioner on 
its Federal estate tax return. 
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The court first determined that the option was not relevant in 
determining estate tax value. The Tax Court pointed out that 
nei ther the decedent's death nor his Will affected what the 
decedent owned. Thus the full fair market value of the Ranch. 
($6,000,000), without the option, was included.in the decedent's 
gross estate. 
Next, the court determined the valu.e· with the option for 
purposes of deciding the amount of the charitable deduction. The 
experts of the various parties were not far from one another and 
the court settled on a value of $4,836,320. 
The court finally confronted the IRS and the residuary takers 
which argued that the charitable bequest lapsed. The issue turned 
on the meaning of the sentence, "[s]hould it be finally.determined 
by competent authority that the expected deduction is not.allo.wed, 
. . 
whether under Section 2055(a) (1), or other provision of applicable 
law, this special devise .. ~ shall lapse." What did the decedent 
mean by the expected deduction? 
Th'""e' residuary takers and the IRS argued that it meant a 
deduction equal to the value of the Ranch in the decedent's gross 
estate. Texas Tech argued that it meant only substantially equal; 
the residuary takers and the IRS responded that the deduction --
$4,836,320 --was not substantially equal to the gross estate value 
($6,000,000) . 
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The court found the phrase to be ambiguous and looked to 
extrinsic evidence, particularly testimony from, and client letters 
written by, the drafter of the Will. In particular, the court 
focused on the following discussion of the effect of the grazing 
option on the value of the charitable deduction: 
.. 
You may well ask why provide that J.D. 
(Junior) Hays and wife, Beth Hayes, must pay 
rent to Texas Tech University for a grazing 
lease on the Channing Ranch. I have two 
reasons; namely, 
(1) It enables me to pass the fee simple title 
to the Ranch to the Uni versi ty· immediately 
upon your death, thus distinguishing it from a 
remainder interest, which is a title postponed 
to a title having prior enjoyment; and 
(2) It should make the value of the interest 
passing to the University· substantially the 
full value of the Ranch at date of death. A 
remainder interest must pe valued by 
subtracting the value of the preceding life 
estate .,from the date of death value. The 
value of the life estate is determined by 
applying a factor found in life tables 
published in the Internal Revenue Regulations 
to the full value, as of the inception of the 
life interest. Valuation. of the interest 
passing to charity in that manner would result 
in an increased burden on the liquid assets of 
the estate to pay death taxes. If the 
University is to receive immediate title, 
subj ect only to an option to J. D. (Junior) 
Hays and wife, Beth Hays, to lease the 
premises for the only purpose for which it is 
definitely suited at the market value of such 
a lease, it can hardly be supposed that the 
value to the University is substalltially less 
than it would be in the absence of the option. 
[Emphasis added.] 
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The court held that the tests were whether the deduction was 
"substantially equal" to the gross estate value. The court stated 
as follows on the issue of substantially equal: 
In light of the foregoing, we hold that 
decedent's primary intent was to devise his 
interest in the Channing Ranch to charity in a 
manner that would allow his estate to claim a 
substantial charitable deduction under section 
2055(a) while allowing"Mrs. Hays to remain on 
the Ranch. Accordingly, we hold that decedent 
"expected" that his estate would be entitled 
to claim a substantial chari table deduction 
for the devise of the Channing Ranch to Texas 
Tech. We concluded, supra p. 53, that 
petitioner would be entitled to a charitable 
deduction under section 2055(a) in the amount 
of $4,836,320, if the devise of the Channing 
Ranch to Texas Tech did not lapse under 
section 5.3 of decedent's will. A $4,836,320 
deduction is slightly more than 80 percent of 
the value of the Channing Ranch on the date of 
decedent's death ($6,000,000). We believe 
that a deduction equal to approximately 80 
percent of the fair market value" of the 
Channing Ranch on the date of decedent's death 
is "substantial." Consequently, the special 
devise of the Channing Ranch to Texas Tech 
does not lapse under section 5.3 of decedent's 
will. 
The court did not discuss the tax apportionment ramifications 
of its decision. From portions of. the Will reproduced in the 
opinion it would appear that the intestate takers would pay the 
increase in estate taxes. 
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An interesting issue would have been the effect of putting the ~ 
option on the property prior to the decedent's death. Presumably 
that could have been done by sale to Mrs. Hays and Ms. Baker, for 
even a de minimis sum. ~ 
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P. Sections 2056 and 2056A - Marital Deduction 
1. Post-Death Interest. 
In Richardson, 89 T.C. 1193 (1987), street, 974 F.2d 723 
(6th Cir. 1992), and Whittle, 994 F. 2d 379 (7th Cir.), various 
courts determined that post-death interest on· deferred federal 
estate taxes payable from transferred property should not reduce 
the value of this property. The issue is important for valuing the 
charitable deduction, but is more important (because more frequent) 
with respect to the marital deduction. 
Revenue Ruling 93-48, IRB 1993-25 at 9, reflects IRS 
acknowledgement of the cases. The ruling states as follows: 
~-
Rev. Rul. 82-6 [1982-1 C.B. 137] holds that, 
if deferred federal estate taxes and post-. 
death interest thereon are payable out of a 
residuary estate, the value of a residuary 
chari table bequest for purposes of section 
2055 of the Internal Revenue Code must be 
reduced by an estimate of the maximum amount 
of the interest that is expected to be paid 
out of the residuary estate. In light of the 
cases cited above 7 Rev. Rul. 82-6 is revoked. 
Rev. Rul. 66-233, 1966-2 C.B. 428, holds that, 
for purposes of section 2013 of the Code, the 
value of a residuary bequest transferred by a 
prior decedent is to be reduced by the amount 
of all administrative expenses payable from 
the residuary bequest. Rev . Rul. 66-233 is 
modified to apply to administration expenses 
other than interest accruing on obligations 
payable from the residuary bequest. 
Rev. Rul. 73-98, 1973-1 C.B. 407, holds that, 
for purposes of section 2055 of the Code, the 
value of a residuary chari table bequest is 
reduced by the amount of administrative 
expenses payable from the income of the 
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residuary property. Rev. Rul. 73-98 is 
modified to apply to administrative expenses 
other than interest accruing on obligations 
payable from the residuary principal or 
income. 
Rev. Rul. 80-159, 1980-1 C.B. 206, holds that, 
for purposes of section 2056 of the Code, the 
value of a residuary marital request is not 
reduced by any interest paid on deferred 
federal estate taxes where state law requires 
both estate tax and interest on the tax to be 
paid from portions of the estate other than 
the residuary marital bequest. Rev. Rul. 80-
159 is clarified to hold that the value of the 
marital bequest for purposes of section 
2056(b) (4) is not reduced by post-death 
interest expense accruing on taxes even if 
state law requires payment from the marital 
bequest of estate tax and interest on the tax. 
2. QTIP Regulations. 
The IRS has issued final and temporary regulations' taking 
into consideration the following tax acts: ERTA, DRA '84, TRA '86, 
,TAMRA, OBRA, and EPA '92. The drafter's Explanation is attached as 
Appendix B. The following are a few of the more important points: 
a. Lifetime QTIP. 
The regulations allow a donor spouse to create a 
lifetime QTIP trust for the donee spouse, which will be included in 
the donee spouse's estate under section 2044(b), even if the donor 
spouse retains an income interest if the donee spouse predeceases. 
---=-, 
Generally, absent a gift tax return showing a gift, section 2044 d 
inclusion will be presumed. Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(f)-1(d), and 
Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(f)-1(f), Examples 10 and 11. Those Examples 
are as follows: ~ 
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Example 10. Retention by donor spouse of 
income interest in property. On October 1, 
1994, D transfers property to an irrevocable 
trust under the terms of which trust income is 
to be paid to S for life,then to D for life 
and, on D's death, the trust corpus is to be 
paid to D's children. D elects under section 
2523 (f) to treat the property as qualified 
terminable interest property_ D dies in 1996, 
survived by S. S subsequently dies in 1998. 
Under §2523(f)-1(d) (1), because D elected to 
treat the transfer as qualified terminable 
interest property, no part of the trust corpus 
i's includible, in D's gross estate because of 
D's retained interest in the trust corpus. On 
S's subsequent death in 1998, the trust corpus 
is includible in S's gross estate under 
section 2044. 
Example 11. Retention by donor spouse of 
income interest in property. The facts are 
the same as in Example 10, except that S dies 
in 1996 survived by D, who subsequently dies 
in 1998. Because D made an election under 
section 2523(f) with respect to the trust, on 
S's death the trust corpus is includible in 
S's gross estate under section 2044. 
Accordingly, under section 2044(c), S is 
treated as the transferor of the property for 
estate and gift tax purposes. Upon D's 
subsequent death in 1998, because the property 
was subject to inclusion in S's gross estate 
under section 2044, the exclusion rule in 
§25.2523(f)-1(d) (1) does not apply under 
§25.2523 (f) -1 (d) (2) . However, because S is 
treated as the transferor of the property, the 
property is not subject to inclusion in D's 
gross estate under section 2036 or section 
2038. If the executor of S's estate made a 
section 2056 (b) (7) election with respect to 
the trust, the trust is includible in D's 
gross estate under section 2044 upon D's later 
death. 
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Presumably, the donor spouse may also receive principal 
distributions, and may have a special power of appointment, without 
causing inclusion in the donor spouse's estate. 
On the other hand, the donor spouse may not have an income 
interest which precedes the donee spouse's (Example 9). 
b. Specific Portion. 
The term has been redefined to allow a marital 
deduction if a spouse receives an income interest over a specific 
portion of property. The issue about receiving an annuity is 
answered "yes" for transfers before October 25, 1992, but left 
unanswered thereafter. The answer should be the same, but may not 
be. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-5(c) (2) and 2S.2523(e)-1(c). 
c. Protective Elections. 
Are allowed. Treas. Reg. §20.20S6(b)-7(c). 
d. Trust Division. 
A trust division will be allowed which meets three 
criteria: (1) it is allowed by the trust instrument or applicable 
state law; (2) it is done before estate administration ends, and is 
noted on the estate tax return; and (3) it is made on a fractional 
or percentage basis, but may be non-pro rata (contrary to the GST 
regulations). A faulty division simply means that the division is 
invalid for income tax and estate tax purposes. A partial QTIP can 
be made, and all distributions to the spouse charged to the QTIPed 
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portion, withdut dividing the trust. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-
7 (b) (2) (ii) and 20.2044-1 (d) (3) . 
e. Distributions to Spouse to Make Gifts. 
This will be a problem if the spouse is legally 
bound to make gifts. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(d) (6) provides as 
follows: 
(6) Power to distribute principal to spouse. 
An income interest in a trust will not fail to 
. consti tute a qualifying income interest for 
life solely because the trustee has a power to 
distribute principal to or for the benefit of 
the surviving spouse. The fact that property 
distributed to a surviving spouse may be 
transferred by the spouse to another person 
does not result in a failure to satisfy the 
requirement of section 2056 (b) (7) (B) (ii) (II) . 
However, if the surviving spouse is legally 
bound to transfer the distributed property to 
another person without full and adequate 
consideration in money or money's worth, the 
requirement of section 2056(b) (7) (B) (ii) (II) 
is not satisfied. 
[See the discussion in Section L-3 of these materials.] 
f. Charitable Remainder Trusts and Pooled Income Funds. 
Treas. Reg. § 20.2056-b(8) and Treas. Reg. § 
20.2056(b)-7(d) (5) allow the marital deduction only if the spouse 
has the only non-chari table interest (with some grandfathered 
exceptions) . 
g. Right of Recovery -- Section 2207. 
Failure to exercise a right of recovery is a gift, 
unless the beneficiaries cannot compel the executor to exercise it. 
Treas. Reg. § 20.2207A-1 (a) (3). 
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3. Partial QTIP Election. 
This is a different result from Prop. Reg. §26. 2 654-
l(c) (2), which for GST purposes, that the trusts be "funded with a 
fractional share of each and every substantial interest or right 
held by the single trust." Private Letter Ruling 9335025 indicates 
that the IRS may not require pro rata funding when dividing a QTIP 
trust. The ruling states: 
A trust may be divided into separate trusts to . 
reflect a partial election that has been made 
or is to be made if authorized under the 
governing instrument or otherwise permissible 
under local law. The division of the trust 
must be done on a fractional or percentage 
basis to reflect the partial election. The 
separate trusts formed after the division do 
not have to be funded with a pro rata portion 
of each asset held by the undivided trust. 
However, the value of the assets used to fund 
each trust must be equal respectively to the 
value of the fractional portion of the 
residuary trust as of the date of funding 
represented by each trust. 
The ruling is in accordance with the QTIP regulations 
discussed above. 
4. Contingent QTIP. 
The Eighth Circuit, in Robertson Estate v. Commissioner, 
15 F.3d 779 (1994) has followed the Fifth Circuit's decision in 
Estate of Clayton v. Commissioner, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992) 
and reversed the Tax Court on the issue of the QTIP election where 
the executor's failure to make the election would change the 
disposition of the property. A case is before the Sixth Circuit on 
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this issue. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(d) (3) follows the IRS 
position. 
5. Marital Deduction and Guarantees. 
PLR 9113009 set forth an IRS position that no marital 
deduction would be allowed for any assets which could be used to 
satisfy loans guaranteed by the decedent. The Service has now 
changed its position. The facts recited by the IRS were: 
To facilitate a lender's approval of loans to 
corporations and other business entities owned 
by the taxpayer's children, the taxpayer 
gratuitously provided the lender with the 
taxpayer's personal guarantee that the loans 
will be repaid. The taxpayer has not pledged 
or otherwise conveyed any interest in specific 
property to secure any of these guarantees. 
If the taxpayer dies before all of these loans 
are repaid, the taxpayer's estate will become 
liable for each outstanding guarantee. As a 
result, property that passes toa marital 
discretionary income trust described in 
§20.2056(e)-2(b) of the Estate Tax Regulations 
(Estate Trust) and a marital income trust 
described in §2056(b) (7) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (Marital Trust) may become 
subject to the payment of the guaranteed 
loans. The will provides that property equal 
, to two times the "Net Value Cost" of making 
payments on guarantees given by the taxpayer 
that are outstanding as of the date of the 
taxpayer's death is to be alloca-ced to the 
Estate Trust. The Estate Trust defines "Net 
Value Cost" in terms of twice an estimate of 
the present value of satisfying the loan 
guarantees. The residue of the estate is to 
be allocated to the Marital Trust. 
Under applicable local law, if the borrower 
defaul ts on a guaranteed loan and the 
guarantor or his estate pays the defaulted 
amount to the lender, the guarantor or his 
estate is subrogated to the lender's 
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collection rights on the loan for the amount 
the guarantor or his estate paid. 
The new conclusions are: 
Under §2056(b) (4), if property passing to the 
surviving spouse is encumbered in any manner, 
the encumbrance is taken into account in the 
same manner as if the amount of a gift to the 
spouse were being determined. Under the terms 
of the taxpayer's will, assets will pass to 
the Estate,:Trust for the benefit of the 
surviving spouse only if there are any loan 
guarantees outstanding at the taxpayer's 
death. The marital deduction for the bequest 
of such assets would not be reduced by the 
entire unpaid balance of the guaranteed loans 
unless at the time of the taxpayer's death it 
appears that a default after the Estate Tax 
Return is filed is likely, that" assets of the 
Estate Trust will be used to pay the entire 
unpaid balance of such loans, and that the 
SUbrogation rights appear to be worthless. 
It is well settled that, notwithstanding the 
restrictions of §2056(b), an asset in the form 
of a promissory note that passes from a 
decedent to or for the benefit of the 
surviving spouse is ordinarily eligible for 
the marital deduction, whether the note passes 
outright to the spouse or to an estate trust 
described in §20.2056(e)-2(b) or to a marital 
trust described in §2056(b) (5) or (b) (7). 
After a decedent's death, the spouse (or the 
trustee of the trust for the benefit of the 
spouse) holds the note asa creditor of the 
borrower and is subject to a risk of loss if 
the borrower were to default and be incapable 
of repaying the note. It follows that the 
mere presence of a promissory note among 
assets passing to a trust for the benefit of 
the surviving spouse would not ordinarily 
cause the disallowance of the marital 
deduction. 
If one or more assets (not necessarily 
promissory notes) pass from a decedent to or 
for the benefit of the spouse subject to a 
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loan guarantee encumbrance, the spouse (or the 
trustee of the trust for the benefit of the 
spouse) is subject to a risk of loss if the 
borrower were to default and be incapable of 
repaying the guaranteed loan. In the event of 
default, the spouse (or the trustee) would pay 
the lender pursuant to the guarantee, as a 
result of which the spouse (or the trustee) 
would be immediately subrogated to the lender 
and would consequently become a creditor of 
the borrower for the amount paid pursuant to 
the guarantee. 
Thus, for purposes of §2056(b), the position 
of a spouse (or trustee) as a note holder is 
indistinguishable from the position of a 
spouse (or trustee) as holder of assets 
subject to a loan guarantee. In the case of 
the note asset and in the case of the 
guarantee-encumbered asset, the risk of the 
borrower's default presents the same issue for 
purposes of determining whether a surviving 
spouse's interest in the asset is considered a 
nondeductible terminable interest. In either 
case, neither the borrower nor the lender 
possesses an "interest in" or a "power to 
appoint" property, as those terms are used in 
§2056(b) . 
The importance of the changes is clear: there is no risk of 
a complete disallowance of the marital deduction. However, a 
number of issues remain. The IRS analogized to the risk that a 
promissory note might be unpaid. In such instances, the value of 
the note depends on, among other factors, the likelihood of 
repayment. Presumably, if marital deduction assets were likely to 
be used for the payment of a guarantee, there would be a reduction 
in the value of the marital deduction. 
The 1990 ruling had also dealt with gift guarantees. The new 
ruling does not. 
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6. Loans From a QTIP. 
The IRS addressed loans from a QTIP trust in PLR 9418013. 
In pertinent part, the transaction was as follows: 
The Marital Trust contains substantial liquid 
assets. The trustee proposes to make loans of 
up to $Y to each 0 f the three sons from the 
assets of the Marital Trust. These loans in 
the aggregate will not exceed 8% of the 
current fair market value of the Martial 
Trust. In exchange for the loan, each son 
will execute a promissory note to the Marital 
Trust, payable on the spouse's death bearing a 
rate of interest sufficient to satisfy the 
provisions of §7872, although the interest 
will accrue instead of being paid on a current 
basis. 
Under. the proposed. loan arrangements, the 
trustee will make principal distributions to· 
the spouse each year in an amount equal to the 
accrued interest on the promissory notes. 
The IRS held that there was no disposition of the spouse's 
interest: 
In th~ present case, the trustee proposes to 
make loans of up to $Y to each of decedent's 
three sons from the corpus of the Marital 
Trust. The interest on the loans will be a 
rate of interest that meets the requirements 
of §7872. The intereet howe~er, will· accrue 
instead of being paid on a current basis. 
Under the proposed loan arrangement, the 
trustee will make principal distributions to 
spouse each year in an amount equal to the 
accrued interest. This distribution will 
offset the loss of "real income i ' to spouse. 
Under these circumstances,the spouse will not 
be deprived of the income that she would 
receive from the Marital Trust if the loans 
were not made. Therefore, the quality of the 
spouse's qualifying income interest for life 
will remain substantially unchanged as a 
result of the proposed transaction. In 
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addition, the promissory notes that will be 
given in exchange for the loans will accrue 
interest over the life of the spouse and upon 
her death, the promissory notes and the 
accrued interest thereon, will be includible 
in spouse's estate under section 2044. 
Apportionment of Taxes to QTIP. 
The Ohio tax apportionment statute was involved in Estate 
of Hans W. Vahlteich, 67 TCM 1994-168. The statute provides as 
follows, in relevant part: 
(A) Unless a will or other governing 
instrument otherwise provides, and except as 
otherwise provided in this section, a tax 
shall be apportioned equitably in accordance 
with the provisions of this section among all 
persons interested in an estate in proportion 
to the value of the interest of each person as 
determined for estate tax purposes. 
* * * 
(I) If any part of an estate consists of 
property, the value of which is included in 
the gross estate of the decedent by reason of 
section 2044 of the "Internal Revenue Code of 
1986," 100 sta. 2085, 26 U.S.C.A. 2044, as 
amended, or of section 5731.131 * * * of the 
Revised Code, the estate is entitled to 
recover from the persons holding or receiving 
the property any amount by which the estate 
tax payable exceeds the estate tax that would 
have been payable if the value of the property 
had not been incltided in the gross estate of 
the decedent. This division does not apply if 
a decedent provides otherwise in his will or 
another governing instrument and the will or 
instrument refers to either section mentioned 
in this division or to qualified terminable 
interest marital deduction property. 
[Emphasis added.] 
A - ~~ 
The decedent's will provided for the residue of the estate to 
be distributed to charity. An asset of the decedent's estate was 
a QTIP trust; if the taxes generated to the estate by the QTIP 
trust were paid from the residue, the resulting charitable 
deduction would be reduced creating a "tax on tax" situation. On 
the other hand, if the taxes were to come from the QTIP trust 
itself, the residue would remain intact. 
The decedent's tax clause said this: 
I direct that all my just debts, funeral and 
administration expenses be paid as soon as 
practicable after my decease and that all 
transfer, estate or inheritance taxes, 
including any interest and penalties thereon, 
imposed by any taxing authority upon or in 
relation to any property owned by me at the 
time of my death which is disposed of by this 
Will or any Codicil to it, or upon or in 
relation- to any trust, gift, insurance, 
annuity, joint property or transfer, included 
as part of my taxable estate, shall be paid as 
an expense out of my residuary estate (as 
hereinafter defined) without apportionment 
against the legatees, beneficiaries, donees, 
or transferees thereof. [Emphasis added.] 
The court determined the nub of the issue to be: does the Ohio 
statute require a specific reference to either section 2044 of the 
Internal Revenue Code or qualified terminable interest property in 
order for apportionment to be waived? The court said no. First 
the court noted that the Ohio Legislature could have required a 
specific reference, but that the statute does not. Second, the 
decedent's tax clause provided that all taxes imposed on account of 
trust being included in the decedent's taxable estate would be paid 
A _ 100 
from the residue without apportionment. The QTIP trust was the 
only such trust. 
KRS 140.190(2) provides that: 
(2) The .heir, devisee or other donee shall be 
personally liable for the tax on real 
property, as well as the personal 
representative 'or trustee, and if the personal 
representative or trustee pays the tax he may, 
unless the tax is made an expense of 
administration by the will or other 
instrument, recover the tax from the heir, 
devisee or other donee of the real property. 
Also of interest is University of Louisville v. Libertv 
National Bank & Trust Company, Ky., 499 S.W.2d 288 (1973) 
construing a clause to pay taxes from the estate to be a direction 
that the residue generally should be charged, without allocation, 
with the result that a charitable interest was burdened with tax, 
and Union Bank and Trust Company v. Barrett, Ky., 253 S.W.2d 632 
(1952) dealing with allocation to power of appointment property. 
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Q. sections 2501 to 2524 - Gifts 
1. Check to Individual. 
In recent years several cases have dealt with when a gift 
by check is effective for gift tax purposes, the most recent being 
Estate of Metzger v. Comm'r, 100 T.C 204, which discusses the prior 
cases. The issue was whether payment of checks to individuals in 
1986 related back to the delivery and deposit of the checks in 
1985. The court answered this question in the affirmative. 
opinion states: 
We see no reason for refusing to apply the 
relating back doctrine to noncharitable gifts 
wher.e the taxpayer is able to establish: (1) 
The donor's intent to make a gift, (2) 
unconditional delivery of the check, and (3) 
presentment of the check within the year for 
which favorable tax treatment is sought and 
wi thin a reasonable time of issuance. 
Assuming these elements are present, the 
practical realities of everyday commerce 
recognized in Estate of Spiegel v. 
Commissioner, 12 T.C. 524, 529 (1949), require 
a limited extension of the relation-back rule. 
The 
A contrary interpretation was reached by the Virginia Supreme 
Court in Woo v. Smart, 442 S.E.2d 690 (1994) which held that checks 
given to donee prior to the donor's death that were cashed after 
the donor's death were not gifts. The court held that a check was 
neither an inter vivos gift nor a gift causa mortis because there 
were no transfers of funds and thus no delivery. 
A _ 10') 
2. Gifts by Power of Attorney. 
Technical Advice Memorandum 9342002 holds that a power of 
attorney which gives the attorneys-in-fact broad powers but does 
not expressly authorize them to make gifts cannot be effectively 
exercised, under Oregon law, to make gifts or to create a trust on 
behalf of the decedent which authorizes the trustee to make 
transfers to other persons during the decedent's life. 
Technical Advice Memorandum 9347003 reaches the same 
result under Texas law . 
. Al though the Texas Supreme Court has not 
addressed the authority of an attorney-in-fact 
under a durable power of attorney to make 
gifts if not specifically authorized, other 
Texas courts have addressed the extent of the 
authority of an agent under a power of 
attorney. In Gciuldy v. Metcalf, 12 S.W. 830 
(Tex. 1889) '. the court set forth the 
established rule that, where the authority is· 
conferred in a formal instrument, the general 
words are restricted to the context of the 
instrument and construed as to exclude the 
exercise of any unwarranted power. (Citations 
omi tted. ) 
The durable power of attorney gave A the power 
to sell, convey, mortgage, and exchange any 
real property and, generally, to do anything 
that D could do. However, it did not 
specifically give A the power to make gifts of 
the property or to transfer the property 
without adequate consideration. under Texas 
law, the instrument must be strictly construed 
and we do not believe that the Texas Supreme 
Court would construe this instrument as giving 
a the power to transfer D's property without 
full and adequate consideration. 
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PLR 9410028 expresses the IRS view that, under Colorado law, 
attorneys in fact may not make gifts without specific authority to 
do so. No Colorado case or statute was cited. 
3. Section 483 - Interest Rates. 
In Schusterman v. U. S., (D.C. N. Okla. 
1994) the court followed Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F. 29 529 
(8th Cir. 1991) and rejected Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 184 
(7th Cir. 1988), in holding that the interest rates of section 483 
are irrelevant to gift tax. The facts involved interest-free leans 
prior to Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984). 
4. Dominion and Control. 
The case of Claude J. Autin v.Commissioner, 102 T.C. No. 
35, involved unusual facts. On August 14, 1974, father and son 
incorporated Louisiana International Marine, Inc. ("LIM"); father 
received 51 shares and son received 49 shares. Father filed no 
gift tax return, even though son furnished no capital. On the same 
day, father and son executed a "counter letter" which the court 
discussed as follows: 
On August 14, 1974, petitioner and his son executed the 
counter letter, which states that petitioner signed the 
following documents before Mr. Pitre, as notary public: 
Articles of Incorporation for Louisiana 
International Marine, Inc., an Initial Report, 
Minutes of a Meeting of Incorporation, Minutes 
of the First Meeting of the Board of 
Directors, By-Laws, two (2) stock certificates 
and a receipt for Stock Certificate No. 1 for 
fifty-one (51) shares of Capital Stock of 
Louisiana International Marine, Inc. for the 
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purpose of forming said Corporation so that he 
and his son Bobby C. Autin, could begin 
working together in the Marine Industry; that 
in accordance with all of the documents above 
mentioned, Claude J. Autin, appeals herein, 
received and is the registered owner of 
Certificate No. 1 representinq 51 shares of 
the Capital stock of Louisiana International. 
Marine, Inc.; 
The counter letter further states: 
That in truth and in fact appearer has no 
ownership interest in said stock certificate 
of said capital stock of· said corporation; 
that the same was acquired by him for the 
account of his son, Bobby C. Autin, and that 
he will execute in favor of said Bobby C. 
Autin, or his nominee, at such time as 
appearer is called upon so to do, . any and all 
instruments and documents necessary to 
transfer to the said Bobby C.Autin all right, 
title and interest that appearer has or may 
have in and to Louisiana International Marine, 
Inc. and/or Certificate No. 1 representing 51 
shares of the capital stock of said 
corporation. 
The counter letter also states the following as the 
reason why the 51 shares. were issued in petitioner's 
name: 
although the corporation in truth and in fact 
belongs to Bobby C. Autin, and appearer will 
be employed as president of the corporation, 
it will be to the best interest of the 
corporation, and his son that the clients and 
customers of said corporation believe appearer 
to be the principal stock holder of Louisiana 
International Marine, Inc. because of 
appearer's reputation in the Marine industry 
and because of the personal contacts and 
relationships established over the years 
between appearer and these customers. 
Father held himself out as in charge of LIM, although son also 
worked in the business. In 1988, father retired from LIM and the 
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51 shares were recorded in son's name. Upon gift tax audit, father 
argued there was no 1988 gift because he never owned the shares, or 
had transferred them by the counter letter. The IRS claimed that 
father never relinquished dominion and control over the shares and 
that the counter letter was not effective against people who had no 
notice of it. 
The court concluded as follows: 
Respondent contends that the following factors 
indicate petitioner's dominion and' control 
over, and substantive ownership of, the 51 
shares: (1) Petitioner held himself out as a 
51-percent shareholder on LIM's Federal and 
state corporate income tax returns; (2) 
petitioner signed corporate tax returns under 
penalties of perjury, (3) petitioner reported 
51 percent of all of LIM's undistributed 
taxable income on his Form 1040 for taxable 
year 1974 when LIM was an S corporation; (4) 
during 1974, LIM reported to the Internal 
Revenue Service that petitioner was a 51-
percent shareholder in LIM; (5) to break the 
subchapter S election, the 49 shares held by 
petitioner's son were reduced to 48, rather 
then reducing petitioner's shares from 51 to 
50; (6) once LIM became a C corporation, LIM's 
corporate minutes reflect that petitioner 
attended the shareholders meetings and 
exercised his voting rights as to the 51 
shares; (7) petitioner was in charge of LIM 
from the time of LIM's incorporation until 
June 1988 when he resigned as president (in 
favor of his son's become president) and 
became vice president; (8) petitioner traveled 
2 to 4 days per week to meet with potential 
customers to sell LIM's services; (9) 
petitioner was the guiding force who set up 
LIM's business and successfully managed it 
until his son gained the experience necessary 
to successfully run LIM; (10) petitioner 
personally guaranteed several of LIM's loans 
during early days; (11) petitioner had the 
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authority to invest LIM's capital; (12) as 
part of their community property settlement, 
peti tioner paid Cherie Autin to waive her 
rights and claims to petitioner's interest in 
LIM; . and (.13) throughout . the years, 
petitioner's auditors and attorneys who knew 
of the counter letter apparently treated the 
counter letter as a secret document that had 
an· effect only between petitioner and his son. 
We agree with respondent that· petitioner's 
actions indicate his extensive assertion of 
dominion and control over LIM and petitioner's 
substantive ownership of the 51 shares. 
Significantly, petitioner held himself out as 
the majority shareholder to all of LIM's 
customers and business associates and acted as 
the true owner of the 51 shares. He held 
himself out to the Internal Revenue Service as 
well as the Louisiana taxing authorities as a 
51-percent owner. Petitioner reported 51 
percent of' LIM's undistributed taxable income 
on his Form 1040 for taxable year 1974. He 
attended shareholders meetings and exercised 
his voting rights with respect to the 51 
shares . Petitioner controlled LIM as 
president from August 1974. through June 1988. 
At the same time that petitioner relinquished 
the presidency of LIM, he trans£erred the 51 
shares into his son's name. Indeed, 
petitioner transferred the shares to his son 
during 1988, not because his son demanded 
them, but because petitioner decided that he. 
wanted to retire from LIM. 
There is nothing in the record indicating that 
petitioner's son, who purportedly owned 100 
percent of LIM pursuant to. the counter letter,. 
had acted as the sole shareholder. There were 
no voting trust agreements or shareholder 
agreements to document that petitioner was 
required to vote the 51 shares as a fiduciary 
on behalf of his son or in the same manner 
that his son voted his .shares. Moreover, 
petitioner's son did not testify as to his 
control over the 51 shares or his 
understanding with petitioner as to the 
ownership of the 51 shares. The rule is well 
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settled that failure of a party to introduce 
evidence within his possession and which, if 
true, would be favorable to him, gives rise to 
the presumption that if produced it would be 
unfavorable." Wichita· Terminal Elevator Co. 
v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1158, 1165 (1946), 
affd. 162 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1947). 
5. Exercise of Special Power of Appointment. 
In TAM 9419007 the IRS found that a gift occurred upon 
the exercise of an inter vivos power of appointment. The facts, 
which are very important, were these: 
Under the facts as presented, in 1959, the 
Grantor purportedly created eleven separate 
trusts for the benefit of the members of the 
family of M. Each trust had an initial term 
of 20 years. During the first 15 years of the 
trust term, income was accumulated. During 
the next 5 years of the trust term, income was 
paid for the support of a· designated older 
generation family member. 
·At the end of the 20-year term, each trust was 
to be· held for the benefit of a designated 
grandchild of N. The principal and 
accumulated income of each separate trust was 
distributable to a designated grandchild when 
he or she reached age 30. If a grandchild 
died before reaching age 30, the trust 
property otherwise distributable to him or her 
was to be distributed instead to his bt her 
issue, or·if none, to (or for the benefit of) 
the other younger generation family members. 
Between the end of the 20-year trust term and 
the date that a respective grandchild reached 
age 30, the income of the separate trust held 
for that grandchild wa·s payable to him or her. 
The provision creating this interest states: 
As to any persons designated to receive 
distributions who shall be·· under- 30 
. years of age at the end of the 60 month 
period, instead of making distribution to such 
person, Trustee shall distribute to 'such 
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person the net income from his trust until he 
attains the age of 30, at which time Trustee 
shall distribute to him all the accumulated 
income fund, current income and any principal 
then remaining in his trust. [Emphasis 
added. ] 
Under the provisions of each separate trust, 
each grandchild had a power of appointment, 
labeled a "Limited Power of Appointment." The 
power was exercisable at any time during the 
grandchild's lifetime by written instrument or 
at death by testamentary instrument. Under 
the "Limited Power of Appointment," each 
grandchild could appoint "his interest in the 
trust estate" to, or in trust for, certain 
family members. The trust instrument states: 
No power of appointment shall be 
exercised to any extent in favor of the Donee 
of such power, his estate or for the benefit 
of his creditor or the creditors of his 
estate. 
In 1980, when the Donor's grandchild was of majority age, but 
not yet· 30, the Donor exercised the power of appointment in favor 
of new trusts for other beneficiaries. The IRS described the 
Donor's property interests at that time, and the issue: 
At the time that the powers of appointment 
were exercised, the Donor (and each 
grandchild) possessed: 1) a contingent 
remainder interest in a trust (which would 
ripen into absolute ownership of the property 
upon that grandchild's reaching age 30); and 
2) the right to receive current trust income 
until reaching age 30. The issue presented is 
whether the Donor made a taxable gift when she 
exercised the "Limited Power of Appointment," 
thus relinquishing these interests in favor of 
the other family members. 
The IRS position was that by exercising the power the Donor 
relinquished valuable property rights, namely the right to income, 
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and the contingent remainder. The IRS refused to follow Self v. 
United States, 142 F.Supp. 939 (ct. Cl. 1956) , as stated in Rev. 
Rul. 79-327, 1979-2 C.B. 342. Self involved the appointment of 
principal which terminated an income interest. 
The IRS relied on the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Jewett v. 
Commissioner, 455 U.S. 302 (1982) where the Court said: 
[P]etitioner argues that the disclaimer ofa 
contingent remainder is not a taxable event by 
analogizing it to an exercise of a special 
power of appointment, which generally is not 
considered a taxable trans fer. 26 U. S . C. 
§2514. As the Commissioner notes in response, 
however, a disclaimant's control over property 
more closely resembles a general power of 
appointment, the exercise of which is a 
taxable transfer . . . Unlike the holder of a 
special power -- but like the holder of a 
general power -- a disclaimant may decide to 
retain the interest himself. 
The donor argued that this passage was dictum, because, in fact, 
Jewett was decided primarily on other grounds. 
If correct, the IRS position would transform the exercise of 
many inter vivos special powers into gifts. For example, where 
someone can receive income and principal for ascertainable 
standards there could be a gift. Is there a different result if 
the trust provides for the beneficiary to receive income and 
principal only if beneficiary does not exercise the special power 
of appointment; in that event the "standard" has anticipated an 
exercise? What if distributions are purely discretionary? 
A-11D 
6. Gift By Not Redeeming stock. 
The IRS answered the following question in the 
affirmative in TAM 9420001: 
For purposes of §2511 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, did the taxpayer, as the sole voting 
common shareholder, make taxable gifts to the 
nonvoting preferred shareholders by failing to 
have the corporation redeem the preferred 
stock, if, as a result of the failure to 
redeem the preferred stock, the preferred 
stock became convertible into voting common 
stock with a value in excess of the preferred 
stock? 
From 1964 until 1984 the preferred stock could have been 
redeemed to prevent its conversion .. The IRS relied on Snyder v. 
Commissioner, 93 T.C. 529 (1989), Rev. Rul. 89-3, 1989-1 C.B. 278, 
and Rev. Rul. 84-105, 984-2 C.B. 197, to conclude, in general, that 
"the taxpayer's failure to protect her economic interest resulted 
in an indirect transfer to the other shareholders. Consequently, 
for purposes of the gift tax, the taxpayer is regarded as making an 
indirect gift to the preferred shareholders." 
7. Value of Gift. 
The Eighth Circuit, in O'Reilly v. Commissioner, 973 F.2d 
1403 (8th Cir. 1992), determined that the valuation tables of 
section 2512 should not apply in valuing an income interest in 
closely-held shares which, historically; had paid a miniscule 
dividend. The Tax Court has now determined the proper value to be 
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less than 10% of the fair market value of the shares. Charles H. 
O'Reilly, Sr., 67 TCM 1994-61. 
8. Promise To Make a Gift. 
Roberta Schreiber Ulmer, et. ale v. Commissioner, 67 TCM 
1994-234, was a taxpayer victory in Tax Court. The facts were 
complex and involved IRS claims that gifts were made by means of 
certain family agreements and bargain sales. Of interest is the 
court's discussion of the gift tax implications of promises to make 
gifts: 
The rule with regard to a promise to make a 
gift has been well stated by the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Rosenthal 
v. Commissioner [53-2 USTC ~1I10,908], 205 F.2d 
505, 509 (,1953), revg. and remanding [Dec. 18, 
681] 17 T.C. 1047 (1951): "a binding promise 
to make a gift becomes subject to gift 
taxation in the year the obligation is 
undertaken and not when the discharging 
payments are made." That was the view of the 
Tax Court in Rosenthal v. Commissioner [Dec. 
18,681], 17 T.C. 1047 (1951), which was revd. 
and remanded by the Court of Appeals for the 
Second'Circuit [53-2 USTC CjIlO,908], 205 F.2d 
505 (2d Cir. 1953), to determine whether the 
binding promise in question was made in 
consideration of the release of the taxpayer 
from an earlier binding promise. See also 
Estate of Coply v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 17, 
20 (1950) (payments made' in 1946 and 1944, 
pursuant to a binding contract (an antenuptial 
agreement) entered into in 1931, were not 
taxable as gifts in 1936 and 1944), affd. 194 
F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1952). 
9 . Timing of Gift. 
The Tax Court, in Estate of Larch M. Cummins, TCM 1993-
518, determined that funds transferred after the decedent's death 
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(Oregon). The Irrevocable Letter of Instruction was signed by the 
decedent at 3:46 p.m., delivered to the broker at 4:00 p.m., 
accepted by 4:30 p.m. by the broker, and the decedent died at 4:40 
p.m. The instructions were carried out the next day. The court 
rejected arguments that· the letter created a trust relationship 
because the broker was not a designated trustee and the letter did 
not transfer legal title to the broker. And, the broker was not 
the donees' agent because the letter created no obligation to the 
donees directly. 
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R. Section 2518 - Disclaimer 
1. Effective Date. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the disclaimer of a 
remainder interest in a trust is subject to federal gift tax even 
if the trust created before the enactment of the tax. U.S. v. 
Irvine, (U.S. 1994). Justice Souter stated the 
issue to be: 
In Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 
(1982), we construed the 1958 version of 
Treasury Regulation §25.2511-1(c) to provide 
that the disclaimer of a remainder interest in 
a trust effects a taxable gift unless the 
disclaimant acts within a reasonable time 
after learning of the transfer that created 
the interest. This case presents the question 
whether the rule is the same, under current 
Treasury Regulation §25.2511-
l(c) (2) (Regulation), when the creation of the 
interest (but not the disclaimer) occurred 
before enactment of the federal gift tax 
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1932. We 
hold that it is. 
In 1917 Mr. Ordway established a trust, which terminated in 
1979 in favor of Mr. Ordway' s living grandchildren (and the 
descendants of a deceased grandchild). Two months after 
termination a grandchild disclaimed; the disclaimer was valid under 
applicable state law (Minnesota) because it was within 6 months of 
the grandchild becoming indefeasibly vested in the interest. The 
IRS argued that the disclaimer was not within a reasonable time 
after the grandchild learned of the interest. Wi th respect to 
reasonableness, the Court said: 
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The opportunity to disclaim, and thereby to 
avoid gift as well as estate taxation, should 
not be so long as to provide a virtually 
unlimited opportunity to consider estate 
planning consequences. While a decision to 
disclaim even at the earliest opportunity may 
be made with appreciation of potential estate 
tax consequences, the passage of time puts the 
prospective disclaimant in a correspondingly 
superior position to determine whether her 
need to enjoy the property (~nd incur a tax 
for a subsequent gift of it or an increased 
estate tax if she retains it) outweighs the 
favorable estate and gift tax consequences of 
a disclaimer. Al though there is no bright 
line rule for timeliness in the absence of a 
statute or regulation providing one, Mrs. 
Irvine's delay for at least 47 years after the 
clock began running, until she reached age 68, 
could not possibly be thought reasonable. By 
the date of her disclaimer, Mrs. Irvine was in 
a position to make a fairly precise 
determination of the advantage to be gained by 
a transfer diminishing her estate and its 
eventual taxation. If her decision were 
treated as timely, the requirement for a 
timely election would have no bite at all. 
The Court rejected the taxpayer's arguments: 
Even assuming the soundness of one or both of 
these arguments that the Regulation is 
inapposite, however, the disclaimer would not 
escape federal gift taxation by reference to 
state law rules giving effect to the 
disclaimer as causing a transfer to the 
beneficiary next in line. Any such reasoning 
would run counter to our holding in Jewett. 
2. Devolution of Disclaimed Property. 
TAM 9417002 reviewed Mississippi disclaimer law and 
discussed the consequences in light of no statutory provisions. 
The result was unfortunate for the taxpayer. The facts were 
simple: 
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The decedent died testate in 1989, a resident 
of Mississippi. under the decedent's Will, 
her daughter, A, was named as the sole 
beneficiary of the residue after the payment 
of debts and expenses. The Wtll further 
provides that if A does not survive the 
d.ecedent, a specified percentage of the 
decedent's stock in a close corporation will 
pass to each of A's three children named in 
the will and to A's spouse; the remaining 
property will pass to A's children named in 
the Will. The Will contains no provision 
concerning any beneficiary's disclaimer of an 
interest or the lapse of an interest. A 
survived the decedent and was appointed 
executor of the estate. 
Within nine months after the decedent's death, 
A executed a disclaimer of part of her 
interest as sole residuary beneficiary in the 
closely held shares. The disclaimer recited 
that, under the decedent's will, A is the 
beneficiary of 48,162 shares of the stock and 
that she was disclaiming any interest in 
23,085 of the shares in that gift. On the 
same date, A's spouse executed a disclaimer, 
reciting his belief that, due to A's 
disclaimer, an interest in the disclaimed 
. shares would pass to him under the decedent's 
will and that he disclaimed that interest. 
Both disclaimers were silent concerning any 
possible intestate interests of either person 
in the disclaimed property. 
A, as executor, distributed all of the 
disclaimed shares to her children named in the 
will. 
The IRS determined that at common law disclaimed property 
passed to intestate takers. The decedent's child, A, was the 
intestate taker. Thus, there was a gift when A distributed the 
assets to her children. 
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S. Sections 2601-2654 - Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax 
1. Grandfather Protection. 
PLR 9335005 held that a judicial modification of two 
trusts would not affect their grandfathered status forGST 
purposes. Among the trust assets were closely-held stock. One of 
the two trust remaindermen was actively involved with the closely-
held company. The judicial modification would permit the trustee 
to make a non-pro rata distribution of the trust assets at 
termination so that the stock of the closely-held company would be 
distributed to the remainderman who was active in the company. The 
other remainderman would receive other assets of equal value. The 
ruling notes this additional limitation on the trustee's power: 
The trust as judicially modified will provide 
that the power to make a non-pro rata 
distribution must not allow the trustee to 
affect the timing or fair market value of any 
distribution. Under the proposed modifi-
cation, in selecting assets to be distributed 
to E and F, the trustee would not be 
restricted by the liquidity, or the income tax 
basis, of the assets being distributed, or the 
acceptance or approval of the non-:-pro rata 
distribution by the trust beneficiaries. 
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T.· . Sections 2701-2704 - Special Valuation Rules 
1. Section 2701. 
In T.D. 8536 (May 4, 1994) a short final regulation 
relating to the mitigation of double taxation was issued. 
2. Section 2702. 
A. T.D. 8536 also eliminated the need to prorate the 
first year's payment for GRATs and GRUTs, thereby simplifying the 
valuation. 
~. As interest rates increase, personal residence 
trusts become more attractive and GRATs less attractive. 
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U. Sections 4940 - 4947 -- Private Foundation Restriction. 
1. stock Options. 
PLR 9411018 allowed the contribution of stock options to 
a private foundation by a disqualified person. The facts 
presented, and rulings given, were as follows: ' 
M is an individual who owns approximately 81% 
of the outstanding common stock of X and 100% 
of the Series A preferred stock ofX. 
Foundation is a nonprofit trust recognized by 
the Internal Revenue Service as exempt from 
tax under section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Foundation is also a private 
foundation as defined in section 509(a) of the 
Code. ,Both M and X are disqualified persons 
with respect to Foundation. 
M wishes to pledge stock options to Foundation 
which provides Foundation with a];l option to 
purchase XIS common stock at an option price 
equal toM's mean per share cost basis in the 
stock. The pledge option is exercisable by 
Foundation commencing on December 31, 1993 
until twenty years from the 'date' of the 
pledge. 
Prior to the expiration of the stock options, 
Foundation will transfer the stock options to 
one or more unrelated charitable organizations 
described in section 501 (c) (3) of the Code. 
It is expected that the unrelated charitable 
organizations will pay to Foundation a price 
for the option equal to the diffe-rence between 
the fair market value of the stock subject to 
the option on the date of the transfer and the 
exercise price of the option, less an agreed-
upon discount. The unrelated charitable 
organization will thereafter exercise the 
option prior to its expiration date. 
* * * 
Based on the information submitted, we rule as 
follows: 
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1. The pledge of the stock options by M 
to Foundation does not constitute an act of 
self-dealing between Foundation and a 
disqualified person under section 4941 of the 
Code. 
2. The exercise of the pledged stock 
options by unrelated charitable organizations 
to whom the options are transferred will not 
consti tute acts of self-dealing between 
Foundation and a disqualified person under 
section 4941 of the Code. 
4. The pledged options will be excluded 
from the assets taken into account in 
computing the amount of the minimum investment 
return or Foundation for purposes of 
determining the tax on failure to distribute 
income under section 4942 of the Code. 
5. Gains form the sales of the options 
by Foundation to unrelated charitable 
organizations will not be treated as net 
investment income of Foundation under section 
4940 of the Code. 
6. Gains from Foundation's sale of 
options to unrelated charitable organizations 
will be excluded from unrelated business 
taxable income under section 512(b) (5). 
2. Charitable Lead Trusts and Private Foundations. 
The Ninth Circuit has upheld the Tax Court in The Ann 
Jackson Family Foundation v. Commissioner, (1994). 
The issue, as the court presented it, was whether Treas. Reg. 
§53.4942(l)-2(b) (2) was invalid because inconsistent with section 
4942(e) of the Internal Revenue Code. The court's analysis was 
straightforward: 
By placing the amended statute [amended in 
1981] alongside the unrevised regulation, the 
difference between the two becomes obvious: 
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Under the statute, "distributable amount" is 
effectively limited to a maximum cf 5% of the 
fair market value of a foundation's own 
assets, while the regulation defines 
"distributable amount" as beginning with that 
same 5%, then adding thereto the income 
portion of trusts (which the IRS seeks to have 
here defined as included the Trust's entire 
corpus) . In short, the regulation seeks to 
include all of the Trusts's assets in those of 
the Foundation. (Footnote omitted.) 
Thus, charitable lead trusts become very helpful as ways to 
fund a family foundation. 
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V. Tax Admdnistration 
1. Section 6501 - Six Year Gift Tax Statute of Limitations. 
Section 6501(e) (2) provides that if a gift tax return 
omits from total gifts an item or items in excess of 25 percent of 
the amount of total gifts, gift tax may be assessed within 6 years 
after the filing of the return. In Estate of Robinson v. Comm'r, 
101 T.C. 33, the court rejected the IRS position that the section 
applied to ~ a return in which the donor claimed excessive annual 
exclusions: 
The 6-year period of limitations found in 
section 6501(e) (2) does not apply in the 
instant gift· tax case because decedent 
reported the correct values of all gifts she 
made during 1983 on her 1983 Federal gift tax 
return. There was no omission from total 
gifts of an item or items in excess of 25 
percent of the amount of total gifts reported 
by decedent on her 1983 gift tax return. 
Assuming, without deciding, for the purpose of 
the instant case, that claiming more annual 
exclusions that allowable under section 
2503 (b) would lead to our holding that an 
omission from the total amount of gifts 
occurred for purposes of section 6501 (e) (2), 
the gift tax returns filed by decedent made no 
such omission. As stated above, section 
6501(e) (2) provides that items which are 
adequately disclosed are not taken into 
account in determining the amount omitted from 
total gifts. The Federal gift tax. returns 
filed by decedent stated the number of annual 
exclusions being claimed and, therefore, 
adequately apprised the Commissioner of the 
specific number of annual exclusions claimed 
by decedent. Indeed, respondent does not 
argue that decedent did not adequately 
disclose the annual exclu~ions b~irig claimed. 
Consequently, the exclusions are not to be 
taken into account for purposes of determining 
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the amount omitted from total gifts for 
purposes of section 6501 (e) (2), and the 6-year 
period of limitations found in section 
6501 (e) (2) is not applicable to the 1983 gift 
tax year. 
2. Section 6324 (b) - Gift Tax Lien. 
In Ripley v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. No. 26 (1994), the 
court held that the gift tax lien of section 6324 (b) was not 
subject to usual deficiency procedures (e.g 90 day letter, etc.). 
The court described the operation of section 6324 as follows: 
In sum, section 6324(b) provides that where a 
donor fails to pay Federal gift tax for 
particular period for which a gift tax return 
was filed, a special 10-year lien attached to 
all gifts made by the donor during that period 
and the donees of such gifts are personally 
liable for the tax. Further, should the donee 
transfer the gifted property to a purchaser or 
security interest holder, the lien does not 
remain on the transferred property but a like 
lien attaches to the donee's other property, 
including after-acquired property. 
The court relied on the regulations issued under section 6324: 
(d) Application of lien imposed by section 
6321. The general lien under section 6321 and 
the special lien under subsection (a) or (b) 
of section 6234 for the estate or gift tax are 
not excl usi ve of each other, but are 
cumula ti ve. Each lien will arise when the 
conditions precedent to the creation of such 
lien are met and will continue in accordance 
wi th the provisions applicable to the 
particular lien. Thus, the special lien may 
exist without the general lien being in force, 
or the general lien may exist without the 
special lien being in force, or the general 
lien and the special lien may exist 
simultaneously, depending upon the facts and 
p~rtinent statutory provisions applicable to 
the respective liens. 
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three year gift tax statute of iimitations expired, under section 
~ 6501(a), without an audit by the IRS. On April 13, 1992, the IRS 
~ 
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sent to the grandchildren notices of transferee liability for a 
deficiency in the O'Neals' gift tax liability. The gift tax issue 
was picked up by the IRS because Mrs. O'Neal died in 1988, and the 
gift tax returns were reviewed as part of the estate tax audit. 
The Tax Court stated the issues as follows: 
The issues for decision are: (1) whether a 
donee/transferee ca~be held liable at law as 
a donee/transferee for gift tax and 
generation-skipping transfer . tax when 
respondent failed to assert the deficiency 
against the donor prior to the running of the 
statute of limitations against the donor; (2) 
whether, in accordance with section 6910, 
notice of liability was properly sent to 
petitioners; and (3) whether section 2504(c) 
precludes respondent from challenging the 
value used by the donors in reporting the 
gifts when the period of limitations for 
assessment against the donors has expired. 
The court analyzed the first issue in this way: 
Section 2501 imposes a tax on the transfer of 
property by gift. An additional tax on a 
generation-skipping transfer is imposed by 
section 2601.· A generation-skipping transfer 
is defined to include transfers of property 
from a grandparent to a grandchild. Secs. 
2611, 2612 and 2613. 
The second sentence of section 6324 (b) 
provides that if the gift tax or generation-
skipping transfer tax is not paid when due, 
the donee is personally liable for the gift 
tax or the generation skipping transfer tax to 
the extent of the value of the gift. 
Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 
147 F.2d 186, 187-188 (8th Cir. 1945), affg. a 
Memorandum Opinion of this Court. In Fletcher 
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Trust Co. V. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 36, 40 
(7th Cir. 1944), affg. 1 T.C. 798 (1943), the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in 
affirming our decision, held that the 
predecessor to section 6324(b) imposed 
liability at law upon a donee. See also Bauer 
V. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 338 (3d Cir. 1944) 
affg. 2 T.C. 1916 (1943). There are no 
requirements that respondent first assert a 
deficiency against a donor or that other steps 
be taken to collect from the donor. 
Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 
supra at 188; Moore v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 
14, 15 (1942), affd. 146 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 
1945) . Likewise, there is not requirement 
under section 6324(b) that the period of 
limitations on assessment of tax against the 
donor has not expired. I f the tax "is not 
paid when due," the dOnee is personally liable 
for the tax to the extent of the gift under 
section 6324(b). 
The fact of the personal liability of the. 
donee "at law" distinguishes this case and 
similar cases from those cases such as 
Commissioner v. Stern, 257 U.S. 39 (1958), 
whether respondent was required to show 
liabili ty of the transferee in equity under 
State law. cases such as Ste:cn have no 
applicability to the instant case. 
No matter what the reason for the donor's 
failure to pay the tax when due, the donee is 
liable for the tax to the extent of the value 
of the Gift. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. 
Commissioner, supra at 187-188. That the 
reason for the donor's not paying the tax when 
due was that no deficiency had been determined 
against the donor before the period of 
limitations for assessment against the donor 
expired is immaterial. The only requirement 
is that there be tax due with respect to the 
gift which remains unpaid. 
With respect to the second issue, the court noted that section 
~ 
~ 
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~ 6901(c) gives the IRS one year after the limitations period against ~ 
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the donor runs to assess the donees. Thus, the time periods were 
met. The court also rejected the application of section 2504(c) 
saying: 
Section 2504(c) does not limit how respondent 
values a gift of the current year. It limits 
the valuation for a prior year where the time 
within which "a tax may be assessed under this 
chapter" for the year has expired. Here, we 
have held that the time to assess the gift tax 
for the year would have not expired as to the 
transferee. Section 2504(c) limits how a gift 
from a preceding calendar year is valued for 
assessment of the gift tax for a subsequent 
calendar year. In the present case, the 
asserted deficiency is for the 1987 calendar 
year, and the gifts took place during 1987. 
Since the gifts are not gifts from a calendar 
period preceding the year in issue, the 
valuation of the gifts is not restricted by 
section 2;504 (c) . 
4. Renunciation; Effect on Section 6321. 
In U.S. v. Comparato, F.3d (2d 
Cir. 1994), the court held that once liens attach to property 
interests to be received by taxpayers from an estate, under section 
6321, a subsequent renunciation of the property interests by the 
taxpayers will not defeat the liens even if the renunciation is 
retroactive under applicable state law to before the date of the 
IRS assessments against the taxpayers. 
5. Retroactivity of Tax Changes. 
In United States v. Carlton, U.S. (1994), 
Justice Blackmun delivered the unanimous judgment of the Court that 
the 1987 repeal of a 1986 estate tax provision giving special tax 
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treatment to sales to ESOPs, which harmed a taxpayer who made use 
of the provision before repeal, did not violate the Fifth Amendment 
of the Constitution. 
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w. Potential Forthcoming Developments 
1., Fiduciary Income Tax Rates. Reportedly, effo'rts are' 
being made to have the income tax rates on trusts and estates 
lowered to the rates that apply to married individuals filing 
separately. The Daily Tax Reporter (May 23, 1994) notes efforts by 
the AICPA Tax Division, the American Bankers Association Taxation 
Committee, and the ABA Taxation and Real Property, Probate and 
Trust Law, 'Sections, and ACTEC. If successIul, the top tax rate 
for a trust or estate would begin above $125,000 . 
2. Regulations. Comments of Richard Grosebauer (Branch 
Chief, Office of Assistant Chief Counse'l, Passthroughs and Special 
Industries) before ABA Tax Sect,ion on May 13. 
A. Section 7520 - final regulations expected soon (in 
fact, issued· on June 10, 1994; see Appendix C for copy and 
comments) . 
B. Section 2056A -- proposed regulations expected by 
October (QDOTs). 
C. Section 2518 proposed regulation relating to 
timing in light of the u.S. Supreme Court's decision in J. Irvine, 
and clarifying rules about disclaimers of joint property. 
D. Section 2056 - proposed regulations relating to the 
mari tal deduction "specific portion" requirements and annuities 
expected, maybe, in early 1995. 
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E. Generally working on some section 2032A issues and 
Chapter 14 issues . 
3 . IRS Wish List. 
This Wish List has now been widely circulated (e.g., 1994 
Heckerling Estate Planning Institute; Practical Drafting) . 
IRS "Wish List" of Transfer Tax Changes 
The following list of suggested transfer tax changes prepared 
by personnel in the IRS National Office as distributed at a June 
1993 IRS meeting in Austin, Texas: 
a. Amend section 2053(a) (2) to disallow a deduction for any 
interest expense accruing to the estate after the decedent's death. 
b. Amend section 2503(b) to provide that an annual exclusion 
is not allowable for a gift to a donee unle.ss it is certain that 
the donee will eventually receive the gift property. 
c. Amend section 2519 of the Code to provide that, to the 
extent that there is an underfunding of a disposition establishing 
a QTIP interest for a surviving spouse, the underfunded portion 
will be deemed a gift made by the surviving spouse. The statute of 
limitations would not begin to run on this gift until the later of 
the date it is reported in full or the date that the estate tax 
return of the surviving spouse is filed. 
d. Amend section 2519 of the Code to provide that the 
purchase by the surviving spouse (or donee spouse) of the remainder 
interest in property subject to a QTIP election is deemed to be a 
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gift of the amount of the purchase price. The statute of 
~ 
a limitations would not begin to run on this gift until the later of 
J the date it is reported in full or the date that the estate tax 
:i 
~ 
return of the surviving spouse is filed. 
e. Amend section 2652 (a) (3) to permit the estate of the 
decedent to elect to treat all ora portion of the property in a 
QTIP trust as if the election to be ·treated as QTIP had not been 
made. 
fo Add new se~tion 2047 to provide that if an individual 
[who could be the grantor or beneficiary] has a power to remove and 
replace a trustee, then that individual shall be deemed to pos·sess 
the powers of the trustee. 
g. HR 11 section 4702 would amend section 2035 of the Code 
by clarifying the present language. 
h. Amend the present section 2035(d) (2) to provide that a 
life insurance policy issued within three. years of the decedent's 
death is includible in the gross estate even if the decedent did 
not technically own the incidents of ownership in the policy prior 
to death. 
i. Amend section 2039(a) to provide that s.urvivor benefits 
payable pursuant to an employer's nonqualifiedbenefi t plan are 
treated as payable under the same contract or agreement as the 
benefits payable under the employer's qualified pension plan. 
d 
E"l 
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j. Amend the estate, gift and generation-skipping transfer 
tax provisions of the Code to limit the application or minority 
discounts when valuing transfers of minority interests in closely 
held corporations among family members. 
k. Amend sections 2056 (d) (2) (B) , 2056(d) (4) (A) . and 
2056 (d) (5) (i) to clarify that the .acts required by these relief 
provisions must be completed before the estate tax return is filed 
and no later than one year after the due date for the return. 
1. Amend section 2056 (d) (3) to provide specific rules for 
allowance of the section 2013 credit for prior transfers for the 
estate of the surviving alien spouse. 
m. Amend section 2056 to provide that, to the extent that 
property passing to the surviving spouse exceeds $3,000,000, the 
marital deduction is limited to one-half of the value so passing. 
n. Amend section 2604 of the Code to repeal the credit for 
certain state generation-skipping transfer taxes (GSTT). 
o. Amend section 2612 to clarify that any generation-
skipping transfer that meets the definition of a direct skip and 
the definition of a taxable termination shall be defined as a 
direct skip. 
p. Amend section 6163 to provide for the deferral of estate 
tax that is attributable to the inclusion of an annuity in a 
decedent's gross estate. 
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q. Add a new section 7872 A to provide for the valuation of 
loan guarantees for purposes of chapters 11 and 12. 
A-134 
x. Miscellaneous state Cases of Interest 
1. In Matter of Estate of Laschkewitsch, 507 N.W.2d 65 (N.D. 
1993), the court denied a claim filed in the state of ancillary 
probate, even though the claim related to repairs made on property 
in the ancillary state, because the claimant had actual knowledge 
of the domiciliary probate. 
2. In Lansburgh v. Lansburgh, 632 A.2d 221 (Md. App. 1993), 
a trust terminated at the death of husband, with the remaining 
assets to be divided with husband's widow receiving the amount she 
would have received had the trust been part of husband's estate at 
his death. Husband was a domiciliary of Texas at his death; the 
trust was created and administered in Maryland. The court 
concluded Maryland law would control. 
3. Burch v. George, 866 P.2d 92 (Cal. 1994), dealt with the 
application of community property claims, and ERISA preemption, to 
in terrorem clauses. The surviving spouse wanted to be free to 
Ii tigate certain community property claims, and ERISA claims, 
without being subject to the clause; the court said no. 
A - 135 
Y. Kentucky Developments. 
~ 1. New Health Care Surrogate-and Living Will Statute. Copy 
attached as Appendix D. 
The new Act is a clear improvement over the prior legislative 
efforts. There are a number of potential issues however. 
a. What is its effect on non-Kentucky documents? The term 
"advance directive" applies to "any other document that provides 
direction relative to health care to be provided to the person 
executing the document." Yet, section 3 (2) provides that an 
"advance directive" must be executed in a particular manner. What 
about those executed in other states that do not meet this 
requirement? 
b. Precedence. Assume that in the Living Will Directive the 
grantor has authorized the withholding or withdrawal of 
artificially provided food, water, or other artificially provided 
nourishment or fluids. Does that take precedence over, or is it 
subservient to, the provisions of section 5 (3) setting forth 
specific circumstances under which a health care surrogate may 
authorize a withdrawal or withholding of artificially provided 
nutrition and hydration? Section 2 provides that a directive must 
be honored even if there is no health care surrogate. This should 
not mean that you are better off in certain circumstances not to 
have a health care surrogate. 
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c. Effectiveness. The Living Will Djrective provides that 
it sets forth the grantor is wishes regarding "life-prolonging 
treatment and artificially provided nutrition and hydration to be 
provided to me if I no longer have decisional capacity, 
terminal condition, or become permanently unconscious. 
the lack of decisional capacity alone a triggering event? 
have a 
" Is 
Or, is 
it tied to having a terminal condition or becoming permanently 
unconscious? Presumably the latter was intended, but the exact 
wording of the statute is confusing. 
d. Terminal Condition. The definition of "terminal 
condition" is a condition which "to a reasonable degree of medical 
probabili ty," as certified in certain ways, is incurable and 
irreversible and will result in death within a relatively short 
time, and where the application of life-prolonging treatment would 
serve only to artificially prolong the dying process. What about 
conditions which would otherwise be terminal -- that is they are 
incurable, irreversible and will result in death within a 
relatively short time, but which are not affected by the 
application of life-prolonging treatment but only by the 
application of artificial nutrition and hydration? 
e. Life-prolonging treatment. The definition of "life-
prolonging treatment" is any medical action which uses mechanical 
or other artificial means to sustain, prolong, restore, or supplant 
a spontaneous vital function and when administered to a patient 
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would serve only to prolong the dying process. Is there an 
accepted meaning to "prolong the dying process?" 
- ~ 
f. Determination of permanently unconscious or terminal 
condition. Both the definition of "permanently unconscious" and 
"terminal condition" require a determination to a reasonable degree 
of medical probability, and provide that such will be determined 
solely by the patient's attending physician and one other 
physician. Presumably, to determine a terminal condition,. it is 
not necessary to have the other physician clinically examine the 
individual, because the phrase "on clinical examination" is present 
in the definition of permanently unconscious, but not terminal 
condition. Is that intentional? 
Can a person's attending physician be changed? By whom? 
Generally, that would be part of a health care decision-making 
process so that a health care surrogate could change the attending 
physician. Th~ phrase "attending physician" is defined as "the 
physician who has primary responsibility for the treatment and care 
of the patient." 
Is it intended that the determination of whether someone is in 
a permanently unconscious state or has a terminal condition is not 
to be subject to review by (1) the health care provider, or (2) the 
courts. Section 7 (2) provides that a physician or health care 
facility which refuses to comply with an advance directive may not 
impede the transfer of the patient to another physician or health d :;;;;; 
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care facility which will comply. This could create a paradox. An 
3 
.= attending physician has no duty to comply with a health care 
d 
surrogate directed, for example, to withdraw life prolonging 
_--=---=3 treatment if there is no terminal condition (because the attending 
physician has decided that there is not a terminal condition). 
But, if another physician would decide that there is a terminal 
condition, then presumably the statute intends the second att!=nding 
physician to take over. 
9 . Execution. The Advance Directive must be witnessed by 
two or· more adults in the presence of the Grantor and in the 
presence of each other, or acknowledged before a Notary Public, and 
the statute sets forth a number of people who cannot be witnesses. 
That would appear to mean that the Notary replaces the witnesses, 
not that the witnesses have either to be in the presence of the 
Grantor and the presence of each other, or the witnesses have to be 
acknowledged by the Notary. I f so, can the Notary be a blood 
relative, etc.? Ordinarily you would think "yes" because of the 
literal language of the statute. However, the statute specifically 
provides that an employee of a health care facility in which the 
grantor is a patient cannot be a witness, but Gan be a Notary 
Public. The safest path would appear to be to have two witnesses 
and a Notary, like a Will. 
h. Withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. A health care 
~ surrogate may authorize the withdrawal or' withholding of 
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artificially provided nutrition and hydration in certain 
circumstances, some of which are interesting. The first is "when 
inevitable death is imminent." For that purpose, the statute says 
the phrase means when death is expected within a few days, and that 
the determination is to be made "by reasonable medical judgment." 
There is none of the attending physician/second physician language 
that the statute provides elsewhere. The second is "when a patient 
is in a permanently unconscious state if the grantor has executed 
an advance directive" authorizing the withholding or withdrawal. 
Presumably that means that the health care surrogate can authorize 
a withdrawal or withholding of artificially provided nutrition and 
hydration at any time when inevitable death is imminent, regardless 
of what the Grantor has said, assuming that the Grantor has not 
said anything contrary, but only if the Grantor is in a permanently 
unconscious state if the Grantor has executed an Advance Directive. 
In the so called "Karen Ann Quinlan situation," the person would be 
in a permanently unconscious state, but would not have executed an 
Advance Directive. The same would be true in a DeGrella or similar 
circumstance. Of course,the statute says that "may authorize" in 
the following circumstances and does not rule out authorizing in 
other circumstances. Is that important? 
i. Pregnancy. The pregnancy provision is of interest. The 
statute returns to the reasonable degree of medical certainty 
standard but with subtle differences. The reasonable degree of 
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medical certainty must be certified on the woman's medical chart by 
the intending physician and one other physician who has examined 
the woman. Is the change intentional? The statute goes on to 
provide that nutrition and hydration will be provided to a pregnant 
woman unless, in accordance with that reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, the procedures will not maintain the woman in a way to 
permit the continuing development live birth of the unborn child, 
or will be physically harmful to the woman, or will prolong severe 
pain which cannot be alleviated by medication. When would the 
provision of artificial nutrition and hydration be physically 
harmful to the woman? Further, the statute already suggests that 
artificial nutrition and hydration cannot be withdrawn if it is 
needed for the comfort or relief of pain (section 4(3) (d)) 
j. Applicability. This Act only applies to adults. Section 
2 provides that an adult with decisional capacity may make a 
written living will directive. Section 6 provides what happens to 
an adult patient who does not have decisional capacity but who has 
not executed an advance directive or who has not executed one which 
is directed if a decision must be made. A potential problem with 
section 6 would be for a person who has multiple children, and no 
spouse, and no guardian, because the decisions are made by a 
majority of the adult children who are reasonably available for 
consultation. What does reasonably available for consultation 
mean? If a person has no guardian, spouse, adult child or parent, 
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the person falls into a catchall which is the nearest living 
relative of the patient, or, if more than one relative of the same 
relation, a majority of the nearest living relatives, again using 
the reasonably available consultation standard. 
The statute provides that more than one health care surrogate 
may be designated, and that the health care surrogate(s) will act 
by unanimous decision unless a designation provides otherwise. Yet 
the statute earlier provided for a majority of children to serve. 
Thus, the statute does not choose a clear policy when the 
provisions of section 6(1) have in line the parents of the patient, 
does it require the parents to act unanimously or not? By the way, 
it also does not say the parents who are reasonably available, or 
if one declines to act, can the other act? 
k. Presumptions. Section 9 contains interesting provisions. 
Section 4 provides that the Act will not create a presumption 
concerning the intention of an adult who has revoked or has not 
executed an Advance Directive with respect to the use, withholding, 
withdrawal of a life-prolonging treatment if a terminal condition 
exists. Does that mean there is a presumption if the person is 
permanently unconscious? Surely that is not what the Legislature 
intended. Also, should there be an inference from the fact that a 
person has revoked an Advance Directive? 
2. Real Estate Transfer Tax statute. Copy attached as 
Appendix E. In general, transfers for estate planning purposes 
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(e.g., to a revocable trust agreement or personal residence trust) 
are protected. 
3. Lilly v. Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Company, Ky. 
App., 859 S.W. 2d 666 (1993). The court held, on complicated 
facts, that the law in effect when a testator died controlled 
whether a power of appointment was exercised, not the law at the 
time the power was created. Further, a power of appointment may be 
exercised in favor of a trust, absent a limitation in the power, as 
long as the trust beneficiaries are objects of the power. 
4 . Everly v. Wright, Ky. App., 872 S.W.2d 95 (1993) A 
widow who had never been appointed personal representative could 
not bring a wrongful death action. 
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APPENDIX A 
IRS NEWS RELEASE 93-121 (12/21/93) 
AND PROPOSED REGULATIONS (5/26/94) 
REQUIREMENT FOR CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO BE SUBSTANTIATED BY WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
FROM CHARITY 
[, 7222) IDtem&l Revenue Hew. IteIeue 93-121. December 21. 1993. 
(CodeSec& 170md6lJS) 
Charitable caatribw:iooa: R.nesaue RecoaciUatiOD Act of 1993.-Tbe IRS baa provided 
cuidmce to charities IUd iDdi'9idua1l for compliance with the n_ requirementa for doaatiolw 
0\'eI" S250 &ad quid pro quo caatribudoaa impoeed by the Rrlenae Reconciliation Act oil993 in 
New Public:atioo 1771. Charitable Coatrihationa-Sut.watiatioo aDd DiaclOlVl RequiremeatL 
Back refereoces:, 18S2.051Jlcl5Ol4A.05. 
Charities have a new substantiation J"eQUiR-
ment for certain contributions they receive OIl or: 
after January I, 1994, due to the Omnibus Budset 
Reconciliation Act'of 1993. 
To usi.st tharities in comp1yina1riththele new 
~ the IRS IIudeveloped new Publication 
1171, Chari~1e Cootributiont-Substantiatioo 
and Disclosure Requiremenu. The IRS aid it is 
mailing tliis pu&licatioa to over ~OOkharities 
in December 1993. 
Besinnins January I, clwities reeeiviiJ« pay-
ments described IS' "quid pro quo caBtributiens," 
in excess of $75, must provide a wriftell statement 
to the doooI. A qWd pro quo contributa-.iI ODe in 
which .part of the J1!ly¥l .~ for sooda or ~ 
received and part is a contribuUoe... . 
2 If section l(Xl2(d)-o(tiae"Tu ~. Ud 
Tedurica.l Carnctioal-~· at 1993, H..;R. 3419, 103d 
Cq., 1st Sesa., is enacted, SectiCIIl 7· of 1CeY. PnE. 
This statement must give a good faith estiinate 
of the value of the goods and service5 plus inform 
the donor that the charitable ded,1,ICti0ll iJ.liinited 
to the amount of the payment in u.cas of the 
value of the goods and services provided. for 
eJaDlple, if a penon gives a charity $100 aDd 
rs:eives in exchanse & $40 din.qer, the charity 
must inform the donor in writing that the dinner 
was valued .at $40 and only the portion of the 
payment exc:eediDs tbe value 0( the dinner, $60, 
qualifies u a ~haritable contribution. 
A written statement is DOt required if the &OOds 
or services provided by the orPruzatiOll are de 
. minimis,. token gpod.s or services, or an intan&ible 
reli&ious ~t. 
The responsibilitY. for providing disclosure 
statements for quid pro quo contrlbutioes fillet 
$75 rests with the charity. The t~ty Dust pro-
92-lOZ (immodifled) wauId be ~ ler ta ,.... 
beciJmin&.in 1993~ ..' 
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vide the statement in connection with either the 
solicitation or the receipt of the contribution. A 
penalty of $10 per contribution can be imposed on 
the charity for each failure to provide the reo 
quired statement. 
Charities also need to be aware of a new change 
affecting contributors. For charitable contribu-
tions of $250 or more made after Dec. 31, 1993, 
the· donor is not allowed a deduction unless the 
gift is acknowledged by the charity in writing. 
Also, the donor must obtain the acknowledgement 
by the earlier of the date the return is filed or the 
due date of the return. including any extensions. 
The acknowledgement must contain the 
amount of the cash or check and a description of 
any noncash propeny contributed. It must state 
whether the charity provided any goods or ser-
vices in return for the contribution. If so, it must 
also include a description and good faith estimate 
of the val ue of the goods or services or, if the goods 
and services consist solely of intangible religious 
benefits, a statement to that effect. 
A copy of Publication 1771 is attached. 
Publication 1771 
C1ari~ble Contributio~ul¥untiation 
and Disclosure Requiremenr. 
UNDER THE NEW LAW. CHARITIES 
WILL NEED TO PROVIDE NEW KINDS 
OF INFORMATION TO DONORS. Failure 
to do so may result in denial of deductions to 
donors and the imposition of penalties on chari-
ties. 
Legislation signed into law by the President on 
August 10, 1993. contains a number of significant 
provisions affecting tax~xempt charitable organi-
unions described in section 501(cX3) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. These provisions include: (1) 
new substantiation requirements for donors, and 
(2) new public disclosure requirements for chari· 
ties (with potential penalties for failing to com· 
ply). Additionally, charities should note that 
donors could be penalized by loss of the deduction 
if they fail to substantiate. THE SUBST ANTI· 
ATION AND DISCLOSURE PROVI· 
SIONS APPLY TO CONTRIBUTIONS 
MADE AFTER DECEMBER 31. 1993. 
Charities need to familiarize themselves with 
these tax law changes in order to briq themselves 
into compliance. This Publication alerts you to 
the new provisions affecting tax-exempt charita· 
ble organizations. Set forth below are brief de-
scriptions of the new law's key provisiOns. The 
Internal Revenue Service plans to provide further 
Ij;uidance in the near future. 
Donor', Subauntilltion R~uirrnnenu 
Documenting Certain Charitable Contribu· 
tionl.-Beginning January 1, 1994, no deduction 
will be allowed under section 170 of the Internal 
Revenue Code for any charitable contribution of 
$250 or more unless the donor has contemporane-
ous written substantiation from the charity. In 
cases where the charity has provided goods or 
services to the donor in exchange for making the 
contribution, this contemporaneous written ac-
knowledgement must· include a good faith esti-
rna te of the value of such goods or services. Thus, 
taxpayers may no longer rely solely on a cancelled 
check to substantiate a cash contribution of $250 
or more. 
The substantiation must be "contemporaneous." 
That is, it must be obtained by the donor no later 
than the date the donor actually files a return for 
the tax year in which the contribution was made. 
If the return is filed after the due date or ex-
tended due date. then the substantiation must 
have been obtained by the due date or extended 
due date. 
The responsibility for obtaining this substantia-
tion lies with the donor, who must request it from 
the charity. The charity is not required to record 
or report this information to the IRS on behalf of 
donors. 
The legislation provides that substantiation will 
not be required if, in accordance with regulations 
prescribed by the Secretary, the charity reports 
directly to the IRS the information required to be 
provided in the written substantiation. At pre-
sent, there are no regulations establishing pr0ce-
dures for direct reporting by charities to the IRS 
of charitable contributions made in 1994. Conse-
quently. charities and donors should be pr~pared 
to provide/obtain the described substantiation for 
1994 contributions of $250 or more. 
There is no prescribed format fOf" the written 
acknowledgement. For exam~, letten, postcards 
or computer·generated forms may be acceptable. 
The acknowledgement does not have to include 
the donor's social security or tax identification 
number. It must, however, provide sufficient in· 
formation to substantiate the amOWlt of the de-
ductible contribution. The acknowledgement 
should note the amount of any cash contribution. 
However, if the donation is in the form of prop-
erty, then the acknowledgement must describe, 
but need not value. such property. Valuation of 
the donated property is the responsibility of the 
donor. 
The written substantiation should also note 
whether the donee organization provided any 
goods or services in considera tion, in whole or in 
pan, for the contribution and, if so, must provide 
a description and good-faith estimate of the value 
17222 
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of the goods or services. In the new law these are 
referred to as "quid pro quo contributions." 
Please note that there is a new law requiring 
charities to furnish disclosure statements to do-
nors for such quid pro quo donations in excess of 
$75. This is addressed in the next section regard-
ing Disclosure by Charity. 
If the goods or services consist entirely of intangi-
ble religious benefits, the statement should indi-
cate this, but the statement need not describe or 
provide an estimate of the value of these benefits. 
"Intangible religious benefits" are also discussed 
in the following section on Disclosure by Charity. 
If, on the other hand, the donor received nothing 
in return for the contribution, the written sub-
stantiation must so state. 
The present law remains in effect that, generally, 
if the value of' an item or group of like items 
exceeds $5,000, the donor must obtain a qualified 
appraisal and submit an appraisal summary with 
the return claiming the deduction. 
The organization may either provide separate 
statements for each contribution of $250 or more 
from a taxpayer, or furnish periodic statements 
substantiating contributions of $250 or more. 
Separate payments are. regarded as independent 
contributions and are not aggregated for purposes 
of measuring the $250 threshold. However. the 
Service is authorized to establish anti-abuse rules 
to prevent avoidance of the substantiation re-
quirement by taxpayers writing separate smaller 
checks on the same date. 
If donations are made through payroll deductions, 
the deduction from each paycheck is regarded as a 
separate payment .. 
A charity that knowingly provides false written 
substantiation to a donor may be subject to the 
penalties for aiding and abetting an understate-
ment of tax liability under section 6701 of the 
Code. 
Disclosure by Charity of Reaript of Quid Pro 
Quo Contribution 
Beginning January I, 1994, under new section 
6115 of the Internal Revenue Code, a charitable 
organIzation must provide a written disclosure 
statement to donors who make a payment, de. 
scribed as a "quid pro quo contiibution," in excess 
of $75. This requirement is separate from the 
written substantiation required for deductibility 
purposes as discussed above. While, in cenain 
circumstances, an organization may be able to 
meet both requirements with the same written 
document, an organization must be careful to 
satisfy the section 6115 written disclosure state-
ment requirement in a timely manner because of 
the penalties involved. 
~7222 
A quid pro quo contribution is a payment made 
partly as a contribution and panly for goods or 
services provided to the donor by the charity. An 
example of a quid. pro quo contribution is where 
the donor gives a charity $100 in consideration for 
a concert ticket valued at $40. In this example, 
$60 would be deductible. Because the donor's pay-
ment (quid pro' quo contribution) exceeds $75, the 
disclosure statement must be furnished, even 
though the deductible amount does not exceed 
$75. 
Separate payments of $75 or less made at differ-
ent times of the year for separate fundraising 
events will not be aggregated for purposes of the 
$75 threshold. However, the Service is authorized 
to develop anti-abuse rules to prevent avoidance 
of this disclosure requirement in situations such 
as the writing of multiple checks for the same 
transaction. 
The required written disclosure statement 
must: 
(1) inform the donor that the amount of the 
contribution that is deductible for federal income 
ta)!: purposes is limited to the excess of any money 
(and the value of any property other than money) 
contributed by the donor over the value of goOds 
or services provided by the charity. and 
(2) provide the donor with a good-faith estimate 
of the value of the goods or services that the donor 
received. 
The charity must furnish the statement in connec· 
tion with either the solicitation or the receipt of 
the quid pro quo contribution. If the disclosure 
statement is furnished in connection with a par-
ticular ~licitation, it is not necessary for the 
organization to provide another statement when 
the associated contribution is actually received. 
The disclosure must be in writing and must be 
made in a manner that is reasonably likely to 
come to the attention of the donor. For eumple, a 
disclosure in small print within a larger document 
mi6.~t not meet this requirement. 
In the foUowiB« three circumstances, the discl~ 
sure statement is not required. 
(1) Where the only goods or services given to a 
donor meet the standards for "insubstantial 
value" set out in section 3.01, paracraph 2 of Rev. 
Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, as amplified by 
section 2.01 of Rev. Proc. 92-49, 1992-1 CoB. 987 
(or 'any updates or revisions thereof); 
(2) Where there is no donative element in-
volved in a particular transaction wjth a charity, 
such as in a typical museum gift shop sale. 
(3) Where there is only an intangible religious 
benefit provided to the donor. The intallgible reo 
CCll994, Commerce Clearinc Hou.. Inc. 
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ligious benefit must be provided to the donor by 
an organization organized exclusively for religious 
purposes, and must be of a type that generally is 
not sold in a commercial transaction outside the 
donative context. An example of an intangible 
religious benefit would be admission to a religious 
ceremony. The exception also generaIly applies to 
de minimis tangible benefits, such as wine, 'pro-
vided in connection with a religious ceremony. 
The intangible religious benefit excep.tion, how· 
ever, does not apply to such items as payments for 
tuition for education leading to a recognized de· 
gree, or for travel services, or consumer goods. 
A penalty is imposed on charities that do not meet 
the disclosure' requirements. For failure to make 
Exempt Orpnizationa Reports 
the required disclosure in connection with a quid 
. pro quo contribution of more than $75, there is a 
penalty of $10 per contribution, not to exceed 
$5,000 per fundraising event or mailing. The 
charity may avoid the penalty if it can show that 
the failure was due to reasonable cause. 
Please note that the prevailing basic rule allowing 
donor deductions only to the extent that the pay·. 
ment exceeds the fair market value of the goods or 
services received in return still applies generally 
. to all quid pro quo contributions. The $75 thresh-
old pertains only to the obligation to disclose and 
the imposition of the $10 per contribution pen-
alty, not the rule on deductibility of the payment. 
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INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE TEMPORARY REGULATIONS (TO 8544) 
AND NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (IA-74-93) BY CROSS-REFERENCE 
TO TEMPORARY REGULATIONS REGARDING SUBSTANTIATION REQUIREMENTS 
FOR CERTAIN CONTRIBUTIONS, ISSUED MAY 26,1994 
(TEXT) 
(Note: The temporary regulations and notice of proposed rulemaking are scheduled to appear in the Federal 
Register dated May 27, 1994.) 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
Internal Revenue Service 
26 CFR Parts 1 and 602 
[TO 8544] 
RIN 1545-AS28 
Substantiation Requirement for Certain Contributions 
AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury. 
ACTION: Temporary regulations. 
r 
SUMMARY: These temporary regulations are being issued 
to provide guidance to the public with respect to the substan-
tiation requirement contained in section 170(f)(8) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. Section 170(f)(8) was added to the Code by 
section 13172 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993. The guidance contained in these regulations affects 
donors of charitable contributions of $250 or more. 
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 1, 1994. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joel S. Rut-
stein, 202-622-4930 (not a toll-free call). 
SUPPLEMENT ARY INFORMATION: 
Paperwork Reduction Act 
These regulations are being issued without prior notice 
and public procedure pursuant to the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (5 U.S.C. 553). For this reason, the collection of 
information contained in these regulations has been re-
viewed and, pending receipt and evaluation of public com-
ments, approved by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) under control number 1545-1431. 
For further information concerning this collection of in-
formation, and where to submit comments on this collection 
of information, the accuracy of the estimated burden, and 
suggestions for reducing this burden, please refer to the 
preamble in the cross-reference notice of proposed rulemak-
ing publ:s!led in the Proposed Rules section of this issue of 
the Federal Register. 
Background 
This document contains amendments to the Income Tax 
Regulations (26 CFR part 1) relating to the substantiation 
requirement for the deduction of certain charitable contri-
butions under section 170(f)(8) of the Internal Revenue Code 
(Code). Section 170(f)(8) was added by section 13172 of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. 
Need for Temporary Regulations 
The prOvisions contained in this Treasury decision are 
needed immediately to provide guidance to the public with 
respect to the application of the substantiation requirement 
of section 170(f)(8). Therefore, it is found impracticable and 
contrary to the public interest to issue this Treasury deci~ 
sion with prior notice under section 553(b) of title 5 of the 
United States Code. 
Explanation of Provisions 
Section 170 allows a deduction for contributions to or for 
the use of certain specified organizations, including those 
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, literary, or educational purposes. 
To be deductible under section 170 of the Code, a payment 
to or for the use oia qualified organization must be a gift-
that is, a payment of money or transfer of property without 
adequate consideration. Rev.Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104. 
Thus, if a taxpayer receives goods or services from the 
organization in consideration for a payment, the taxpayer 
may not deduct as a charitable contribution more than the 
excess of the amount paid over the value of. the consider-
ation received therefor. Id. The Service has determined, 
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however, that if a taxpayer receives only certain inconse-
quential or insubstantial benefits in consideration for a 
payment to a qualified organization, the taxpayer may 
deduct the entire payment as a charitable contribution. Rev. 
Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471. See also Rev. Proc. 92-49, 
1992-1 C.B. 987 (amplifying Rev. Proc. 90-12 by providing 
that certain free, unordered, low-cost items that accompany 
charitable solicitations are considered to have insubstantial 
value). (See §601.601(d)(2)(ii) of the Statement of Procedural 
Rules, 26 CFR part 601.) 
Section 170(f)(8) disallows a deduction for any contribu-
tion of $250 or more that is not substantiated by a written 
acknowledgment from the donee organization. The acknowl-
edgment must provide information regarding (a) the money 
or other property contributed, and (b) any goods or services 
provided by the donee organization in whole or partial 
consideration for the contributed money or other property. 
Section 170(f)(8) is a compliance provision, intended to 
facilitate the enforcement of the substantive requirements 
for a deduction under section 170. The compliance purpose 
of section 170(f)(8) does not require that an acknowledgment 
refer to goods or services provided by a donee organization 
to a donor if the provision of goods or services does not 
affect the amount that the donor is entitled to deduct as a 
charitable contribution. Therefore, the temporary regula-
tions provide that goods or services given in return for a 
contribution need not be taken into account for purposes of 
section 170(f)(8), if the goods or services have insubstantial 
value under the guidelines provided in Rev. Procs. 90-12 and 
92-49 (and any successor documents). (See §601.601(d)(2)(ii) 
of the Statement of Procedural Rules, 26 CFR part 601.) 
The legislative history of the 1993 Act states that Con-
gress intended a similar exception to apply in connection 
with the disclosure requirement of section 6115. See H. Rep. 
No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 566 (1993). Although the 
legislative history does not discuss application of such an 
exception to the substantiation requirement of section 
170(f)(8), the Service has determined that such al\ exception 
is equally appropriate. 
Some donee organizations receive contributions through 
arrangements in which employers withhold amounts from the 
wages of their employees in accordance with pledges made 
by the employees, and pay the withheld amounts to the donee 
organizations. Donee organizations that use these arrange-
ments may not know the identity of the contributing employ-
ees or the amounts contributed by each employee. Therefore, 
these donee organizations may face difficulty in preparing 
the acknowledgments contemplated by section 170(f)(8). 
The statutory language and legislative history of section 
170(f)(8) suggest that Congress appreciated the difficulties of 
applying the substantiation requirement to contributions 
made by payroll deduction and intended that these difficul-
ties be addressed by regulations. Section 170(fX8)(E) directs 
the Secretary to "provide such regulations as may be neces-
sary or appropriate" to carry out the purposes of section 
170(f)(8), "including regulations that may provide that some 
or all of the requirements of [that section] do not apply in 
appropriate cases." The Conference Report on the 1993 Act 
expresses the conferees' intent that the Secretary exercise 
his regulatory authority "to clarify the treatment of contri-
butions made through payroll deductions." H. Rep. No. 213, 
supra, at 567. 
Accordingly, the temporary regulations also provide spe-
cial rules for contributions made by payroll deduction. The 
special rules allow taxpayers to substantiate contributions 
made by payroll deduction by a combination of two docu-
ments: (a) a document furnished by the taxpayer's employer 
that evidences the amount withheld from the taxpayer's 
wages, and (b) a document prepared by the donee organiza-
tion that states that the organization does not provide goods 
or services as whole or partial consideration for any contri-
butions made by payroll deduction. 
The special rules for contributions made by payroll deduc-
tion, like the underlying statutory provisions, do not require 
that the document prepared by the donee organization take 
any particular form. Similarly, although donors must obtain 
the document in time to meet the "contemporaneous" re-
quirement of the statute (generally, by the time they file the 
relevant tax return), the rules do not require· the donee 
organization to prepare the document at· any particular 
time. Therefore, if a donee organization includes the state-
ment contemplated by the rules on a pledge card prepared 
to solicit contributions in 1995, a donor who receives the 
card before timely filing the donor's 1994 tax return could 
use the card to substantiate contributions made in 1994. 
Contributions made by payroll deduction during 1994 can 
thus be substantiated under these rules even if the donee 
organization has used pledge cards for 1994 contributions 
that do not include the statement contemplated by the rules." 
As a result; the Service understands that donee organiza-
tions will be able to comply with the "contemporaneous" 
requirement for 1994 contributions. The Service invites 
comments, however, on whether transitional relief from the 
"contemporaneous" requirement is needed for 1994 
contributions. . 
The temporary regulations also provide that, for purposes 
of applying the $250 threshold provided in section 
170(f)(8)(A) to contributions made by payroll deduction, the 
amount withheld from each paycheck is treated as a sepa-
rate contribution. Thus, the substantiation requirement of 
section 170(f)(8) will not apply to contributions made by 
payroll deduction unless the employer deducts $250 or more 
from a single paycheck for the purpose of payment to a 
donee organization. This rule is consistent with the legisla-
tive history of section 170(f)(8). See H. Rep. No. 213. supra, 
at 565 n.29 ("In cases of contributions paid by withholding 
from wages, the deduction from each paycheck will be 
treated as a separate payment."). 
Some charitable organizations solicit contributions in the 
form of payroll deductions or lump-sum payments for the 
purpose of distributing the amounts received to other chari-
table organizations. The temporary regulations provide that. 
in such cases, the distributing organization is treated as a 
donee organization for purposes of the substantiation re-
quirement of section 170(f)(8). This rule applies regardless of 
whether the distributing organization distributes the contrib-
uted funds pursuant to the donor's instructions. The rule 
does not apply, however, if a distributee organization pro-
vides goods or services to the donor as part of a transaction 
structured with a view to avoid taking the goods or services 
into account in determining the amount of the deduction to 
which the donor is entitled under section 170. 
Special Analyses 
It has been determined that these temporary regulations 
are not a significant regulatory action as defined in Execu-
tive Order 12866. It has also been determined that se<:tion 
553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 
5) and the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) do 
not apply to these regulations, and, therefore, an initial 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is not required. Pursuant to 
section 7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, these regula-
tions will be submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of 
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the Small Business Administration for comment on their 
impact on small business. 
Drafting Information 
The principal author of these regulations is Joel S. Rut-
stein, Office of the Assistant Chief counsel (Income Tax & 
Accounting), Internal Revenue Service. However, other per-
sonnel from the Service and Treasury Department partici-
pated in their development. 
List of Subjects 
26 CFR part 1 
Income taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 
26 CFR part 602 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 
Adoption of Amendments to the Regulations 
Accordingly, 26 CFR parts 1 and 602, are amended as 
follows: 
PART 1 - INCOME TAXES 
Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 is amended 
by adding an entry in numerical order to read as follows: 
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 • •• §1.l70A-13T also issued 
under 26 U.S.C 170(f)(8)(E). 
Par. 2. Section 1.170A-13T is added to read as follows: 
§ 1.170A-13T Substantiation requirement for certain 
contributions. 
(a) Certain goods or services that have insubstantial 
value not taken into account. Goods or services that have 
insubstantial value under the guidelines provided in Rev-
enue Procedures 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, and 92~49, 1992-1 
C.B. 987, (and any successor documents) need not be taken 
into account for purposes of section 170(fX8). (See 
§601.601(d)(2Xii) of the Statement of Procedural Rules, 26 
CFR part 601.) 
(b) Contributions made by payroU deduction - (1) 
Form of substantiation. A contribution made by means of 
withholding from a taxpayer's wages and payment by the 
taxpayer's employer to a donee organization may be sub-
stantiated, for purposes of section 170(£)(8), by -
(i) A pay stub, Form W-2, or other document furnished 
by the employer that evidences the amount withheld by 
the employer for the purpose of payment to a donee 
organization, and 
(ii) A pledge card or other document prepared by the 
donee organization that includes a statement that the 
organization does not provide goods or services in whole 
or partial consideration for any contributions made to the 
organization by payroll deduction. 
(2) Application of $250 threshold. For the purpose of 
applying the $250 threshold provided in section 170(fX8XA) 
to contributions made by the means described in paragraph 
(b)(l) of this section, the amount withheld from each pay-
ment of wages to a taxpayer is treated as a separate 
contribution. 
(c) Distributing organizations as donees. An organiza-
tion described in section 170(c), or an organization described 
in 5 CFR 950.105 (a Principal Combined Fund Organization 
for purposes of the Combined Federal Campaign) and acting 
in that capacity, that receives a payment made as a contri-
bution is treated as a donee organization solely for purposes 
of section 170(f)(8), even if the organization (pursuant to the 
donor's instructions or otherwise) distributes the amount 
received to one or more organizations described in section 
170(c). This paragraph (c) does not apply, however, to a case 
in which the distributee organization provides goods or 
services as part of a transaction structured with a view to 
avoid taking the goods or services into account in determin-
ing the amount of the deduction to which the donor is 
entitled under section 170. 
(d) Effective date. The rules of this section apply to 
contributions made on or after January 1, 1994. 
PART 602-0MB CONTROL NUMBERS UNDER 
THE PAPE.RWORK REDUCTION ACT 
Par. 3. The authority for part 602 continues to read: 
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805. 
Par. 4. Section 602.101(c) is amended by adding the entry 
"1.l70A-13T ... 1545-1431" in numerical order to the table .. 
/s/ Margaret Milner Richardson 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
Approved: May 6, 1994 
/s/ Leslie Samuels 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
Internal Revenue Service 
26 .CFR Parts 1 and 602 
IA-.74-93 
RIN 1545-AS27 
Substantiation Requirement for Certain Contributions 
AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury. 
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking by cross-refer-
ence to temporary regulations. 
SUMMARY: In the Rules and Regulations section of this 
issue. of the Federal Register, the Internal Revenue Service 
is issuing temporary regulations relating to the substanti-
ation requirement for certain charitable contributions under 
section 170(fX8) of the Internal Revenue Code. The guidance 
contained in those temporary regulations affects donors of 
charitable contributions of $250 or more. The text of the 
temporary regulations also serves as the comment docu-
ment for this notice of proposed rulemaking. Comments will 
be considered not only on the temporary rules promulgated, 
but also on other issues arising under section 170(f)(8). These 
issues include, but are not limited to, (a) what constitutes a 
good faith estimate of the value of goods and services, (b) 
what is an intangible religious benefit, and (c) what is a 
contemporaneous acknowledgment. 
DATES: Comments and requests for a public hearing must 
be delivered or maileq by July 26, 1994. 
ADDRESS: Send comments and requests for a public hear-
ing to: Internal Revenue Service, P.O. Box 7604, Ben Frank-
lin Station, 
Attn: CC:DOM:CORP:T:R (IA-74-93), Room 5228, Washing-
ton, DC 20044. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joel S. Rut-
stein, 202-622-4930 (not a toll-free call). 
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
Paperwork Reduction Act 
'The collection of information contained in these regula-
tions has been submitted to the Office of Management and 
Budget for review n accordance with the Paperwork Reduc-
tion Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3504(h». Comments on the 
collection of information should be sent to the Office of 
Management and Budget: Paperwork Reduction Project, 
Washington, DC 20503, with copies to the Internal Revenue 
Service, Attn: IRS Reports Clearance Officer PC:FP, Wash-
ington; DC 20224. 
The collection of information in this notice of proposed 
rulemaking is in section 1.170A-13T. This information, is 
required by the Internal Revenue Service to substantiate 
certain charitable contributions. The likely recordkeepers 
are individuals, business or other for-profit institutions, and 
small businesses. 
Estimated total annual recordkeeping burden: 51,500 
hours. The estimated annual burden per recordkeeper varies 
from 15 minutes to 30 minutes, depending on individual 
circumstances, with an estimated average of 30 minutes. 
Estimated number of record keepers: 16,000. 
Background 
For the text of the temporary regulations adding 
§1.l70A-13T to 26 CFR part 1, see TD 8544, published in the 
Rules and Regulations section of this issue of the Federal 
Register. The preamble to the temporary regulations ex-
plains the regulations. 
Special Analyses 
It has been determined that this notice of proposed rule-
making is not a significant regulatory action as defined in 
Executive Order 12866. It has also been determined that 
section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 
chapter 5) and the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 
chapter 6) do not apply to these regulations, and;therefore, 
an initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is not required. 
Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, 
these proposed regulations will be submitted to the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration 
for comment on their impact on small business. 
Comments and Request for a Public Hearing 
Before these proposed regulations are adopted as final 
regulations, consideration will be given to any written com-
ments that are timely submitted (preferably a signed origi-
nal and eight copies) to the Internal Revenue Service. All 
comments will be available for public inspection and' copy-
ing in their entirety. A public hearing will be scheduled and 
held upon written request by any person who timely submits 
written comments on the proposed rules. Notice of the date, 
time, and place for the hearing will be published in the 
Federal Register. 
Drafting Information 
The principal author of these proposed regulations is Joel 
S. Rutstein, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel (Income 
Tax & Accounting), Internal Revenue Service. However, 
other personnel from the Service and Treasury Department 
participated in their development. 
List of Subjects in 26 CFR part 1 
Income taxes! Reporting and recordkeephlg requirements: 
Proposed Amendments to the Regulations 
Accordingly, 26 CFR part 1 is proposed to be amended as 
follows: 
PART 1-INCOME TAXES 
Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 is amended 
by adding an entry in numerical order to read as follows: 
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 ••• §1.170A-13A also issued 
under 26 U .S.C. 170(f)(8)(E). 
Par. 2. Section 1.170A-13A is added to read as follows: 
§1.170A-13A Substantiation requirement for certain 
contributions. 
[The text of this proposed section is the same as the 
text of §1.170A-13T published elsewhere in this issue of 
the Federal Register]. 
/s/ Margaret Milner Richardson 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
End of Text 
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APPENDIX C 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (PS-26-93), 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO INCOME, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAX REGULATIONS 
UNDER INTERNAL REVENUE CODE RELATING TO EXCEPTIONS TO USE OF STANDARD 
VALUATION TABLES FOR VALUING ANNUITIES, INTERESTS OF LIFE OR A TERM OF YEARS, 
AND REMAINDER OR REVERSIONARY INTERESTS, ISSUED JUNE 9, 1994 
(TEXT) 
(Note: The notice of proposed rulemaking is scheduled to appear in the Federal Register dated June 10, 1994.) 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
Internal Revenue Service 
26 CFR Parts 1, 20, and 25 
[PS-26-93] 
RIN 1545-AR56 
Actuarial Tables Exceptions 
AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury. 
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. 
SUMMARY: This document contains proposed amend-
ments to the income, estate, and gift tax regulations under 
the Internal Revenue Code relating to exceptions to. the use 
of standard valuation tables for valuing annuities, interests 
for life or a term of years, and remainder or reversionary 
interests. These amendments are necessary in order to 
provide guidance consistent with court decisions that call 
for deviation from the use of standard valuation tables in . 
valuing those interests. The proposed regulations would 
apply in valuing all interests that would, but for the excep-
tions, be valued under section 7520 of the Code~ ;. 
DATES: Written comments and requests for a puolic. 
hearing must be received by August 9, 1994. 
ADDRESSES: Send submissions to: CC:OOM..-CORP:T:R. 
([PS-26-93D, room 5228, Internal Revenue Service, POB 
7604. Ben Franklin Station, Washington. DC 20044. In the 
alternative, submissions may be hand delivered to: CC:DOM: 
CORP:T:R ([PS-2S-93D, room 5228, Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, 1111 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William L. 
Blodgett, telephone (202) 622-3090 (not a toll-f~ number). 
SUPPLEMENT ARY INFORMATION: 
Background 
This document contains proposed regulations (26 CFR 
1.7520-3(b), 20.7520-3(b). and 25.7520-3(b» for th-e valuation 
of certain partial interests in property under section 7520 of 
the Internal Revenue Code (Code), as added by rection 5031 
of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, 
when the use of standard actuarial tables would produce 
unreasonable results. The regulations are proposed to be 
effective for valuation dates occurring after the date the 
regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal 
Register. 
Explanation of Provisions 
Section 7520(a), which is effective after April, 30, 1989, 
provides that the value of annuities, interests for life or a 
term of years, and remainder or reversionary interests is to 
be determined under tables published by the IRS based on an 
interest rate equal to 120 percent of the applicable Federal 
mid-term rate (rounded to the nearest two-tenths of one 
percent) in effect under section 1274(dX1) for the month in 
which the valuation date falls. Section 7520(b) provides that 
section 7520 shall not apply for purposes of any provision 
specified in regulations. The Conference Report to the. Tech-
nical and . Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, H.R. Conf. 
Rep. No. 1104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1988), 1988-3 C.B. 
603. explains that section 7520 does not apply to "situations 
specified in Treasury regulations." 
. .' The "IRS has 'never attempted to include in the regulations 
. ~: ~1l·oUh.e : different actuarial factors that could apply to the 
many different kinds of vested and contingent annuity, 
i~!!!l.me, and remainder interests that can arise in tax admin-
"istration,Thtql.c~uarial tables that have been set forth in the 
regulatio~'fropi'time to time have listed only those factors 
that are t.DQst frequently needed by taxpayers. Generally, 
these ac;:~a.rial tables have included the one-life annuity. 
income; and remainder factors for ages 0 through 109 and 
tl)e term-certain annuity, income. and remainder factors for 
periods of 1 through 60 years. These one-life· and term-
certain factors are often referred to in this notice of pro-
posed rulemaking as "standard actuarial. factors" or 
"standard section 7520 actuarial factors." 
Other standard actuarial factors that are less frequently 
needed by taxpayers. are included in tables that have been 
separately published by the IRS from time to time and that 
may be purchased. from the Government printing Office. 
The tables in these books include two-life actuarial factors, 
as well as many one-life factors and term-certain factors 
not found in the regulations tables. These publications also 
include a number of examples that illustrate how to com-
pute sp~cial section 7520 actuarial factors such as the 
annuity, income, or remainder factor for a period limited to 
the lesser of a term certain or a lifetime; Special actuarial 
factors have for many years been referred to as such in the 
regulations. See, for example, §20.2055-2(fX5). 
Other special section 7520 actuarial factors that may 
apply to more unusual situations may be computed by the 
taxpayer or, upon request, by the Internal Revenue Service 
for the taxpayer, by using actuarial methods consistent with 
those used to compute the standard section 7520 actuarial 
factors that appear in the tables in the regulations and in the 
Service's publications. Examples of these more unusual 
situations include an annuity-payable for more than two 
lives, a right to income for a term certain or until the prior 
death of the first to die of two individuals, and the right to 
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A -161 
L-2 (No. 110) TAXATION, BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING TEXT (DTR) 6-10-94 
receive a remainder after a term certain if an individual 
survives the term. 
In calculating a standard section 7520 actuarial factor, 
certain assumptions are made. For all standard section 7520 
actuarial factors in the single-life and term-certain tables in 
§20.2031-7(d), the interest rate for enjoyment or the postpon-
ement of enjoyment is the applicable section 7520 rate. In 
the case of a life annuity, income, or remainder factor, the 
basis for mortality rates for measuring lives is the data in 
Table 80 CNSMT. However, in unusual situations, where 
special section 7520. actuarial factors must be computed, 
one or more alternaflve assumptions may be appropriate. 
For example, if the actual income is known to be below 
applicable standards, the section 7520 interest rate may not 
be used to project the trust income yield. Similarly, jf a 
measuring life is classified as terminally iII, the standard 
mortality data from Table 80 CNSMT may not be used as 
the mortality basis. But, even though one or both of these 
exceptions is applicable in a case, the section 7520 interest 
rate will ordinarily be used to discount the value of the right 
to any postponed enjoyment. 
In cases requiring the valuation of ordinary annuities, 
income interests, and remainder and reversionary interests, 
the courts have consistently recognized the need to use the 
standard actuarial factors prescribed by the regulations. See 
Ithaca Trust v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929). 
However, the courts have recognized that the use of the 
standard actuarial factors is inappropriate in certain cases. 
Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943) (reversionary 
interest with several interdependent contingencies); Stark 
v. United States, 477 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 975 (1973) (closely held stock that was not publicly 
traded and paid no dividends); O'Reilly v. Commissioner, 
973 F.2d 1403 (8th Cir. 1992), rem'd, T.C.M. 1994-61 (dispar-
ity between .2 percent yield and 10 percent tables produced 
unrealistic and unreasonable result); and Commissioner v. 
Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187 (1955) (charitable 
bequest that would occur only if decedent's unmarried 
daughter died without issue surviving her and her mother). 
In addition, the courts have held that the standard actuarial 
factors cannot be used if the measuring life is terminally iII. 
Estate of McLendon v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1993-459; 
Estate of Jennings v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 323 (1948); 
and Estate of Denbigh v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 387 (1946). 
See Rev. Rul. 80-80, 1980-1 C.B. 194, which provides that, in 
cases where the individual's death is imminent, the taxpayer 
may not use standard actuarial factors prescribed by the 
regulations. See also, Carter v. United States, 921 F.2d 63 
(5th Cir. 1991), where the court refused to ascribe value to 
an income interest for purposes of the section 2013 credit 
where death of the measuring life was simultaneous with 
that of the decedent. 
In Shapiro v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1993-483 
(1993), the Tax Court allowed the taxpayer to improperly 
value an annuity with a standard one-life annuity actuarial 
factor from Table A in §20.2031-7(f) in a situation in which 
the annuity could have exhausted the fund from which the 
annuity was to be paid before the death of the annuitant. The 
Internal Revenue Service believes that the annuity factor 
that should have been used in this case is a special annuity 
factor for the right to receive annual payments for 4 years 
or until the prior death of the annuitant. See Rev. Rul. 77-
454, 1977-2 C.B. 351. See also Moffett v. Commissioner, 
269 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1959), and United States v. Dean, 224 
f.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1955). Therefore, the Service will not follow 
the result in Shapiro. 
Sections 1.7520-3(a), 20.7520-3(a), and 25.7520-3(a) set 
forth specific Code sections that are exempt from the valu-
ation rules of section 7520. The proposed regulations con-
tamed. in this notice descr~be other areas in which the 
valuatIOn methodology apphcable to standard and special 
section 7520 actuarial factors is not to be used. Generally if 
the interest in property that is to be valued is not 'an 
ordinary annuity, income interest, or remainder interest, the 
standard annuity, income, and remainder factors in the 
tables of factors set forth in the regulations and IRS publica-
tions cannot be used. In some cases in which the standard 
factors from the regulations and publications tables cannot 
be used. a special factor may be computed by the taxpayer 
or by the Service upon the request of the taxpayer. In other 
cases where standard or special factors may not be used, the 
property interest may be valued using other valuation tech-
niques. Depending upon the facts and circumstances, a 
property interest that cannot be valued using the standard 
or special section 7520 factors may have no ascertainable 
value. 
The proposed regulations establish two primary tests to 
determine whether the fair market value of the interest is 
computed by use of the standard section 7520 actuarial 
factors found in the regulations and IRS publications. The 
first test is whether the instrument of transfer provid~s the 
beneficiary with the degree of beneficial enjoyment that is 
consistent with the type of property interest that the stand-
ard valuation tables are designed to measure. In this regard, 
the rights of an annuity beneficiary must be adequately 
defined and, if the annUity is payable from a group of assets, 
the value of the assets must be sufficient to support all of 
the annuity payments. Similarly, the rights of an income 
beneficiary must be consistent with the rights of an outright 
owner of the property interest for the same period of time, 
and the rights of a remainder or reversionary beneficiary 
must be protected against invasion or erosion of the corpus. 
The second test in the proposed regulations addresses the 
mortality component of the transferred interest. The Inter-
nal Revenue Service previously addressed this issue in Rev. 
.Rul. 66- 307, 1966-2 C.B. 429, and Rev. Rul 80-80. Rev. Rul. 
66-307 set forth the rule that the value of a life or remainder 
interest would be determined by taking into account the 
health of the life tenant if it was known on the valuation 
date that the life tenant was afflicted with a fatal and 
incurable disease in its advanced stages and that the life 
tenant could not survive for more· than a brief period of 
time. Rev. Rul. 80·80 clarified the "brief period" test in Rev. 
Rul. 66-307, and stated that the standard life actuarial 
factors are to be applied to value the interest unless death is 
clearly imminent. In the view of the Service, because the 
test for determining whether death is imminent set forth in 
Rev. Rul. 66-307 and Rev. Rul. 80-80 does not satisfactorily 
quantify the probability of death occurring within 1 year 
from the valuation date, this test may permit the use of 
standard actuarial factors in inappropriate situations. These 
regulations propose to explicitly quantify the applicable 
standard for purposes of applying this test. 
Under the proposed regulations, if an individual who is a 
measuring life of the interest being transferred is known to 
be terminally ill, the mortality test of the proposed regula-
tions is not satisfied and a special section 7502 actuarial 
factor, rather than a standard actuarial factor must be used 
in valuing the interest. Terminal illness is defined in the 
proposed regulations as an incurable illness or other deterio-
rating physical condition that would substantially reduce a 
person's life expectancy to the extent that there is at least a 
50 percent probability that the individual will not survive 
for more than 1 year from the valuation date. Exceptions 
are made in the regulations for special situations under 
sections 2013, 2037, and 2042. 
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In the case of the simultaneous death of the transferor and 
an individual who is the measuring life of a property inter-
est, the proposed regulations specifically preclude use of the 
standard factors in the tables to value that interest. This is 
pertinent in determining the previously taxed property cred-
it under section 2013 and reaffirms the pOSition of the Fifth 
Circuit in the Carter case. . 
Special Analyses 
It has been determined that this notice of proposed rule-
making is not a significant regulatory action as defined in 
EO 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not re-
quired. It also has been determined that section 553(b) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) and the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) do not apply 
to these regulations, and, therefore, an initial Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis is not required. Pursuant to section 
7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, this notice of proposed 
rulemaking will be submitted to the Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for com-
ment on its impact on small business. . 
Comments and Requests for a Public Hearing 
Before these proposed regulations are adopted as final 
regulations, consideration will be given to any written com-
ments that are submitted timely (preferably a signed origi-
nal and eight copies) to the Internal Revenue Service. In 
particular, the Service invites .comments on whether the 
proposed definition of terminal illness adequately deals with 
certain illnesses that are known to cause death in a short 
period of time but are often· diagnosed more than 1 year 
before death. All comments will be available for public 
. inspection and copying. A public hearing may be scheduled 
if requested in. writing by a person that timely submits 
. written comments. If a public hearing is scheduled, notice of 
the date, time, and place for the hearing will be published in 
the Federal Register. 
Drafting Information :. 
. The principal author of these proposed regulations js 
William L. Blodgett,. Office of Assistant Chief COUnSel 
(Passthroughs and Special Industries), Internal Revenue ~r~ 
vice. However, other personnel from the IRS and Treasury 
Department participated in their development. 
. List of Subjects 
26CFR Part 1 
Income taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 
26 CFR Part 20 
Estate taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 
26 CFR Part 25 
Gift taxes, Reporting and recordkeepin~ requirements. 
Proposed Amendments to the Regulations 
Accordingly, 26 CFR parts 1, 20 and 25 are proposed to be 
amended as follows: . 
Part 1--INCOME TAXES 
Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 continues to 
read in part as follows: 
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * • • . 
Par. 2. Section 1.7520-3 is amended by adding the text of 
paragraph (b) to read as follows: 
§1.7520-3 Limitation on the application of section 7520. 
••••• 
(b). Other limitations on the application of section 
7520-- (1) In general--(i) Ordinary beneficial inter-
ests. For purposes of this section: 
(A) An ordinary annuity interest is the right to receive 
a fixed dollar amount at the end of each year during one or 
more measuring lives or for some other defined period. A 
standard section 7520 annuity factor for an ordinary annuity 
interest represents the present worth of the right to receive 
$1.00 per year for a defined period, using the interest rate 
prescribed under section 7520 for the appropriate month. If 
an annuity interest is payable more often than annually or is 
payable at the .beginning of each period, a special adjust-
ment must be made in any computation with a standard 
section 7520 annuity factor. . . ... 
(B) An ordinary income i*erest is the right to reCeive < 
the income from, or the use of, property during one or more 
measuring lives or for some other defined period. A stand-
ard section 7520 income factor for an ordinary income 
interest represents the present worth of the right to receive 
the incQl'ne from $1.00 for a defined period, using the 
interest rate. prescribed under section 7520 for the appropri-
ate month. '. 
.(C) An.ordinary remainder or reversionary interest is 
1;I!e right to receive an interest in property at the end of one 
or inor:e measuring lives or for some other defined period. A 
. standard section 7520 remainder factor for an ordinary 
remainder or ~versionary interest represents the present 
worth. of the right to receive $1.00 at the end of a defined 
period, using the interest rate prescribed under section 7520 
for the appropriate month, .. . . 
(ii)-Certain restricted beneficial interests. A restricted 
beneficial interest is an annuity, income, remainder, or 
reversionary interest that is subject to a contingency, power, 
or other restriction, whether the restriction is provided for 
by thelerms of the trust, will, or other governing instrumerit 
. -' : or is caused by other circumstances. In general, a standard 
section 7520 annuity, income, or remainder factor may not 
be used to value a restricted beneficial interest. However, a 
special section 7520 annuity, income, or. remainder factor 
may be used to value a restricted beneficial interest under 
some drcums~nces. See Example 2 in §1.7520-3(bX4), 
which illustrates a situation where a. special section 7520 
actuarial factor is needed to take into account the shorter 
life expectancy of the terminally ill measuring life. See 
§1.7520-1(c) for requesting a special factor from the Internal 
Revenue Service. 
(iii) Other beneficial interests. If, under the provisions 
of §1.7520-3(b), the interest rate and mortality components 
prescribed under section 7520 are not applicable in deter-. 
mining the value of any annUity, income, remainder, or 
reversionary interest, the actual fair market value of the 
interest (determined without regard to section 7520) is based 
on all of the facts and circumstances if and to the extent 
permitted by the Internal Revenue Code provision applica-
ble to the property interest. . 
(2) Provisions of governing instrument and other 
limitations on source of payinent--(i) Annuities. A 
standard section 7520 annuity factor is not to be used to 
determine the present value of an annuity for a specified 
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term of years or the life of one or more individuals unless 
the effect of the trust, will, or other governing instrument is 
to ensure that the annuity will be paid for the entire defined 
period. In the case of an annuity payable from a trust or 
other limited fund, the annuity is not considered payable for 
the entire defined period if, considering the applicable sec-
tion 7520 interest rate, the annuity is expected to exhaust 
the fund before the last possible annuity payment is made in 
full. For this purpose, it must be assumed that it is possible 
for each measuring life to survive until age 110, because 
every standard section 7520 life annuity factor is calculated 
on the basis of that asSumption. If it is determined that the 
trust or other fund from which an annuity is to be paid may 
exhaust before the end of the defined period of the annuity, 
it will be necessary' to calculate a special section 7520 
annuity factor that takes into account the facts and circum-
stances that may exhaust the trust or fund. 
(ii) Income and similar interests--(A) Beneficial 
enjoyment. A standard section 7520 income factor for an· 
ordinary income interest is not to be used to determine the 
present value of an income or similar interest in trust for a 
term of years or for the life of one or more individuals 
unless the effect of the trust, will, or other governing 
instrument is to provide the income beneficiary with that 
degree of beneficial enjoyment of the property during the. 
term of the income interest that the principles of the law of 
trusts accord to a person who is unqualifiedly designated as 
the income beneficiary of a trust for a similar period of 
time. This degree of beneficial enjoyment is provided only if 
it was the transferor'S intent, as manifested by the provi~ 
sions of the governing instrument and the surrounding cir~ 
cumstances, that the trust provide an income interest for the 
income beneficiary during the specified period of time that 
is consistent with the value of the trust corpus and with its 
preservation. In determining whether a trust arrangement 
evidences that intention, the treatment required or permit-
ted with respect to individual items must be considered in 
relation to the entire system provided for in the administra-
tion of the subject trust. Similarly, in determining the 
present value of the right to use tangible property (whether 
or not in trust) for one or more measuring lives or other 
specified period of time, the interest rate component pre-
scribed under section 7520 and §l. 7520-1 is not to be used 
unless, during the specified period, the beneficiary is enti-
tled to that degree of use, possession, and enjoyment of the 
property that an outright owner would be entitled to exer-
cise during a similar period of time. 
(B) Diversions of income and corpus. A standard sec-
tion 7520 income factor for an ordinary income interest is 
not to be used to value an income interest or similar interest 
in property for a term of years or for one or more measur-
ing lives if--
(1) The trust, Will, or other governing instrument requires 
or permits the beneficiary's income or other enjoyment to 
be withheld, diverted, or accumulated for another person's 
benefit without the consent of the income beneficiary; or 
(2) The governing instrument requires or permits trust 
corpus to be withdrawn from the trust for another person's 
benefit during the income beneficiary's term of enjoyment 
without the consent of and accountability to the income 
beneficiary for such diversion. 
(iii) Remainder and reversionary interests. A standard 
section 7520 remainder interest factor for an ordinary re-
mainder or reversionarv interest is not to be used to deter-
mine the present value of a remainder or reversionary 
interest (whether in trust or otherwise) unless, consistent 
with the preservation and protection that the law of trusts 
would provide for a person who is unqualifiedly designated 
as the remainder beneficiary of a trust for a similar dura-
tion, the effect of the administrative and dispositive provi-
sions for the interest or interests that precede the remainder 
or reversionary interest is to assure that the property will 
be adequately preserved and protected from erosion, inva-
sion, depletion, or damage until the remainder or reversion-
ary interest takes effect in possession and enjoyment. This 
degree of preservation and protection is provided only if it 
was the transferor's intent, as manifested by the provisions 
of the arrangement and the surrounding circumstances, that 
the entire disposition provide the remainder or reversionary 
beneficiary with an undiminished interest in the property 
transferred. 
(iv) Pooled income fund interests. In general, pooled 
income funds are created and administered to achieve a 
special rate of return. A beneficial interest in a pooled 
income fund is not ordinarily valued using a standard sec-
tion 7520 income or remainder interest factor. The present 
value of a beneficial interest in a pooled income fund is 
determined according to rules and special remainder factors·· 
prescribed in §1.642(c)-6. . 
. (3) Mortality component. The mortality comp<ment pre-
scribed under section 7520 is not to be used to determine the 
present value of an annuity, income interest, remainder 
interest, or reversionary interest if an individual who is a 
measuring life for the interest dies or is terminally ill at the 
time of the transaction. For purposes of this paragraph 
(b)(3), an individual who is known to have an incurable 
illness or other deteriorating physical condition is consid-
ered terminally ill if there is at least a 50 percent probabil-
ity that the individual will die within 1 year. . 
(4) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph (b) are 
illustrated by the following examples: . 
Example 1. Annuity funded with unproductive prop-
erty. The taxpayer transfers corporation stock worth 
$1,000,000 to a trust. The trust provides for a 6 percent 
($60,000 per year) annuity' in cash or other property to be 
paid to a charitable. organization for 25 years and for the 
. remainder to be distributed to the donor's child. The trust 
specifically authorizes, but· does not require, the trustee to 
retain the shares of stock. The section 7520 interest rate for 
the month of the transfer is 8.2 percent. The corporation has 
paid no dividends on this stock during the past 5 years, and 
there is no indication that this policy will change in the near 
future. Under applicable state law, the corporation is con-
sidered to be a sound investment for a trust with diversified 
investments because the corporation's practice of retaining 
its earnings has caused the value of the corporation stock to 
grow commensurately each year. Considering the 6 percent 
annuity payout rate and the 8.2 percent section 7520 interest 
rate, the trust corpus is considered sufficient to pay this 
annuity for the entire 25-year term of the trust, or even 
indefinitely. Thus, though the trust assets not likely to earn 
dividend income during the term of the trust, the assets 
would be assumed to apprecjate at the rate of 8.2 percent 
per year if there were no income. Therefore, the trust's sole 
investment in this corporation is not expected to adversely 
affect the inter.est of either the annuitant or the remainder 
beneficiary. Although it appears that neither beneficiary 
would be able to compel the trustee to make the trust corpus· 
produce investment income, the annuity interest in this case 
is considered to be an ordinary annuity interest, and the 
standard section 7520 annuity factor may be used to deter-
mine the present value of the annuity. In this case, the 
section 7520 annuity factor would represent the right to 
receive $1.00 per year for a term of 25 years. 
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Example 2. Terminal illness. The taxpayer transfers 
property worth $1,000,000, to a charitable remainder uni-
trust described in section 664(d)(2) and §l.664-3. The trust 
provides for a fixed-percentage 7 p.ercent unitrust benefit 
(each annual payment is equal to 7 percent of the trust 
assets as valued at the beginning of each year) to be paid 
quarterly to an individual beneficiary for life and for the 
remainder to be distributed to a charitable organization. At 
the time the trust is created, the individual beneficiary is 
age 60 and has been diagnosed with an incurable illness and 
there is at least a 50 percent probability of the individual 
dying within 1 year. Because there is at least a 50 percent 
probability that this beneficiary will die within 1 year, the 
standard section 7520 unitrust remainder factor for a person 
age 60 from the valuation tables may not be used to deter-
mine the present value of the charitable remainder interest. 
Instead, a special unitrust remainder factor must be com-
puted that is based on the section 7520 interest rate and that 
takes into account the projection of the individual beneficia-
ry's actual life expectancy. 
(5) Additional limitations. Section 7520 does not apply to 
the extent provided by the Internal Revenue Service in 
revenue rulings or revenue procedures. 
(6) Effective date. The provisions of paragraph (b) of this 
section are effective with respect' to transactions after the 
date these regulations are published as final regulations in 
the Federal Register. . 
PART 20--ESTATE TAX; ESTATES OF DECEDENTS 
DYING AFTER AUGUST 16,1954 
Par. 3. The authority citation for part 20 continues to read 
in part as follows: 
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 • • • 
Par. 4. Section 20.7520-3 is amended by adding the text of 
paragraph (b) to read as follows: . 
§20.7520-3 Limitation on the application of section 7520. 
••••• 
(b) Other limitations on the application of ~~ction 
7520-- (1) In general--(i) Ordinary beneficial infer-
ests. For purposes of this section: .. , 
(A) An ordinary annuity interest is the right to receive 
a fixed dollar amount at the end of each year during one or 
more measuring lives or for some other defined period. A 
standard section 7520 annuity factor for an ordinary annuity 
interest represents the present worth of the right to receive 
$LOO per year for a defined period: using the interest rate 
prescribed under section 7520 for the appropriate month. If 
an annuity interest is payable more often than annually or is 
payable at the beginning of each period, a special adjust-
ment must be made in any computation with a standard 
section 7520 annuity factor. 
(B) An ordinary income interest is the right to receive 
the income from or the use of property during one or more 
measuring lives or for some other defined period. A stand-
ard section 7520 income faCtor for an ordinary income 
interest represents the present worth of the right to receive 
the income from $1.00 for a defined period, using the 
interest rate prescribed under section 7520 for the appropri-
ate month. 
(e) An ordinary remainder or reversionary interest is 
the right to receive an interest in property at the end of one 
or more measuring lives or for some other defined period. A 
standard section 7520 remainder factor for an ordinary 
remainder or reversionary interest represents the present. 
worth of the right to receive $1.00 at the end of a defined 
period, using the interest rat"e prescribed under section 7520 
for the appropriate month. 
(ii) Certain restricted beneficial interests. A restricted 
beneficial interest is an annuity, income, remainder, or 
reversionary interest that is subject to any contingency, 
power, or other restriction, whether the restriction is pro-
vided for by the terms of the trust, will, or other governing 
instrument or is caused by other circumstances. In general, 
a . standard section 7520 annuity, income, or remainder 
factor m~y not be used to value a restricted beneficial 
interest. However, a special section 7520 annuity, income, or 
remainder factor may be used to value a restricted benefi-
cial interest under some circumstances. See Example 4 in 
§20.7520-3(b)(2)(iv) and Example 2 in §20.7520- 3(b)(4), 
which illustrate situations where special section 7520 actu-
arial factors are needed to take into account limitations on 
beneficial interests. See §20.7520-1(c) for requesting a spe-
cial. factor from the Internal Revenue Service. 
(iii) Other beneficial interests. If, under the provisions 
of §20.7520-3(b), the interest rate and mortality components·' 
prescribed under section 7520 are not applicable in deter-
mining the value of any annuity, income, remainder, or 
reversionary interest, the actual fair market value of the 
interest (determined without regard to section 7520) is. based 
on all of the facts and circumstances if and to the extent 
permitted by the Code provision applicable to the property 
interest. 
(2) Provjsions of governing instrument and other 
limttations 'on source of payment--(i) Annuities. A 
standard section 7520 annuity factor is not to be used to 
- deter~ine the present value of an annuity for a specified 
te~ :~f years or the life of one or more individuals unless 
. the effe~t of the trust, will, or other governing instrument is 
. to ensure thae the annuity will be paid for the entire defined 
period. In .the case of an annuity payable from a trust or 
other llmiJed fund, the annuity is not considered payable for 
the ~ntire defined period if, considering the applicable sec~ 
tion 7520 interest rate, the annuity is expected to exhaust 
the fund before the last possible annuity payment is made in 
full. ]for this purpose, it must be assumed that it is possible 
for each measuring life to survive until age 110, because 
:. everj standard section 7520 annuity factor is calculated on 
• the. basis of that assumption. If it is determined that the 
trust or other fund from which an annuity is to be paid may 
exhaust before the end of the defined period of the annuity, 
it will be necessary to calculate a special section 7520 
annuity factor that takes into account the ·facts and circum-
stances that may exhaust the trust or fund. 
(ti) Income and Similar Interests--(A) Beneficial 
enjoyment. A standard section 7520 income factor for an 
ordinary income interest is not to be used. to determine the 
pr~ent value of an income or similar interest in trust for a 
term of years, or for the life of one or more individuals, 
unless the effect of the trust, will, or other governing 
instrument is to provide the income beneficiary with that 
degree of beneficial enjoyment of the property during the 
term of the income interest that the principles of the law of 
. trusts accord to a person who is unqualifiedly designated as 
the income beneficiary of a trust for a similar period of 
time. This degree of beneficial enjoyment is provided only if 
it was the transferor'S intent, as manifested by the provi-
sions of the governing instrument and the surrounding cir-
cumstances, that the trust provide an income interest for the 
income beneficiary during the specified period of time that 
is consistent with the value of the trust corpus' and with its 
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preservation. In determining whether a trust arrangement 
evidences that intention, the treatment required or permit-
ted with respect to individual items must be considered in 
relation to the entire system provided for in the administra-
tion of the subject trust. Similarly, in determining the 
present value of the right to use tangible property (whether 
or not in trust) for one or more measuring lives or other 
specified period of time, the interest rate component pre-
scribed under section 7520 and §20.7520-1 is not to be used 
unless, during the specified period, the beneficiary is enti-
tled to that degree of use, possession, and enjoyment of the 
property that an outright owner would be entitled to exer-
cise during a similar period of time. 
(B) Diversions of income and corpus. A standard sec-
tion 7520 income factor for an ordinary income interest is 
not to be used to value an income interest or similar interest 
in property for a term of years, or for one or more measur-
ing lives. if--
(1) The trust, will, or other governing instrument requires 
or permits the beneficiary's income or other enjoyment to 
be withheld, diverted, Qr accumulated for another person's 
benefit without the consent of the income beneficiary; or 
(2) The governing instrument requires or permits trust 
corpus to be withdrawn from the trust for another person's 
benefit without the consent of the income beneficiary during 
the income beneficiary's term of enjoyment and without 
accountability to the income beneficiary for such diversion. 
(iii) Remainder and reversionary interests. A standard 
section 7520 remainder interest factor for an ordinary re-
mainder or reversionary interest is not to be used to deter-
mine the present value of a remainder or reversionary 
interest (whether in trust or otherwise) unless, consistent 
with the preservation and protection that the law of trusts 
would provide for a person who is unqualifiedly designated 
as the remainder benefiCiary of a trust for a similar dura-
tion, the effect of the administrative. and dispositive provi-
sions for the interest or interests that precede the remainder 
or reversionary interest is to assure that the property will 
be adequately preserved and protected from erosion, inva-
sion, depletion, or damage until the remainder or reversion-
ary interest takes effect in possession and enjoyment. This 
degree of preservation and protection is provided only if it 
was the transferor's intent, as manifested by the provisions 
of the arrangement and the surrounding circumstances, that 
the entire disposition provide the remainder or reversionary 
beneficiary with an undiminished interest in the property 
transferred. " 
(iv) Pooled income fund interests_ In general, pooled 
income funds are created and administered to achieve a 
special rate of return. A beneficial interest in a pooled 
income fund is not ordinarily valued using a standard sec-
tion 7520 income or remainder interest factor. The present 
value of a beneficial interest in a pooled income fund is 
determined according to rules and special remainder factors 
prescribed in §42(c)-B of this chapter (Income Tax 
Regulations ). 
(v) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph (bX2) are 
illustrated by the following examples: 
Example 1. Unproductive property. The decedent's 
will provides for a bequest of corporation stock to a trust 
under the terms of which all of the trust income is payable 
to the decedent's child for life. After the death of the life 
income beneficiary, the trust is to terminate and the trust 
property is to be distributed to the decedent's grandchild. 
The trust specifically authorizes, but does. not require, the 
trustee to retain the shares of stock. The corporation has 
paid no dividends on this stock during the past 5 years, and 
there is no indication that this policy will change in the near 
future. Under applicable state law, the corporation is con-
sidered to be an adequately sound growth investment for a 
trust with diversified investments because the corporation's 
practice of retaining its earnings has caused the value of the 
corporation stock to increase commensurately each year. 
The facts and circumstances, including applicable state law, 
indicate that the life income beneficiary would not be able 
to compel the trustee to make the trust corpus productive in 
conformity with the requirements for a lifetime trust in-
come interest under applicable local law. Therefore, the life 
income interest in this case is considered nonproductive. 
Consequently, the income interest may not be valued actu-
arially under this section. 
Example 2. Beneficiary's right to make trust produc-
tive. The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that 
the trustee is not specifically authorized to retain the shares 
of stock. Further, the terms of the trust specifically provide 
that the, life income benefiCiary may require the trustee to 
make the trust corpus productive consistent with income 
yield standards for trusts under applicable state law. Under 
that law, the minimum rate of income that a productive 
trust may produce is substantially below the section 7520 
interest 'rate for the month of the decedent's death. In this 
case, because the income beneficiary has the right to compel 
the trustee to make the trust productive for purposes of 
applicable local law during the beneficiary'S lifetime, the 
income interest is. considered an ordinary income interest 
for purposes of this paragraph, and the standard section 
7520 life income interest factor may be used to determine 
the present value of the income interest. 
Example 3. Discretionary invasion of corpus. The 
decedent transfers property to a trust under the terms of 
which all of the trust income is to be paid to the decedent's 
child for life and the remainder of the trust is to be 
distributed to. a grandchild. The trust authorizes the trustee 
without restriction to distribute corpus to the decedent's 
surviving spouse for the spouse's comfort and happiness. In 
this case, because the trustee's power to invade trust corpus 
is unrestricted, the exercise of the power could result in the 
termination of the income interest at any time. Consequent-
ly,the income interest is' not considered an ordinary income 
interest for purposes of this paragraph, and may not be 
valued actuarially under this section. 
Example 4. Limited invasion of corpus. The decedent 
bequeaths property to a trust under the terms of which all of 
the trust income is to b'e paid to the decedent's child for life 
and the remainder is to be distributed to the decedent's 
grandchild. The trust authorizes the child to withdraw up to 
$5,000 per' year from the trust corpus. In this case, the 
child's power to invade trust corpus is limited to an ascer-
tainable amount each year. Annual invasions of any amount 
. would be expec.ted to progressively dimiriish the property 
from which the child's income is paid. Consequently, the 
income interest is not considered an ordinary income inter-
est for purposes of this paragraph, and the standard section 
7520 income interest factor may not be used to determine 
the present value cif the income interest. Nevertheless, the 
present value of the child's income interest is ascertainable 
by making a special actuarial calculation that would take 
into account not only the initial value of the trust corpus, the 
section 7520 interest rate for the month of the transfer, and 
the mortality component for the child's age, but also the 
assumption that the trust corpus will decline at the rate of 
$5,000 each year during the child's lifetime. The child's right 
to receive an amount not in excess of $5,000 per year may 
be separately valued in this instance and, assuming the trust 
Copyright © 1994 by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC .. Washington, D.C. 20037 
A -166 
~ 
= 
6-10-94 (OTR) TAXATION, BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING TEXT (No. 110) L-7 
corpus would not exhaust before the child would attain age 
110, would be considered an ordinary annuity interest. 
Example 5. Power to consume. The decedent devises a 
life estate in 3 parcels of real estate to the surviving spouse 
with the remainder to a child. The decedent also confers 
upon the spouse an unrestricted power to consume the 
property, which includes the right to sell part or all of the 
property and to use the proceeds for the spouse's support, 
comfort, happiness, and other purposes. Any portion of the 
property or its sale proceeds remaining at the death of the 
surviving spouse is to vest by operation of law in the child at 
that time. In this case, the surviving spouse's power to 
consume the corpus is unrestricted, and the exercise of the 
power could entirely exhaust the remainder interest during 
the life of the spouse. Consequently, the remainder interest 
is not considered an ordinary remainder interest for pur-
poses of this paragraph and may not be valued actuarially 
under this section. 
(3) Mortality component. (i) Terminal illness cases. 
Except as provided in paragraph (bX3Xii) of this section, the 
mortality component prescribed under section 7520 is not to 
be used to determine the present value of an annuity, 
income interest, remainder interest, or reversionary interest 
if an individual who is a measuring life dies or is terminally 
ill at the time of the decedent's death. For purposes of this . 
paragraph (b)(3), an individual who is known to have an 
incurable illness or other deteriorating physical condition is 
considered terminally ill if there is at least a 50 percent 
person age 60 (7.4230) may not be used to determine the 
present value of the charitable organization's annuity inter-
est because there is at least a 50 percent probability that the 
measuring life will die within 1 year. Instead, a special 
section 7520 annuity factor must be computed that takes 
into account the projection of the child's actual life 
expectancy. 
(5) Additional Limitations Section 7520 does not apply 
to the extent provided by the Internal Revenue Service in 
revenue rulings or revenue procedures. 
(6) Effective date. The provisions of this paragraph (b) 
are effective with respect to estates of decedents dying after 
the date these regulations are published as final regulations 
in the Federal Register. 
PART 25--GIFT TAX; GIFTS MADE 
AFTER DECEMBER 31,1954 
Par. 5. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read 
in part as follows: 
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 .* • 
Par. 6. Section 25.7520-3 is amended by adding the text of 
paragraph (b) to read as follows: 
§25.7520-3 Limitation on the application of section 7520. 
• * ••• 
probability that the individual will die within 1 year. (b) Other limitations on the application of section 
(ii) Exceptions. If, in the case of the allowance of the 7520--(1) In general--(i) Ordinary beneficial inter-
credit for tax on a prior transfer under section 2013, the taxests. For purposes of this section: 
in the transferor's estate was finally determined withol1t~···,<,.".,:JA) An ordinary annuity interest is the right to receive 
regard to the fact that one or more measuring lives were <" .. a fix.ed dollar amount at the end of each year during one or 
terminally ill at the time of the transferor's death, the value ... ~ .. }jiore measuring lives or for some other defined period. A 
of any transferred interest dependent on any of those lives .-. :·standard·section 7520 annuity factor for an ordinary annuity 
shall be detE!rmined for purposes of section 2013 without interest represents the present worth of the right to receive 
regard to the fact that those measuring lives were terminal- . $1.00 per year for a defined period, using the interest rate 
ly ill. In addition, the value of a decedent's reversionary prescribed under section 7520 for the appropriate month. If 
interest under section 2037(b) or 2042(2) shall be determined an annuity interest is payable more often than annually or is 
without regard to the physical condition of the deGedent payable at the beginning of each period, a special adjust-
immediately before death. .: .. mentmust be made in any computation With a 'standard 
(4) Examples. The provisions of paragraph (b)(3) of this sectiori 7520 annuity factor. 
section are illustrated by the following examples:. . (B) An ordinary income interest is the right to receiVE! 
Example 1. Simultaneous deaths. The decedent's will .;. the income from or the use of property during one or more 
establishes a trust to pay income to the decedent's surviving measuring lives or for some other defined period. A stand-
spouse for life. The will provides that, upon the spouse's ard section 7520 income factor for an ordinary income 
death, or if the spouse fails to survive the decedent, the trust interest represents the present worth of the right to receive 
property is to pass to the decedent's children. The decedent the income from $1.00 for a defined period, using the 
and the decedent's spouse die simultaneously in an accident interest rate prescribed under section 7520 for the appropri-
under circumstances in which it was impossible to deter- ate month. However, in the case of certain gifts made after 
mine who survived the other. Applicable state law presumes October 8, 1990, if the donor does not retain a qualified 
that the decedent died first with the result that the property annuity, unitrust, or reversionary iriterest, the value of any 
interest is considered to have passed in trust for the benefit interest retained by the donor is considered to be zero if the 
of the spouse for life, after which the remainder is to be remainder benefiCiary is a member of the donor's family. 
distributed to the decedent's children. Therefore, the See §25.2702-2. 
spouse's life income interest may not be valued under this (C) An ordinary remainder or reversionary interest is 
section. the right to receive an interest in property at the end of one 
Example 2. Terminal illness. The decedent bequeaths or more measuring lives or for some other defined period. A 
$1,000,000 to a trust under the terms of which the trustee is standard section 7520 remainder factor for an ordinary 
to pay $103,000 per year to a charitable organization during remainder or reversionary interest represents the present 
the life of the decedent's child. Upon the death of the child, worth of the right to receive $1.00 at the end of a defined 
the remainder in the trust is to be distributed to the dece- period, using the interest rate prescribed under section 7520 
dent's grandchild. The child, who is age 60, has been diag- for the appropriate month. 
nosed with an incurable illness, and there is at least a 50 (ii) Certain restricted beneficial interests. A restricted 
percent probability of the child dying within 1 year. The beneficial interest is an annuity, income, remainder, or 
section 7520 interest rate for the month of the decedent's reversionary interest that is subject to any contingency, 
death is 10.6 percent. The standard life annuity factor for a power, or other restriction, whether the restriction is pro-
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vided for by the terms of the trust, will, or other governing 
instrument or is caused by other circumstances. In general, 
a standard section 7520 annuity, income, or remainder 
factor may not be used to value a restricted beneficial 
interest. However, a special section 7520 annuity, income, or 
remainder factor may be used to value a restricted benefi-
cial interest under some circumstances. See Examples 3, 4, 
and 5 in §25.7520-3(b)(2)(iv) and the Example in §25.7520-
3(b)( 4), which illustrate situations in which special section 
7520 actuarial factors are needed to take into account 
limitations on beneficiaL,interests. See §25.7520-1(c) for re-
questing a special factor from the Internal Revenue Service. 
(iii) Other beneficial interests. If, under the prOVisions 
of §25.7520-3(b), the interest rate and mortality components 
prescribed under section 7520 are not applicable in deter-
mining the value of any annUity, income, remainder, or 
reversionary interest, the actual fair market value of the 
interest (determined without regard to section 7520) is based 
on all of the facts and circumstances if and to the extent 
permitted by the Internal Revenue Code provision applica-
ble to the property interest. 
(2) Provisions of governing instrument and other 
limitations on source of payment--(i) Annuities. A 
standard section 7520 annuity factor is not to be used to 
determine the present value of an annuity for a specified 
term of years or the life of one or more individuals unless 
the effect of the trust, will, or other governing instrument is 
to ensure·that the annuity will be paid for the entire defined 
period. In the case of an annuity payable from a trust or 
other limited fund, the annuity is not considered payable for 
the entire defined period if, considering the applicable sec-
tion 7520 interest rate, the annuity is expected to exhaust 
the fund before the last possible annuity payment is made in 
full. For this purpose, it must be assumed that it is possible 
for each measuring life to survive until age 110, because 
every standard section 7520 annuity factor is calculated on 
the basis of that assumption. If it is determined that the 
trust or other fund from which an annuity is to be paid may 
exhaust before the end of the defined period of the annuity, 
it will be necessary to calculate a special section 7520 
annuity factor that takes into account the facts and circum-
stances that may exhaust the trust or fund. 
(ii) Income and similar interests--(A) Beneficial 
enjoyment. A standard section 7520 income factor for an 
ordinary income interest is not to be used to determine the 
present value of an income or similar interest in trust for a 
term of years, or for the life of one or more individuals, 
unless the effect of the trust, will, or other governing 
instrument is to provide the income beneficiary with that 
degree of beneficial enjoyment of the property during the 
term of the income interest that the principles of the law of 
trusts accord to a person who is unqualifiedly designated as 
the income beneficiary of a trust for a similar period of 
time. This degree of beneficial enjoyment is provided only if 
it was the transferor's intent, as manifested by the provi-
sions of the governing instrument and the surrounding cir-
cumstances, that the trust provide an income interest for the 
income benefiCiary during the specified period of time that 
is consistent with the value of the trust corpus and with its 
preservation. In determining whether a trust arrangement 
evidences that intention, the treatment required or permit-
ted with respect to individual items must be considered in 
relation to the entire system provided for in the administra-
tion of the subject trust. Similarly, in determining the 
present value of the right to use tangible property (whether 
or not in trust) for one or more measuring lives or other 
specified period of time, the interest rate component pre-
scribed under section 7520 and §25.7520-1 is not to be used 
unless, during the specified period, the beneficiary is enti-
tled to that degree of use, possession, and enjoyment of the 
property that an outright owner would be entitled to exer-
cise during a similar period of time. 
(B) Diversions of income and corpus. A standard sec-
tion 7520 income factor for an ordinary income interest is 
not to be used to value an income interest or similar interest 
in property for a term of years, or for one or more measur-
ing lives, if--
(1) The trust, will, or other governing instrument requires 
or permits the beneficiary's income or other enjoyment to 
be withheld, diverted, or accumulated for another person's 
benefit without the consent of the income beneficiary; or 
(2) The governing instrument requires or permits trust 
corpus to be withdrawn from the trust for another person's 
benefit without the consent of the income beneficiary during 
the income beneficiary's term of enjoyment and without 
accountability to the income beneficiary for such diversion. 
(iii) Remainder and reversionary interests. A standard 
section 7520 remainder interest factor for an ordinary re-
mainder or reversionary interest is not to be used to deter~ 
mine the present value of a remainder or reversionary 
interest (whether in trust or otherwise) unless, consistent 
with the preservation and protection that the law of trusts 
would provide for a person who is unqualifiedly designated 
as the remainder benefiCiary of a trust for a similar dura-
tion, the effect of the administrative and dispositive provi-
sions for the interest or interests that precede the remainder 
or reversionary interest is to assure that the property will 
be adequately preserved and protected from erosion, inva-
sion, depletion, or damage until the remainder or reversion-
ary interest takes effect in possession and enjoyment. This 
degree of preservation and protection is provided only if it 
was the transferor's intent, as manifested by the provisions 
of the arrangement and the surrounding circumstances, that 
the entire disposition provide the remainder or reversionary 
beneficiary with an undiminished interest in the property 
transferred. 
(iv) Pooled income fund interests. In general, pooled 
income funds are created and administered to achieve a 
special· rate of return. A beneficial interest in a pooled 
income fund is not ordinarily valued Using a standard sec-
tion 7520 income or remainder interest factor. The present 
value of a beneficial interest in a pooled income fund is 
determined according to rules and special remainder factors 
prescribed in §1.S42(c)-S of this chapter (Income Tax 
Regulations). 
(v) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph (b)(2) are 
illustrated by the following examples: 
Example 1. Unproductive property. The donor trans-
fers corporation stock to a trust under the terms of which all 
of the trust income is payable to a child for life. After the 
death of the life income beneficiary, the trust is to terminate 
and the trust property is to be distributed to a grandchild. 
The trust specifically authorizes, but does not require, the 
trustee to retain the shares of stock. The corporation has 
paid no dividends on this stock during the past 5 years, and 
there is no indication that this policy will change in.the near 
future. Under applicable state law, the corporation is con-
sidered to be an adequately sound growth investment for a 
trust with diversified investments because the corporation's 
practice of retaining its earnings has caused the value of the 
corporation stock to increase commensurately each year. 
The facts and circumstances, including applicable state law, 
indicate that the income beneficiary would not have the 
legal right to compel the trustee to make the trust corpus 
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productive in conformity with the requirements for a life- est may be determined by using the section 7520 unitrust 
time trust income interest under applicable local law. factor for a term of years or a prior death. 
Therefore, the life income interest in this case is considered Example 5. Eroding corpus in an annuity trlLst. The 
nonproductive. Consequently, the income interest may not donor, who is age 60 and in normal health, transfers proper-
be valued actuarially under this section. ty worth $1,000,000 to a trust. The trust will pay a 10 
Example 2. Beneficiary's right to make trust produc- percent ($100,000 per year) annuity to a charitable orgaijiza-
tive. The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that tion for the life of the donor, and the remainder is to be 
the trustee is not specifically authorized to retain the shares distributed to the donor's child. The section 7520 rate for the 
of corporation stock. Further, the terms of the trust specifi- . month of the transfer is 6.8 percent. Because the 10 percent 
cally provide that the life income beneficiary may require annuity payout rate exceeds the 6.8 percent income and 
the trustee to make the trust corpus productive consistent growth rate that the trust is expected to experience each 
with income yield standards for trusts under applicable year, the annuity payout must ·be assumed to progressively 
state law. Under that law, the minimum rate of income that erode the corpus. Using an interest rate of 6.8 percent, an 
a productive trust may produce is substantially below the annuity payout of $100,000 per year will exhaust a 
section 7520 interest rate on the valuation date. In this case, . $1,000,000 trust corpus 'in 18 years. The final payment at the 
because the income beneficiary has the right to compel the end of the 18th year will consist of a partial payment of 
trustee to make the trust productive for purposes of applica- $32,712. Under section 7520, the standard life annuity fac-
ble local law during the beneficiary's lifetime, the income tors are based on the assumption that any person may 
interest is considered an ordinary income interest for pur- survive until age 110. This means that the standard life 
poses of this paragraph, and the standard section 7520 life annuity factor for age 60 (9.8585) takes into account the 
income factor may be used to determine the value of the separate probabilities that a person age 60 may surv~ve to 
income interest. However, in .. the case of gifts made after receive each of 50 different annuity payments. Howev~r, in 
October 8, 1990, if the donor was the life income beneficiary, the present case, because of the eroding corpus, the person 
the value of the income interest would be considered to be age 60 can be assumed to receive no more than 17 $100,000 
zero in this situation. See §25.2702-2. .: annuity payments, regardless how long that person might 
. Example 3. Annuity trust funded with unproductive survive. Therefore; the standard life annuity factor for a 
property. The donor, who is age 60, transfers corporation person age 60 (9.8585) is not applicable in this case, and 
stock worth $1,000,000 to a trust. The trust will pay a 6 special section 7520 annuity factors that take into account 
percent ($60,000 per year) annuity in cash or other property the 18-yea~ limitation on the annuity payout must be used. 
to the donor for 10 years or until the donor's prior death. The special annuity factor for the present value of the right 
Upon the termination of the trust, the trust property is to b~ .. _ to receive $1.00 per year for 17 years or until the prior death 
distributed to the donor's child. The section 7520 rate for the, ;.' --qfa person age 60 is $8.6121, and the special factor for the 
month of the transfer is 8.2 percent. .The corporation has'" present value of the right to receive $1.00 in 18 years if a 
paid no dividends on the stock during the past 5 years, and .. ·~.;.:_p'erson ~ge 60 survives is $.1836. The present value of the 
there is no indication that this policy will change in the near' - .. charitable annuity interest is $867,269 ($100,000 X 8.6121 
future. Under applicable state law, the corporation is con- . plus $32,712 X .1836). . 
sidered to be a sound investment for a trust with diversified (3) MoTjality component. The mortality component pre-
investments because the corporation's practice of retaining scri~ed.under section 7520 is not to be used to determine the 
its earnings has caused the value of the corporation stock to. present value of an annuity, income interest, remainder 
grow commensurately each year. Considering the 6 percent interest, or reversionary interest if an individual who is a 
annuity payout rate and the 8.2 percent section 7520 interest measJIring life dies or is terminally ill at the time the gift is . 
. rate, the trust corpus is considered sufficient to pay this completed. For purposes of this paragraph (b)(3), an individ-
annuity for the entire 10-year term of the trust, or even ual who is known to have an incurable illness or other 
indefinitely. Thus, though the trust assets not likely to earn 'o' deteriorating physical condition is considered termillally ill 
dividend income during the term of the trust, the assets if there is at least" a 50 percent probability that the individ-
would be assumed to appreciate at the rate of 8.2 percent ual will die within 1 year. . . . 
per year if there were no income~ Therefore, the trust's sole (4) Example. The provisions of paragraph (b)(3) of this 
investment in this corporation is not expected to adversely section are illustrated by the following example: . . 
affect the interest of either the annuity beneficiary or the Example. Terminal illness. The donor transfers proper-
re~ainder beneficiary. The trust specifically authorizes, but ty worth $1,000,000 to a child in exchange for the child's 
does not require, the trustee to retain the shares of stock. promise to pay the donor $103,000 per year for the donor's 
Although it appears that neither beneficiary would be able life. The donor is age 60 but has been diagnosed with an 
to compel the trustee to ma:ke the trust corpus produce inc\lrable. illness and has at least a 50 percent probability of 
investment income, the annuity interest in this case is dying within 1 year. The section 7520 interest rate for the 
considered to be an ordinary annuity interest, and a section month of the transfer is 10.6 percent, and the standard 
7520 annuity factor may be used to determine the present annuity factor at that interest rate for a person age 60 in 
value of the annuity. In this case, the section 7520 annuity normal health is 7.4230. Thus, if the donor were not termi-
factor would represent the right to receive $UiO per year nilily ill, the present value of the annuity would be $764,569 
for a term of 10 years or the prior death of a person age 60. ($103;000 X 7.4230). Because there is at least a 50 percent 
Example 4. Unitrust funded with unproductive prop- probability that the donor will not survive for 1 more year, 
erty. The facts are the same as in Example 3, except that the standard section 7520 annuity factor may not be used to 
the donor has retained a unitrust interest equal to 7 percent determine the present value of the donor's annuity interest. 
of the value of the trust property, valued as of the beginning Instead, a special section 7520 annuity factor must be 
of each year. Although the trust corpus is non income produc- computed that takes into account the projection of the 
ing, the present value of the donor's retained unitrust inter- donor's actual life expectancy. 
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(5) Additional limitations. Section 7520 does not apply to 
the extent provided by the Internal Revenue Service in 
revenue rulings or revenue procedures. 
(6) Effective date. The provisions of this paragraph are 
effective with respect to gifts made after the date these 
regulations are published as final regulations in the Federal 
Register. 
lsi Margaret Milner Richardson 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
End of Text 
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G) 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 
REGULAR SESSION 1994 
SENATE BILL NO. 311 
WEDNESDAY; MARCH 16,1994 
The following bill was reported to the Ho~ from the Senate and ordered to be printed. 
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AN ACT relating to health care decisions. 
Bt it tnacted by the Gerumn Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky: 
SECTION 1. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO 
2 READ AS FOLLOWS: 
3 As used in Sections 1 to n ofthis Act; 
4 (J) "Adr!ll" meanJ a person ei~hteen (1S) years of afe or older ang wllQ is of squad 
5 miruL. 
6 (2) "Advance directiye" means: g lirine will directixe made in aHordgnce with 
7 Sections 1 to 12 of this Act. g Urine win or desiengtion of health care surro~gl!! 
1.\ executed prior to the effectiye date of Septions 1 to 12 of this A cl. and any other 
9 document thai provides directi9ns relaliff to health cart to be provided to the 
10 Del1QtJ executine the document. 
11 (3) "Artificiqlly prorided nutrition and hydratjpn" means sustenance or fluids that 
12 are 4tOficiaIlv 9l.: IecbnQIQiical{y ~ministered. 
13 (4) "AUendinr physician" means the uhvrician whQ has.primary ros.ponsibiljty for 
14 the treatment and care of the.l'qdUli. 
'15 (5) "Decisional cauacjt,y" means the ability (9 make and communicate a health care 
16 decjsjoQ. 
17 ~) "DiI' ti " [' . 'U d' .. .. tcve means amn~ lfl1l1ctiye 'n wntinlloluntarily made by an adult 
18 in accQrdance with the provisions of Sections 1 to 12 of this Act, 
19 (1L "Grantor' meqns an aduY who has executed an adyance directive in accordance 
20 with Sections ., .to 12 of this A ct. 
21 (8) "Health ewe decision" means Consenting to. or withdrawing consent for anY 
22 m,di&al Slt'9ctdurt, treatment or jnteryeotion. 
23 (9) "Health Cartfacili/J" means any institu.tion, place. buildinf, aten~ or portion 
24 thereof., public or priyal(. whether oCfaniud for profit or not. uud.,..QQerakd. or 
25 desi~ned to prorlde medical diaenosis. treatment "ursine. rehabilitative. or 
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:2 !J..QJ. 
3 
4 
preventive car~ and licensed pursuant to KBS Chapter 216B. 
"Health carr orovider" means gni health care facility Qr l1rovidfr of healtb 
sea ices, includin, but nat limited to. those licensed. certified, or ",ulated under 
th' prOVisions of KBS Chapters 211, 216, 311.312, 313. or 314. 
5 (J 1) "Life·"rolon:ing treatment" meqns qny mediCal procedure, treatment. Or 
6' intervention which.' 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
(G) Utilizes mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, prolong, res/Q[£, Qr 
supplant a SJ2Qntaoeous vital function: and 
(b) When administered to a ment lfOuld serve only to "rolom:· the dyiu~ 
process. "Life-proloaeing treatment" shaU not include the administratjon 
of medicqtjon or the "eaoemanc, of aay medicqi proceJiJu:e deemed 
"'cessary W alleviate Rain. 
(12) "Pfnnqnently unconscious" means. a condition which. to a reasonable d~r€e of 
medical probability, as determined solely by the ['alient's qttendine l>/usician and 
Qne (J 1. gl!Jer uhysjcian gn clinical examination. is characteriud by qn qbsence 
of cerebral cortical functions indicative of consc;iou:):nco¥s or behavioral 
interaction with the environment, 
OJ) "Ph.Ymtgn" means a Rerson licensed to practice medici", in.Jhe Commonwealth 
QfKeatucky. 
(14) "Responsible party" megns an adult who has authority untler Section 6 Qj this 
del t!J make a health care decision for a patient who has not executed a livin~ 
will directive. 
(15) "Surro~ale" means an adult who has beea desimated to make health care 
decisions in accordance with Sections 1 to -12 orchjs A,t. 
(16) "Terminal condition" means a condition caused by injury, disease, or iUness 
which, it;! a reasonable dewe of medical prob«bilit.y, as determined solely by tlte 
pqtient's attendine physician and one (1) other physician. is incurable and 
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irreversible and will result in death within a relatively shQrt time. and wheu.. the 
applicatiQn of life-Drolon~in~ treatment would seae only tQ grtiJicially p[Qlon~ 
. the dying urocess. 
SECTION 2. A NEW SEcrION OF KRS CHAPTER 31\ IS CREATED TO 
READ AS FOLLOWS: 
(l) An adult with decisional ,aracily may make a written living will gjre'llve that 
dan any or all of the (ollow;ne: 
Ca) Directs the withholdiur or withdraw"' o( [ife-urolonrjne treatment: or 
Cb) DjlXcis the witbholdini Qr withdrawql of artificjally provided dutdtion or 
hYdration; or 
(e) DnifnateS one (l) or more adults as. a surrogate or succeSSQr surrOK,afe to 
make heqlth care decisions on behalf at the ,raptor. Durin~ an~ lleriod in 
which llf'a (2) or more surrogates are serving. all decisions shall be bJ 
IUlgnjmous COBrent afaa the actinr surrogates unless the adVance directive 
lU1Jyides otherwise. 
(2) Exce;t a,s provided in Section Z q(thil Act, a Iivin¥ will dirrctiye miule pucsuant 
tg this section shaa be honored by a wntqr's family. regular fgrnilY llhysician or 
fUkwnr ph)'ficiqn, and any heSlUh care (qcilifJ' of or in Which the grantor is a 
patital. 
(J) for purpQSU of Sections 1 to 12 or this Aflt l1qtWcgtjon to any emer~enc)! 
medic;Y responder a.t defined bJ KRS Chqpter 211 or any paramedic as defined 
b.1 KRS ChCU'ter 3Il, of a peqon's authentic wish not to be resuscitated shall be 
recQfnil,ed QnlY iron a standard (orm' or identific{llitm.,cwroved by the Kentucky 
Board QJ Medical Uten!u,.,. in consultation with the Cabinet fur Human 
RtSQurcet 
SECTION 3. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO 
READ AS FOLLOWS: 
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(J) A livine will directive made pursuant tp Section 2 of this A ct shall be 
substantially in the fQlIowin~ (orm, and mQl' include alha: ~efific directions 
which are in accordance with (lfceJ?1eq mediCal practice and not wecificqlly 
prohibited by any 9the! statute. [faro Qtb-er specific di,.e,tiQM are held by a court 
of WropriqJe iurisdiction 10 be invalid. that invalidity shgll not. af(ect th{ 
directive, 
"Livinr}fill D;,ecJju 
My wishes re~ardin, life-prolonging treatment and artiftcially D~vided nutritiqn and 
hydration to be provided to me ifl no·lQnger haye decisional capacity. have a lermlltill 
condition. or become QermanentlY unconscious haye been indicated b.y checking and 
initialing the appropriate lines below. By checking and initiqling the appropriate lines. 
1 5Pecifl,g~ 
_ DesiraW "11"""" .... "" .... as l7l] health ClUJ: surromk(s) to mgkf health Care 
decisions for me in accordance with this directjyc when 1 no lon"r haye decisjonal 
capqcity. [[ "';""'!!!!T!W'!!""'W refuses or is not able to act (or me, [ t/esirnate 
"",,""""'''''''''''''''' as my health care sunoe'ale(s). 
Any prior designation is revoked. 
If 1 do not "sirna', g surrout" the foUowin~ are my directions 10 my attendin~ 
physician. If 1 haye desirnated a suuoz.flIf. my suuQe'Clk shall cQwU1y with my wishes 
asindic.ated beJcv£: 
~ Dinet that treatment be withheld or wjthd1JDfn. and that 1 be permitted to die 
naturallJ lfitiJ only the administration qf medicatiqn or the pedormance of any 
medi~al trcgtm,nt deemed nectssm to alleviate pain. . 
we DO NOT qutltoriu that life.l'ro/Qnrinr treatment be withheld or withdrawn. 
....... Authorite the wjthhoimng or withdrawal of artificially PrQvided food. water. Qr 
other artificially proyided nourishmentor auids. 
~ DO NOT authorize the withhQldin~ or withdrawal of artificially provided food. 
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water. or ather artificiaUy p,-ayjded nourishment 0,. fluids, 
.... A "(harite my mrro~te, desiznated qbove. 10 withhold or withdraw artificially 
vrol'jdednourislzment or fluids. or other trea/ment if the suaoeale determines thgt 
withholwnr or withdrawing is in my best intrrest,' but 1 do not manda~ that 
withholding Qr withdrawing, 
In the absence of my abilitlUq 'gire directions revarding the use of Iiff-lZcolqnginc 
tcJatment and artlflciaUy proyjded nutrition and hydration. it is my int~ntion that this 
directive shall be honored by my attending physician. my (gmily. and any surrogate 
desi~nqted pU11uant to this directive as thr final expression Q,( my legal debt to lefuse 
medical or sur~ical treatment and I accept the conseqyences of the refusal. 
d tbGl diar:naSJs IS kn .. own ta my attendjn~ 
If 1 han heeD djaV/Oie tU r effect duri.g the Mum 0 m d Qreg·ant Q' ( J 
. h II have "0 [arce 0 d' ctive s a physician, thlSITf 
Reernancy, 
1 understqnd the fUll importa,f this dU:ective and 1 am emotionally and menIally 
cQwpmnr to make this directiYL 
Sifneg this " .. dgy 0("",,," .. 19 ... 
Signature gnd addU « 0(0£ rrantor. 
In our joint presence. tbe uantof', who is of sound mind and €i~bteen years {If are. or 
older. voluntarily dated and signed this wOOn, ar dilected it to be dated and limed /IlL 
the erantor. 
QJI 
S,itryztuu and address Q[ witness· 
Siznaluu and addreu Q[ witnas. 
S:TA TE OF KENTUCKY) 
t ..... tr."County) 
Befort me. the undtrsj~ned authority. came the ~rantor whQ is of sound mind and 
ei~hte,eJl (lS) years of aee, or oldEr. and acknowledf£ui thai he voluntarily dated and 
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si~ned this writini' or fljrected it to 1H sieved and dqted qs aboye. 
Done this 'tf! dca of """'" 19 ... 
Signature. orNota" Public or other officer. 
Dgte commission expires.· .... "" .. ". 
Execution of this dgcument restricts wilhholdinr and withdrawin~ of some medical 
proceduru. Consu« KenJucg Rev1sedStatutes or your alJorna, " 
(2) All adyanced c!irecUye shgll be in writing. dated. and sir,.ed by the VantOt. Qr at 
the· rrantor's direction. and either witnessed by two (2). or more gduUs in the 
J2resence of (he mntor and ia the greKace qf each other, or acknowledfe4 ,. 
biro" a notarY public or ather person quthorized to administer oaths. None of 
tiz, follow;,.,. shall be a wiIDe« to any advance directive made under this section.' 
(q) A bloqd relative of the uaatf/Cj 
(b) A beneficiary fl.r the frantar under descent and distribution statutes of the 
Commonwealth; 
Cd A n employee of a health cve racility in which the Va"to,"- ii a patient. 
unleu IbJ. ,"U'lq1f' scml til a "olga R"~li£i 
Cd) An atkndin, phYsician oUb, grantor.· or 
Cel Arocze".on C#rectlY [manciaUy reuzoruibk for (he ~rqnfQr'i h~glth Can. 
(3) A Renon desivrated as a suUQ~at, llUltuaol to an adya,.« directive mQJ resif,a 
at w tim, by 2jvi"r written notice to the van to,.: to the immediate wc.ceSSOl 
surroratl •. if any; to theatiersdial physicillnj and to any. heaUh care fqc,Ujt.)1 
which is then waitinr for. the Stplozate to make a health care decision. 
(4) An employ(C. owner. director, or officer of 4 heaUh care facility where the 
ua"tar is a "sident or patient shall nol be designated or act as SUUall"te unless 
related ~ the ,rantor within the fourth dew" of cQns"n(ujnjb' aT affinity or q 
. member orthe same rcliriaus order, 
SECTION 4. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 [S CREATED TO 
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READ AS FOLLOWS: 
(ll An aelvance directive made Dunnam to Section 2 QfthisAQI may be revoked by: 
(a) A wririr;r declarin~ an intention to revoke .... wh;ch ""iiia, shall be sieved 
gad dated by the frantor; 
(bl An oral statement of inteat to rqvQke made ax a ~rantor with decisjonal 
c@qcia in the "resenee of&o (2) adulls. one (J) of whom shall be a health 
care provider; 0" 
Cd Destruction of the document III the wgntor or by some Qerson in the 
fran/or's "resent, and at the Wlnta", direction. 
(2) An oral !I£Zltment by a vantol' with decisional capacit;y to revoke an advance 
dirtctiyt shall override anYNevious written adrancq directive made. 
(3) A ax revOtation made puauant to this section shall become dfective immediatelli 
dIJ attend;nr physician or health cQlU4cility Shall not be required to administer 
treatment in accordance with the reyacation until the time noli" of the 
reyocation is llceived, Upon receiyinr noli" at (he reyacatian. the attendini 
phYSjcian or health ~gre facility shqll record. in the aaametE medical record, the 
rimc, date, and plgce oUhe notice «cripl . . No physician or health "gre fqcility 
sha« be SlIbie,' 10 any liability (or acting iQgOQd fqith "Don the knowledte. or 
lack theaa.G Qj'the existetlt(t or reyocatioa ofan gdvance directive. 
(4) The desiuration.p(q health care mrrofllle made pursuant to Section 2 alibis Act 
mo be revoked in whole Dr in Daetor the surro~ate'$ DOWen reduced or limited 
at any time by the uantor. if Ihe eranlDl:..bas decisional capacity. A new 
desjgnation shaH woke an, Driar designation· unless the revocation. in whole or 
in gart. issuec(fically negated. 
SECTION 5. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO 
READ AS FOLLOWS; 
(]! A SUUQrate deri~nQted puauaal to an advance directive rna): make health care 
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decisions fof' the (roalor which the grantor could make indi1!idually if he or she 
had decisiPnal capacify. plOyided aU the decisions shaU be .mgde in accordance 
. with the desires of the frantor as indicated in the advance directive, Whea 
making aay health care misionfQr the "aato4the surrogate wan consider the 
recommendation of the attendini physician. and hODor the .decjsion made by the 
ucmtor as €:rRwsed in the advance wcJiVf, 
(2) The surrogate maY not make a health care decisjgn in any situation in which the 
fran tar's qtteadinf physician has determined in rood f«jlh that the vantOr has 
decisicnql cf1.U{(city, The gttenciinr, DitwcifW 3,hqU proceed as if ther, I!!ere no 
desirnation if the surrorate i~ "!Hlrailable or refuses to make a health cgee 
decision. 
(3) A health (are surrorate may quthorize the witht/cawal or withholdini Qf 
'artificia1lJ provided nutrition and hydratiqn in the (ollow;nr circumstances.' 
(a) When merilable death is imminent. which for the pU'l1oses of this l2rovjsjon 
shan mean when geath if'Dect" by rraroaqble medical ju~menb within 
a few dalE Qr 
au When q pgtillli is in a permanently unconscious state if the fran tor has 
executed an mance dkecJjye authoriijn~ the withholdin, Qr withdralf.gl of 
artificiallv provided nutritioagnd hJdration; or 
ee) When the proriston Qf cu:tWcial nutrition '(Ulno' be physically Cljsimilated 
b,y the Derron,' or 
Cd) When the burden Qf th~ provision of artificial nutation and hYdration itself 
shaIl outwei:h its benefit. Even in the exce.ptions listed in parawuzhs(al. 
Cb), and (d of this subsection. grtifjciallY.,p1'Ovided nutrition and hydration 
shall not be withheld or withdrawn if it is needed for comfort or the reUdol 
JlJlilJ. dv • diw:1iVI1 lif. ,u,/ai"iar (".!m,n' ti 11 of an a anc I (4) Notwithstamiine- the exec« Q 
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and artificially provided nutritjon gng hydration shall be provided to a preen ant 
woman unlessl to a reasonable d,tuee of medical certainty. as certified on (hf 
woman's medical chart by the attendin~ gh.J5ician and Qne (J) other ~hy"sician 
who has eXamined the woman. ti,e prQcedwes win not maintain the woman in a 
way to "eunit the CQntjnuinr clevelapment and live birth Qf the unborn child. will 
be physjcally harmful to the woman. or "to lon, severe gain which cannot he 
glleyjated by medicqtion. 
SECfION 6. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO 
READ AS FOLLOWS: 
(1) If gn adult patient. who dues not have decisional capacity. has not execukd an 
adyaace directive or to th~ altnl the advance directive does not addresS a 
chcision thai muu be made. anyone (1) of the following rnDonSIble pqrties. in 
the foUowine Qrder af priority if no inditidual in a priQr class is reasonably 
arailgble. wining. and caml''',nt to act. shan be q(llhqriud to make health care 
decisions on behq1,fofthe owent: 
(q) The judicially wointed pardiaa of the patient. if the ,"ardian hgs been 
ClRZ?Ojnted and if medical d,dsions are within the seQue of the 
,uqtdignshilli 
Cb) The SoRaus, of the RatiUlt; 
Cd A n adult child p( the Patient. or l' lbg patient has more than oae (J) child. 
the majoril] oj the adult 'hilda" \fIh" cue "«somma ayailable foe 
consultation; 
(d) The "aarDlS af the aatient; 
(e) The nea,est liyin2 re1atjye o.t.the "atient or ijmQrethaa One (J) relative of 
the same relation is reasonably ayailabJe (or consultation, a majority of the 
Manst liYin~ refqfiyer. 
(2) In any case in which a health can decision is made under this section, the. 
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ge£isien shall be noted in writinf in the patient's medjcal records. 
An jndjviduaLauthorized Ie conseat Lor anether under. this sectw ShqU act in 
good fqith! in accordance with an, advance directive executed by the indiliidual 
whQ lacks decisienal capacity! and in the best internt of the individual who dOf5 
not have decisional capacity! 
A n individual authorizec{ to make a health cart decision under this section may 
authoriz;e the withdrawal or withholdin, of artificiallY-proyitkd.· nutrition aTJd 
hydration only in the circumstances as set forth in mbsection (3l of Section 5 of 
this Act. 
10 SECTION 7. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO 
11' READ AS FOLLOWS: 
12 (I) It shall hI th, responsibility of the wan tor or the' responsible DartY of the uantor 
13 to rupvide for notification to the uanlDc's attendine ,llhysicjan and health care 
14 fqdlit.x where the grantor if a patient thgt an advgnce directive has peen madf. [( 
15 the uanloe iJ comatose. incompettnt. oe otherwise. mtmallv. or phuically 
16 incapable, any other person may notify the gtlfLnWI l'hyricjan Q,f the exislenH 
17 Qf an adyanct directive. An attendin~ ghysician whq is noCififd. ~hgU grQmgtll 
18 make the liyiar win diactive Ot a copy Qf the advimce directive a Dart. of the 
19 uantor's medical records. 
20 (2l An gtteadjne physician or health care fqcility which refuses to carnaly with the 
21 adyanCl directive of «I patient or decision made by a surrofate Dr responsible 
22 partJ shall immediateLY Worm the patient or the paJimt's reSllonsible party and 
23 the ["milY or 2uaniian of the patient of the refusal. No physician or health caFf 
24 facility which refuses to complY with the advance dire,me qf a qualified patient 
, 
25 Qr decision mqde by a responsible Qqrty shall impede fM transfer of the patient to· 
26 gnother physiciQIJ or heaUh care facility which will comply with the advanc(! 
27 directive. Lf Ihe gatient, the family. or the iuardian of the ,,«film has requested 
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and a"(hQOted a transfer. the transferrine attending physician and health care 
facility shall s"@li the patient's medical records and other information or 
assistance medically nrerum for the continued care of the Dgtienl. to the 
receiv;nr physicign and health care facility. 
(3) No phYsician, nurse. stqffmember. or emlliQ}!ee ora gublic Qr private h~~itql. or 
employee of a public or gtivate health care taqUiO'. who shqll start in writing to 
the haSlljtal or health care (qcilitJ -his objection to complYing with the qdvance 
directive' of q rxWent or a he'alth care decision qf g responsible Dam under 
Sections I to 12 ottbis Act. an moral. reli(iQus. argrqfessional munds. shgn be 
regKiad to. or held liable (or n:bwIl to. comply with th, adyance directive Qr 
health cm decjsion as IOnr ~ lite physician. nurse. staff member. or employee 
COMan" with the requirements of subsection (2) Qf this nclion reegrding patient 
""tmeatio" and patient trQ!!sfer. 
(4) It $haU be unlawful discrimjngtoa pm"';" (or any peaon to imD0geDenalties or 
tab disciplinary getion miDlt or deny or limit licenses. eerN,ticatioD$. df~rees. 
or other ~rqyals ~r documenq qf 'lllfJlification to any gbysician. nUl'sestq'" 
member. or employee whq tfluw' to comply with the gdyance directive qf a 
patient or a b,aUh carr decision b.y a t;fuansibll. EZgrtv under Sections 1 [2 12 gf 
this del. asian, il3 th, physician, num stqfjmember. or ~mRIOJ'" complier with 
the ProvtsWtlf d ~u~sectiolf (2) of this section r<,ardin, notification and 
transfer. 
SECTION 8. A NEW.SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO 
READ AS FOLLOWS: 
(J) A health cgrc facility. physician; or other penon actinr under the directjon of a 
Dbydcian shaY not be sult,iecl to criminal prosecution Or cifil ligbility or be 
.deemed to have eniA~ed in ultlmnsional conduct Ka resuU Qf the withhQldin~ 
or the withdrawal of life-Drolonrin& treatment or artificially provided nutrition 
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and hvdrqtion from 4 Datiln' in « tenninal condition in qccordance with an 
advance directive executed pursuant to Se.,tians 1 to 12 q(this Act. A "erson who 
authorizes the withholding or withdtawal of life-proTone;nr tr;rQtment· or 
artificially profided nutrition (md hYdmU(JR (ram q patient in a termjnal 
conditioa in accordance with qn adyane, directive ,hall no' be subject to criminal 
"rqscrcu#on or dyi1liqbUitv for 0, gction, 
An independent investiration of q surrogate', authority mqU not be necessary 
unleu II person is in "pssesSion of infonnatipn as to the su"o~ate's 
disqualification. No sunyr«t" responSible pam. physiciao, or health egre 
fgcilill gctini' in good faith. shall be mbject to criminal or ciyjlligbilia [or riyine 
. instiuetion, IQ" a mrro"". mqkjni' a health car' decision. as q resDonsilzle UactY· 
under Section' 1 to 12 OJ tllil Aq. or carryi!, out. or afuring to carry oul 
pursuant to Section Z of 0i1. Act, the ,uwlater, ar reuwnsible D(111y's 
instmctions or acting in reliance on the aantor's desirngtiqa oJ a SHuvrate or a 
beaUh care decision by a C'IPQasible party undu Section! 1 io 12 of this A,t. 
The pmvi$iolu of tbis Kctioll thaY tWIll unleu.it is maWR by a r;ruoh4erance 
Q/tb, mdene, that fh, peaoRi 
fa) . Autho .. nunr or e(feetugtia . r th, wrthholdi 
pmlaarill. tWltmlllll; ng 9r. lffthdrawl af life. 
(b) Givinr jnWucti . on, ll$ a fUno,,",· 
(£1 Makin, a health . . • carr deClslO ( . RIllA mp!!!!Ijblc I!l.tlllS Act. JIf!lf1 under£ecdq I . n wU 
(d) Cgminr out. or reJusint to Carry Ollt. tle !iUUQrate's or responsible party's. 
inl/tUctiQW; qr 
Q a sunpgat€ or a health (e) Actinr ira reliane; on the ,rantor's d(fj~natiQn f, 
cg~ deciSion ~Y a TespolJrjb[, pam under S"tjons l '2 12 of this A cL 
did not. in fQodiajth. comply with the RrovisiaDr "(Sections 1 to 12 oOM3 AcL 
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(41 An advanct: directive made ;n accordance with Sections I to 5 of this Act shalllz€ 
presumed to have betn madf voluntarily and l'alidiy executed unless the 
attending physjcian or health Cart fqcility has actual knowletf$e to the contrau. 
SECTION 9. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO 
s READ AS FOLLOWS: 
6 (l) The wilhholdiltg Or with4mwal of life-proloRrin, treatment or artificiall1. 
7 provided nutrition and hydration from a irgntor in accordance with the 
8 proyjsions" of St£ti9as 1 to 12 of this Act· thaU not. far gay purpose. constitute a 
9 suicide. the makjn~ oran aclyanee directive under Stetigall to 5 of this Act or a 
10 health em decision by q resVOaS'ible paw uada: Sectiom I to 12 of this Act shall 
11 no' qffect in any manner 0, sale. procurement. or issuance of any llolicy of life 
12 insurance. ngr shall it be considered 19 modify the terms of au existing policy Qf 
13 life insUWlce. Notwithstanding any term of the Wlic! to the contrary. no policy 
14 of lift jnsurance shall be lewlJ imggiud or inyalidated in gay manner QY q 
IS heaUh care decision made by a maa2aie or· re9110nsjble PartY Qr by the 
16 withholdint or withdJ:awaJ from an insured patient any medicgJ IJ!79,edure !l.! 
l7 inteNtation whjch would sery, only to groWu. artificially the cbinK gro,ess. 
18 (2) No gerson. cO'l1oration. or wyetnnJental cu:gDC1 Wall re'lu;" or induct an1 
19 peCIon to e:recute a Urine will dim;tiye ar ttl make q heaUh care decision as Ii 
20 rngansibk Party under Sections 1 ~ l~ of this Act as a condition (Qr a contract 
21 or (oelhe prol'itiQl1lif"nJ DrY;«. medicaltreatmen~ or benefit. 
22 (3) No0inr in SedWns 119 12 of this Act shaY be construed to impose anY liability 
23 on a suao:ate of respon~ible llartx for aa! errzenst.$ of the uantor for whjch the 
24 surrogate or responsible party would not othuwise have beeR liauk. 
25 (4) Sections 1 to ·12j)r this Ad shall..notcreqte a presumption cQncemin~ the 
26 intention or an adult who has revoked or h~ not executed an a!/yance directive 
,7 with respect to the use. withholdine. or withdrawal of l,fe-Drolonrine treatment it 
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a tenninq/ condition aids. 
(5) Sectjons 1 to 12 of this Act shall not affect the common law or slaty/oO' dehl of 
sn adult to make decisions ~eardint the use qf Ufe,-prolongine treatment. so 
10llr as the adult is able to do so, or impair or supenedfl gay common law Qr; 
I1f1114lal] d~ht that an adult hasJo g(Jeet the witbhaIdinv or wUhdralfine of 
medj,al care. 
(6) Sectioas 1 to 12 of (his Act shgU oat preclude or restrict the debt of persons to 
, make aciyaart djrectivn outside the provisions of Sections 1 (0 12 ofthis Act.' and 
Sections 1 tg l1 of this Act $haU not.Dstz:i£t.. or pre.dlldc medical personnfL 
physician!. nurses, or health CgB facilities from foUowine oth" written advance 
weedv,s consistent with accepted medical practice. 
SEcnON 10. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO 
READ AS FOLLOWS: 
Sections 1 to 12 at this Act sh"U not be construed to condone. authoriub or aPllroye 
mercy killin, or euthanasia. ar to pemit any q,fJirmatiye or. deUberqtf act to end Ute 
othet thaa to Qennit the nalUraiRroceu orching. 
SECTION 11. A NEW-SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 IS CREATED TO 
READ AS FOLLOWS: 
(1) A nJ DelAon who wiUfuUv conceals. caneth. de.fqcU. oblitaates. or dwn(lW the 
advance djrccfut Q,f another without the uantor'S consent or who falsifies or 
(arc" a teyocgtion oflhe qdJ'(lDce directive pf aMthee, tlwub cgusinr liff· 
prolonr;nr treatment 10 be Uh1iud in contravention of tb~ preyiously eXj?ressed 
intent orlbe gatignt sball b, civilly liable. 
a) A ay person whQ lalsifies or fQ~e$ the ac/yance directive of another. or wiUfulLv 
cpnctals Q7 withholds· PCl10nal knowledze Q[ the I'tvQcation of an advance 
djrfcjjYf. with the intent to cause a withhQldine or withdrawal af li(e.prQ1Qn~ng 
lITatment, contrary to the. wishes Q,f the frantor. and thereby causes life-
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prolonfin~jceatme.fJt to be withheld Qr withdrawn and deRlh to be hastened, 5hgll 
be gujltv ora elgss B felony. 
3 SECTION 12. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 311 [S CREATED TO 
4 READ AS FOLLOWS: 
5 Sections 1 to 12 qfthis Act mCJ.)' by cited as' the "KentuckJ Liying Will Directiye..Act. It 
6 Section 13. The following KRS sections are repealed: 
7 311.622 Legislative finding. 
S 3 11.624 Definitions for KRS 311. 622 to 311.644. 
9 311.626 Declaration -- Witness. 
10 3 t 1.628 Notification of declarli!lt's attending physician of ~xistence of declaration. 
11 311.630 Revocation procedures. 
12 311.632 Exemption of health care facility or physician from criminal prosecution or civil 
13 liability for actions. 
14 311.634 Notification of patient when .attending physician or health care facility refuses to 
15 comply -- Transfer of patient. 
16 311.636 Construction of KRS 311.622 to 311.644. 
17 311.638 \yithholding or withdrawal of ute-prolonging treatment not to constitute suidde 
1 S -- Effect of declaration on life insurance. 
19 311.640 Effect of KRS 311.622 to 3~1.644 onintemion or right of adult 
20 311.642 Civil liability .- Penalty. 
21 311.644 Short title. 
22 311. 970 Defmitions for KRS 311.970 to 311.986. 
23 311. 972 Designation of surrogate - Resignation - Persons prohibited from serving. 
24 311.974 Execution of designation. 
25 311.976 Revocation of qesi~ation. 
26 311. 978 Powers of surrogate -- Limitations. 
27 311. 980 Fonn of designation. 
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311.982 Refusal of health care provider to comply with desi~nation -- Effect of refusal. 
311.984 Liabilities of surrogate -- Effect of designation on life insurance -- Right to 
make decision as to use of life-prolonging treatment 
311.986 Shon title. 
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APPENDIX E 
KENTUCKY'S 1994 REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAX STATUTE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 
REGULAR SESSION 1994 
HOUSE BILL NO. 157 
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1994 
The following bill was reported to the Senate from the House and ordered to be printed. 
A - 189 
AN ACT relating to real estate transfer tax. 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky: 
1 Section 1. KRS 142.050 is amended to read as follows: 
2 (1) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: 
3 
4 
5 
6 
(a) "Deed" means any document, instrument, or writing other than a will and other 
than a lease or easement, regardless of where made, executed, or delivered by 
which any real property in Kentucky, or any interest therein; is conveyed, 
vested, granted, bargained, sold, transferred, or assigned. 
7 (b) "Value" means: 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
1~' In the case of any deed not ~- gift, the amount of the full actual 
consideration therefor, paid or to be paid, including the amount of any 
lien or liens thereon; and 
--
2. In the case of a gift, or any deed wi.th nominal consideration or Without 
stated consideration, the estimated price the property would -bring in an 
open market and under the- therr prevailing market conditions in a sale 
between a- willing selIer and a: willing buyer~ both conversant with the 
-
property and with prev.ailing general price levels. _ 
16 (2) A tax upon the grantor named in the-deed' shaB- be-imposed at the rate of fifty cents 
17 ($0.50) for each S500 of value oc- fraction thereo( which vaJueis declared in the 
18 deed upon the privilege oftransfeningtitleto real property. 
19 (3) (a) If any deed evidencing a-transfer of title subject to the tax herein imposed is 
20 offered for recordation, the county clerk shall ascertain -and compute the 
21 amount of the tax due thereon and shall collect the amount as prerequisite to 
22 acceptance of the deed for-recordation. 
. 
23 (b) The amount- of tax shall be -computed- on the -basis of,the: -value -of the 
24 transferred property as set forth in the deed. 
25 (c) The tax required to- be levied by-this section shall be collected: only once on 
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each transaction and in the county in which the deed is required to be recorded 
2 by KRS 382.110(1). 
3 (4) The county clerk shall collect the amount due and certify the date .of payment and 
4 the amount of cellectien on the deed. Theceunty clerk shall retain five percent (5%) 
5 as his fee for cellectien and remit the balance every three (3) menths te the county 
6 treasurer, whe shall depesit the meney in the ceunty general fund. 
7 (5) The Revenue Cabinet may prescribe regulatiens necessary te carry .out the purpeses 
8 .of this section. 
9 (6) Any ceunty clerk whe willfully shall recerd any deed upon which a tax is impesed by 
10 this sectien witheut cellecting the pre per ameunt .of tax and· certifying the date and 
11 ameunt .of cellectien .on the deed as required by this sectien based en the declared 
12 value indicated in the affidavit appended te the deed shall, upen cenvictien, be fined 
13 $50 fer each .offense. 
14 (7) The tax impesed by this sectien shall net apply te a transfer .of title: 
15 (a) Recorded prier te March 27, 1968; 
16 (b) Te, in the event .of a deed .of gift .or deed with neminal censideratien, .or frem 
17 the United States .of America, this state, any city or ceunty within this state, or 
18 any instrumentality, agency, .or subdivision hereof, 
19 (c) Selely in .order te previde .or release security fer a debt .or ebligatien; 
20 (d) Which cenfinns .or corrects a deed previeusly recorded; 
21 (e) Between husband and wife, .or between fermer speuses as part .of a diverce 
22 proceeding; 
23 (t) On sale fer delinquent taxes .or assessments; 
24 (g) On partitien; 
~-.. 
25 (h) Pursuant te mergers .of corperations; 
26 (i) By a subsidiary cerperatien te its parent cerporatien fer no censideratien, 
27 neminal consideration, .or in sele censideratien .of the cancellatien .or surrender 
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of the subsidiary's stock; 
2 G) Under a foreclosure proceeding; 
3 
4 
5 
6 
(k) Between individuals and a corporation, with only nominal consideration 
therefor, if those individuals are the exclusive owners of that corporation; 
faOOt 
(1) Between parent and child or grandparent and grandchild, with only nominal 
7 consideration therefor; and 
8 (m) Of property to a trustee. to be held in trust. or bv a trustee to a beneficiary 
9 of the trust. if a direct transfer from the grantor of the trust to each 
10 individual beneficiary of the trust would' have qualified (or an exemption 
11 from the tax pursuant to one of the provisions of this section. As used in 
12 this paragraph, "trust" shall have the same definition as contained in KRS 
13 386.800. 
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SELECTED SOPHISTICATED GIFTING STRATEGIES: 
A CHECKLIST OF IDEAS 
by 
THEODORE B. ATLASS, ESQ. 
Atlass Professional Corporation 
2100 East Fourteenth Avenue 
Denver, Colorado 80206 
(303) 377-0707 
I. INTRODUCTION TO GIFTING 
A. What Constitutes A Gift? 
Virtually any direct or indirect gratuitous transfer will constitute a gift for 
purposes of Chapter 12 (i.e., the gift tax provisions) of the Internal Revenue 
Code unless such transfer qualifies for some specific exemption. 
B. Non-Tax Reasons For Making Gifts 
1. Funding Specific Needs Of The Donee 
To assist the donee by providing funds to go to college, purchase a 
home, start a business, or to otherwise have an enriched life. 
2. Facilitating Financial Maturity 
To provide funds for the donee to gain some experience in managing 
money, making investment decisions, dealing with professional advisors, 
etc. 
3. Testing The Donee's Financial Acumen 
To see what the donee will do with a large gift. If the donee acts 
responsibly with the gifted property, then the donor may be more 
generous later. If the donee wastes the gift, then the donor may be 
very tightfisted with later gifts. 
4. Not Requiring The Donee To Wait 
To allow the donee to receive funds while still young enough to benefit 
from them, as opposed to making the donee wait until the donor's 
death to receive anything, at which time the donee may be very old. 
B-1 
5. Providing The Donee With Financial Security 
To provide the donee with financial security, such as might b 
accomplished by setting up a trust for the donee which would be 
protected from the beneficiary's creditors, divorce actions, financial 
mismanagement, or from death taxes at the beneficiary's death. 
6. Anti-Creditor Planning 
To get some assets set aside for family members while the donor is 
solvent, just in case some financial calamity later financially wipes the 
donor out. 
7. Planning To Qualify For Medicaid 
To position the donor so that Medicaid will pay for the donor's nursing 
home costs by gifting non-exempt property away and letting the 36 
month waiting period expire. 
C. Tax-Motivated Reasons For Making Gifts 
1. Income Tax Minimization 
2. 
To shift income from the donor's income tax return to the another 
income tax return (i.e., the donor's income tax return or a trust's 
income tax return) where it will be subject to a lower effective income 
tax rate. 
Example: If assets producing $1,200 in income are gifted by a donor 
(who is in a 39.6% tax bracket) to a child under age 14 with no other 
income, $385.20 in annual tax savings will result. The child's taxes on 
$1,200 would only be $90 (as $600 is exempt and $600 is taxed at 15%, 
based upon the 1992 kiddie tax rules and 1993 rates). If such $1,200 
of income had been retained by the donor and all taxed at 39.6%, of 
$475.20 of tax would instead be due. 
Gift Tax Minimization 
To shift assets from the donor to the donee at the least (if any) gift tax 
cost possible so that such assets will be subject to a lowest possible 
effective transfer tax rate. 
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Example: Husband and wife, who will ultimately be in a 55% death tax 
bracket, strongly believe in home ownership and desire to see that each 
of their children has $100,000 at age 25 to own a home free and clear. 
They could wait until each child turns 25 to give such child the 
$100,000. However, even with gift-splitting and use of two annual 
exclusions, $80,000 of taxable gifts would then be made (which would 
result in $44,000 additional estate tax at death). Instead, $20,000 per 
year (less whatever benefit is achieved from appreciation and/or 
accumulation of net income after taxes) could be made for five years 
without any taxable gifts being incurred. 
Estate Tax Minimization 
To eliminate (to the extent possible) estate taxes at the client's death 
and, if such taxes can't be eliminated, then to postpone them until the 
death of the client's spouse. 
Example: Client has a pre-1981 will which leaves one-half of client's 
$2,000,000 estate to the spouse, and the balance (after estate taxes) to 
a so-called "family trust" for the surviving spouse and children. The 
$1,000,000 going to the family trust exceeds the $600,000 exemption-
equivalent, and is subject to $153,000 in death taxes (not considering 
any available credits). The client's estate planning documents (i.e., will 
and/or revocable trust) can be updated, if desired, to take advantage 
of the unlimited marital deduction introduced in 1981. This will cause 
more assets to go to the spouse (or to be set aside in a so-called 
"marital deduction trust" for the spouse's benefit), and will completely 
eliminate death taxes upon the client's death, assuming that the client 
is survived by his or her spouse. It should be noted, however, that 
assets which qualify for the marital deduction are subject to estate 
taxation at the surviving spouse's later death, to the extent that they 
have not been used up or given away by the time of the surviving 
spouse's death. 
Example: Husband and wife have combined assets of $1,200,000, all of 
which are owned by wife, and simple wills which leave all of their 
assets to the survivor of them. No estate tax will be due at the first 
death (Le., husband has no assets, and wife's estate will not be taxed 
because of the marital deduction). Whoever dies last will have 
$1,200,000 to pass on to the children. Only $600,000 of those assets will 
be sheltered from estate taxation at the survivor's death, with the 
balance of the assets generating $235,000 in death taxes (not 
considering any available tax credits). If husband and wife split their 
B-3 
assets, so that each of them had a net worth of $600,000, the first to 
die could put his or her assets into a so-called IIfamily trust ll (sometimes 
also called a liB trust ll or IIcredit shelter trustll ) for the surviving spouse. 
The family trust would benefit the surviving spouse, but not be deemed 
to be an asset of the surviving spouse for estate tax purposes, and 
$253,000 of estate taxes would be eliminated. 
4. Multi-Generational Tax Planning 
Thought should also be given to minimizing taxes at the death of the 
donor's child, grandchild, and possibly even great grandchild by setting 
up a multi-generational dynastic trust arrangement whereby successive 
trust beneficiaries have very broad rights to benefit from property held 
in the trust without having a transfer tax imposed when one 
beneficiary's interest terminates in favor of the next beneficiary. 
Example: In their wills husband and wife each put $1 Million (after 
estate taxes) into generation-skipping trusts for their descendants. The 
trusts are to benefit children, then grandchildren, and ultimately pass 
to great grandchildren. Assume that a 55 % estate tax applies. If the 
$2 Million had been given to the children and remained intact, the 
estate tax when the children died would be $1.1 Million, leaving 
$900,000 for grandchildren. The estate tax when the grandchildren 
died would be $495,000, leaving only $405,000 of the original $2 Million 
for the great grandchildren. Use of the generation-skipping trust 
causes no estate taxes to be due when children and grandchildren die, 
thus resulting in the entire $2 Million (rather than $405,000) being 
available for the great grandchildren. 
II. APPLICABLE TAX RULES 
A. Income Tax Implications Of Non-Charitable Gifts 
1. Income Shifting Opportunities 
a. Income shifting has been made much more difficult in recent 
years by bracket compression, kiddie tax, trust throwback rules, 
prohibitions against multiple trusts, elimination of many income 
shifting devices (Clifford trusts, Rushing trusts, spousal 
remainder trusts, etc.), taxation gain realized by trust at the 
grantor's tax rates under certain circumstances, etc. 
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b. The income tax rates for tax years beginning in 1993 are as 
. follows: 
SINGLE INDIVIDUALS (NOT A QUALIFIED SURVIVING 
SPOUSE OR HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD) 
Taxable Income 
Not over $22,100 
$22,100 to $53,500 
$53,500 to $115,000 
$115,000 to $250,000 
Over $250,000 
Computation of Tax 
15 % of the taxable income 
$3,315.00 plus 28% of the 
excess over $22,100 
$12,107.00 plus 31% of the 
excess over $53,500 
$31,172.00 plus 36% of the 
excess over $115,000 
$79,772.00 plus 39.6% of the 
excess over $250,000 
MARRIED FILING JOINTLY· AND QUALIFIED 
SURVIVING SPOUSES 
Taxable Income 
Not over $36,900 
$36,900 to $89,150 
$89,150 to $140,000 
$140,000 to $250,000 
Over $250,000 
HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS 
Taxable Income 
Not over $29,600 . 
$29,600 to $76,400 
$76,400 to 127,500 
B - 5 
Computation of Tax 
15 % of the taxable income 
$5,535.00 plus 28% of the 
excess over $36,900 
$20,165.00 plus 31% of the 
excess over $89,150 
. $35,928.50 plus 36% of the 
excess over $140,000 
$75,528.50 plus 39.6% of the 
excess over $250,000 
Computation of Tax . 
15% of the taxable income 
$4,4440.00 plus 28% of the 
excess over $29,600 
$17,544.00 plus 31% of the 
excess over $76,400 
c. 
$127,500 to $250,000 
Over $250,000 
$33,385.00 plus 36% of the 
excess over $127,500 
$77,485.00 plus 39.6% of the 
excess over $250,000 
MARRIED INDIVIDUALS FILING SEP ARATEL Y 
Taxable Income 
Not over $18,450 
$18,450 to $44,575 
$44,575 to $70,000 
$70,000 to $125,000 
Over-$125,000 
ESTATES AND TRUSTS. 
Taxable Income 
Not over $1,500 
$1,500 to $3,500 
$3,500 to $5,500 
$5,500 to $7,500 
Over $7,500 
Computation of Tax 
15 % of the taxable income 
$2767.50 plus 28%. of the 
excess over $18,450 
$10,082.50 plus 31% of the 
excess over $44,575 
$17,964.25 plus 36% of the 
excess over $70,000 
$37,764.25 plus 39.6% ofthe 
excess over $125,000 
Computation of Tax 
15 % . of taxable income 
$225.00 plus 28% of the 
excess over $1,500 
$785.00 plus 31% of the 
excess over $3,500 
$1,405.00 plus 36% of the 
excess over $5,500 
$2,125.00 plus 39.6% of the 
excess over $7,500 . 
It may be possible to maximize income shifting possibilities by 
combining the use of a trust and a custodianship under UGMA 
or UTMA for a minor beneficiary. Each year the trustee would 
determine how marty dollars of trust income it would be 
worthwhile to instead have taxed on the minor beneficiary's 
Form 1040 instead of on the trust's Form 1041, and such 
amount could be distributed by the trustee to a custodiari under 
UGMA or UTMA for such child's benefit. The distribution will 
carry out DNI of the trust, thus shifting taxable income to the 
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child's presumably lower income tax bracket. There is no 
reason why the trustee couldn't also act as the custodian. 
Example: It would be possible to establish a trust which had 
assets producing $8,800 in income and have such trust distribute 
$1,200 per year to a child under age 14 (or a custodian under 
UGMA or UTMA for such child). Mter the distributions 
deduction is taken into account the trust would have $7,600 of 
income, $100 of which would be exempt and $7,500 of which 
would cause $2,125 of tax to be due by the trust. The child's 
taxes on $1,200 would be $90 (as $600 is exempt and $600 is 
taxed at 15%, based upon the 1992 kiddie tax rules and 1993 
rates). If such $8,800 of total income had been retained by the 
donor and all taxed at 39.6%, $3,484.80 of tax would be due. 
$1,269.80 of annual income tax savings is thus achieved for each 
beneficiary under age 14. 
Example: It would be possible to establish a trust which had 
assets producing $30,300 in income and have such trust 
distribute $22,700 per year to a child over age 14 (or a 
custodian under UGMA or UTMA for such child). Mter the 
distributions deduction is taken into account the trust would 
have $7,600 of income; $100 of which would be exempt and 
$7,500 of which would cause $2,125 of tax to be due by the 
trust. The child's taxes on $22,700 would be $3,315 (as $600 is 
exempt and $22,100 is taxed at 15%, based upon the 1992 
kiddie tax rules and 1993 rates). If such $30,300 of total income 
had been retained by the donor and all taxed at 39.6%, 
$11,998.80 of tax would be due. $6,558.80 of annual income tax 
savings is thus achieved for each beneficiary under age 14. 
d. Many factors besides bracket differential may impact the 
amount of tax savings achieved through income shifting, 
including the kiddie tax rules, trust throwback rules, the 
percentage limitations on various deductions (medical expenses, 
charitable deductions, casualty losses, miscellaneous itemized 
deductions, etc.), the (maximum 80%) disallowance of itemized 
deductions impacting high income· taxpayers, capital and net 
operating loss carryforwards, phaseout of the $25,000 real estate 
exception to the· PAL rules, AMT consequences, etc. 
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2. Consequences To The Donor 
a. Any income generated on gifted property after the date of the 
gift is shifted from the donor's income tax return to the donee's 
income tax return. 
b. Any unrealized gain in appreciated gifted property becomes the 
donee's problem (as the donee receives a carryover basis) 
unless the gift itself is characterized as a taxable disposition 
triggering gain to the donor (such as in the case of a gift of an 
installment obligation ). 
c. Gift loans (i.e., those containing a below market rate of interest) 
cause the lender to have imputed interest income for income 
tax purposes, subject to a de minimis rule. IRC §7872. 
d. Where a "net gift" is made (i.e., the gift taxes on the transfer, 
which are the legal obligation of the donor, are instead to be 
paid by the donee), the donor will realize gain to the extent the 
gift tax paid exceeds the donor's adjusted cost basis in the 
property. Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 
1981). 
e. Where a gift is made of property subject to nonrecourse 
indebtedness, the donor will realize gain to the extent that 
indebtedness exceeds the basis of the property. Winston F. e. 
Guest, 77 T.e. 9 (1981). The "amount realized" is equal to the 
outstanding balance of the nonrecourse obligation, and the fair 
market value of the property is irrelevant to the computation. 
Tufts v. Commissioner, 103 S.Ct 1826 (1983). . 
f. The transfer of an installment obligation by lifetime gift will 
constitute a disposition and cause an acceleration of the 
deferred gain for income tax purposes. IRC §453B. 
g. The transfer of· a passive-activity asset by lifetime gift does not 
trigger the recognition of suspended passive activity losses. IRC 
§469(j)( 6). 
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3. Consequences To The Donee 
a. 
b. 
Gross income does not include the value of property acquired 
by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance. IRC §102(a). 
Gross income does include the income derived from any 
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance. IRC 
§ 102(b )(1). 
c. Gross income does include the amount of such income where 
. the gift, bequest, devise or inheritance is of income from 
property. IRC § 102(b )(2). 
d. In the case. of the gratuitous forgiveness of indebtedness, the 
Code contains conflicting provisions relating the whether the 
donee has received gross income. IRC §§61(a)(2) and 102(a). 
It has been held that the forgiveness of indebtedness which is a 
true gift made gratuitously and with donative intent is not 
included in gross income. Helvering v. American Dental, 318 
U.S. 322 (1943). 
e. Gift loans (i.e., those containing a below market rate of interest) 
cause the borrower to have imputed interest expense for income 
tax purposes. IRC §7872. 
f. Appreciated property which is given to a trust and subsequently 
sold within two years (and during the donor's lifetime) by the 
trust will be taxed to the trust at the grantor's tax rate rather 
than the trust's tax rate. IRC §644. 
4. Adjusted Basis Of Gifted Property 
a. The donee of property which is received in a lifetime gift 
transaction where no gain is recognized receives such property 
with a carryover of the donor's cost basis and acquisition date. 
IRC §1015. 
b. The basis of gifted property is increased for pre-1977 gifts by 
the gift tax paid. For gifts made after 1976, the basis of gifted 
property is increased by that portion of the gift tax paid 
attributable to the donor's net appreciation in the gifted assets. 
IRC §1015. 
F 9 
Example: Assume that the donor gives stock having a basis of 
$200 and a fair market value of $1,000 to child, and pays $400 
of gift tax. The basis adjustment for the gift tax paid is [(1000 
minus 200)/1000] times $400, or $320. The donee's basis 
becomes $200 plus $320, for a total basis of $520. 
c. The basis of gifted property is increased (but not to above fair 
market value) by generation-skipping taxes paid. IRe §2654. 
This basis adjustment for GST taxes paid is applied after the 
basis adjustment for gift taxes paid pursuant to IRe §1015. 
d. Any suspended passive activity losses attributable to a gifted 
asset are added to the donee's adjusted cost basis and benefit 
the donee (although a dual basis may exist, and such addition 
to basis, to the extent it causes basis to exceed the fair market 
value of the property at the time of the gift, will not benefit the 
donee in a loss transaction). IRe §469U)(6). 
Example: Assume that the donor has an asset with a fair 
market value of $100, an adjusted cost basis of $70, and a 
suspended PAL of $40. When the asset is gifted, the donee will 
have a $100 basis for loss purposes and a $110 basis for gain 
purposes. 
e. For purposes of determining loss in a subsequent sale of a 
gifted asset by the donee, the donee's basis cannot exceed the 
fair market value of the gifted property at the time of its receipt 
by the donee. IRe §1015. 
B. Gift Tax Implications 
1. General Scheme Of Taxation 
a. The gift tax is imposed on the donor with respect to gratuitous 
transfers. IRe §2501 et ~ Obvious examples include the 
transfers of cash or other property to members of the donor's 
family, trusts for such persons benefit, etc. 
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b. The gift tax is not applicable to transfers such as which are not 
gratuitous by their nature. 
(1) Transactions where fair consideration is received back 
(i.e., parent gives child $1,000 and receives from child 
$1,000 worth of stocks in return) do not constitute gifts 
for gift tax purposes. 
(2) Payments made to (or for the benefit of) one family 
member by another family member in fulfillment of the 
payor's duty under state law to legally support the 
person being benefitted (i.e., husband pays wife's grocery 
or doctor bill, parent buys minor child some clothing, 
etc.) do not constitute gifts for gift tax purposes. 
(3) Payments made by one spouse (or ex-spouse) to the 
other incident to a divorce property settlement do not 
constitute gifts for gift tax purposes. IRC §2516. 
c. A person who receives a gift or inheritance can turn it down 
(i.e. disclaim or renounce the gift), which may cause the to go 
to a. default beneficiary (possibly the disclaimant's child). If 
technical . statutory requirements are met (e.g., a timely 
disclaimer has been made prior to accepting any benefits of the 
disclaim property, etc.), then the disclaimer will not constitute 
a gift by the disclaiming party for gift tax purposes. IRC §2518. 
2. Available Exclusions, Deductions and Credits 
a. The Annual Exclusion 
It will be desirable to make gifts each calendar year to as many 
people as possible. No gift tax will be incurred (nor is a gift tax 
return due) so long as the total gifts to a particular individual 
do not exceed $10,000 in anyone calendar year. IRC §2503(b). 
The annual exclusion is $100,000 for gifts made by a person to 
his or her spouse where the spouse receiving the gift is not a 
U.S. citizen. Such gifts will not be included in the donor's estate 
pursuant to IRC §2035, even if the donor dies within three 
years, unless a life insurance policy on the donor's life was 
gifted or the donor retained some interest in the gifted property 
under IRC §§2036, 2037, or 2038. 
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b. Spousal Gift Splitting 
c. 
Spouses may consent to split gifts, which causes the amount 
which the two of them (in the aggregate) can gift tax free each 
calendar year to become $20,000 per individual donee. IRe 
§2523. Such election can be made on a late filed gift tax return 
(as long as it is the first gift tax return filed for the year in 
question), and if made the election applies to all gifts made 
during that year while the couple was married. 
The Exclusion For Medical And Tuition Expenses 
Direct payments to the providers for the medical or tuition 
expenses of another are gifts which qualify for an unlimited gift 
tax exclusion. Reimbursing the individual who incurred such an 
expense will not qualify for this special gift tax exclusion. IRC 
§2503(e). 
d. The Marital Deduction 
Outright transfers to a spouse (as well as transfers to a properly 
drafted "marita~ deduction" trust for a spouse's benefit) will 
qualify for the gift tax marital deduction and can thus be made 
on a gift tax free basis. There is no limit on the amount of 
assets that can be transferred via the marital deduction to a 
spouse who is a U.S. citizen, but no gift tax marital deduction 
is allowed with respect to assets transferred to a spouse who is 
not a U.S. citizen. 
e. The Charitable Deduction 
f. 
Gift taxes are generally not imposed on transfers to qualified 
charitable organizations. IRC §2522. Unlike the income tax 
charitable deduction, the gift tax charitable deduction is 
. potentially unlimited (i.e., it is not subject to percentage 
limitations ). 
Use Of The Unified Credit 
Every individual has a unified credit of $192,800 for estate and 
gift tax purposes which allows transfer tax free gifts of up to 
$600,000 to be made in addition to whatever gifts have been 
which were not gift·taxable by reason of the annual exclusion or 
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exclusion for direct payment of tuition and medical expenses. 
To the extent not used during lifetime to shelter otherwise 
taxable gifts, it is usable at death to shelter transfers from estate 
taxation . 
Making Of Gifts Which Cause Gift Tax To Be Due 
Gift tax is due when cumulative lifetime taxable gifts in excess of the 
$600,00 exemption equivalent have been made. Gift tax is less 
expensive than estate tax, even though the tax rates appear to be the 
same: 
a. This result occurs because lifetime taxable gifts are computed 
on a "tax exclusive" basis and taxable transfers at death are 
taxed on a "tax inclusive" basis. 
b. As an example, assuming $100 in assets and a 50% flat transfer 
tax bracket, $66-2/3 could be given away during lifetime with 
$33-1/3 of gift taxes being paid, but if the same $100 was held 
until death, only $50 would go to the donee (and $50 of estate 
taxes would be paid) since the gift tax is based upon the net 
amount passing to the donee (exclusive of the gift tax itself) and 
the estate tax is based upon the gross amount of assets passing 
to the donee (before deducting the estate tax attributable to 
such assets) 
c. However, to prevent persons from making substantial taxable 
deathbed gifts as a means of circumventing the less favorable 
estate tax, any gift tax due on gifts made within three years of 
a decedent's death is taxed as, in effect, a "phantom asset" in 
the decedent's estate. IRC §2035( c). This nullifies the benefit 
of having the gifted assets taxed on a "tax exclusive" basis. 
d. Another issue to consider is the time value of money. The 
making of a taxable gift may save estate taxes later, but at the 
cost of being out of pocket the dollars that must be used to pay 
gift tax in advance of when the estate tax would otherwise have 
been due. 
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C. Estate Tax Implications 
Lifetime gifts can have estate tax implications in a number of situations, 
particularly where the donor has retained some power or interest in the gifted 
property: 
1. Impact Of Completed Transfers 
The general rule is that completed transfers are out of the donor's 
estate. However, even completed transfers have estate tax implications 
if taxable gifts were involved, as the donor's lifetime use of unified 
credit (i.e., of the so-called "$600,000 exemption equivalent") will 
reduce the amount at death that the donor can pass to beneficiaries 
without incurring death tax. Additionally, the unified nature of the gift 
and estate tax situation causes lifetime taxable gifts to move the 
donor's estate up the rate ladder and cause the assets remaining at 
death to be taxed at a higher rate. 
Example: The donor is a single person with one child and has never 
made any gifts before. Donor gives $410,000 to the child in 1993. 
$10,000 qualifies for the annual exclusion and $400,000 is a taxable gift. 
No gift tax is due, as unified credit was used, and the donor's 
remaining unified credit will allow $200,000 to pass estate tax free at 
the donor's later death. If the donor died having $300,000, then 
$100,000 in assets would be subject to a 37% estate tax rate. 
2. Impact Of Incomplete Transfers 
a. Retained Income Or Use Of Property 
IRC Section 2036 will cause assets to be included in the donor's 
estate for estate tax purposes where the donor retains the right 
to use the gifted property, the right to the income from the 
gifted property, the right to designate who can use (or get the 
income) from the gifted property, or the right to vote gifted 
securities. 
b. Retained Reversionary Interest 
IRC Section 2037 will cause assets to be included in the donor's 
estate for estate tax purposes where the donor retains a 
reversionary interest in the gifted property and some third party 
can succeed to such property only by surviving the donor. 
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d. 
Power To Alter Or Amend 
IRe Section 2038 will cause assets to be included in the donor's 
estate for estate tax purposes where the donor retains the 
power to revoke the gift (and get the gifted property back), or 
the power to alter or amend the time or manner of enjoyment 
of the gifted property or its income (for the benefit of third 
parties). 
Non-Spousal Joint Tenancy Interests 
IRe Section 2040 will cause a portion of joint tenancy property 
to be included in a deceased joint tenant's estate. It doesn't 
matter whether a taxable gift was made when the joint tenancy 
was created. A tracing of contribution test (i.e., who originally 
owned it or who put his or her money into it) determines how 
much of the property is included in the deceased joint tenant's 
. estate. For example, if mom puts her house into joint tenancy 
with daughter then nothing is included in the daughter's estate 
if she dies first, but the entire property is included in mom's 
estate if she dies first. 
3. Gifts Made Within Three Years Of Death 
a. The General Rule 
b. 
Generally, lifetime gifts are not brought back into the donor's 
estate even if the donor dies shortly after making completed 
gifts. For example, a dying client could give $10,000 gifts to 
everybody in the phone book shortly before dying and the gifted 
property would generate no gift tax liability (by reason of the 
$10,000 annual exclusion) and would also be out of the grantor's 
estate for estate tax purposes. 
Release Of Certain Powers And Interests 
IRC Section 2035 will cause assets to be included in the 
decedent's estate for estate tax purposes where property was 
transferred (e.g., a right in a trust may have been given up) 
within three years of the decedent's death and, if such transfer 
had not occurred, such property would have been included in 
the decedent's gross estate under IRe §§2036, 2037, or 2038. 
B -15 
D. 
c. Transfer Of Life Insurance 
IRC Section 2035 will cause life insurance to be included in the 
decedent's estate for estate tax purposes where such policy was 
transferred within three years of the decedent-insured's death 
and, if such transfer had not occurred, such life insurance would 
have been included in the decedent-insured's gross estate under 
IRC Section 2042. 
d. Gift Tax Liability 
IRC Section 2035 will cause any gift tax paid by the decedent or 
the decedent's estate with respect to gifts made within three 
year's of the decedent's death to be included as a phantom asset 
in the decedent's estate for estate tax purposes. 
4. Beneficiary Issues Re Withdrawal Powers 
The beneficiary of a trust who dies will be deemed to own all (or some 
portion) of a trust where such beneficiary has a withdrawal right (under 
a so-called "Crummey" power or five-by-five withdrawal power). The 
unexercised withdrawal right that is still exercisable at the beneficiary's 
death will constitute an asset for estate tax purposes, and the 
beneficiary can be deemed to own a portion of the trust for purposes 
of determining the beneficiary's gross estate if withdrawal rights 
exceeding the five-by-five limitation have lapsed in a prior year. IRC 
§2041. 
5. Restoration Of Tax Credits 
Where a donor makes a taxable gift and later the gifted property is 
included in the donor's gross estate at death, the gift tax credits 
previously used by the donor with respect to such gift (but not the 
consenting spouse's gift tax credits if gift-splitting was elected) will be 
restored. IRC §2012. 
Generation-Skipping Tax Implications 
1. Background 
a. Complex estate planning issues were introduced by provisions 
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA '86) which impose a 
generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax on certain wealth 
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b. 
c. 
d. 
transfers made to younger generation beneficiaries. It is a flat 
tax imposed at the highest estate tax rate (now 55%). The GST 
tax is in addition to any gift tax or estate tax payable. 
The TRA '86 retroactively repealed the GST tax introduced by 
the TRA '76 in favor of a somewhat simplified (but still quite 
complex) approach to GST taxation that appears likely to 
remain in effect. The GST tax contains exemptions designed to 
exclude most persons, estates and trusts from ever having to pay 
GST tax or file a GST tax return. But it is a brutally expensive 
tax; in fact, it is viewed by many as confiscatory. 
The GST tax is contained in Chapter 13 of the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) , which consists of IRC §2601 through 
§2663. Technical corrections were made by TAMRA in 1988, 
by OBRA in 1989 and by OBRA in 1990. Temporary 
regulations (now finalized) were issued in 1987. Additional 
proposed and temporary regulations were issued in 1988 (and 
corrected later in 1988). 
Two sets of proposed regulations were issued on December 24, 
·1992. One set (57 Fed. Reg. 61356) broadly deals with issues 
such as definitions,. how GST tax exemption is allocated, how 
the inclusion ratio and applicable fraction is computed, the 
reverse QTIP election, and how single trusts may be separated. 
The other set of proposed regulations (Fed. Reg. 61353) deals 
with the liability for GST tax on life insurance where a direct 
skip occurs at death and with the exercise of special powers of 
appointment contained in grandfathered trusts. These two sets 
of proposed regulations are generally effective as to generation-
skipping transfers made on or after December 24, 1992, except 
for: (a) the division of a QTIP trust where a reverse QTIP 
election was made and GST tax exemption allocated to it prior 
to December 24, 1992; (b) elections out of an automatic 
allocation of GST tax exemption to direct skips; and (c) dealing 
with the GST tax consequences of transfers of non-U.S. situs 
property by a non-resident alien. 
e. Historically, generation-skipping trusts have been the preferred 
method for the wealthy to perpetuate their family fortune. 
Prior to the introduction of the first GST tax in the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976 (TRA '76), the Rule Against Perpetuities provided 
the only effective time limit on how long property could escape 
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transfer taxatiop by remaining in trust. It was possible for 
several successive persons to be given broad interests and 
powers over property held in a trust without any gift, estate or 
other transfer tax being due at the time one beneficiary's 
interest in the trust terminated in favor of a successor 
beneficiary. 
f. The GST tax is designed to mmlmlze transfer tax planning 
benefits which would otherwise arise from the use of 
generation-skipping trusts (such as a trust for a child's lifetime 
benefit that eventually terminates in favor of a grandchild) and 
. from the making of direct gifts to descendants of younger 
generation beneficiaries (such as a direct gift to a grandchild or 
great -grandchild). 
g. It is possible to inadvertently incur GST tax under even rela-
tively simple estate plans where the client is not trying to 
engage in tax motivated multi-generational estate planning. 
Many older persons with large estates are certain to be 
impacted by the GST tax. Accordingly, the estate plans of all 
wealthy clients should now be reviewed to determine if potential 
GST tax liability can be eliminated, minimized or deferred. 
h. Multi-generational tax savings trusts have not been entirely 
eliminated by the generation-skipping tax. Instead a $1 Million 
limit has been placed on the amount of assets which each 
person can put into a generation-skipping trust without the new 
GST tax law applying. There are a number of reasons why such 
trusts are now viable estate planning vehicles: 
(1) Assets in such a trust are protected from the 
beneficiary's creditor and divorce problems. Putting 
some of junior's inheritance in a trust which benefits 
junior for life and ultimately passes to grandchildren will 
give junior a safety net of income and assets which 
cannot be lost. 
(2) Significant tax savings can result, as funds ina trust 
which is exempted for GST tax purposes will be setup so 
as not to be subject to gift or death taxes when the child 
dies and the grandchildren receive the assets (or 
becomes the new beneficiary of the trust). 
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Example: Husband and wife each set aside $1 Million 
(after estate taxes) in generation-skipping trusts for their 
descendants. The trusts are to benefit children, then 
grandchildren, and ultimately pass to great 
grandchildren. Assume that a 50% estate tax applies . 
If the $2 Million had been given to the children and 
remained intact, the estate tax when the children died 
would be $1 Million, leaving $1 Million. The estate tax 
when the grandchildren died would be $500,000, leaving 
$500,000 for the great grandchildren. Use of the 
generation-skipping trust causes no estate taxes to be 
due when children and grandchildren die, thus resulting 
in $2 Million (rather than $500,000) being available for 
the great grandchildren. 
This outline only attempts to generally familiarize the 
practitioner with the operation of the GST tax, so that those 
common estate planning situations in which the GST tax may 
apply can be recognized. For a detailed analysis of the GST 
tax, see Kalik and Schneider, Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes 
Under The Tax Reform Act of 1986, 21 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 
900 (1987); Covey, Generation-Skipping Transfers, 1149 
PRACTICAL DRAFTING (July, 1987); Halbach, Generation-
Skipping: Planning Opportunities and Drafting Problems, 22INST. 
ON EST. ·PLAN. 900 (1988); Horn, Planning and Drafting for 
the Generation-Skipping Tax, 13 PROBATE NOTES 263 (1988). 
2. Terminology 
The GST tax is imposed on a "generation-skipping transfer" of property 
to a "skip person". Under IRC §2611(a), a "generation-skipping 
transfer" is any "taxable termination", "taxable distribution", or "direct 
skip". 
a. Skip Person 
IRC §2613(a) defines "skip person"as a person assigned to a 
generation which is two or more generations below that of the 
transferor (e.g., a grandchild or great-grandchild) or any trust 
where all of the beneficiaries are skip persons. IRC §2613(b) 
defines a "non-skip person" as any person who is not a skip 
person. 
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b. Taxable Termination 
IRe §2612(b) provides that a "taxable termination" occurs upon 
the termination of all of the beneficial interests held by non-skip 
persons in a trust, if thereafter any of the beneficiaries are skip 
persons. For example, where a trust is established for the 
lifetime benefit of the transferor's child and is to eventually be 
distributed to the transferor's grandchildren, a taxable termi-
nation will occur at the child's death. 
Transfers that qualify as both a direct skip and a taxable 
termination (such as a general power of appointment marital trust 
that terminates in favor of grandchildren at the surviving spouse's 
death) will be considered to be a direct skip only. Prop. Treas. 
Reg. §26.2612-1(b)(1)(i). 
c. Taxable Distribution 
IRe §2612(b) provides that a "taxable distribution" occurs when 
any distribution of income or principal is made from a genera-
tion-skipping trust to a skip person (other 'than a taxable termi-
nation or direct skip). For example, where a discretionary 
sprinkle trust is established for the transferor's surviving spouse 
and descendants, any distribution made during the surviving 
spouse's lifetime to a grandchild or great-grandchild of the 
transferor is a taxable distribution. 
GST tax (plus penalties and interest thereon) paid by a distlibuting 
tmst shall be an additional taxable distlibution in the year in 
which the original taxable distribution was made. . Prop. Treas. 
Reg. §26.2612-1 (c). 
d. Direct Skip 
IRe §2613( c) provides that a "direct skip" occurs when a trans-
fer subject to federal gift tax or federal estate tax is made to a 
skip person. For example, where a transfer is made during life 
or at death to the transferor's grandchild or great-grandchild, a 
direct skip occurs. However, a transfer to a grandchild of the 
grantor is not a direct skip if the child of the grantor who is 
such grandchild's parent is dead at the time of such transfer. 
This so-called "predeceased child" exception only applies to 
transfers in trust that are direct skips. If the transferor's child 
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survives the transferor and is a beneficiary of a trust, a taxable 
termination will occur at the child's subsequent death when the 
trust assets pass to (or are held in further trust for the benefit 
of) the deceased child's children. 
Only one direct skip occurs where a single transfer of property skips 
more than one generation. Prop. Treas. Reg. §26.2612-1(a)(1). 
A disclaimer cannot be used to cause a living descendant to be 
deemed to have predeceased the grantor or donor. Prop. Treas. 
Reg. §26.2612-1 (a)(2). 
e. Generation Assignment 
IRC §2651 provides that a person who is not a lineal descen-
dant of a grandparent of the transferor or the transferor's 
spouse shall be assigned to a generation on the basis of such 
person's date of birth. If such person is no more than 12-1/2 
years younger than the transferor, such person will be assigned 
to the transferor's generation. If between 12-1/2 and 37-1/2 
years younger than the transferor,. such person will be assigned 
to the first generation younger than the transferor. Similar rules 
apply for a new generation every 25 years. 
3. Excluded Transfers 
a. Assets Also Subject To Estate Tax Or Gift Tax 
IRC §2611(b)(1) provides that any transfer (other than a direct 
skip) from a trust is not a generation-skipping transfer to the 
extent federal estate tax or federal gift tax is imposed on such 
transfer with respect to a person in the first generation below 
that of the grantor. For example, if a trust provides for the 
grantor's child to receive income for life and grants the child a 
general power of appointment over the remainder, the trust will 
not be GST taxable at the child's death because the general 
power of appointment will cause the trust to be included in the 
child's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. 
B - 21 
b. Educational And Medical Expenses 
~ 
Any transfer which, if made during life by an individual, would ~ 
not be treated as a taxable gift by reason of IRC §2503( e) 
(relating to exclusion of certain educational or medical expens-
es) is excluded from being a generation-skipping transfer by 
IRC §2611(b)(2). 
c. Prior GST Taxation 
In addition, IRC §2611(b )(3) provides that a transfer is not a 
generation-skipping transfer to the extent the property was 
subject to GST tax with respect to a prior transfer to a person 
assigned to the same generation (or a lower generation) as the 
current transferee if such transfer does not have the effect of 
avoiding the GST tax. 
d. Annual Exclusion Gifts 
Gifts that qualify for the $10,000 gift tax exclusion escape GST 
taxability by reason of IRC §2642( c), which excludes such trans-
fers from the GST tax base. However, a special provision 
prevent most gifts subject to a so-called "Crummey" withdrawal 
power from being excluded from the GST base by requiring that 
no portion of the corpus or income of the trust can be distrib-
uted to anyone other than the "Crummey" power holder and 
that, if such "Crummey" power holder dies before the trust 
terminates, the trust assets must be included in his gross estate 
for federal estate tax purposes. 
Example: Client creates a single trust for the benefit of his four 
children while they (or any of them) are alive, and which is 
. ultimately to go to grandchildren after all children have died. 
A $1 million life insurance policy on client's life is owned by the 
trust, and the client will contribute $20,000 per year to the trust 
to enable it to pay the life insurance premium on such policy. 
Each of client's four children have a Crummey power to 
withdraw $5,000 each year (i.e., 1/4th each of the $20,000 added 
to the trust each year). If this was the client's only gift, no 
beneficiary would have received a gift of more than $5,000 in a 
given year and no gift tax return would be due. But it would be 
necessary to file a gift tax return to elect to apply $20,000 of the 
client's GST tax exemption each year. 
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An initial transfer to a Crummey tnlSt constitutes a completed 
transfer for gift tax purposes of the entire amount, and the lapse of 
a withdrawal power (to the extent in excess of the 5 by 5 
limitations) will also cause the Cntmmey beneficiary to be the 
transferor to the extent the lapse is treated as a taxable gift. Prop. 
Treas. Reg. 26.2652-1(a)(5), Example 5. 
Available Exemptions 
a. $1,000,000 GST Tax Exemption 
Each transferor has a $1 million GST tax exemption (GST 
exemption) which IRC §2631(a) allows such individual to allo-
cate in any manner desired. Any GST exemption not used 
during life is available to the transferor's estate. Once made, 
any GST exemption allocation is irrevocable. If no allocation 
of GST exemption is made by the transferor or his executor, a 
mandated allocation of GST exemption is provided in IRC 
§2632. 
Prior regulations indicated that the election out of the automatic 
allocation rules was revocable. Such election has now been made 
in'evoca b Ie, and transitional relief is provided. Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§26.2632-1 (b) (1). 
Fonnula allocations of GST tax exemption are now allowed, 
which will be velY helpful where hard to value assets are involved. 
Additionally, except in the case of chm1table lead annuity tntsts, 
allocations in excess of the amount needed to obtain a zero 
inclusion ratio are void. Prop. Treas. Reg. §26.2632-1 (b)(2). 
In the case of a lifetime transfer where a late allocation of GST 
tax exemption to a trust is being made, the fair market value of 
the tnlSt assets (except with respect to life insurance) may (by 
election) be deemed to be the value of such assets on the first day 
of the month during which the late election is made. Prop. Treas. 
Reg. §26.2643-2(a)(2). 
After death a timely election of GST tax exemption with respect to 
lifetime transfers can be made by the personal representative on a 
timely filed gift tax retum -- which is the earlier of the due date for 
the Fonn 706 or Fonn 709, A late allocation of GST tax 
exemption by the personal representative with respect to lifetime 
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transfers can be made on Form 706 -- it is effective as of the date 
of the transferor's death, and not on the date it is made. Prop. 
Treas. Reg. §26.2632-1 (d)(I). 
Exceptions to the automatic allocation rules at death have been 
added to prevent GST tax exemption from being automatically 
allocated in such a way as to be wasted for a certainty at the time 
the Fonn 706 is due, but such rules won't save you from 
affirmatively allocating GST tax exemption in a wasteful way. 
Prop. Treas. Reg. §26.2632-1 (d)(2). 
After death GST tax exemption can be allocated to a trnst created 
at or after death even if the trnst is not yet funded when the Form 
706 is filed, by formula, ~f the notice of allocation clearly identifies 
the tnLSt and the amount of GST tax exemption being allocated to 
such trust. Prop. Treas. Reg. §26.2632-1 (d) (1). 
b. Gallo Amendment Transfers 
A special $2 million per grandchild GST exemption (the so-
called "Gallo Amendment") is available for pre-1990 transfers 
to grandchildren by IRC §1433(b)(3) of the TRA '86. Such 
transfers can be made by lifetime gift or at the transferor's 
death. Both outright transfers and transfers in trust (provided 
that the grandchild is the sole beneficiary to whom distributions 
can be made during the grandchild's lifetime, that the trust will 
be included in the gross estate of the grandchild if he dies after 
the trust's termination, and, that - as to transfers made after 
June 10, 1987 - the trust's income must be distributed to the 
grandchild at least annually after age twenty-one ) will qualify for 
Gallo Amendment transfers. 
5. Computation Of Tax Due 
a. Overview 
In the case of a taxable termination or taxable distribution, the 
GST tax is computed on a tax inclusive basis (i.e., the GST tax 
base or "taxable amount" is the value of the property to be 
distributed, with certain deductions allowed by IRC §2621 or 
§2622, but with no deduction for the GST taxes payable from 
such distribution). In the case of a direct skip, IRC §2623 pro-
vides that the GST tax is computed on a more favorable tax 
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exclusive basis (Le., the GST tax base or "taxable amount" is the 
value of the property actually received by the transferee and is 
not grossed up by the GST taxes owed by the transferor). 
Applicable Definitions 
The GST tax due is defined by IRe §2602 as the taxable 
amount multiplied by the "applicable fraction". Under IRC 
§2641, the applicable rate is the product of the maximum 
federal estate tax rate (now 50%) and the "inclusion ratio". 
IRC §2642 provides that the inclusion ratio is 1.0, minus the 
"applicable fraction", and that the applicable fraction has a 
numerator equal to the GST exemption allocated to the trust or 
direct skip and a denominator equal to the value of the proper-
ty transferred to the trust (or involved in the direct skip), re-
duced by the sum of (1) any federal estate tax or state death tax 
actually recovered from the trust attributable to such property, 
and (2) any charitable deduction allowed under IRe §2055 or 
§2522 with respect to such property. IRe §2604 allows a state 
death tax credit, not to exceed 5% of the federal GST tax, for 
state GST taxes paid on transfers (other than direct skips) 
occurring by reason of death. 
In detel1nining the denominator of the applicable fraction with 
respect to testamentmy transfers, estate tax values are generally 
used (but special I1lles may require the fair market value of 
property subject to a Section 2032A election to be used). Prop. 
Treas. Reg. §26. 2642-2 (b). 
Special new rules for pecunimy payments have been implemented 
to determine the denominator of the applicable fraction. Date of 
distribution values must be used or else the pecunimy payment 
must be satisfied so as to fairly reflect appreciation and 
depreciation. ff the pecuniary payment is made in cash, the 
denominator is the pecunimy amount. ff an in kind distribution 
is made to satisfy a pecuniary gift, the pecuniary gift must be 
satisfied either using property on the basis of the value of the 
property: (a) on the date of distJibution, or (b) if it is a date other 
than the date of distribution, using values that are fairly 
representative of appreciation and depreciation in the assets of the 
estate or tnlSt at such time, and such gift must be valued and 
satisfied at date of distribution values. Prop. Treas. Reg. §26.2642-
2 (b)(2). 
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Complex new rules govem the computation of the denominator 
where a residual transfer follows a pecuniary payment (such as a 
$1,400,000 estate that provides for $400,000 to wife and the 
balance to a GST trust). The pre-residumy pecunimy bequest 
must cany "appropliate interest". If satisfied in kind, date of 
distribution values must be used or the pecunimy amount must be 
adjusted so as to be fairly representative of appreciation or 
depreciation in the assets of the estate or trust. Otherwise, adverse 
adjustments are made in the computation of the fraction. Prop. 
Treas. Reg. §26. 2642-2 (b ). 
c. Computations 
An example is helpful. Assume a lifetime transfer of $1 million 
is made to a trust which is to pay its income to the transferor's 
child for life and thereafter be distributed to the transferor's 
grandchildren. The normal gift tax rules will apply at the time 
the trust is created. If $400,000 of the transferor's GST exemp-
tion is allocated to the trust at its inception and the. trust is 
valued at $2 million when the child dies, $660,000 of GST tax 
will be payable when the trust terminates at the child's death. 
A 55% GST tax bracket is assumed to apply. 
The applicable fraction is .40 (400,000/1,000,000) 
The inclusion ratio is .60 (1.0 minus .40) 
The applicable rate is .33 (55% times .60) 
The GST tax due is $660,000 (.33 times 2,000,000) 
The maximum state death tax credit is $33,000 (5% times 660,000) 
A different result would occur if the same transfer were instead taxable 
as a direct skip upon the creation of such a trust for the sole benefit 
of the transferor's grandchildren. Assuming the Gallo Amendment is 
not applicable, GST tax of $330,000 (i.e., the applicable rate multiplied 
by the value of the trust at the time of the GST taxable event occurs) 
would be due upon the creation of the trust. In addition, IRe §2515 
provides that the amount of the gift for federal gift taxes is increased 
by the $330,000 of GST tax imposed as a result of such gift. 
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6. Procedural Issues 
a. Who Pays The Tax 
IRe §2603(a) provides that the transferor is liable for any GST 
tax due upon a direct skip other than from a trust, and that the 
distributee is liable for any GST tax due in the case of a taxable 
distribution. If the trust making a taxable distribution pays the 
GST tax due by the distributee, such GST tax paid will 
constitute an additional taxable distribution. Trustees now need 
to consider the establishment of a GST tax reserve when 
making certain types of distributions, as IRe §2603(a) makes 
the trustee liable for any GST tax due upon a taxable 
termination or direct skip from a trust. 
In the case of a direct skip occurring at death with respect to 
property held in a tlust an-a1tgement such as life insurance, the 
personal representative must file the CST tax return and pay the 
CST tax to the extent that the total value of the property included 
from such insurance company causes a direct skip with respect to 
the trustee of the tnLSt to the extent of the first $250,000. Prop. 
Treas.Reg. §26.2662-1 (c)(2)(iii). 
b. Reporting Requirements 
(1) GST Reporting During Life By Donor 
Form 709 is used by the donor to allocate GST 
exemption on transfers occurring during lifetime; and to 
report and compute the GST tax due on direct skip 
transfers occurring during lifetime. Form· 709 must be 
filed and the tax paid between January 1 and April 15 of 
the year following the calendar year when the lifetime 
direct skip occurred. 
(2) Reporting Direct Skip At Death 
Form 706 is used by the executor to allocate GST 
exemption on transfers occurring at death and to report 
and compute the GST tax due on direct skips occurring 
at death. Form 706 must be filed and the tax paid 
within nine months of the decedent's date of death. 
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(3) 
Schedules Rand R-l are the specific Form 706 
schedules relating to the GST tax. 
Reporting Taxable Distribution 
Form 706 GS (D-l) is used by the trustee to report a 
taxable distribution and to inform the distributee of the 
distribution. Form 706 (D) is used by the recipient of a 
taxable distribution to report and compute the GST tax 
on taxable distributions. Form 706 GS (D) and 706 GS 
(D-l) must be filed and the tax paid between January 1 
and April 15 of the year following the calendar year 
when the taxable distribution occurred. 
(4) Reporting Taxable Termination 
Form 706 GS (T) is used by the trustee to report and 
compute the GST tax due on taxable terminations of 
trusts. Form 706 GS (T) must be filed and the tax paid 
between January 1 and April 15 of the year following the 
calendar year when the taxable termination occurred. 
c. Effective Date Provisions 
(1) General Rules 
IRe §1433 of the TRA '86 makes the GST law applica-
ble to every generation-skipping transfer occurring after 
October 22, 1986. However, any lifetime transfer made 
after September 25, 1985 and on or before October 22, 
1986, is treated as if made on October 23, 1986 and is 
therefore subject to the GST tax. 
(2) Exceptions 
Transfers are exempt from the GST tax if made (1) from 
trusts that were irrevocable on September 25, 1985 (to 
the extent not made from additions to corpus occurring 
after that date), (2) under a will executed before Octo-
ber 22, 1986, if the testator died before January 1, 1987, 
or (3) under a will of, or trust included in the gross 
estate of, a decedent who at all times from October 22, 
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1986 until his death lacked the legal capacity to change 
the disposition of his property. 
GIFTING TIPS, TRICKS, AND TRAPS 
A. Know The Tax Advantages Of Lifetime Gifting 
1. Income from gifted assets is shifted from the donor's income tax return 
to the donee's income tax return, where presumably it will be taxed at 
a more favorable (or no worse) effective income tax rate in most 
circumstances. 
2. Gifts qualifying for the $10,000 ($20,000 if married and gift-splitting is 
elected) annual gift tax exclusion completely escape both gift taxation 
and estate taxation. 
3. Income and growth on gifted assets which occur subsequent to the 
making of a gift escape death ta.-xation in the donor's estate. 
4. Paying gift taxes (because the gift tax is computed on a more favorable 
tax exclusive basis, but estate taxes are imposed on a tax inclusive 
basis) are a bargain compared to the estate tax if the donor lives three 
years after making a gift upon which gift taxes are due. 
B. Know The Disadvantages Of Lifetime Gifting 
1. The donor will not want to give away assets that may be later needed 
by the donor for his or her own support, as there is no assurance that 
the donee will still have the gifted assets and then be willing to help . 
the donor. 
2. It is best to give away assets that are expected to appreciate between 
the date of gift and the donor's later death. It would be very wasteful 
to utilize unified credit and/or pay gift taxes on the lifetime gift of 
assets that subsequently decline in value. 
3. The tax advantages of lifetime gifting are somewhat lessened by the 
loss of stepped-up basis at the donor's death where appreciated assets 
have been. given away during lifetime. 
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C. Practical Pointers 
1. Unintentional Gifts Should Be Avoided 
Assets are often retitled for a non-tax purpose (such as probate 
avoidance), with no appreciation for the fact that a taxable gift may 
have been made when another person's name was added to the title. 
Proper planning can assure that no unintended tax results occur. If 
probate avoidance is desired, the use of a funded revocable trust or 
nominee' agreement might be advisable in lieu of joint tenancy. 
Example: An elderly widow wants to avoid probate on her $1,500,000 
farm, so she decides to place title in the names of herself and her 4 
children. She has made the children the owners of 80% of the farm, 
worth some $1,200,000, and substantial gift tax will be due. 
Example: Unintended gift tax consequences arise where one person 
pays the premiums on a policy owned by another, and at the insured's 
death where the beneficiary of the policy differs from the owner of the 
policy. This would happen where wife owns a life insurance policy on 
husband's life that she makes payable to their children at husband's 
death. See Goodman v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 218 (2nd Cir. 1946). 
2. Selecting The Right Assets To Gift Away 
a. Cash Need Not Be Given Away 
It is not necessary to give away cash. Many more people would 
make gifts if they realized that stocks, partial interests in real 
estate, etc. can be gifted away. 
b. Illiquid Assets Make Ideal Gifting Candidates 
Illiquid assets, such as stock in a family business or an interest 
in real estate, can make especially good gifting vehicles. This is 
because gifts of only a small piece of such assets will probably 
qualify for a number of special discounts, including a minority 
discount and lack of marketability discount. 
c. Assets with the most growth potential should be given away. 
All income and growth which occurs after a completed gift is 
made will escape gift and estate taxation. 
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d. Avoid Making Gifts From Revocable Trusts 
Annual exclusion gifts should not be made directly from a 
revocable trust, as the death of the grantor within three years 
may cause the gifted assets to be included in the grantor's estate 
under IRC Section 2035 on the theory that an IRC Section 2036 
or 2038 power or interest lapsed when the gift was made. See 
PLR 8609005, TAM 9117003, and TAM 9139002. Section 602 
of H.R. 3419 (introduced on November 1, 1993) would 
eliminate this potential problem if passed. In the meantime, 
have clients with assets in revocable trusts do a two step 
transfer (i.e., take assets from trust, first transfer into trust 
grantor's name, then have trust grantor individually make the 
gift). 
3. Control Of Gifted Property 
a. Donees Need Not Get Immediate Benefits Or Control 
The gifted assets can be held in trust for the intended 
beneficiary if it is not desired that the beneficiary have 
immediate access to such assets. Non-controlling interests in 
corporations and partnerships can be given (i.e., non-voting 
stock, limited partnership interests, etc.) can be given away 
(either directly to the beneficiary or to a trust). Family limited 
partnerships and second classes of non-voting stock are often 
created solely to facilitate the client's gifting program. 
b. Sometimes The Donor Can Keep Control 
The grantor can often keep control of gifted assets if that is 
important. For example: 
(1) The grantor could gift limited partnership interests and 
retain control of the partnership by being general 
partner. 
(2) The grantor could gift non-voting stock (or a minority of 
the voting stock) and still control the corporation by 
reason of the retained voting stock. 
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(3) The grantor can be trustee of a trust holding assets 
gifted by the grantor if the grantor's powers to distribute 
are limited by so-called ascertainable standards. 
However, there are many possible traps if the grantor 
acts as trustee (e.g., the trust couldn't hold life insurance 
on the grantor-trustee's life or voting stock in a 
controlled corporation, and complex income tax 
implications may arise). 
c. Cutting Strings Is Sometimes Necessary 
It is often necessary and/or advisable, from both an estate tax 
and income tax standpoint, for the donor to cut all strings over 
gifted assets in order to cease owning such assets for estate tax 
purposes (under IRC §§2036-2042) and income tax purposes 
(under IRC §§671-678). 
Example: Donor has been faithfully making $10,000 gifts each 
year to custodianships for each of the donor's three children. 
Each child now has $100,000 sitting in an account under the 
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA) and the donor is acting 
as custodian of such accounts. When donor dies, all funds in 
the custodial accounts will be included in donor's gross estate 
for purposes of the federal estate tax by reason of the broad 
powers which donor retained over the gifted property as 
custodian under UGMA. IRC §2038. 
4. Gifting Should Be Timed For Maximum Benefit 
a. Make A Series Of Annual Gifts 
b. 
It is obviously better to make a series of smaller gifts which 
qualify for the $10,000 annual gift tax exclusion over a period of 
years, as opposed to making occasional larger gifts that use up . 
unified credit and/or generate gift tax liability. 
Make Gifts Early In The Year 
Generally, gifts should be made as early in the year as is 
possible, so that the annual exclusion for such gifts will be 
obtained before the donor can die or Congress can change the 
rules. 
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d. 
Beware Of Year End Gifts. 
It is essential that the gift be completed prior to the end of the 
calendar year if annual exclusion for that year is to be utilized, 
or prior to the donor's death if exclusion from the donor's 
estate is sought. Beware of last minute transfers requiring that 
a check clear or a deed or stock certificate be retitled. 
Consider bank wire transfers, use of certified checks (not 
cashier's checks) actually delivered to the donee, etc. 
Leapfrog Gifts To Minimize Appraisal Costs 
If the donor is healthy (i.e., no reason to expect imminent 
death) and is gifting hard to value assets (such as interests in a 
family partnership or corporation) requiring a formal appraisal, 
then consideration should be given to updating the appraisal 
late in the year every other year to minimize appraisal costs. 
Example: Client is planning to make periodic and significant 
gifts of a hard to value asset starting in late 1992. The 
December, 1992, appraisal can be used for both 1992 and early 
1993 gifts made. The client can then wait until late 1994, 
update the appraisal (at a lower cost for an update then was 
first incurred for the appraisal), and use the updated appraisal 
for both late 1994 and early 1995 gifts. 
5. Miscellaneous Considerations 
a. Gifting By Incompetents Is Possible 
It will generally be possible to cause gifts to be made by a 
wealthy but incompetent older person in order to minimize his 
or her expected estate tax liability. 
(1) Gifts can be made with the incompetent's money on 
behalf of the incompetent by the incompetent's attorney 
in fact (acting under a durable power of attorney signed 
by the incompetent before becoming incompetent, 
provided that the power specifically authorizes the 
making of gifts. Note --- Care must be taken to limit the 
ability of the person holding the power of attorney to 
make gifts to himself or herself, as a real tax disaster 
could occur if the power holder died first having a 
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general power to gift an unlimited amount of assets to 
himself or herself. 
Gifts can generally be made by a court appointed 
guardian or conservator on behalf of an incompetent 
after being authorized by the court. It will be necessary 
to convince the court that the incompetent's assets are 
sufficient to last for the incompetent's life, to 
demonstrate that tax savings will result, and to show that 
such gifts do not serve to defeat the incompetent's estate 
plan (i.e., a historical pattern of gifting will be continued, 
the same persons will receive the lifetime gifts as would 
receive the incompetent's assets at death, etc. 
(3) It may be possible for the trustee of the incompetent's 
revocable living trust to make gifts from such trust. 
However, absent the passage of pending changes 
proposed to be made to IRC §2035, it will be necessary 
to first transfer such funds to the incompetent's name so 
that the gift can be made by an attorney in fact (acting 
under a durable power authorizing the making of gifts) 
or conservator (with proper court authority). [See 
III(C)(2)( d) above]. 
b. Maximizing Deathbed Gifts 
The donor may wish to treat each branch of the family equally 
(i.e., each child and such child's descendants will usually be 
intended to be treated equally). It is possible to make unequal 
distributions during lifetime that qualify for the annual 
exclusion, and to make up the difference at death. 
Example: An dying client has a son and a daughter. The son 
is married and has five children. The daughter is single and 
childless. Consideration should be given to giving son, son's 
wife, daughter, and each of the five grandchildren $10,000, and 
making an additional gift of $60,000 to the daughter (during 
lifetime as a taxable gift, or in the client's will) to equalize total 
gifts between the two branches of the family. This way, $80,000 
escapes taxation at marginal rates as high as 60%. 
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c. Avoid Trying To Be Too Cute 
Do not be too cute by trying to make gifts where you haven't 
really made a gift. For example, giving the intended donee a 
$10,000 note payable executed by the donor or gifting cash to 
the donee which is immediately lent back to the donor can not 
be expected to effectuate a valid gift. 
Immediate Pre-Mortem Tax Planning 
1. Gifts That Might Be Made 
a. Non-Appreciated Property Might Be Gifted Away 
If the dying client is going to make lifetime gifts, it will usually 
be desirable to make gifts of property which is neither highly 
appreciated property (and would thus be entitled to stepped up 
basis at death if retained by the donor) nor loss property (since 
the donee's basis for loss purposes cannot exceed the fair 
market value of the property at the time of gift). IRC §§1014 
and 1015. 
b. Appreciated Property Should Generally Be Kept 
The dying client will want to retain appreciated property that 
will be entitled to stepped up basis at death. IRC §1014. 
c. Certain Charitable Gifts Might Be Made During Life 
The client may wish to make charitable gifts planned to be 
made at death instead as lifetime gifts, so as to both get a 
charitable income tax deduction for such gift and remove such 
gifted property from the taxable estate. Charitable gifts at 
death may be taken as an estate tax deduction, but are not 
entitled to be taken as an income tax deduction. 
2. Gifts That Might Be Received 
a. Appreciated Property Might Be Received As A Gift 
The dying client without an estate tax problem (i.e., because his 
or her gross estate is under $600,000, or because the marital 
deduction will be used to eliminate the estate tax) may wish to 
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receive gifts of appreciated property prior to death. Such 
property will be entitled to stepped up basis at the decedent's 
death unless reacquired by the transferor by inheritance within 
one year. IRC §1014(e). It appears that such property could 
be given to the dying spouse by the other spouse within one 
year of the dying spouse's death and qualify for stepped up 
basis if such property were left by the decedent to children or 
to a properly structured (totally discretionary sprinkle) family 
trust for the surviving spouse and children. 
3. Rearranging Joint Tenancy And Community Property Interests 
a. Sever Certain Joint Tenancies With Non-Spouses 
It may be desirable to sever certain joint tenancies between 
owners who are not married to each other. This is because IRC 
§2040, dealing with the taxability of joint tenancy interests 
between owners who are not married to each other, requires a 
tracing of contribution to determine what portion of the 
property is to be included in a deceased joint tenant's estate. 
Example: Mom paid $40,000 for her house in 1960 and retitled 
it shortly after its purchase (in 1960) when it was still worth 
$40,000 so that it would be owned by mom and her three 
children as joint tenants. The house is now worth $400,000. If 
mom now dies, IRC §2040 causes a $400,000 inclusion in mom's 
estate, and IRC §1014 causes the children to have a $400,000 
basis in the home after mom's death. This isn't a bad result if 
the house is mom's only asset, so that the $600,000 exemption 
equivalent causes no estate tax to be due. 
Example: Assume the same facts as above (i.e., that mom had 
given the house away in 1960 and is now on her deathbed), 
except also assume that mom is in a 55% estate tax bracket. If 
mom now dies, $220,000 of estate tax will be due upon mom's 
death and the children will get stepped up basis. However, 
assume that mom and the children convert the joint tenancy 
ownership in the house to tenancy in common ownership while 
mom is still alive. No gift is made by converting to tenancy in 
common, as they each still have a 25% interest in the house, but 
mom's will controls where her 25% interest goes rather than 
having it automatically go to the children via joint tenancy. 
Only mom's 1/4th interest (i.e., $100,000) will be included in her 
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estate, causing $55,000 of estate tax due. The children will have 
historic cost basis in their 3/4th of the house (i.e., $30,000) and 
stepped up basis in the l/4th of the house included in mom's 
estate (i.e., $100,000). Estate taxes due at mom's death are 
reduced by $165,000 with no gift tax due as a result, but the 
children have $270,000 less basis). 
Sever Certain Joint Tenancies Between Spouses 
Tax rules now in effect provide that one-half of property held 
by husband and wife as joint tenants is included in the estate of 
the first spouse to die and that the deceased spouse's one-half 
interest is subject to having its basis adjusted. IRC §§1014 and 
2040. However, a recent case has held that joint tenancy 
.property acquired by a husband and wife prior to 1977 is 
subject to the pre-1977 rules which require a tracing of 
contribution to determine what portion of it is included in the 
deceased spouse's gross estate and subject to basis adjustment. 
Gallenstein v. United States, 91-2 USTC ~60,088 (D.C. Ky. 
1991), affirmed 92-2 USTC ~60,114 (C.A. 6, 1992). The IRS 
does not agree with the Gallenstein result. It may thus be 
possible to pick and choose the desired tax result, and during 
life to sever a pre-1977 spousal joint tenancy (by making it into 
a tenancy in common or by titling the entire property in one 
name or the other) in order to give the surviving owner of the 
property maximum income tax basis. 
c. Create Community Property With Appreciated Separate 
Property 
It may be desirable to convert appreciated separate property 
into community property if the client is married and lives in a 
community property state. This will be appealing because 
under IRC §1041 the conversion of separate property to 
community property is not a taxable event, and under IRC 
§1014(B)(6) both the decedent's interest and the survivor's 
interest in community property has its basis adjusted to fair 
market value at the death of either spouse. . 
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d. Partition Community Property Which Has Depreciated 
Conversely, it may be desirable to convert depreciated 
community property into separate property if the client is 
married and (because they lived in a community property state 
at some time) has community property. This results because 
IRC §1014(b)(6) results in a stepped down basis adjustment for 
both halves of community property at the death of either 
spouse, and such a conversion to separate property will allow 
the surviving spouse to perpetuate his or her higher historic cost 
basis in property which has declined in value. 
E. Applicable Valuation Principles 
1. The General Rule 
The fair market value of property is the price at which the property 
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, 
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. Determination of fair market 
value will often require the assistance of one or more appraisal experts. 
2. Discounts And Premiums 
Interests in closely-held businesses are inherently less marketable than 
interests in a publicly traded company. A lack of marketability 
discount is thus available in valuing such business. Additionally, a 
minority interest in a closely-held business is particularly hard to· sell, 
and a minority discount for a non-controlling interest is available. 
However, a majority interest will usually have a premium attached to 
it. Significant transfer tax savings result if a series of transfers causes 
only minority interests in a closely-held business to be subject to gift 
and/or estate taxation. 
Example: Client has 4 children, has a closely-held business worth 
$1,000,000, and will be in a 50% death tax bracket. If client keeps the 
business until death there will be $500,000 of estate tax due. If client 
gifts .15% of the business to each child, then a substantial minority 
valuation discount (lets assume 30%) will be available on the gifted 
stock for gift tax purposes. The client will later die owning only a 
minority interest (i.e., 40% of the stock) in the business, and a similar 
minority discount will be available for estate tax purposes. $300,000 in 
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value has thus never been subject to taxation because of the minority 
and lack of marketability discounts, resulting in tax savings of $150,000. 
Example: Client has a parcel of land worth $100,000 and wants to give 
as much of it as is possible to client's child under the $10,000 annual 
exclusion rule. A discount for an undivided interest in land, perhaps 
15%, may be taken. This means that a 11.76% interest in the land, not 
merely a 10.00% interest in the land, can be valued at $10,000 and 
given away without gift tax consequences each year. 
Procedural Issues 
Some form of contemporaneous expert appraisal should also be 
obtained for hard to value assets (i.e., closely-held business interests, 
real estate, valuable art work, etc.) whenever the client is making 
lifetime gifts or dies. The extent of the appraisal may vary according 
to the facts. For example, where an IRS audit is expected an MAl 
may be useful in valuing real estate. But where the decedent had less 
than $600,000 and value is only relevant in establishing the successor's 
basis, then a letter from an experienced realtor may suffice. 
F. Getting The Client To Act· 
1. Quantify The Benefits 
Clients cannot be expected to fully appreciate the value of making 
lifetime gifts unless the taxes owed and the tax savings are quantified. 
Running the tax savings numbers will often surprise even the tax 
planning professional and cause many clients to decide to proceed with 
gifting plans who otherwise would have done nothing. 
Example: Assume that husband (age 50) and wife (age 45); Bill and 
Sally Moneybags, each have $5,000,000 worth of assets that are 
expected to appreciate (after income taxes and consumption) at a rate 
of 6% per annum. Assume that husband and wife live out their life 
expectancies under the IRS unisex mortality tables, will use marital 
deduction estate planning, and will each annually make $10,000 gifts to 
each of their four children. Without gifting the survivor's taxable estate 
would total $90,739,588 at the second death, causing $49,906,773 in 
estate taxes to be due. With gifting such taxable estate would total 
$78,721,584 at the second death, causing $43,296,871 in estate taxes to 
be due. The estate tax savings total $6,609,902 if gifts are made.' 
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Example: Assume that husband (age 60) and wife (age 60), Joe and 
Mary Sample, each have $1,000,000 worth of assets that are expected 
to appreciate (after income taxes and consumption) at a rate of 4% 
per annum. Assume that husband and wife live out their life 
expectancies under the IRS unisex mortality tables, will use marital 
deduction estate planning, and will each annually make $10,000 gifts to 
each of their four children. Without gifting the survivor's taxable estate 
would total $4,526,608 at the second death, causing $1,937,635 in estate 
taxes to be due." With gifting such taxable estate would total $1,069,871 
at the second death, causing $181,647 in estate taxes to be due. The 
estate tax savings total $1,755,988 if gifts are made. 
Example: Assume that a 60 year old widow, Merry Widow, has 
$500,000 worth of assets that are expected to appreciate (after income 
taxes and consumption) at a rate of 5 % per annum. Assume that she 
lives out her life expectancy under the IRS unisex mortality table, and 
that she will annually make $10,000 gifts to each of her two children. 
Without gifting her taxable estate would total $1,612,550 at death, 
causing $413,648 in estate taxes to be due. With gifting her taxable 
estate would total $613,506 at death, causing $4,997 in estate taxes to 
be due. The estate tax savings total $408,651 if gifts are made. 
Example: Client is in flat 50% gift and estate tax brackets, and has 
been told that paying gift taxes is a better deal than paying estate taxes 
because gift taxes are computed on a tax exclusive basis, while estate 
taxes are computed on a tax inclusive basis. Assuming that the client 
has $1,000,000 to dispose of (via donative transfers and payment of 
taxes), the client can give $666,666.67 via a taxable gift (since the 
$333,333.33 gift" tax is imposed on the net amount passing to the 
donee), by only $500,000 via an estate taxable transfer (since the 
$500,000 estate tax is imposed on the gross amount of assets before the 
estate tax is subtracted). However, deathbed taxable gifts will not 
achieve this savings, as IRC §2035 will cause the $333,333.33 of gift tax 
incurred within three years of death to be included as a phantom asset 
of the estate, thus eliminating the benefit if the donor died within three 
years of making the gift. 
Example: Even last minute gifting strategies can achieve significant 
estate tax savings. Assume that it is December and" an 87 year old 
client in very poor health has three children in their sixties (all 
married), eight grandchildren in their thirties and forties (six of whom 
are married), twelve great grandchildren aged between 10 and 25 (two 
of whom are married), and two young great great grandchildren. The 
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client has 25 living lineal descendants and 11 spouses of living lineal 
descendants. Such 36 beneficiaries will allow $360,000 to be removed 
from the client's taxable estate with simple $10,000 gifts and no gift 
splitting and double that amount if the client is married and gift 
splitting is elected. Additionally, such gifts can be made again on 
January 1st of the next calendar year (only some two weeks off). This 
is in addition to any direct payment of tuition or educational expenses, 
use of discounts (discussed below), use of unified credit, etc. 
Illustrate The Benefits 
The old saying "One picture is worth a thousand words" has great 
application when explaining the tax benefits of engaging in a long term 
gifting strategy to the client. See the attached exhibits hereto. They 
were prepared using Estate Forecast Model, software available from 
ViewPlan, Inc., a San Diego company (800-826-2127). 
3. The "KISS" Principle 
Some clients cannot or will not tolerate a complex estate plan. For 
such persons, it is better to utilize one or two of the simpler (i.e., 
"Keep it simple, stupid!") gifting techniques than to do nothing at all. 
Significant tax savings will still result over time. 
IV. SPECIFIC LIFETIME GIFTING TECHNIQUES 
A. Transfers Which Generate No Gift Tax Liability 
1. Annual Exclusion Gifts 
It will be desirable to make gifts each calendar year to as many people 
as possible. No gift tax will be incurred (nor is a gift tax return due) 
so long as the total gifts to a particular individual do not exceed 
$10,000 in anyone calendar year. IRC §2503(b). Such gifts will not· 
be included in the donor's estate pursuant to IRC §2035, even if the 
donor dies within three years, unless a life insurance policy on the 
donor's life was gifted or the donor retained some interest in the gifted 
property under IRC §§2036, 2037, or 2038. IRC §2035( d)(2). 
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2. Spousal Gift-Splitting 
Spouses may consent to split gifts, which causes the amount which the 
two of them (in the aggregate) can gift tax free each calendar year to 
become $20,000 per individual donee. IRC §2523. Such election can 
be made on a late filed gift tax return (as long as it is the first gift tax 
return filed for the year in question), and if made the election applies 
to all gifts made during that year while the couple was married. 
3. Payments For Medical Expenses And Tuition 
Direct payments to the providers for the medical or tuition expenses 
of another are gifts which qualify for an unlimited gift tax exclusion. 
Reimbursing the individual who incurred such an expense will not 
qualify for this special gift tax exclusion. IRe §2503( e). 
4. Use Of The Unified Credit 
It will often make sense for the client to make taxable gifts during 
lifetime (i.e., gifts .in excess of $10,000 annual exclusion gifts), thus 
utilizing all or part of the $192,800 unified credit (sometimes called the 
"$600,000 exemption equivalent"). No gift taxes will be due, although 
it will be necessary to file a gift tax return to report the amount of 
unified credit used. But all income and growth in value on the gifted 
assets that occurs after the date of the gift will escape estate taxation 
at the client's death. Additionally, the client won't have to worry about 
the law changing (so as to lower the amount of unified credit) if it had 
already been used prior to any change in the law. 
5. Creation Of Income Tax Defective Trusts 
It is possible to gift assets to a trust in such a way as to make a 
completed and effective gift for gift and estate tax purposes while, at 
the same time, keeping some minor power over the trust (such as the 
right to later substitute property of equivalent fair market value for 
property owned by the trust) which causes the trust to be a so-called 
"defective" grantor trust for income tax purposes. This causes the 
trust's income to be taxed to the grantor, rather than to the trust itself, 
which in effect allows' the grantor to indirectly make an additional (but 
gift tax free) gift to the trust when the grantor pays income taxes which 
the trust would normally have to pay. 
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6. 
Example: Grantor always makes $10,000 annual gifts to each of the 
grantor's two children. Additionally, grantor gifts $600,000 to an 
intentionally defective grantor trust for the benefit of grantor's children. 
The trust invests in 8% taxable bonds and has $48,000 of taxable 
income. Assume that the trust would normally pay combined state and 
federal income taxes of 40%, or $19,200, per year. The grantor is 
technically income taxed on the trust's income since the trust was 
structured as a defective grantor trust. The grantor thus effectively 
transfers $39,200 to his or her children each year (i.e., $20,000 of 
annual exclusion gifts and the $19,200 of income taxes paid). 
Qualified Disclaimers 
It is possible to turn down an inheritance by making a qualified 
disclaimer of it. Such a disclaimer must be made within nine months 
of the decedent's death an before any benefits (such as income from 
the gifted property) relating to the gift have been accepted. IRe 
§2518. Disclaimed property automatically goes to the next beneficiary 
as if the disclaiming beneficiary had already died. 
Example: Sally is a wealthy 65 year old widow has been diligently 
making $10,000 annual gifts to each of her two children in order to 
minimize the estate taxes which will be due at her death. Sally's 90 
year old mother dies leaving her entire $500,000 estate to Sally, if she 
is alive, otherwise to Sally's children. Sally may wish to disclaim all (or 
part) of the gift from her mother, as Sally doesn't need the money and 
it will generate as much as $300,000 of additional estate taxes in Sally's 
estate. It would take Sally 25 years to get $500,00 to he two children 
via $10,000 annual gifts, but a disclaimer allows her to do it 
immediately with no gift or estate tax due. 
7. Opportunity Shifting 
An incredibly good business opportunity will sometimes arise. It may 
make sense to cut the children or grandchildren (or trusts for their 
benefit) in at the start. If a new business is being formed, why not give 
away some of the stock (perhaps nonvoting stock or a minority 
interest) before any significant value arises'? 
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8. Other Techniques 
It may be possible to enhance the value of assets held by other family 
members without making a taxable gift in the process. 
Example: A wealthy oil and gas investor has purchased the rights to 
drill on a promising large tract of land. Perhaps he wants to assign his 
drilling rights to the northern portion of the property to a trust for his 
children prior to the commencement of any drilling. He will then drill 
an exploratory well on his retained southern portion of the property 
near the border with the children's portion of the property. If the 
exploratory well is successful, the value of the children's property will 
be enhanced. If unsuccessful, the children didn't spend any of their 
money drilling a dry hole. 
B. Methods To Effectuate Gifts 
1. Do Nothing At All During Life 
The easiest method of gifting is to do nothing during lifetime, so that 
the assets merely pass at death via will, the state intestate statute if no 
will is in force, via joint tenancy survivorship, or via beneficiary 
designation. 
a. The advantage of doing nothing is that it easy to do. 
b. The disadvantage of doing nothing is that the tax benefits 
associated with lifetime gifting will not be achieved. 
2. Outright Gifts To Individuals 
Outright gifts can be made directly to a responsible adult donee, which 
is a very simplistic approach to gifting since no trusts need to be 
created to hold such gifted assets. 
a. The advantages of outright gifting are many --- it's simple, the 
donee has unrestricted access to the funds (also a possible 
disadvantage), value is removed from the donor's estate (i.e., 
the amount of annual exclusion as well as the income and 
appreciation subsequent to the gift), the income from the gifted 
asset is shifted to the donee's return where it may be income 
taxed at a lower rate, etc. 
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b. The disadvantages of outright gifting are also many --- the 
donee has unrestricted access to the funds (also a possible 
advantage), the gifted assets will be at risk to the donee's 
lawsuits and divorces, the limited benefits of having the trust as 
a separate taxpaying entity will not exist, the assets will be 
subject to estate taxation at the donee's death, etc. 
3. Bargain Sale Transactions 
If the client cannot afford to totally give an asset away, then 
consideration should be given to making a bargain sale (i.e., part gift, 
part sale) of the asset to the desired beneficiary. 
4. Net Gift Transactions 
Gift tax is the legal liability of the donor. However, it is possible to 
make a gift (called a "net gift") where the donee is required to pay the 
gift tax as a condition of the gift. This may be useful where the older 
family member has illiquid assets such as stock or land. 
5. Gifts To Custodianship 
Gifts to a minor (21 in most states for this purpose) can be made to a 
custodian for such minor under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act or (if 
enacted in your state) the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. 
a. The advantages of gifting to a custodianship are many --- such 
an arrangement is easy to create (via signature card at a bank 
or stock brokerage firm) and gifts to the custodian qualify for 
the annual $10,000 gift tax exclusion as if made directly to the 
minor beneficiary. 
b. The principal disadvantage of gifting to a custodianship is that 
when the Income is reported in the minor's Form 1040. The 
custodian can dole out the money to the minor as the custodian 
sees fit until the minor turns 21, at which time the assets must 
all be turned over the beneficiary. 
6. Gifts To Conservatorships 
A conservatorship (in some states called a "guardianship of the 
property") is a court-supervised arrangement for running the assets of 
a minor or incompetent. Gifts to such an arrangement will qualify for 
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the annual exclusion and the income will generally be taxed on the 
beneficiary'S Form 1040. The beneficiary becomes entitled to the 
assets upon becoming an adult (usually age 18 for this purpose) or 
regaining competency. 
7. Gifts To Section 2503(b) Trusts 
Although rarely used, it would be possible to create a trust for a minor 
beneficiary under IRC 2503(b). Such a trust need only mandate that 
its net fiduciary accounting income be paid to its beneficiary, at least 
annually. The net present value of the future income payments will 
qualify for the annual gift tax exclusion. The trust will file a Form 
1041. Payments to the minor could be made to a custodian under the 
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act or Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, or 
to a court appointed conservator for the minor. 
8. Gifts To Section 2503( c) Trusts 
A trust for a minor beneficiary can be created under IRC §2503( c). 
Such a trust must grant the trustee reasonable authority to expend 
funds for the minor prior to the minor turning age 21. The beneficiary 
must have the right (and actually be informed of such right) to take all 
of the trust's assets at age 21 (although it can be a right for a limited 
period of time, after which the funds can be mandated to stay in trust 
until some later age chosen by the grantor of the trust). Gifts to the 
trustee of such a trust qualify for the $10,000 gift tax exclusion as if 
made directly to the minor beneficiary. Income is reported on the 
trust's Form 1041. 
9. Gifts To Crummey Trusts 
A more traditional long term "Crummey" trust could also be used for 
a minor beneficiary. Such a trust could last past age 21 and not qualify 
under the provisions of IRC §2503( c). Instead, gifts to it would be 
subject to a so-called "Crummey" withdrawal right. This is a provision 
in the trust that allows the trust's beneficiary or beneficiaries the right, 
for a reasonable time (say 30 days) and after receiving notice of such 
right, to withdraw gifts that have been made to the trust. Such a right 
is given in order to qualify gifts to the trust for the $10,000 annual gift 
tax exclusion, but generally with the expectation that such right will not 
actually be exercised. A parent, guardian, or conservator can act under 
most such clauses on behalf of a minor beneficiary. 
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10. Gifts To Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts 
a. 
b. 
Client Situation 
Where the decedent (or if married and the unlimited marital 
deduction is used, the decedent's surviving spouse) will have an 
estate large enough to be subject to death taxes, it is desirable 
to structure life insurance ownership so that the proceeds will 
not be included in the insured's (nor in the surviving spouse's) 
taxable estate. 
Mechanics Of Arrangement 
An irrevocable life insurance trust would be created, and would 
be the owner and beneficiary of the insurance on the grantor's 
life. The grantor's surviving spouse could be the trust bene-
ficiary (and trustee if desired) for life, with the assets passing to 
the grantor's descendants thereafter. The trust would be 
carefully drafted so as to keep its contents from being taxed in 
either the grantor's estate or in the grantor's surviving spouse's 
estate. During his or her lifetime, the grantor can give the trust 
money to pay the insurance premiums or, if arranged properly, 
can pay the premiums directly. Estate liquidity is achieved by 
empowering the trustee to buy assets from, or loan money to, 
the insured's probate estate. 
c. Preserving Flexibility 
The biggest drawback in using an irrevocable life insurance trust 
is that the document, by its terms, must be irrevocable and 
unamendable. Flexibility can be provided by: 
(1) Granting broad discretionary powers of distribution to 
the trustee (including the right to cancel policies or 
distribute policies to a beneficiary during the grantor's 
life ). 
(2) Granting special powers of appointment to someone 
other than the grantor, so as to allow for termination of 
the trust during the grantor's life. 
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Defining the term "spouse" generically, so as to provide 
for the death or divorce of the spouse prior to the 
insured's death. 
Providing a means of qualifying the insurance proceeds 
for the marital deduction if the grantor should die within 
three years and have trust insurance proceeds included 
in the grantor's gross estate for estate tax purposes. 
d. Post-ERTA "Crummey" Clauses 
ERT A's increased annual gift tax exclusion (i.e., from $3,000 to 
$10,000) does not necessarily mean that it is desirable to 
increase the available "Crummey" clause exclusion to $10,000. 
It may be better to limit any withdrawal rights to the 5 x 5 
limitation imposed under IRC §§2041 and 2514 (usually $5,000 
per year for each donee of an irrevocable life insurance trust) 
to minimize the beneficiary's potential estate tax exposure. 
e. Newly-Acquired Insurance 
It is essential that the trustee of the trust acquire (as the initial 
owner, applicant, and beneficiary) any new policies. If the 
insured bought the policy and assigned it to the trust there 
would be a three year period during which the policy proceeds 
would be included in the insured's estate for tax purposes. IRC 
§2035( d)(2). However, if the trustee is the initial owner of the 
policy, the insured's death within three years will not cause 
estate taxability. Leder v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 237 (10th 
Cir. 1989); Chapman v. Commissioner, T.C Memo 1989-105; 
Perry v. Commissioner, T. C Memo 1990-294; Headrick 
v. Commissioner, 93 T.C 171 (1989). 
f. Generation-Skipping Tax Consequences 
In order to get maximum leverage from the one million dollar 
exemption available under the generation-skipping tax law, it is 
desirable that an election should be made to use enough of such 
exemption as will completely exempt the trust from generation--
skipping tax consequences. 
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Gifts To Charitable Remainder Trusts 
Clients will often have stock or real estate that is highly appreciated in 
value and produces little current income. One way to dispose of such 
an asset without incurring capital gains taxes at the time of sale, so that 
all of the net sales proceeds can be reinvested in· something else that 
will produce more income, is to contribute such property to a 
charitable remainder trust prior to its sale. A charitable remainder 
trust is a special trust which property is gifted to and periodic 
distributions are made to the donor and/or some other person( s), 
either for life or for a preset number of years. When the trust 
terminates, a charity is the beneficiary. 
a. Client Situation. 
Assume $1,000,000 in properties with a zero cost basis and low 
current yield are owned by a person desiring to convert them to 
a high yield investment by (1) selling them and investing the net 
sales proceeds, or (2) utilizing an inter vivos charitable 
remainder trust. Assume the person is a female age 56, in good 
health, in 50% death and 28% income tax brackets and that an 
8% pre-tax yield will be earned on the sale proceeds. 
b. Situation If No Charitable Remainder Trust. 
c. 
The $1,000,000 in assets would (after income tax on the gain) 
leave $720,000 for investment. With an 8% pre-tax yield the 
client would receive $57,600/year of income before taxes and 
$41,472 after income taxes. At death, the client's family would 
receive $360,000 after estate taxes. 
Situation With Use Charitable Remainder Trust. 
The $1,000,000 property would be put into an inter vivos 
charitable remainder unitrust with an 8% annual payment 
retained by the client and the remainder to go to charity at the 
client's death. This means that the client gets annual payments 
equal to 8% of the trust's value, as redetermined each year (i.e., 
if the trust appreciates to $1,200,000, then the trust pays the 
client $96,000 in the next year). The trust would sell the 
property and not be liable for a capital gains tax. IRC §644, 
which taxes certain gains recognized within two years of the 
transfer of the property to the trust at the grantor's tax rates, is 
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specifically not applicable to sales by charitable remainder 
trusts. 
If the trust has an 8% pre-tax yield the client would receive 
$80,000 per year of income before taxes and $57,600 per year 
after income taxes. Additionally, the client will receive a 
charitable income tax deduction of $243,610 to offset personal 
income tax liability (which would result in income tax savings of 
$68,211 if the charitable deductions were fully deductible). 
At death, the client's family would not receive anything (as the 
property goes to charity). However, at a cost of approximately 
$9,000/year for ten years, $360,000 life insurance on the client's 
life can be purchased for the children's benefit (through an 
estate tax exempt irrevocable life insurance trust) to replace the 
assets that would have gone to them in the absence of the 
charitable trust. 
d. Summary If Use Charitable Remainder Trust. 
(1) The client gets an income tax charitable deduction of 
$243,610 which saves $68,211 of income tax if the 
deduction can be fully utilized; 
(2) $280,000 of capital gains taxes are avoided if the 
property is put into a charitable remainder trust prior to 
its being sold. 
(3) The client's ongoing annual after tax cash flow is 
increased by $16,128 per year if no life insurance 
premiums are paid and is increased by $7,128 per year 
if life insurance premiums are paid. 
(4) Estate taxes at the client's death are reduced by $360,000 
(assuming the client would make a lifetime sale of the 
property) by reason of the property having been 
transferred to the charitable remainder trust prior to 
death. 
(5) The children get the same $360,000 after estate taxes (if 
life insurance premiums are paid) that they would have 
gotten if the property had been sold directly by the client 
prior to death. 
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(7) 
Charity ultimately gets $1,000,000 at the client's death, 
and the client will no doubt get the appropriate 
recognition and perks while alive because of this 
eventual gift. 
This technique will only be used with a portion of the 
client's assets since enhanced lifetime payments are 
obtained only by giving up access to the underlying 
assets. 
12. Gifts To Charitable Lead Trusts 
Clients will sometimes be making substantial charitable gifts on regular 
annual basis. It may be possible to use a charitable lead trust to 
combine charitable gifting with family gifting to achieve overall tax 
savings. A charitable lead trust is a special trust which property is 
gifted to and from which periodic distributions are made to charity for 
a preset number of years. When the trust terminates, the grantor's 
children (or trusts for the grantor's children or grandchildren) receive 
the assets of the trust. . 
Example: Assume that the client has (among substantial other assets) 
$500,000 worth of bonds or notes receivable which earn 8% (i.e., 
$40,000) per year, and that the client donates to charity (and is able 
to deduct) the entire $40,000 each year. In 20 years the client will still 
have the $500,000 worth of bonds and notes in his ot her estate. 
Assume that a 50% gift or estate tax will have to be paid in order to 
ultimately pass ownership of such bonds and notes to the children or 
grandchildren. 
Example: Alternatively, assume that the $500,000 worth of bonds and 
notes were transferred to a charitable lead trust which would pay 
$40,000 per year to a designated charity (perhaps even the client's own 
family foundation). 
a. The $40,000 per year of income is no longer on the client's 
b. 
. income tax return (as the charitable lead trust now has the 
income and takes a deduction for it when it is paid to charity). 
If the client sets up a 20 year charitable lead trust (as either a 
fixed 20 year term or for the grantor's lifetime, which happens 
to be 20 years under the applicable IRS mortality tables), then 
the IRS tables (using a 6.4% rate) say that the right of the 
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children (or other beneficiaries) to get the bonds and notes in 
20 years is worth 11.146% of it's current value. A gift tax 
return would be filed reporting a $55,736 gift. No gift tax would 
be due unless client had already used. up the $600,000 
exemption equivalent. 
At the end of the 20 year term the children get the charitable 
lead trust assets. If the client instead had kept the bonds and 
died in 20 years, then making a $55,736 gift prevented $250,000 
of death taxes at the client's death (i.e., $500,000 of bonds taxed 
at a 50% rate). Setting up the trust used up tax credits that 
would otherwise have been available at death and, in effect, 
caused death taxes to be increased by $27,883 on the client's 
remaining assets at death. Net tax savings are thus $223,117. 
It is assumed that the assets actually yielded (i.e., had a total 
return) of 8% per annum during such 20 year period. 
d. Income tax savings result during the client's lifetime if the 
grantor's income is such that up to 80% of the client's itemized 
deductions are being disallowed pursuant to IRe §68. Absent 
the use of the charitable lead trust as much as $32,000 per year 
of charitable deductions could be wasted (i.e., 80% of $40,000 
in deductions is disallowed), causing $12,672 per year of income 
taxes (i.e., 39.6% tax rate on $32,000 of additional income since 
that amount of charitable deductions would be disallowed) that 
could be avoided if instead ownership of the income producing 
assets could be shifted to the charitable lead trust (i.e., the 
$40,000 of income is taken off of the grantor's return) where 
the trust would be able to deduct them in full. 
13. Gifts To Grantor Retained Income Trusts 
a. Prior to the enactment of IRe §2702, grantor retained income 
trusts ("GRITS") were used to reduce the estate and gift tax 
cost of transferring assets to family members. 
b. Property would be transferred to a trust wherein the grantor 
retained the right to the trust's income (as defined for fiduciary 
accounting purposes) for a fixed number of years, after which 
the trust assets passed to the remainderman (usually the 
children or a trust for the children. Only the present value of 
the remainder interest constituted a taxable gift, and more funds 
than were supposed to (based upon the actuarial assumptions 
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required to be used) could pass to the remainderman if the 
funds were invested so as to minimize current yield and 
maximize growth in value. If the grantor outlived the retained 
income term then significant savings would result, but if the 
grantor died during the retained income term then the trust 
would be included in the grantor's estate pursuant to IRe §2036 
(with any gift tax credits used by the donor being restored). 
c. Recently enacted IRe §2702 effectively eliminated GRITS as a 
planning device when the remainder beneficiary is the grantor's 
spouse, a lineal descendant of the grantor or the grantor's 
spouse, or the spouse of any such descendant. However, they 
are still a useful device for other beneficiaries, such as a niece 
or nephew of the grantor. 
Example: A 50 year old grantor transfers $100,000 to a trust which 
provides for the grantor retain income payments for 15 years. If the 
grantor dies within the 15 year period then the trust assets revert to the 
grantor's estate. If the grantor outlives the 15 year term then the trust 
assets go to the grantor's niece. Assume a 6.0% IRe §7520 rate, a 
55% death tax rate, and that the trust assets will appreciate in value by 
5% per year (after taxes). A $35,153 gift will be reported when the 
trust is established, but $207,893 can be expected to pass to the niece 
when the trust terminates, resulting in approximately $95,007 in 
potential death tax savings. 
Gifts To Qualified Personal Residence Trusts 
A relatively new tax planning vehicle authorized in IRe §2702 is the 
qualified, personal residence trust. It involves transferring a principal 
or second residence to a trust wherein the grantor retains the right to 
live in the residence for a fixed number of years, after which such 
rights terminate and the children (or some other designated 
beneficiary, such as a trust for grandchildren) own the residence. 
Significant estate tax savings can result if the grantor lives long enough 
for his or her rights to use the residence to terminate. It's really better 
than it sounds! 
Example: Assume that a 55 year old client owns a $400,000 Snowmass 
, vacation home and is in a 50% estate tax bracket. Assume that the 
Snowmass home will appreciate at 4% per year. If the client does 
nothing and lives until age 80, then the house will be worth $1,066,335 
and $533,117 of death tax will be due. 
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a. If the client sets up a 15 year qualified personal residence trust, 
then the IRS tables (using a 6.4% factor) say that the right of 
the children (or other beneficiaries) to get the residence in 15 
years is worth 30.4627% of it's current value. A gift tax return 
would be filed reporting a $121,851 gift. No gift tax would be 
due unless client had already used up the $600,000 exemption 
equivalent. 
b. At the end of the 15 year term the children own the residence. 
If the client dies at age 80 then making a $121,851 gift 
prevented $533,117 of death taxes from being due (although 
setting up the trust used up tax credits that would otherwise 
have been available at death and, in effect, caused death taxes 
to be increased by $60,926 on the client's remaining assets at 
death). Net tax savings are thus $472,191. 
c. The client might die during the first 15 years. Because the 
client would have died while still having the right to use the 
residence the entire transaction is unwound (i.e., the residence 
is included in the client's taxable estate, the tax credits used 
when the trust was established are restored, and the death tax 
result is as if no trust was setup). The client would,however, be 
out the appraisal and legal fees incurred hen the trust was 
established. 
d. The client may want to continue to use or own the residence 
when the trust terminates at the end of 15 years. This could be 
accomplished by renting the residence back from the children 
at a fair rental rate (which would get more money out of client's 
estate) or by repurchasing the residence from the trust at its 
then fair market value (presumably $720,377 in 15 years if it 
had appreciated at 4% per year). No capital gain will be 
incurred by the trust if the repurchase takes place prior to the 
end of the 15 year period (as the trust 'is deemed to be a 
defective grantor trust for income tax purposes), as the client 
would only be entitled to his or her original historic cost basis 
in the residence. 
15. Gifts To GRATs And GRUTs 
Congress felt that the ability to establish a GRIT and engineer the 
investments (so that there was no accounting "income" to pay to the 
grantor and capital gains instead are generated to pass to the 
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remainderman) was to good to allow. Except in the case of personal 
'residence trusts, no interest in a trust retained by the grantor is 
deductible in determining the gift tax value of the interests in the trust 
which will pass to the remainderman unless the grantor has retained an 
annuity interest (i.e., fixed periodic payments, which cause the trust to 
be a grantor retained annuity trust or "GRAT") or a unitrust interest 
(i.e., periodic payments equal to a fixed percentage of the trust's 
annually redetermined fair market value, which cause the trust to be 
a grantor retained unitrust or "GRUT"). IRe §2702. 
Gifts To Near Zero Gift GRATs 
Recently enacted IRe §2702 imposes actuarial assumptions for gift tax 
purposes that can be used to the taxpayer's advantage (via a device 
called a linear zero gift GRAT") if a higher rate of return than is 
assumed earned can be actually be earned in a trust which ultimately 
passes to children or grandchildren. 
Example #1: Assume that the client has a hot investment that could 
hit a real home run (perhaps a penny stock that might appreciate at 
30% per year d:uring the next two years). If that month's 120% of mid-
term AFR rate (i.e., the IRS assumed trust investment return) is 6.4% 
and gift taxes are determined based on that up front assumption, then 
little or no gift tax will be due if the trust is intentionally structured to 
have payments going to the grantor with net present value almost equal 
to the entire initial value of the trust. 
If the client creates a trust with $100,000 worth of the speculative 
investment and directs that the trust pay the grantor $55,000 per year 
at the end of years one and two, the IRS assumes that at the end of 
two years there will be almost nothing (i.e., less than $1,000.00) left in 
the trust when whatever is left passes to the client's children. 
However, if the trust earns more than a 6.4% return then the excess, 
in effect, passes to the children in two years entirely gift tax free. For 
example, a 30% annual return means that a taxable gift of $1,000 was 
reported but approximately $42,00D is actually passing to the children 
when the trust terminates in two years. But if less than 6.4% per year 
is earned, then it was wasteful to report a $1,000 taxable gift because 
there is less than that left in the trust for the children. Is it worth 
taking a flyer and reporting a $1,000 taxable gift to possibly get $42,000 
to the children? You won't know until two years later when the trust's 
investment results are in. But this planning technique is basically a 
heads, the taxpayer wins, tails, it didn't cost much Gust the attorney 
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fees to establish the trust and the gift tax relating to a $1,000· taxable 
gift), arrangement. 
The grantor retained annuity trust (i.e., "GRAT") can be a very useful 
estate planning device if the client has an asset that generates a lot of 
cash flow which can actually be distributed. Ideal vehicles would be S 
corporation, limited partnership, and limited liability company interests. 
Commercial real estate, alarm companies, and cable television 
companies are examples of the types of assets that generate good cash 
flow if not highly leveraged. The GRAT is a particularly viable 
technique where the property gifted to the GRAT can be discounted 
(for lack of marketability, minority interest, etc.). 
Example #2: Assume that a 50 year old client owns 100% of an S 
corporation which is valued at $1 million (i.e., ten times cash flow) and 
which can distribute all of such cash flow in the form of dividends. 
Also assume that 120% of the mid-term APR rate (i.e., the IRS 
assumed investment return) is 6.4% and that a combined discount for 
lack of marketability and minority interest of 40% would be 
appropriate if less than 50% of the stock were gifted to a GRAT. 
Assume that the client puts 40%' of the corporation's stock into a 
~ 
,~ 
~ 
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GRAT which is to pay $40,000 per year (i.e., all of the cash flow . 4 
attributable to such interest) to the client for eight years and then go 
to (or be held in trust for) the client's children. Such stock would be 
valued at $240,000 (i.e., $400,000 less the discount of 40%) and would 
have $40,000 per year of cash dividends. The remainder interest of the 
children would be valued at about $6,040.65 for gift tax purposes at the 
time of creation of the trust. The client may complain that the 
business needs the cash. Inasmuch as all of the cash will be in client's· 
hands individually, surely some method of getting the cash into the 
business can be devised. 
If the client lives for more than 8 years, the client's children end up 
owning 40% of the corporation. The amount of assets subject to 
transfer taxation will have been reduced by 98.49%. If the client dies 
within such eight year period then the trust property reverts back to 
the grantor's estate and the trust's assets will be included in the client's 
taxable estate as if nothing had been done. According to Leimberg's 
Number Cruncher software, a male age 50 has a 92.6% chance of 
living to age 58 and a female age 50 has a 95.5% chance of living to 
age 58. 
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Example #3: Assume that the pre-discounted value of the client's 
business interests was $80,000,000 in the above example, making the 
value $48,000,000 after a 40% discount. The taxable gift at creation 
would be $1,208,130.84, which means that a gift-splitting couple could 
remove an asset worth $80,000,000 from their taxable estates in eight 
years by utilizing their unified credits and reporting a taxable gift of 
$8,131 (which involves paying gift tax of $3,008)! 
Other Value Shifting Techniques 
1. Loans To Family Members 
It may be possible to loan funds to a family member at the lowest 
interest rate possible under IRC§7872 and to shift value free of 
transfer taxes if the borrower has investment opportunities that will 
yield more than the interest that must be paid. 
2. Private Annuities 
It may be possible to enter into a private annuity transaction with a 
family member and shift value free of transfer taxes if the transferor 
hasn't a life expectancy shorter than that contained in the IRS actuarial 
tables or if the obligor on the annuity can obtain a higher yield than is 
assumed by the IRS in valuing the annuity for gift tax purposes. 
a. General Overview 
b. 
A private annuity usually involves the transfer of appreciated 
property to a relative in exchange for an unsecured promise to 
make payments to the annuitant. 
Tax Consequences To Annuitant 
Where appreciated property is transferred in exchange for a 
private annuity, a "capital gain element" is added to the usual 
"recovery of basis" and "annuity element" which are relevant in 
the case of annuities purchased by individuals from commercial 
annuity issuers. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 c.B. 43. 
Example: A 65 year old owns property worth $100,000 having 
a basis of $10,000 and wishes to engage in a private annuity 
transaction at a time when the IRS table rate for such 
transactions is 8.2% and life expectancy according to the IRS 
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unisex mortality table is 20.0 years. The annuitant will receive 
payments of $12,464 per year for life, of which $500.00 will be 
a tax-free return of basis (until basis is fully recovered), $4,500 
will be capital gain, and $7,464 will be ordinary income. 
c. Tax Consequences To Obligor 
All annuity payments made by the obligor are treated as capital 
expenditures and are nondeductible. Payments exceeding basis 
are not deductible until the property is sold. Complex basis 
determinations must be made if the property is sold prior to the 
annuitant's death. Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 c.B. 352. 
d. Unrecovered Basis In Annuity At Death 
The decedent's unrecovered investment in an annuity is 
available as a deduction on the deceased annuitant's final Form 
1040. IRC §72(b )(3)(A). 
3. Installment Sales 
It may be possible to sell assets to a family member and achieve 
transfer tax savings if the assets sold subsequently appreciate at a 
higher rate than the interest rate that must be charged on the funds 
borrowed to finance the purchase. The seller may choose to leaseback 
the assets (but beware that a higher rate of interest may be required 
on the financing), and the note might be setup to self-cancel at the 
holder's death if not yet paid off (but see the Frane case concerning 
the income tax consequences to the holder's estate). 
4. Arrangements Impacted By "Anti-Freeze" Rules 
Beyond the scope of this outline are corporate and partnership 
recapitalization techniques that have historically been used as estate 
. freezing techniques. The goal of such arrangements (where, for 
example, the older generation keeps preferred stock and the younger 
generation gets the common stock) is to shift future growth to someone 
else. See IRe §2701. 
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D. Dynastic Estate Planning Strategies 
1. Overview 
The keys to GST tax planning are to take full advantage of those 
transactions which are grandfathered and not subject to the GST tax 
law, to maximize use of transfers which are excluded from being 
subject to GST taxation, and to utilize all of the exemptions which are 
available to shelter transfers which would otherwise be subject to GST 
taxability. A thorough review of all existing wills, revocable trusts and 
gifting strategies is necessitated, as estate planing strategies that might 
have been appropriate under prior law may be detrimental, or without 
effect, under the GST tax law. 
2. Drafting Exempt Trusts For Maximum Flexibility 
Trust benefits which can be granted are so broad as to be tantamount 
to ownership of the trust assets for most purposes. They include: 
a. The right to receive all trust income; 
b. The right to receive discretionary distributions of trust principal 
(self-determination of needs was possible if the beneficiary was 
acting as pursuant to an ascertainable standard; 
c. The right to exercise a five-by-five right of withdrawal (with 
estate taxability only to the extent such right was unexercised in 
the year of death); 
d. The right to possess a broad inter vivos and/or testamentary 
special power of appointment (which must only exclude the 
holder, the holder's creditors, the holder's estate, and the 
creditor's of the holder's estate as objects of the power); 
e. The right to direct trust investments and vote trust securities; 
and 
f. The right to hire and fire trustees (beware of the IRS position, 
enunciated in Rev. Rul. 79-353 and later rulings but rejected by 
the Tax Court in the Wall case, that the trustee's powers will be 
attributed to the beneficiary if the beneficiary can hire and fire 
trustees). 
B - 59 
3. Taking Advantage Of Grandfathering 
a. Overview 
Trusts which are grandfathered from GST taxability by the 
effective date provisions of TRA '86 are valuable tax planning 
vehicles which should be perpetuated if at all possible. The 
assets of a grandfathered trust should be invested for growth 
and only distributed to non-skip persons if it is not possible to 
make such distributions from a non-grandfathered trust. 
b. Utilize Annual Gift Tax Exclusion 
In order to maintain their wholly exempt status, no additions to 
a grandfathered trust should be made unless the addition quali-
fies under the $10,000 annual gift tax exclusion as a nontaxable 
gift, or GST tax exemption equal to the value of the addition is 
allocated to the trust. The lapse of a five-by-five right of with-
drawal over a grandfathered trust will not constitute 'an addition 
to that trust for GST tax purposes. 
c. Special Powers Of Appointment 
The exercise of a special power of appointment over a grand-
fathered trust may allow the imposition of all transfer taxes to 
be postponed if the power is exercised so as to cause the ap-
pointive property to be held in a new trust with an extended 
termination date. There are many trusts that were irrevocable 
on the effective date of the GST law and which will eventually 
terminate in favor of the current income beneficiary's children 
if an available special power of appointment is not so exercised. 
Great care must be taken when a special power of appointment 
is exercised in favor of a trust, as the maximum duration that 
the new trust can last under the Rule Against Perpetuities will 
be the same limitation imposed on the original trust. 
d. Continuous Mental Disability 
Every effort should be made to document the continuous 
mental disability of an individual who did not have the compe-
tence to change the disposition of his property on October 22, 
1986, or at any time during his life thereafter. It is not neces-
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sary that the person be adjudged mentally incompetent, al-
though it may be helpful. 
Maximizing Excluded Transfers 
a. Gift Tax Exclusion Gifts 
Annual exclusion gifts made to GST tax exempt trusts, rather 
than outright, are less useful than prior to technical corrections, 
as it is now necessary to either elect the use of GST exemption 
or draft the trust in such a manner as will cause the "Crummey" 
power holder to be subject to estate taxability on the trust assets 
resulting from such lapsed "Crummey" power. Also, it may be 
necessary to consider the timing of outright gifts and "Crummey" 
gifts made to a beneficiary during a calendar year before any 
outright gifts are made in order to avoid application of the rule 
which states that it is the first $10,000 of gifts made to a donee 
in a particular calendar year that qualify for the annual $10,000 
gift tax exclusion. 
b. Trusts should be drafted to allow direct payment of the tuition 
and medical expenses of skip persons. If such items could be 
paid from more than one trust, the trustee must ·consider the 
potential transfer tax consequences when choosing the trust 
from which payment is to be made. 
5. Making Optimal Use Of Exemptions 
a. Overview 
The GST exemption should be utilized as early as is possible in 
order to cause the maximum amount of income and appre-
ciation occurring after the transfer to escape gift, estate and 
GST taxation. The benefit of the GST exemption can be maxi-
mized if it is used for assets with the most appreciation poten-
tial (i.e., the GST exemption could be leveraged and result in 
the sheltering of significantly more than $1 million if allocated 
to gifts made to an irrevocable life insurance trust). A man-
dated allocation of GST exemption should be avoided, as no 
allowance will be made for the likelihood of various trusts 
having differing potentials for appreciation or the occurrence of 
generation-skipping transfers. 
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Example: Client puts $1,000,000 of highly speculative stock into 
a generation-skipping trust. During client's lifetime the stock 
grows in value to $5,000,000. The $4,000,000 of appreciation is 
not subject to gift tax, is not estate taxed in client's estate, and 
is not subject to GST tax later when grandchildren or great 
grandchildren receive distribution of the trust's assets. 
Example: Assume a couple purchased $2 Million of survivorship 
life insurance at a cost of $14,400 per year for 10 years. If that 
insurance had been purchased via a generation-skipping trust 
then' only $144,000 of GST exemption would need to be 
allocated by each in order to get $2,000,000 down to 
grandchildren or great grandchildren free of GST tax. It is thus 
important to allocate GST exemption to those transfers having 
the most potential leverage. 
b. Avoiding Gift Tax 
A significant gift tax liability is possible if the GST exemption is 
fully utilized during life, so most clients will postpone transfers 
in excess of the $600,000 exemption equivalent until death. 
However, IRC §2652( a) provides that split-gifts pursuant to IRC 
§2513 of the gift tax law will be deemed to have been made 
one-half by each spouse for GST tax purposes, so it is possible 
for a married couple to make transfers of $1,200,000 without 
incurring any gift tax or GST tax. 
c. Reverse QTIP Election 
If the transferor is survived by a spouse, traditional marital 
deduction estate planning will cause a $600,000 bypass trust to 
be created, with the balance of the estate being paid to (or 
placed in a marital deduction trust for the benefit of) the surviv-
ing spouse. It is usually desired to completely avoid transfer tax 
at the death of the first spouse, which means that $400,000 of 
the transferor's GST exemption may be wasted. IRC §2652(-
a)(3) permits the transferor to create a QTIP trust and elect to 
be treated as its transferor for GST tax purposes. It is likely 
that $400,000 QTIP trusts will now be established under circum-
stances where they would not otherwise be desired. Any marital 
deduction gift in excess of $400,000 should be distributed out-
right or held in a separate marital trust. 
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At the death of a surviving spouse no constructive addition will be 
deemed made to a trust for which a reverse QTIP election was 
made at the first spouse's death if the estate taxes attributable to 
such trust are paid other than from such trust. Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§26.2652-1 (a) (3). 
Where a reverse QTIP election was made prior to December 24, 
1992, and GST tax exemption has been allocated to a single QTIP 
trust, such single QTIP trust may be treated as two separate tlusts 
(for GST tax purposes only) by reason of a transitional Jules ij the 
appropriate election is made on or before April 15, 1993. Prop. 
Treas. Reg. §26.2652-2(c); 26.2654-1 (a). 
6. Other Planning Considerations 
a. Subject Assets To Estate Or Gift Tax 
It may be advantageous to cause assets to be subject to estate 
taxation rather than GST taxation. The value of the unified 
credit and lower estate tax bracket of the beneficiary of a GST 
trust will be wasted at the death of a beneficiary who has mini-
mal personal assets. The GST tax is imposed at the top estate 
tax bracket and significant transfer tax savings can result if some 
assets are given outright to the beneficiary rather than placed 
in a GST trust. It would also be possible to give the beneficiary 
a general power of appointment over some portion of the GST 
trust in order to cause trust assets to be subject to estate taxa-
tion rather than GST taxation. 
b. Use Of Disclaimers 
Disclaimers will now potentially cause the imposition of GST 
tax, as disclaimed property often passes from a child to a 
grandchild of the transferor. The use of disclaimers will proba-
bly be reduced, although it is possible that no GST tax will be 
due by reason of the grandfather rules, unused GST exemption 
or the availability of the Gallo Amendment prior to 1990. 
c. Miscellaneous Considerations 
Complexities introduced by the GST tax law will cause many 
changes to be made in the way that wills and trusts are drafted. 
It is likely that future administrative powers will routinely grant 
B - 63 
discretion to allocate GST exemption, to allow the final distri-
bution of a trust to be postponed until the satisfaction of all 
GST liability for which the trustee may be liable, and to allow 
trustees to augment taxable distributions by an additional 
amount to cover GST taxes due by the distributee. Issues such 
as the apportionment of GST tax due, the allocation of GST 
exemption between potentially adverse beneficiaries, multi-
generational survivorship presumptions, the creation of both 
GST tax exempt and GST taxable trusts where one trust would 
have sufficed in the past, and the use of a special QTIP trust to 
prevent a transferor's GST exemption from being wasted create 
new and unresolved drafting problems. 
E. Combining Various Gifting Techniques 
Each of the lifetime gifting techniques discussed has its own pros and 
cons. The typical client's estate planning objectives can usually be 
achieved only by using a variety of techniques having a significant 
combined tax impact. 
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Therefor in Estate Plans 
James E. Hargrove, JD, CPA 
THE PENSION PLANNING! 
ESTATE PLANNING PARADOX 
~ PENSION PLANNING GOAL: 
~ .......... Wealth Creation 
~ ESTA1E PLANNING GOAL: 
~ .......... WeaIth Transfer 
PENSION PLANNING 
~ To Accumulate Wealth 
~ To Use for Retirement 
~ Not to Use as a Tool 
to Transfer the Wealth 
PARADOX PLANNING 
The Possible Solutions 
~ Timing of Distributions 
~ Proper Beneficiary Designations 
~ Pension Plan Alternatives 
c - 1 
PARADOX PLANNING 
Everyone Says Defer, Defer, Defer 
• Accountants Say DEFER Plan Distributions 
• Lawyers Say DEFER Plan Distributions 
• Financial Planners Say DEFER Plan Distributions 
PARADOX PLANNING 
Defer and Pay Dearly 
• Defer and Pay Federal Estate Tax 
• Defer and Pay State Death Tax 
• Defer and Pay'Federal Income Tax 
• Defer and Pay State Income Tax 
• Defer and Pay Federal Excess 
Retirement Accumulations Tax 
THE LOST IRA/PENSION ACCOUNT 
CURRENT VALUE 
LESS: Federal Estate Taxes 
LESS: Kentucky Inheritance Taxes 
LESS: Federal Income Taxes 
LESS: Kentucky Income Taxes 
LESS: Excess Accumulation Tax 
REMAINING BALANCE 
$1,000,000 
$415,000 
$135,000 
$170,000 
$30,000 
$35,000 
$215,000 
PARADOX PLANNING 
Using Plan Assets to Fund the Estate Plan 
~ To Fund Annual Giving Plan 
~ To Fund Charitable Giving Plan 
~ To Fund Liquidity Protection Plan 
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PARADOX PLANNING 
Knowing When to Defer atul When to Distribute 
If Estate Plan can be funded using 
non-qualified assets, then fund it 
with those assets. 
If Estate Plan cannot be funded using 
non-qualified assets, then fund it with 
distributions from Qualified Plans or .IRAs. 
PARADOX PLANNING 
Minimizing the Five Taxes 
~ Planning to Avoid 
Excess Accumulation Tax 
~ Planning to Defer 
Income Taxes 
~ Planning to Avoid 
Death Taxes 
"MRD" 
Minimum Required Distribution 
~ Determines when Distributions Begin (RBD) 
~ "RBD" = Required Beginning Date 
~ Plan or IRA may·be more Restrictive 
"MRD" 
Other Rules 
~ I ~ Distributions Prior to RBD are NOT Credits 
~ A MRD Payment CANNOT be "RoIled Over" 
~ Failure to Comply with MRD = 50% Excise Tax 
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"MRD" 
Effect on lRAs 
~ Generally Three Payout Options 
~ Single Life Annuity (No Estate Thxes) 
~ QJSA (Qualifies for QTIP - No Estate Thxes) 
~ Installment Payments (May Generate Estate Thxes) 
"RBD" 
Required Beginning Date 
~ Determines When Distributions Must Begin 
~ April lst Following Age 70 1/2 
~ Must be Distributed or Commenced by RBD 
~ Exceptions: 
.. .If Born Before 7/1/17 and < 5% Owner 
... If Benefit & Bene. Designated b/f 1/1/84 
"QJSA" . 
Qualified Joint & Survivor Annuity 
~ Single Ufe Annuity or QJSA Required 
~ Unless: 
.... Plan Provides Other Options 
.... AND ... Participant Elects Such Option 
.... AND ... Spouse Consents 
~ QJSA Qualifies for Marital Deduction as QTIP 
mE FIVE YEAR RULE 
What is it? 
~ GENERAL RULE: If death occurs before RBD 
or start of distributions, then entire 
interest must be paid out within 5 years 
~ EXCEPTION 1: Paid over life of Designated 
Beneficiary ("DB") over life expectancy of 
DB or less 
~ EXCEPTION 2: If Spouse is DB, paid over 
his or her life but can wait until Spouse 
reaches 70 1/2 
E'3 
;:j 
8 
~ 
~ 
I 
:::=i 
~ 
-
C-4 
~ 
THE FIVE YEAR RULE 
Other Issues 
~ The Plan Controls and Can Override 5-Yr Rule. 
~ If spouse dies after Participant but b/f 
payout begins and is the DB, then it will 
be as if the spouse was the Participant. 
BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS 
The Spouse: Advantages 
~ Continued Tax Deferral 
~ Greater Flexibility to Spouse 
BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS 
The Spouse: Disadvantages 
~ Loss of Control 
~ Excess Accumulations Tax 
BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS 
Children: Advantages 
~ Greater Tax Deferral 
~ Protect Assets for Children 
~ But.. .. Spousal Consent 
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BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS 
Children: Disadvantages 
• Death Thx Sooner 
• Pre/Postnuptial Agreements 
• But .... Spousal Consent 
BENEFIT DECISIONS 
The Rights & Rules 
• The RBD is Last Day to Select Benefit 
• "At Least As Rapidly" Rule 
.... After Participant's "Death 
.... Payout CANNOT be Lengthened 
• H Participant Elects Installment Payout 
.... Will Not Qualify for Marital Deduction Uriless 
.... Spouse c·an Accelerate Payments 
BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS 
Watch Out For ... 
• Tax Allocation Clauses if 
Beneficiary of Plan is Different 
From Beneficiary of Residue 
• Availability of Sufficient Cash to 
Pay the Tax Under Current Designation 
BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS 
Review 
• Who are the current beneficiary designations? 
• Are they valid under plan & current law? 
• Is there a Pre/Postnuptial Agreement? 
• Is there a Property Settlement Agreement? 
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BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS 
Spousal Consent 
~ 
:J I ~ Must be Within 90 Days of When Payments §i Are to Begin 
l 
~ 
~ 
d 
~ Prenuptial Agreement NOT Valid Consent 
(Treas. Reg. 1.401(a)-20, Q&A 28) 
~ Not Required in IRA's and SEPP's 
DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY 
What Is It? 
~ A Qualifying Beneficiary - Ufe Expectancy 
~ Used in Calculating Retiree's Payments 
~ Allows Longer Deferral of Taxes 
~ Avoids 5-Year Rule 
DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY 
The DiJJerence it Makes 
.. 
Shorter 
Deferral 
p,';". . ; '.".;... "'".' .•.•. ,.," I Longer 
~ Deferral 
DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY ("DB") 
Other Rules 
~ Determined at RBD or Death of Participant 
~ New DB = New Life Calculation if Shorter 
~ Exception: If New DB b/c of Death of Old DB 
~ If MUltiple DB's: 
... A11 Must Qualify 
... Take Shortest Life (Watch Qualified Trusts) 
~ If DB Can Be Changed After Death, NO DB 
C-7 
DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY 
Who Can It Be? 
~ General Rule: Individuals Only 
~ Exception: "Qualified" Trusts 
QUALIFIED TRUSTS 
1jpes 
~ Qualified Terminable Interest Property Trust 
..... "QTIP" Trust 
~ Exemption Equivalent ('EE") Trust 
QUALIFIED TRUSTS 
What Are They? 
~ Must Be Valid Under Local Law 
~ Must Be Irrevocable 
~ Beneficiaries Must Be Identifiable 
~ Copy of Instrument Must Go to Plan 
QUALIFIED TRUSTS 
Exemption Equivalent (EE) 1rust 
~ Important When Non-plan Assets Are < $600,000 
~ Accelerates Tax (Compared to Spouse as Bene.) 
~ Always Fund EE Trust With Other Assets First 
• Secondary Bene. Behind Spouse (Use Disclaimer) 
~ WATCH our USING DISCLAIMER IF: 
.... Payments have already started 
.... Election is in effect to recalculate 
Result is ALL assets in Plan are taxed 
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QUALIFIED TRUSTS 
QTlP Trust 
~ May Be of limited Value 
~ Why QTIP in Finlt Place? CONTROL 
~ nust = DB Status if Part. Dies Before RBD 
~ nust = DB Status in All Cases if 
Irrevocable at RBD or When It Is Named 
~ Requires Plan Approval & Spousal Consent 
QUALIFIED TRUSTS 
QTIP Trust Hazards 
• QTIP & Plan Must Both Pay "All Income" to Spouse 
• Check Defmition of "Income" in QTIP Trust 
• May Be Difficult for Large Corp. Plan to Assist 
• Watch Out For Income in Respect of a Decedent if 
Plan Benefits Are Used to Satisfy Pecuniary Bequest 
DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY ("DB") 
IRA Separate Account Planning 
~ Allows Separate Accounts With 
Different Beneficiaries 
~ Some May Be DBs and Some May Not 
~ MRD Determined for Each Account 
~ Best to Divide Before RBD 
~ May Result in Loss of Deferral 
of Excess Accumulations Thx 
EXCESS ACCUMULATIONS TAX 
What is it? 
• 15% tax 
• Excess Retirement Accumulations Tax: 15% 
• $150,000 Annual Floor 
~ $750,000 Lump Sum 
• . Exceptions: 
..... Death Benefit From Insurance 
..... QDRO Payments 
..... Spouse's Election to Defer 
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EXCESS ACCUMULATIONS TAX 
How to A~oid or Minimize 
~ Do Not Double Up Payment at 70 1/2 
~ Take Distnbutions Before Age 70 1{2 
~ Change Designated Beneficiary Designation 
~ In Defined Contribution Plans 
Consider the Purchase of Life Insurance 
~ Take Advantage of QDRO 
Avoiding Excess Accumulations Tax 
(With the Use 0/ Life Insurance) 
AT DEATH: Re ... iDiAI Proceed. Paid 
TRUST ASSETS TO JaDi OR G~ltIDS 
NO ImATH TAXU 
Avoiding Excess Accumulations Tax 
(W'uh the Use oj LiJe InsurGIICe) 
I ParticipaDt I 
iBR. INS. TRUST 
H.D~ ';'Th,",~ih . 
S.wd ill Jia~e"Eseeu 
AT DEATH: $1,250,000 
:A~'" A'Death :rue. :. 'TRUST ASSETS TO JaDS 01\ G.ElD, 
o DUTH TAXES 
SELECTING THE PAYOUT OPTION 
Do You Dare Advise? 
~ Review Summary Plan Description 
~ Review Disclosure Statement (IRA) 
~ Investment Advisor? Financial Planner? 
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QUALIFIED PLAN ALTERNATIVES 
.. Non-Qualified Plans 
.. Charitable Remainder 'Ihlsts 
NON-QUALIFIED PLANS 
Alternatives 
.. Executive Bonus Retirement Plan 
.. Split-Dollar Retirement Plan 
.. Supplemental Employee Retirement Plan (SERP) 
... Nonqualified Deferred Compensation plan 
CHARITABLE REMAINDER TRUSTS 
. A Creative Retire11Ulnt Alternative 
~ No Limit on Amount Contributed 
~ Participant Can Discriminate 
~ Often Less Administrative/Legal Expense 
~ Less Government Regulation 
~ No 15% Excess Accumul~tioDs Tax 
~ Avoidance of Estate Taxes if WRT Used 
~ Creates Charitable $$ Where None Existed 
"l ~ "CHARITABLE REMAINDER TRUST RETIREMENT PLAN 
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SETTING AND DEDUCTING FEES IN AN ESTATES PRACTICE 
Jerold I. Horn* 
April 12, 1994 
SYSTEMS FOR CALCULATION. 
The systems that lawyers most frequently use to calculate 
their fees are relatively few and easy to describe. 
Respectively, they are time-oriented, percentage-oriented 
and product-oriented. However, the variations are numerous. 
A. Time-Oriented. 
A time-oriented system has two components, (i) 
units of time and (ii) rate per unit. The second 
component varies among attorneys. Surprisingly, 
the first component often varies as well. 
Usually, but not always, it is a function of time. 
The second component is a function of the market. 
1. "Straight" Time. 
Example: 10 hours, multiplied by $250 per 
hour = $2,500. 
The first component of a "straight"-time 
system is, simply, an amount of elapsed time, 
measured on a clock. The starting point is 
the commencement of the work. The ending 
point is the cessation of the ~ork. Use of a 
minimum unit, i.e., a tenth of an hour or a 
quarter of an hour, causes some deviation 
from a strict, straight-time system. 
A straight-time system involves (i) 
allocation directly to a client of only the 
marginal (i.e., additional) time that the 
attorney directly expends for the client, 
*Copyright 1994. Jerold I. Horn. All rights 
reserved. The author used a prior version of this outline 
in conjunction with his presentation at the Philip E. 
Heckerling University of Miami Estate Planning Institute in 
January, 1990. 
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(ii) allocation of other time (including 
research and development work and preparation 
of forms and systems) to office overhead and 
(iii) calculation of the fee by mUltiplying 
the marginal time that directly is expended 
for the client by the hourly rate. 
The first component of a straight-time system 
also serves another function. Overhead, in 
terms of dollars, divided by workable hours 
produces the amount of dollar overhead per 
workable hour. Dollar overhead per workable 
hour multiplied by hours worked gives some 
view of the amount of dollar overhead that a 
particular matter consumes. 
Addition of Factor for Research and 
Development. 
Example: (10 hours of marginal time plus 
.5(10), i.e., a factor for research 
and development), multiplied by 
$200 per hour = $3,000. 
The "time-expended" component of a time-
oriented system can include an additional 
factor for time expended upon research and 
development. Direct time (i.e., marginal 
time expended for a particular client) is 
multiplied by a percentage. The resulting 
number of hours is subtracted from those 
hours of research and development that are 
allocated to office overhead. The hours thus 
subtracted from office overhead are 
reallocated to the particular client. 
Obviously, a given rate per hour will produce 
a higher charge under this system than under 
the straight-time system. Conversely, an 
attorney who uses this system can announce an 
hourly rate that nominally is less, but can 
produce a fee that actually is more, than the 
attorney who uses a straight-time system. 
3. Standard Units. 
Example: 15 hours (the time that is deemed 
required to prepare the work, even 
though time actually expended is 10 
hours), multiplied by $200 per hour 
= $3,000. 
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Some attorneys charge for "time" on the basis 
of standard units, i.e., a particular number 
of units for a particular task. The concept 
is similar to the manner of charging for body 
work on automobiles. 
Obviously, the first component of this system 
can deviate markedly from, or bear little 
relation to, the first component of a 
straight-time system. The name, "time," is 
the only inherent similarity between the 
units of time that are used in this system 
and the units of time that are used in a 
straight-time system. 
This writer understands that some attorneys 
who use this system charge for many more 
"hours" than exist in a working day. 
Obviously, a given rate per "hour" will 
produce for these attorneys a higher charge 
than the same rate will produce for any 
attorney who uses a straight-time system. 
B. Percentage-Oriented. 
Examples: a) Assets of $1,000,000, multiplied 
by 3% = $30,000. 
b) Assets of $900,000 (consisting of 
probate assets of $800,000 
plus 50% of nonprobate assets of 
$200,000), multiplied by 3% = 
$27,000. 
A percentage-oriented system also has two 
components, (i) a value base and (ii) a 
percentage. Often, the first component consists 
solely of a number of dollars. However, it also 
can include subjective elements. While the first 
component might include all probate assets valued 
at fair market value, it might include only a 
percentage of nonprobate assets that are included 
in one or more tax returns. These subjective 
elements of the first component are functions of 
the market. The second component always is a 
function of the market. 
D - 3 
C. Product-oriented. 
Example: $2,500. 
A product-oriented system has one component, a 
fixed fee for a particular item. This component 
usually is a function of someone's judgment of 
value. However, ultimately, it is a function of 
the market. 
D. Hybrid Systems. 
Some systems of fee determination combine two or 
more of the orientations. 
1. Product-oriented and Time-oriented. 
Examples: (a) $1,250, plus (10 hours, 
multiplied by $125 per 
hour) = $2,500. 
(b) $2,500, plus (11 hours minus 
10 hours, multiplied by $250 
per hour, being $250 for each 
hour in excess of ten) = 
$2,750. 
A hybrid system that is both product-oriented 
and time-oriented includes a form of each of 
the constituent systems. The product-
oriented portion compensates the lawyer for 
his ability efficiently and expertly to 
repeat what he has done before. Perhaps, it 
is in the nature of a charge for a document 
or for the lawyer's ability to perform a 
series of procedures. The time-oriented 
portion compensates the lawyer for marginal 
effort that he expends for the particular 
job. 
The product-oriented portion provides 
compensation for products, i.e., elaborate 
procedures and documents based upon 
accumulated expertise and research and 
development. The time-oriented portion 
provides compensation for services, ~, 
time-consuming undertakings for single uses. 
The hybrid arrangement depicted in the first 
example causes a client always to pay both a 
component that (given the nature of the work) 
is fixed in advance and a component that is 
variable. The hybrid system depicted in the 
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second example imposes a variable charge only 
if the expenditure of time exceeds a "normal" 
amount. The system depicted in the second 
example is in the nature of a fixed, minimum 
charge plus a contingent, variable charge. 
Percentage-Oriented and Time-Oriented. 
Example: (a) (Assets of $1,000,000, 
multiplied by l~%), plus (120 
hours, multiplied by $125 per 
hour) = $30,000. 
(b) The greater of (i) (assets of 
$1,000,000, multiplied by 3%) 
and (ii) (130 hours, 
multiplied by $250 per 
hour) = $32,500. 
A hybrid system that is both percentage-
oriented and time-oriented includes a form of 
each of the constituent systems. The 
percentage-oriented portion compensates the 
attorney for his responsibility and for the 
value that he tends to create or preserve. 
The time-oriented portion compensates the 
attorney for marginal effort that he expends 
for the job. 
The hybrid arrangement depicted in the first 
example causes a client always to pay both a 
component that (given the value base) is 
fixed in advance and a component that is 
variable. The hybrid system depicted in the 
second example imposes a variable charge only 
if the expenditure of time exceeds a "normal" 
amount. The system depicted in the second 
example is in the nature of a fixed, minimum 
charge plus a contingent, variable charge. 
3. Product-oriented and Percentage-Oriented. 
Example: $1,250 plus (assets of $1,000,000, 
multiplied by .2%) = $3,250. 
A hybrid system that is both product-oriented 
and percentage-oriented includes a form of 
each of the constituent systems. Given the 
nature of the work and the value base, each. 
portion is fixed in advance. The product-
oriented portion compensates the lawyer for 
his ability efficiently and expertly to 
repeat what he has done before. The 
D - 5 
4. 
percentage-oriented portion compensates the 
attorney for his responsibility and for the 
value that he tends to create or preserve. 
Time-Oriented, Product-oriented and 
Percentage-Oriented. 
Example: $1,250 plus (assets of $1,000,000, 
multiplied by .2%), plus (11 hours 
minus 10 hours, multiplied by $250 
per hour, being $250 for each hour 
in excess of ten) = $3,500. 
A hybrid system that is time-oriented, 
product-oriented and percentage-oriented 
includes a form of each of the constituent 
systems. Compared to the product-oriented, 
percentage-oriented system discussed in the 
preceding paragraph, it additionally imposes 
a variable charge which compensates the 
attorney for marginal effort if the 
expenditure of time exceeds a "normal" 
amount. 
E. Evaluation. 
1. Time-Oriented. 
Time-oriented systems tend to 
expenditure of time, per see 
to reward inefficiency and to 
efficiency. 
reward the 
Thus, they tend 
disadvantage 
Except to any extent that the value of a 
product or service is directly proportional 
to the lawyers' time that is spent to make or 
render it, a time-oriented system tends to 
produce a fee that has only a random 
relationship to value. Increased use of 
systems andtechnolog¥ to deliver a lawyer's 
products additionally attenuates the 
relationship between time and value. 
An attenuated relationship between value, on 
the one hand, and the marginal time that a 
lawyer needs to perform a job, on the other, 
particularly inheres in estate planning. 
Systems, technology, research and nonlawyer 
services are relatively important to, and 
costly components of, the highest quality of 
estate planning compared to the highest 
quality of other types of legal work. 
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Differences in reputation of individual 
attorneys tend to cause courts, firms and 
clients to countenance fees that are based on 
different hourly rates. However, the 
increments that the courts are approving, 
that clients are paying and that firms are 
charging fall within a range that is much 
narrower than the range of value that one 
attorney's work, compared to another 
attorney's work, brings to a client. 
Estate planning and estate administration are 
more efficient, and provide better results, 
when they include use of inputs other than 
lawyers' time. These other inputs include 
elaborate procedures that, themselves, are 
the product of time and other inputs. Any 
attorney who uses these procedures must avoid 
using a straight-time system of charging if 
he is to receive compensation commensurate 
with his efficiency. This writer perceives 
that the better attorneys indeed do tend to 
use these procedures and do tend to avoid 
straight-time charges for estate planning and 
estate administration. He also perceives 
that some attorneys who are unable to avoid 
the straight-time system are falsifying the 
hours they are expending or are expending 
hours indiscriminately. Although the fees 
that these attorneys charge are not 
relatively low, their nominal rates are. 
Among unknowledgeable consumers, and among 
unknowledgeable courts, this, of course, 
tends to disadvantage the expert who is 
honest and efficient. 
2. Percentage and Product-oriented. 
Percentage-oriented fees and product-oriented 
fees reward efficiency directly. 
If the value of a lawyer's work is a function 
of the value of the property that the lawyer 
is preserving or creating, a percentage-
oriented fee tends to bear a direct 
relationship to the value that the client 
receives. Similarly, if both consumers and 
producers adequately are informed, the market 
should tend to cause a product-oriented fee 
to bear a direct relationship to the value 
that the client receives. 
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Malpractice insurers and the law of 
professional responsibility indicate that 
responsibility and compensation for breach of 
responsibility are functions of the number of 
dollars that are involved. The legal measure 
of an attorney's responsibility seems also an 
appropriate basis for an attorney's 
calculation of his compensation. Regardless 
of what some courts and some consumers may 
think, the market is saying that, other 
things being equal, an attorney should 
receive more compensation for working with a 
larger value than for working with a smaller 
value. 
Product-oriented fees and percentage-oriented 
fees additionally have the advantage of 
tending to provide certainty to both attorney 
and client. Additionally, each tends to 
avoid the significant vari~tions that appear 
when fees are based solely upon time. 
3. Hybrid Systems. 
The first version of the product-time hybrid 
and the first version of the percentage-time 
hybrid present the same disadvantages, 
although diluted, that the time-oriented 
systems present. However, the second version 
of the product-time hybrid, the second 
version of the percentage-time hybrid and the 
time-product-percentage hybrid use the time 
orientation only as a contingency. Thus, 
they offer the advantage of assuring 
compensation to the lawyer who must expend an 
abnormally large amount of time. 
The product-percentage hybrid blends the two 
systems that reward efficiency. It directly 
compensates for expertise, responsibility and 
creation or preservation of value. 
F. Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
promulgated by the American Bar Association, 
neither require nor prevent the use of any of the 
systems. They direct only that, "A lawyer's fee 
shall be reasonable." 
"The factors to be considered in determining 
the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following: 
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"(1) the time and labor required, 
the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service 
properly; 
"(2) the likelihood, if apparent 
to the client, that the acceptance of 
the particular employment will preclude 
other employment by the lawyer; 
II (3) the fee customarily charged 
in the locality for similar legal 
services; 
"(4) the amount involved and the 
results obtained; 
"(5) the time limitations imposed 
by the client or by the circumstances; 
"(6) the nature and length of the 
professional relationship with the 
client; 
"(7) the experience, reputation, 
and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 
performing the services; 
"(8) 
contingent 
whether the fee is fixed or 
•••• ft Rule 1.5. 
Although rule 1.5 imposes parameters that alter 
the market, the rule itself recognizes that it 
operates in the context of the market. 
Antitrust Laws. 
Similarly, the anti trust laws do not requ.lre or. 
prevent the use of any of the systems. The 
collusive determination of fees, including by use 
of a fee schedule, is illegal. Goldfarb v. 
Virginia state Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). However, 
the noncollusive determination of fees, including 
by use of a fee schedule, is not illegal. 
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II. CONTROL BY A COURT. 
A. Right to Review. 
When the personal representative and the 
beneficiaries refuse to approve an attorney's fee 
for probate work, the court clearly has the right 
to review and to disallow the fee. Some courts 
would argue that they also have this right even if 
the fee is agreed and the administration is 
unsupervised. 
B. Scope of Review. 
Usually, the scope of appellate review of a 
probate court's determination of the 
reasonableness of an attorney's fee is narrow. If 
the appellate court finds that the local court 
applied the proper criteria, the appellate court 
usually will not overturn the local court's 
determination. 
C. Fee-For-Time Ceiling. 
Some courts attempt to disallow all fees in excess 
of a certain rate per hour. They determine the 
maximum rate in advance, with little regard to the 
lawyer's responsibility, competence, efficiency or 
reputation and with little regard to the nature of 
the work. An hourly rate ceiling compounds all of 
the problems that inhere in a time-oriented 
system. It often applies arbitrarily as well as 
perversely. Whereas a time-oriented system, per 
se, emphasizes the lawyer's expenditure of time, 
the addition of a ceiling tends to prevent the 
lawyer from using the other inputs that are 
essential to production of work of the highest 
quality. 
An hourly rate ceiling ignores the one or more 
bases upon which the attorney actually determines 
the fee. It sUbstitutes time (i.e., a number of 
hours) as the sole criterion. The use of time as 
the sole criterion inherently presupposes, and the 
use of time as a principal criterion tends to 
presuppose, that time is fungible. However, one 
attorney's time is not fungible qualitatively with 
any other attorney's time. Indeed, the comparison 
of the straight-time system and the standard-unit 
system demonstrated that one attorney's "time" is 
not necessarily fungible quantitatively with 
another attorney's time. 
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An hourly limit will tend to affect most adversely 
the most efficient lawyers. These are precisely 
the lawyers that the system most should encourage. 
Since a principal purpose of the system is to 
promote efficient transmission of wealth at death, 
a ceiling that undermines this purpose should be 
unreasonable, per see 
A simple test can resolve many questions of 
reasonableness without laborious analysis. A 
ceiling is unreasonably low if the judge, himself, 
would have to charge more in order personally to 
generate his own salary, office costs, benefits 
and emoluments. 
Tests that directly use the concept of efficiency 
are more difficult. However, they are no less 
telling. 
Efficiency is the rate of output per unit of 
input. Input is measurable in terms of dollars as 
a medium of exchange, regardless of whether the 
input consists of dollars spent (i.e., out-of-
pocket expenditures) or dollars foregone (i.e., 
opportunity costs incurred because of expenditure 
of time in one manner rather than another). 
Maximization of output per unit of input might or 
might not occur within the limits of a fee-for-
time ceiling that a court imposes. The lower the 
ceiling, the less is the likelihood that the 
maximization can occur within it. stated 
differently, if (i) the cost or the composition of 
input that maximizes efficiency is greater than 
the cost or different from the composition of 
input that maximizes the lawyer's net income when 
the lawyer charges an hourly rate that is within 
the ceiling and (ii) the lawyer attempts to 
maximize net income, the ceiling impedes 
efficiency. Accordingly, a judge who solely 
determines whether a fee is less than a certain 
number of dollars per hour will tend to harm the 
very person, the lawyer's client, whom the. judge 
professes to help. 
A ceiling that is based upon lawyers' time tends 
to inhibit the use of all inputs other than 
lawyers' time. Since maximization of output per 
unit of input requires use of inputs other than 
lawyers' time, a time-based ceiling tends to 
impede efficiency. 
D-ll 
since a lawyer's time is the only production 
factor that is not expandable in relationship to a 
unit of time, any effort to improve output per 
unit of time must increase the use of one or more 
production factors that are expandable in 
relationship to a unit of time. This increase 
will necessitate an increase in cost per unit of 
time. Therefore, a fee-for-time ceiling will tend 
to cause any increase in ratio of output to input 
to decrease the lawyer's net income. Conversely, 
it will tend to force a lawyer to decrease 
efficiency in order to increase net income. 
If two attorneys produce different outputs during 
the same period of time, the better producer will 
tend to use more input, ~, supplies, equipment, 
office space, secretarial services, research and 
development. Obviously, a system that compensates 
each at the same rate per unit of time will 
provide each with an identical amount of gross 
income but will provide a greater amount of net 
income to the lawyer who produces less. 
The problem also is describable in terms of a 
single lawyer. Assume that this lawyer's 
preparation of an estate plan formerly consumed 
$1,000 of expenses and ten hours of the lawyer's 
time. He charged a fee of $2,500, or $250 per 
hour, and he generated net income of $1,500, or 
$150 per hour. This lawyer's infusion of 
additional input other than his time permits him 
now to prepare the plan for an expenditure of 
$1,500 and five hours of his time. He uses the 
five hours that he saves to prepare a second plan, 
and the second plan also requires expenditures of 
$1,500. If he charges the same fee, $2,500, for 
each plan, he generates gross receipts of $5,000, 
or $500 per hour, costs of $3,000 and ne.t income 
of $2,000, or $200 per hour. The changed mix of 
production factors does not increase the fee that 
the client pays but does increase the lawyer's 
output and does increase the lawyer's net income 
even though the lawyer increased his costs both 
absolutely and in relation to his time. Why 
should a court complain? 
Assume that the facts remain as described in the 
preceding paragraph except that the lawyer reduced 
his fee to $2,375 for each plan. He would . 
generate gross receipts of $4,750i or $475 per 
hour, costs of $3,000 and net income of $1,750, or 
$175 per hour. The changed mix of production 
factors would have decreased the fee the client 
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paid, increased the lawyer's output and increased 
the lawyer's net income even though the lawyer 
increased his costs both absolutely and in 
relation to his time and even though the lawyer 
reduced somewhat his fee per plan. The changes 
would have benefitted both the consumer and the 
lawyer. Again, why should a court complain? 
Last, assume that the facts remain the same except 
that the lawyer reduced his fee to $2,250 for each 
plan. He would generate gross receipts of $4,500, 
or $450 per hour, costs of $3,000 and net income 
of $1,500, or $150, the same as before any change. 
The changed mix of production factors increased 
the lawyer's output and did not change the 
lawyer's net income even though the lawyer 
increased his costs both absolutely and in 
relation to his time. If one lawyer prefers the 
first method of operating and a second prefers 
this method, why should a court permit the first 
to operate as he wishes but prevent the second? 
The same arguments apply to the administration of 
a decedent's estate. 
The market system can determine more efficiently 
and less intrusively than the judicial system the 
best mix of production factors and the best levels 
of outputs and fees. Whereas the market can 
accommodate two lawyers who produce different 
outputs and use different production factors but 
charge the same price, a fee-for-time ceiling that 
a court imposes will tend to prefer the producer 
who uses less cost per unit of his time or, stated 
more simply, less cost and more of his time. 
since neither method is better than the other, 
the preference is arbitrary. Courts should not 
indulge it. 
A legal fee that a court or an attorney decrees 
but that ignores the market will produce, 
ultimately, a misallocation of legal services 
compared to those that consumers would purchase if 
the edict did not exist. It also will produce a 
misallocation of production factors compared to 
those that lawyers would use if the edict did not 
exist. Any system that focuses solely upon a 
lawyer's time, the one input that the lawyer 
cannot expand per unit of time, tends to distort 
the lawyer's use of all production factors. 
The market inexorably is present even if a court 
or lawyer refuses to recognize it. Wise judges 
realize that they should defer to it. 
D - 13 
"Proceeding presumptively with 
the firm's own rates allows the 
court to avoid the essentially 
impossible task of selecting one 
rate over another from a wide range 
of 'market' rates, it limits the 
power of the trial judge arbitrarily 
to reward or punish attorneys by 
setting rates virtually at will, and 
it allows the parties and the court 
to avoid a 'second major litigation' 
over the rate-making process. The 
marketplace best measures 'market 
value'; appraisal by no other method 
has as much claim to veracity and 
objectivity." Laffey v. Northwest 
Airlines. Inc., 746 F. 2d 4, 18 
(D. C. Cir. 1984) 
Courts should permit the compensation for legal 
services to take into account the output as well as 
the input. Only then will lawyers focus 
principally upon expanding the expandable 
production factors in order to enhance efficiency 
and to increase value to the client and net income 
to the lawyer. 
The appropriate function of a court in reviewing a 
fee is to prevent overreaching. Unless the lawyer 
has agreed with the client to impose a ceiling upon 
himself, no direct relationship is apparent between 
a court's imposition of a fee-for~time ceiling and 
its prevention of overreaching. 
D. Lawyer's Challenge. 
A lawyer can accept a disallowance or can challenge 
it. The only course that will produce greater 
problems, with client and court, than to accept a 
disallowance is to challenge a disallowance meekly 
and to lose. Accordingly, a lawyer should have a 
bias in favor of challenging and of attempting to 
do whatever is necessary to win. 
An attorney who is aware that a local court is 
considering a disallowance should make a record 
that both will tend to persuade the court not to 
disallow and, if the court does disallow, will tend 
to support a reversal. Arbitrariness is the basis 
upon which local courts seem most vulnerable. 
Therefore, if necessary, the record should include 
testimony of experts concerning appropriate bases 
and amounts of fees and testimony of local 
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practitioners (subpoenaed, if necessary) that the 
court generally uses an arbitrary ceiling. An 
effective defense of an hourly charge by an 
attorney who calculated a fee solely on the basis 
of the time that he directly expended for the 
client probably should include a disclosure of how 
other attorneys charge rates that nominally are 
lower but that actually are the same or higher. 
Failure to disclose how other attorneys calculate a 
fee for time permits the court to use a meaningless 
comparison between things that inherently are 
dissimilar, the proverbial apples and oranges. 
Avoiding the System - and the Problems •. 
Arguably, an attorney can avoid the problems by 
avoiding the system. Avoidance of probate by means 
ofa revocable, noncourt trust should avoid the 
court's control. Similarly, the prompt movement of 
all assets from the probate estate to a noncourt 
trust might permit the attorney to render most of 
his services for the trustee and not for the 
personal representative and, therefore, might 
permit the attorney to charge most of his services 
to the trustee and to avoid the inspection of a 
court. 
F. written Agreements. 
As a practical matter, a written agreement between 
lawyer and client, obtained before the services are 
performed or in any event before the lawyer asks a 
court to approve the fee, will tend to avoid a . 
client's challenge and a court's disallowance. 
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III. CONTROL BY INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: 
DEDUCTIBILITY OF FEES FOR ESTATE PLANNING. 
A. Statutory Authority. 
If a deduction is available for the cost of legal 
services that consist of estate planning, the 
statutory authority is section 212 of the Internal 
Revenue Code: 
"In the case of an individual, there 
shall be allowed as a deduction all the 
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or 
incurred during the taxable year---
"(1) for the production or collection of 
income; 
"(2) for the management, conservation or 
maintenance of property held for the 
production of income; or 
"(3) in connection with the 
determination, collection or refund of 
any tax." 
Portions (1) and (2) grant a deduction for the cost 
of operating a revocable trust. Similarly, they 
should grant a deduction for the cost of creating 
the trust. 
Portion (2) allows a deduction for expenses for the 
management of income-producing property. How 
portion (2) applies to an unfunded trust is 
unclear. If a revocable trust is revoked, its 
post-death dispositive provisions never will 
operate. Therefore, arguably, all of the fee 
attributable to the trust is described in portion 
(2). The function of a power of attorney for 
property management is to facilitate the management 
of property. Therefore, arguably, all of the fee 
for it is described in portion (2). 
Portion (3) allows a deduction for expenses 
incurred in connection with the determination of 
any tax. Courts have held that portion (3) 
provides a deduction for the cost of general tax 
advice. Carpenter v. united States, 64-2 USTC !9, 
842 (ct. Cl. 1964); cf. Merians v. Commissioner, 60 
T.e. 187 (1973), and reg. Sl.212-1. Accordingly, 
portion (3) arguably permits a deduction for the 
portion of the fee that is attributable to tax 
advice and is not deducted under another portion of 
section 212. 
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Merians. 
Sidney Merians hired an attorney to prepare an 
estate plan. The Internal Revenue Service assumed 
that any portion of the fee that was attributable 
to tax advice was deductible. Therefore, according 
to the Tax Court, the only question was what 
portion of the unitemized fee was attributable to 
tax advice. Merians v. Commissi.oner, 60 T.C. 187 
(1973). However, some of the judges disagreed with 
the Service's assumption that portion (3) of 
section 212 provided a deduction for general tax 
advice. 
Code 567. 
An individual's "miscellaneous itemized deductions 
for any taxable year [are] allowed only to the 
extent that the aggregate of such deductions 
exceeds 2 percent of adjusted gross income." Code 
S67{a). "Miscellaneous itemized deductions" 
includes deductions under section 212. Code S72{b) 
and reg. S1.67-1T(a). 
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IV. CONTROL BY INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: 
DEDUCTIBILITY OF ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES CONSISTING OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXECUTOR'S COMMISSIONS 
A. Choice Between Deduction for Estate Tax Purposes 
and Deduction for Income Tax PurRoses. 
1. Attorney's fees and executor's commissions 
that are administration expenses are 
deductible either for estate tax purposes or 
for estate or trust or individual income tax 
purposes, but not for both estate tax purposes 
and income tax purposes. 
"(g) PISALLOWANCE OF DOUBLE DEDUCTIONS. -
Amounts allowable under section 2053 or 2054 
as a deduction in computing the taxable estate 
of a decedent shall not be allowed as a 
deduction (or as an offset against the sales 
price of property in determining gain or loss) 
in computing the taxable income of the estate 
or of any other person, unless there is filed, 
within the time and in the manner and form 
prescribed by the Secretary, a statement that 
the amounts have not been allowed as 
deductions under section 2053 or 2054 and a 
waiver of the right to have such amounts 
allowed at any time as deductions under 
section 2053 or 2054. This sUbsection shall 
not apply with respect to deductions allowed 
under part II (relating to income in respect 
of decedents)." 
Code §642(g). 
2. The statutory authority for the deduction for 
estate tax purposes is found in Code section 
2053. 
* * * 
"Ca) GENERAL RULE. - For purposes of 
the tax imposed by section 2001, the 
value of the taxable estate shall be 
determined by deducting from the value of 
the gross estate such amounts -
* * * 
"(2) for administration expenses, 
* * * 
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as are allowable by the laws of the 
jurisdiction, whether within or without 
the united states, under which the estate 
is being administered." 
The statutory authority for the deduction for 
income tax purposes is Code 5212, quoted above 
in III.A. 
Generally, costs for the administration of an 
estate or trust are subject to the two-
percent-of-adjusted-gross-income limit of Code 
section 67. However, these costs are fully 
deductible in determining the adjusted gross 
income of the estate or trust to the extent 
the costs "would not have been incurred if the 
property were not held in such trust or 
estate •••• " Code 567(e). 
Is an excess deduction, under Code section 
642(h), on termination of an estate or trust 
subject to the two-percent limitation of Code 
section 67? 
a. A beneficiary, not the estate or trust, 
claims the Code section 642(h) deduction. 
However, if the estate or trust were in 
existence, it, not the beneficiary, would 
claim a deduction for these items. 
b. This formulation would seem to allow the 
use of qualifying costs of 
administration, without the limitation, 
to reduce what, but for the termination, 
would be the estate's or the trust's 
adjusted gross income. 
c. However, does it impose the two-percent 
limitation with respect to any costs of 
administration that generate what, but 
for Code section 67, is a deduction under 
Code section 642(h)? 
d. An affirmative answer would seem to 
create untenable differences. 
i. It would appear to impair the 
deductibility of costs of informal 
administration (i.e., administration 
without probate) more than it would 
impair the deductibility of costs of 
probate administration. 
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ii. It would appear to impair a 
deduction under Code section 642(h) 
and thus to tend to prolong the 
administration of trusts and 
estates. 
6. Deduction for income tax purposes of items 
that alternatively are deductible for estate 
tax purposes as costs of administration 
requires a statement that 
(i) the items have not been allowed as 
deductions for estate tax purposes, and 
(ii) the taxpayer waives the right to claim 
the items at any time as deductions for 
estate tax purposes. 
Code 5642(g). 
a. The statement must be filed in duplicate. 
Reg. 51.642(g)-1. 
b. It must be filed (i) with the return that 
claims the deduction or (ii) 
alternatively, with the district director 
for the district in which the return was 
filed, for association with the return. 
Id. 
c. The statement is due before the 
expiration of the statute of limitations 
that applies to the taxable year for 
which the deduction is sought. Id. 
d. Until a deduction is finally allowed for 
estate tax purposes, the taxpayer may 
claim the deduction for income tax 
purposes even if a claim of it for estate 
tax purposes is ~ending. Id. 
e. 
f. 
However, the filing of the statement that 
is required to claim the item as a 
deduction for income tax purposes does 
preclude all claim of the item as a 
deduction for estate tax purposes. Id. 
A taxpayer may claim some items as 
deductions for income tax purposes and 
others as deductions for estate tax 
purposes and may claim part of an item 
for one purpose and part of it for 
another purpose. Reg. 51-642(g)-2. 
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7. other things being equal, the taxpayer should 
select the deduction that will have the higher 
present value • 
a. The present value of the deduction is the 
same as the present value of the property 
that the deduction can permit to inure to 
the benefit of the beneficiaries of the 
decedent rather than to the United 
states. 
b. Two rules of thumb tend to facilitate the 
choice. 
i. First, tend to claim the deduction 
for the purpose that first will 
produce a tax benefit. 
(a) If the decedent's spouse 
survives the decedent and the 
decedent gives to other than 
the spouse a gift that is 
defined in terms of the largest 
amount that does not increase 
estate tax, deduction of 
administration expenses for 
estate tax purposes will not 
save any tax upon the 
decedent's death. 
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(i) However, it will exclude 
from the decedent's 
taxable estate the amount 
thus deducted for estate 
tax purposes and, compared 
to a deduction of this 
amount for income tax 
purposes, will decrease 
pro tanto the marital 
disposition and increase 
pro tanto the property 
that is available to 
benefit the family because 
of the shelter of the 
unified credit. 
(ii) Accordingly, while this 
deduction for estate tax 
purposes will not produce 
a tax benefit immediately 
upon the death of the 
predeceasing spouse, it 
will produce a tax benefit 
upon the death of the 
surviving spouse. 
(b) A deduction for income tax 
purposes can save tax upon the 
decedent's death regardless of 
whether the decedent's taxable 
estate is sufficient to 
generate liability for estate 
tax. 
(i) It will include in the 
taxable estate the amount 
thus deducted for income 
tax purposes and, compared 
to a deduction of this 
amount for estate tax 
purposes, will reduce pro 
tanto the property that is 
available to benefit the 
family because of the 
shelter of the unified 
credit and will increase 
pro tanto the marital 
disposition. 
(ii) Accordingly, while this 
deduction for income tax 
purposes will produce a 
tax benefit immediately 
upon the death of the 
predeceasing spouse, it 
will produce a tax 
detriment upon the death 
of the surviving spouse. 
ii. Second, if both a deduction for 
income tax purposes and a deduction 
for estate tax purposes will produce 
a benefit immediate~y upon the 
decedent's death, claim the 
deduction that will produce the 
larger saving. 
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Nature of the Inguiry. 
Regardless of how courts describe the process, 
whether an expense is deductible for estate tax 
purposes requires a two-part inquiry. 
1. First, is the expense of a type that is 
deductible? 
2. Second, if the expense is of a proper type, 
what amount of it is deductible? 
3. Circuit Courts of Appeal have disagreed about 
how to determine whether particular expenses 
are deductible. 
a. Some have said that an expense is 
deductible if the expense is allowable 
according solely to state law. Estate of 
Park y. Commissioner, 475 F. 2d 673 (6th 
Cir. 1973), 73-1 USTC !12,913; Jenner y. 
Commissioner, 577 F. 2d 1100 (7th Cir. 
1978), 78-2 USTC !13,251; and Ballance y. 
Commissioner, 347 F. 2d 419 (7th Cir. 
1965), 65-1 USTC !12,283. 
b. Others have said that an expense is 
deductible only if the expense is 
allowable according to both state law and 
federal law. Love y. Commissioner, 91-1 
USTC !60,056 (4th eire 1991); Hibernia 
Bank y. united states, 581 F. 2d 741 (9th 
Cir. 1978), 78-2 USTC !13,261; and Pitner 
y. united states, 388 F. 2d 651 (5th cir. 
1967), 68-1 USTC !12,499; see also Smith 
y. Commissioner, 510 F. 2d 479 (2d Cir. 
1975), 75-1 USTC !13,046, cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 827 (1975). 
c. Some authority has held that this dispute 
is material only to determining whether 
the expense is of a type that is 
deductible and is not material to 
determining reasonableness (i.e., the 
amount that is allowable). Bank of 
Nevada y. united States, 80-2 USTC 
!13,361 (D. Nev. 1980); see also 
Hibernia, supra, at 85,933, fn. 6. 
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d. However, other authority, discussed 
below, has held that the dispute also is 
material to determining reasonableness. 
Pitner, supra; and united states y. 
White, 853 F. 2d 107 (2d Cir. 1988), 88-2 
USTC !13,777, certiorari granted, 
u.s. (1989), certiorari dismiS'Sed, 
__ u.s. __ (1989). 
C. What Types of ExPenses Are. Deductible? 
Attorney's fees and executor's commissions are not 
deductible for estate tax purposes unless they are 
"administration expenses." Code S2053(a)(2); see 
generally Dewitt y. Commissioner, 54 TCM 759 
(1987). 
1. Expenses are not administration expenses 
unless (i) they are incurred in the 
administration of the estate and (ii) they are 
not incurred for the personal benefit of 
beneficiaries. 
"(a) In general. The amounts 
deductible from a decedent's gross estate 
as 'administration expenses' of the first 
category (see paragraphs (a) and (c) of 
S20.2053-1) are limited to such expenses 
as are actually and necessarily incurred 
in the administration of the decedent's 
estate; that is, in the collection of 
assets, payment of debts, and 
distribution of property to the persons 
entitled to it. The expenses 
contemplated in the law are such only as 
attend the settlement of an estate and 
the transfer of the property of the 
estate to individual beneficiaries or to 
a trustee, whether the trustee is the 
executor or some. other person. 
Expenditures not essential to the proper 
settlement of the estate, but incurred 
for the individual benefit of the heirs, 
legatees, or devisees, may not be taken 
as deductions. Administration expenses 
include (1) executor's commissions;. (2) 
attorney's fees; and (3) miscellaneous 
expenses. Each of these classes is 
considered separately in paragraphs (b) 
through (d) of this section." 
Reg. S20.2053-3(a). 
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"(3) Attorney's fees incurred by 
beneficiaries incident to litigation as 
to their respective interests are not 
deductible if the litigation is not 
essential to the proper settlement of the 
estate within the meaning of paragraph 
(a) of this section. An attorney's fee 
not meeting this test is not deductible 
as an administration expense under 
section 2053 and this section, even if it 
is approved by a probate court as an 
expense payable or reimbursable by the 
estate." 
Reg. §20.2053-3(c)(3). 
2. Fees that are billed after a client's death 
for work performed during the client's life 
are not administration expenses and, 
therefore, are not reportable on Schedule J of 
the United states estate tax return and are 
not deductible under Code section 2053(a)(2). 
a. Rather, these items are reportable as 
debts on Schedule K of the United states 
estate tax return and, if all conditions 
are satisfied, are deductible under Code 
section 2053(a} (3). 
b. 
i. Such of these items as the decedent 
could have deducted for income tax 
purposes during his life if the 
decedent had paid them are 
deductions in respect of a decedent 
by the party that pays them after 
the decedent's death. Code §691(b}. 
ii. Accordingly, contrary to 
administration expenses, these items 
can produce a deduction for estate 
tax purposes and also a deduction 
for income tax purposes. See Code 
S642(g}. 
Upon disallowance of a deduction for an 
attorney's fee as an administration 
expense, the attorney might attempt to 
justify the deduction by arguing that 
part of the fee was for services rendered 
during the client's life. 
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i. This type of argument presents a 
trap in those jurisdictions in which 
the Circuit Courts of Appeal have 
said that consideration of post-
death events is appropriate and that 
enforcement of a claim is a 
prerequisite to the granting of a 
deduction for it. United states v. 
Jacobs, 34 F. 2d 233 (8th Cir. -
1930), 1 USTC !380; Commissioner y. 
Shively, 276 F. 2d 372(2d Cir. 
1960), 60-1 USTC !11,940; Gowetz y. 
Commissioner, 320 F. 2d 874 (1st 
Cir. 1963), 63-2 USTC !12,165; 
Estate of Hagmann, 492 F. 2d 796 
(5th Cir. 1974), 74-1 USTC !12,996; 
and Revenue Ruling 60-247, 1960-2 
C.B. 272. 
(a) The timely filing of a claim 
might be a precondition to its 
deduction in these 
jurisdictions. 
(b) Typically, any attempt of the 
Internal Revenue Service to 
disallow the deduction will 
occur after the time has 
expired for the filing of 
claims. 
(c) However, if the jurisdiction 
permits informal handling of 
agreed claims, the attorney 
might argue that the amount of 
the fee was agreed within the 
requisite time. See~, 
Thompson y. Commissioner, 84-1 
USTC !13,568 (7th Cir. 1983). 
ii. This problem does not exist in those 
jurisdictions in which the Circuit 
Courts of Appeal have said that 
consideration of post-death events 
is inappropriate and whether the 
claim was enforceable at the time of 
the decedent's death, not whether 
the claim actually was enforced 
after the death, determines whether 
a deduction is available under Code 
section 2053(a) (3). united States 
v. Propstra, 680 F. 2d 1248 (9th 
Cir. 1982), 82-2 USTC !13,475; 
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commissioner y. strauss, 77 F. 2d 
401 (7th Cir. 1935), 35-1 USTC 
!9,266; and Russell y. United 
states, 260 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Ill. 
1966), 66-2 USTC !12,418; ~ also 
Ithaca Trust Company y. United 
states, 279 U.S. 151 (1920), 1 USTC 
!386; cf. Greene y. United states, 
78-1 USTC !13,240 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
What Amount Of An Expense of a Proper Type Is 
D.eductible? 
If an expense is of a proper type, such amount of 
it is permitted as a deduction as is "allowable by 
the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or 
without the United States, under which the estate 
is being administered." Code S2053(a) (2). 
1. Deduction is authorized even if a local court 
has not approved the commission or fee. 
a. "On the other hand, a deduction for the 
amount of a bona fide indebtedness of the 
decedent, or of a reasonable expense of 
administration, will not be denied 
because no court decree has been entered 
if the amount would be allowable under 
local law." 
Reg. S20.2053-1(b) (2). 
* * * 
"Cb) Executor's commissions. (1) 
The executor or administrator, in filing 
the estate tax return, may deduct his 
commissions in such an amount as has 
actually been paid, or in an amount which 
at the time of filing the estate tax 
return may reasonably be expected to be 
paid, but no deduction may be taken if no 
commissions are to be collected. If the 
amount of the commissions has not been 
fixed by decree of the proper court, the 
deduction will be allowed on the final 
audit of the return, to the extent that 
all three of the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
"(i) The district director is 
reasonably satisfied that the 
commissions claimed will be paid; 
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"(ii) The amount claimed as a 
deduction is within the amount 
allowable by the laws of the 
jurisdiction in which the estate is 
being administered; and 
"(iii) It is in accordance with 
the usually accepted practice in the 
jurisdiction to allow such an amount 
in estates of similar size and 
character. 
"If the deduction is disallowed in whole 
or in part on final audit, the 
disallowance will be subject to 
modification as the facts may later 
require. If the deduction is allowed in 
advance of payment and payment is 
thereafter waived, it shall be the duty 
of the executor to notify the district 
director and to pay the resulting tax, 
together with interest." 
Reg. S20.2053-3(b)(1). 
* * * 
"(c) Attorney's fees. (1) The 
executor or administrator, in filing the 
estate tax return, may deduct such an 
amount of attorney's fees as has 
actually been paid, or an amount which at 
the time of filing may reasonably be 
expected to be paid. If on the final 
audit of a return the fees claimed have 
not been awarded by the proper court and 
paid, the deduction will, nevertheless, 
be allowed, if the district director is 
reasonably satisfied that the amount 
claimed will be paid and that it does not 
exceed a reasonable remuneration for the 
services rendered, taking into account 
the size and character of the estate and 
the local law and practice. If the 
deduction is disallowed in whole or in 
part on final audit, the disallowance 
will be subject to modification as the 
facts may later require." 
Reg. S20.2053-3(c)(1). 
D - 28 
;..: 
~ 
--, 
~ 
~----j 
~ 
; 
9 
do:-_~ 
i~~' 
b. Whether the administration was formal or 
informal does not affect the 
deductibility of the fee or commission. 
Pitner, supra. 
2. If a local court has not approved the 
commission or fee, the Internal Revenue 
Service has broad power to determine 
deductibility. Reg. SS20.2053-1 (b) (2), 
20.2053-3(b) (1) and 20.2053-3(c) (1). 
a. While section 2053(a) of the Code and the 
regulations (see the last sentence of 
regUlation section 20.2053-1(b) (2) and 
all of regulation sections 20.2053-3 
(b) (1) and 20.2053-3(c) (1» require the 
Internal Revenue Service to defer to 
local law for principles to determine 
deductibility, the Internal Revenue 
Service is required to defer only to the 
pronouncement of those principles by the 
highest court of the state. 
i. Commissioner y. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 
(1967), 67-2 USTC ,12,472, held 
"that where the federal estate tax 
liability turns upon the character 
of a property interest held and 
transferred by the decedent under 
state law, federal authorities are 
not bound by the determination of 
such property interest by a state 
trial court." Id. at 85,550. 
ii. While the Internal Revenue Service 
must apply the law of the state, it 
has considerable latitude to 
formulate that law. 
b. Additionally and.most importantly, the 
Internal Revenue Service has exclusive 
authority to determine the facts. 
3. Arguably, if a local court has approved the 
commission or fee, the Service's power to 
determine deductibility is more limited. 
a. According to regulation section 20.2053-
l(b) (2), 
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b. 
"(2) Effect of court decree. 
The decision of a local court as to 
the amount and allowability under 
local law of a claim or 
administration expense will 
ordinarily be accepted if the court 
passes upon the facts upon which 
deductibility depends. If the court 
does not pass upon those facts, its 
decree will, of course, not be 
followed. For example, if the 
question before the court is whether 
a claim should be allowed, the 
decree allowing it will ordinarily 
be accepted as establishing the 
validity and amount of the claim. 
However, the decree will not 
necessarily be accepted even though 
it purports to decide the facts upon 
which deductibility depends. It 
must appear that the court actually 
passed upon the merits of the claim. 
This will be presumed in all cases 
of an active and genuine contest. 
If the result reached appears to be 
unreasonable, this is some evidence. 
that there was not such a contest, 
but it may be rebutted by proof to 
the contrary. If the decree was 
rendered by consent, it will be 
accepted, provided the consent was a 
bona fide recognition of the 
validity of the claim (and not a 
mere cloak for a gift) and was 
accepted by the court as 
satisfactory evidence upon the 
merits. It will be presumed that 
the consent was of this character, 
and was so accepted, if given by all 
parties having an interest adverse 
to the claimant. The decree will 
not be accepted if it is at variance 
with the law of the state; as, for 
example, an allowance made to an 
executor in excess of that 
prescribed by statute. •• n 
Regulation section 20.2053-1 (b)(2) 
dissipates Bosch to such extent, if any, 
as the regulation provides a result that 
differs from that which Bosch, in the 
absence of the regulation, would provide. 
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i. No regulation affected the result in 
Bosch. 
ii. Here, on the other hand, regulation 
section 20.2053-1 (b) (2) 
specifically requires the Internal 
Revenue Service to defer, in certain 
circumstances, to the order of the 
local court. 
iii. The critical question, of course, is 
whether, and to what extent, 
regulation section 20.2053-1(b) (2) 
provides a result that differs from 
that which Bosch would provide if 
the regulation did not exist. 
c. Regulation section 20.2053-1(b) (2) 
forecloses Internal Revenue Service 
inquiry only if certain criteria are met. 
i. The local court must pass upon the 
facts upon which deductibility 
depends. 
(a) This is presumed in a genuine 
contest. 
(b) A determination of the local 
court that is procured by fraud 
is not a determination on the 
facts. 
(c) A consent decree is acceptable 
if, according to the 
regulation, "the consent was a 
bona fide recognition of the 
validity of the claim." 
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(i) The consent of all parties 
adverse to the claimant 
creates a presumption that 
the consent was a bona 
fide recognition. 
(ii) This requirement disallows 
a deduction for what 
essentially is a gift. 
'"""3' 
~ 
~ 
ii. The Internal Revenue Service will 
not accept a decree that "is at 
variance with the law of the State; 
as, for example, an allowance made 
to an executor in excess of that 
prescribed by statute." Reg. 
S20.2053-1(b) (2). 
(a) The scope of this exception is 
uncertain. 
(i) Arguably, the exception 
was intended to apply to a 
commission that was 
determined on a percentage 
basis in excess of that 
which a statute 
prescribed. 
(ii) The date of the 
regulation, June 23, 1958, 
lends credence to this 
supposition. 
(b) If the exception also applies 
to a commission that is not 
percentage-determined, it 
always permits the Internal 
Revenue Service independently 
to determine the applicable 
law. 
(c) If the exception always permits 
the Internal Revenue Service 
independently to determine the 
applicable law, what, if 
anything, is the function of 
the regulation? 
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(i) If the local court 
properly has determined 
and applied the law, the 
regulation appears to 
prevent the Internal 
Revenue Service from 
redetermining the facts. 
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(ii) This foreclosure, and, 
indeed, whether or not a 
local court order even 
exists, seem unimportant 
if the particular fee or 
commission is determined 
on a percentage basis 
according to a statute. 
(iii) However, the foreclosure 
is potentially significant 
if the fee or commission 
is not determined on a 
percentage basis. 
Most compensation that is not 
determined on a percentage 
basis is determined on the 
basis of what is "reasonable." 
(i) Determination of 
"reasonable" compensation 
appears to present both 
questions of law and 
questions of fact. 
(I) Arguably, "reason-
ableness" subsumes 
various criteria that 
the court must 
identify, weigh and 
apply as a matter of 
law. 
(II) Additionally, the 
court must determine, 
as a matter of fact, 
whether, based upon 
the criteria thus 
defined and 
evaluated, the 
compensation is 
"reasonable." 
(ii) Stated differently, the 
quest for "reasonableness" 
seems inherently, and 
uniquely, to involve a 
tension between where, in 
the contemplation of the 
regulation, law ends and 
facts begin. 
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(iii) The results, if not the 
language, of many 
decisions indicate that 
courts of review often 
have treated the inquiry 
about reasonableness as 
consisting more of a 
determination of fact than 
a determination of law 
and, therefore, have 
deferred to the orders of 
the local courts. See, 
~, Rev. Rul. 69-551, 
1969-2 Cum. Bull. 177; 
Bank of Nevada y. united 
States, supra; Craft y. 
United States, 80-1 USTC 
!13,327 (5th Cir. 1979), 
affirming per curiam, 68 
T.C. 249; First National 
Bank of Nevada y. United 
States, 77-2 USTC !13,207 
(D. Nev. 1977); .J.M. 
Underwood v. united 
states, 69-1 USTC !12,591 
(6th Cir. 1969); Cadden y~ 
District Director, 62-1 
USTC !12,058 (6thCir. 
1962); Estate of S.E. 
Bosworth, Executor y. 
United states, 57-1 USTC 
!11,662 (W.O. Wash. 1956); 
Estate of Charles F. 
Goodwin y. Commissioner, 
53-1 USTC !10,886 (6th 
Cir. 1953); Schmalstig y. 
Collector, 42-2 USTC 
!10,205 (W.D.S.D. Ohio 
1942); Estate of William 
~. Miller v. Commissioner, 
21 T.C.M. 43 (1962); 
Estate of Minnie S. 
Pridmore, 20 T.C.M. 47 
(1961); and Estate of 
Reuben ~. Freed y. 
Commissioner, 6 T.C.M. 216 
(1947). 
(1) Courts of review 
often have asked 
whether the trial 
courts applied the 
proper law, i.e., did 
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"reasonable." 
(II) However, the 
reviewing courts 
generally have not 
reviewed the legal 
criteria that might 
underlie 
"reasonable." 
(iv) One court of review 
appears to have moved, at 
least in its language if 
not its holding, far in 
the other direction. See 
united states y. White, 
supra. 
(I) 
(II) 
The Second Circuit in 
White stated that the 
regulation did not 
prevent the type of 
inquiry that Bosch, 
in the absence of the 
regulation, would 
permit. 
Expressed in the 
parlance of a 
bifurcation between 
determinations of law 
and determinations of 
fact, the Second 
Circuit appears to 
have treated the 
search for 
"reasonableness" as 
consisting more of a 
determination of law 
than a determination 
of fact. 
(III) Thus, it allowed the 
Internal Revenue 
Service to probe the 
fact of reason-
ableness even though 
the Service 
apparently did not 
demonstrate that the 
~ 
~ 
d 
local court misdeter-
mined or misapplied 
the appropriate 
criteria. 
(e) Treatment of reasonable-
ness principally as a 
question of law tends to 
render regulation section 
20.2053-1 (b) (2) a 
nullity. 
(f) stated differently, if (i) 
local law provides for 
"reasonable" fees or 
commissions and (ii) the 
Internal Revenue Service 
can ignore a local court's 
determination of what is 
reasonable, when, if ever, 
will regulation section 
20.2053-1(b) (2) require 
the Service to defer to 
the determination of a 
local court? 
d. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
without mentioning or applying regulation 
section 20.2053-1{b) (2), has said that 
Code section 2053(a), per~, requires 
deference to local court orders. Jenner, 
supra. 
i. Jenner is among the cases that, in 
the context of the conflict about 
whether only state law or both state 
and federal law determine whether a 
particular expense is deductible, 
looked only to state law. 
ii. The more important aspect of Jenner 
for purposes of this part of the 
discussion is that the Seventh 
Circuit indicated that it generally 
would determine the applicable law 
of the state by deferring to the 
decree of a local probate court if 
such a decree existed. 
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iii. According to Jenner, 
"As a general rule the decree 
of a probate court approving 
expenditures as proper 
administrative expenses under state 
law will control. This court held 
in Ballance y. Commissioner [65-2 
USTC !12,331], 347 F.2d 419, 423 (7 
Cir. 1965), that to ascertain 
whether a particular expenditure 
'constitutes an allowable expense of 
administration' 'recourse must be 
had to [state] law • • • • 
"The Sixth Circuit has also 
concluded that the deductibility of 
the expense is governed by state law 
alone. Estate of Park y. 
Commissioner [73-1 USTC !12,913], 
475 F.2d 673, 676 (6 Cir. 
1973).. "78-2 USTC !13,251 at 
85,879. 
iv. Since (i) the Seventh Circuit in 
Jenner did npt mention or apply 
regulation section 20.2053-1(b} (2) 
and (ii) the action of the local 
court in Jenner arguably was weaker 
than that to which the regulation 
would require deference, the Seventh 
Circuit appears. inherently to have 
said that (a) Code section 2053(a), 
per se, countermanded Bosch and· 
di'ssipated whatever effect Bosch 
might have had in the absence of the 
statute and (b) the Seventh Circuit 
also would have required deference 
to the order of a local court in 
situation~ (including most 
allowances of fees and commissions) 
in which regulation section 20.2053-
1(b) (2) clearly applied. 
Internal Revenue Service Position. 
The Internal Revenue Service has treated Code 
section 2053(a) and regulation section 20.2053-
l(b) (2) as though they have not, or in some cases 
have but should not have, impeded seriously the 
Service's ability independently to determine the 
deductibility of a fee or commission that a local 
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court has approved. The focus of the controversy 
is threefold. 
1. First, the Service has rejected the Jenner 
view of Code section 2053(a). 
2. Second, the Service has asserted that neither 
Code section 2053(a) nor regulation section 
20.2053-1(b) (2) has prevented it from 
redetermining the ultimate conclusion about 
whether a fee or commission was "reasonable." 
3. Third, the Service has asserted that both 
state and federal law determine whether an 
expense is of a proper type and, if it is, the 
amount of it that is deductible and that, in 
jurisdictions that accept this doctrine, a 
determination of a local court concerning the 
allowance of fees or commissions always is 
subject to federal law. 
4. Perhaps the Service stated its position most 
comprehensively in two technical advice 
memoranda, 8636100 dated December 31, 1985, 
and 8838009 dated June 17, 1988. 
a. The latter amplified the former. 
b. The Service's amplification of the prior 
ruling was curious, since 
(i) the statute of limitations expired 
in June of 1986, 
(ii) the prior pronouncement was merely a 
private ruling and, thus, nominally 
neither usable nor citable as 
precedent and 
(iii) the latter ruling did not alter the 
Service's conclusion about the 
particular controversy. 
c. Technical Advice Memorandum 8636100 held 
that the Internal Revenue Service was 
required to defer to the determination of 
the local court. 
i. The Illinois Supreme Court had not 
"established a definite standard as 
to what constitutes reasonable 
compensation generally in probate 
matters." 
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ii. Therefore, according to the Service, 
Bosch permitted the Service 
independently to determine the 
applicable law. 
iii. However, by noting that the Illinois 
Supreme Court had "ruled • • • that, 
in order to alter the amount of a 
fee allowance, a reviewing court is 
required to find that the trial 
court's determination is manifestly 
or palpably erroneous," the Service 
indicated that Bosch required the 
Service to defer to the local court 
to the same extent that the Illinois 
Supreme Court required appellate 
courts in Illinois to defer to a 
determination of a fee or commission 
by a local court in Illinois. 
iv. The Service in any event reviewed 
Illinois law and was unable to 
determine that the local court had 
misconstrued it. 
v. Additionally, since the Seventh 
Circuit in Jenner had indicated that 
even without regard to regulation 
section 20.2053-1(b) (2) it would 
defer to a state court decision, the 
Service believed that the Seventh 
Circuit would refuse to redetermine 
whether the fees and the commissions 
were reasonable. 
e. Technical Advice Memorandum 8838009 
reached the same holding as 8636100, but· 
it amplified the earlier ruling. 
"Under section 20.2053-1 and section 
20.2053-3 of the regulations, in 
order for an administration expense 
to be deductible, the expense must 
be found to be reasonable both for 
purposes of (1) state probate law, 
and (2) federal estate tax law." 
"The Internal Revenue Service may 
. independently determine the 
reasonableness of claims for 
administration expenses for purposes 
of section 2053·of the Code." 
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iii. "However, where, as here, the 
Seventh Circuit has ruled that 
there is no separate federal 
standard on the reasonableness of 
claims for administration expenses 
for purposes of section 2053, the 
issue is to be resolved solely on 
the basis of the state law standard 
of reasonableness." 
f. The Service, in TAM 8838009, relied for 
its "amplification" on Pitner, supra, 
Smith, supra, and Hibernia, supra. 
i. Pitner, supra, Smith, supra, and 
Hibernia, supra, are within the line 
of cases that refers both to state 
and to federal law to determine 
whether a particular expense is of a 
type that is deductible according to 
Code section 2053(a). 
ii. Park, supra,· Jenner, supra, and 
Ballance, supra, are within the 
opposite line of authority, i.e., 
the cases that hold that only state 
law determines whether expenses are 
deductible according to Code section 
2053(a). 
iii. In Hibernia, for example, the 
administrator of a decedent's estate 
borrowed funds to maintain the 
decedent's mansion until the 
administrator could sell it. The 
administrator was unable to sell it 
until seven years after the decedent 
died. The probate court approved 
the administrator's payment of 
interest for this purpose. However, 
the Internal Revenue Service 
disallowed the administrator's 
,- ~ 
~ 
deduction of the interest for estate ~ 
tax purposes. The only question was 
whether the interest payments were a 
type of expense that properly was 
deductible according to section 
2053(a) of the Code and section 
20.2053-3(a) of the regulations. 
78-2 USTC 113,261 at 85,931. The ~ 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
believed that deductibility of the 
inter~st required that it be 
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allowable under state law and also 
that it be an "administration 
expense" under federal law. Id. at 
85,932. The district court had 
found that (i) the administrator had 
kept the estate open much longer 
than necessary, (ii) the 
administrator's expenditure of 
interest was largely for the 
convenience and benefit of the 
individual beneficiaries rather than 
of the estate and (iii) therefore, 
the expenditure was not an 
"administration expense" under 
section 2053(a) of the Code. 
g. Some of the line of authority that refers 
both to state and federal law to 
determine whether an expense is of a type 
that is deductible does not necessarily 
hold that the Internal Revenue Service 
independently can redetermine whether a 
fee or commission is reasonable. 
i. Neither Love nor Hibernia, for 
example, involved the question of 
whether the reasonableness (as 
opposed to the characterization) of 
an expense was a matter only of 
state law ora matter of both state 
and federal law. See Love, 91-1 
USTC 160,056 at 18,354; Hibernia, 
78-2 USTC !13,261 at 85,933, fn. 6; 
cf. Pitner, supra, and united States 
y. White, supra. 
ii. Bank of Nevada, supra, clearly 
addressed the question of what law 
determined the reasonableness of 
executor's ~ommissions and 
attorney's fees. 
(a) The united states District 
Court for Nevada, which decided 
Bank of Nevada, is located in 
the Ninth Circuit. 
(b) Thus, as the court properly 
observed, Hibernia was binding 
upon it. 
(c) According to the court, 
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"Thus, the issue before the 
Court as framed is: did the 
District Director of Internal 
Revenue have the power under 
the facts of this case to go 
behind the final order of the 
[probate court] with respect to 
the award of Plaintiff's 
attorney's fees, either as a 
matter of state or as a matter 
of federal law? 
"I must answer this two-
part question in the negative 
both times. Accordingly, I 
grant Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment." 80-2 USTC 
at 85,819. 
* * * 
"As I read [regulation section] 
20.2053-3(C) (1), once an 
executor or administrator is 
awarded attorney's fees by the 
probate court and those fees 
are paid, and the executor or 
administrator actually deducts 
the amount on the Federal 
Estate Tax Return, all further 
inquiry by the Internal Revenue 
Service as to those fees must 
cease .••• n Id. at 85,821. 
A recent authority with respect to the effect 
of a local court decision concerning the 
amount of the deduction (rather than only the 
determination of whether the expense was an 
administrative expense) is united States x. 
White, 88-2 USTC ,13,777 (2d Cir. 1988), 
certiorari granted, U.S. (1989), 
certiorari dismissed-,--- U.S-.--- (1989), 
. supra, reversing and remanding, unIted states 
x. White, 87-1 USTC ,13,710 (W.D.N.Y. 1987). 
a. The Second Circuit in White found that 
the Internal Revenue Service issued 
summons to the estate's attorney for a 
legitimate purpose, and, therefore, it. 
ordered enforcement of the summons. 
b.. The examiner had requested the attorney's 
time records or other documentation of 
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legal work undertaken for the estate and 
had stated that the attorney was required 
to justify his fees notwithstanding that 
a local court had approved them. 
c. The summons sought all records and 
documents that related to the 
administration of the estate, including 
records of the respondent's activities as 
attorney and as executor. 
d. When the respondent refused to comply, 
the Service disallowed a deduction for 
his attorney's fee and disallowed a 
portion of the deduction the estate had 
claimed for his executor's commission. 
e. Since the estate paid the deficiency and 
brought a refund action that was pending 
at the time that the Second Circuit 
rendered its decision, it is unclear 
whether the purpose of enforcement of the 
summons was to facilitate determination 
of the deductibility of the fees and 
commissions or was to facilitate the 
audit of the estate tax return generally. 
f. Contrary to the Seventh Circuit in 
Jenner, the Second Circuit found that 
Code section 2053(a) and regulation 
section 20.2053-1(b) (2) merely indicated 
that Congress (in the case of the 
statute) and the Internal Revenue Service 
(in the case of the regulation) intended 
to absorb the state law into federal law 
and that the principles of Bosch 
permitted the Internal Revenue Service to 
determine the state law. 
g. Perhaps most importantly, the Second 
Circuit said that although the highest 
court of the state had announced certain 
criteria as the appropriate basis for 
determining whether the fee was 
reasonable and the Service had to accept 
these criteria, Bosch permitted the· 
Service to refuse to accept the manner in 
which the local court had applied the 
criteria. 
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h. stated in the parlance of the division 
between questions of law and questions of 
fact, the Second Circuit apparently was 
saying that Bosch did not permit the 
Service to disregard the holding of a 
local court unless it disagreed with the 
court's construction of the law but that 
application of the law to the facts was 
itself a question of law and not a 
question of fact. 
i. The Second Circuit appears to have said 
that regulation section 20.2053-1(b) (2) 
independently permitted the same scope of 
review as the statute and Bosch. 
(i) Therefore, according to the Second 
Circuit, the regulation did not 
inhibit the Service from doing 
whatever it could have done if the 
regulation did not exist. 
(ii) This interpretation, of course, 
tended to render the regulation a 
nullity. 
j. As an independent basis for enforcement 
of the summons, the Second Circuit said 
that it believed that the Service had the 
right to investigate the existence of 
facts upon the basis of which, according 
to the regulation, the Service ordinarily 
would accept the decree of the local 
court. 
6. The Service revealed in its Action on Decision 
for Bank of Nevada, supra, a different 
position with respect to regulation section 
20.2053-1(b) (2). 
a. Although the memorandum criticized the 
ratio decidendi, it recommended that the 
government not appeal. 
h. According to the Action on Decision, 
" neither do we read [the 
regulations] to endorse an inquiry 
under any and all instances of court 
awarded fees. The provision in 
Treas. Reg. S20.2053-1(b) (2) for 
ordinarily accepting the probate 
court's decree seems to require that. 
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in the absence of unusual 
circumstances, the decree be 
followed." 
* * * 
"While we disagree with the 
holding with respect to the scope of 
the district director's discretion, 
the outcome here is essentially 
correct. A fee of five percent of 
the estate is not unreasonable." 
F. Planning. 
v. 
Regulation section 20.2053-1(b) (2) and the Jenner 
interpretation of Code section 2053(a), where it 
applies, have planning implications. Before or 
when a dispute concerning deductibility arises, the 
lawyer should attempt to foreclose the dispute by 
obtaining the order of a local court. 
1. If local law provides for "reasonable" fees, 
the lawyer should ask the court to determine 
that the fees are reasonable. 
2. The lawyer should ask the court to recite as 
the basis for the determination such criteria 
for reasonableness as clearly are known or are 
unobjectionable. 
3. The lawyer should consider asking the court in 
any event to recite that the fee is 
"reasonable considering all appropriate 
factors." 
OTHER ISSUES. 
An attorney additionally might argue that (i) the 
use of time (and time records) as the exclusive 
basis or as a principal basis for determining 
reasonableness is inappropriate, (ii) the system 
fails to accommodate the court's or the Service's 
right to obtain information and the attorney's duty 
not to disclose it, (iii) percentage-oriented fees 
and commissions are not illegal and (iv) an attack 
on the percentage-oriented commission of a 
particular executor requires an attack on the 
commissions of most executors. Even if the court 
or the Service is unwilling to say that it accedes 
to any of these arguments, it might wish to avoid 
the highly charged political issues that can reside 
at the margins of a court's attempt to disallow a 
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fee or the Service's attempt independently to 
determine the deductibility of a fee or commission 
that a local court has approved. 
A. Ethical Constraints. 
Ethical constraints might prevent an attorney 
from disclosing the requested information. 
1. Almost every sizable estate involves 
numerous tax questions and issues. 
2. Only some of the issues are disclosed in 
tax returns. 
3. Divulgence of an attorney's time and 
other records can divulge each and every 
tax issue or question (whether or not 
disclosed in a tax return) to which the 
attorney has devoted any attention. 
4. Mandatory divulgence might lead to an 
untenable situation or to a drastically 
changed system of keeping of records. 
5. A court probably can disallow a fee if a 
lawyer fails affirmatively to justify it. 
6. Similarly, since the taxpayer has the 
burden of establishing entitlement to 
deductions, an attorney's refusal to 
comply with a request for information 
concerning an item for which a deduction 
is sought can lead to the denial of the 
deduction. 
B. Right to Information. 
The Internal Revenue Service might have a 
right to obtain some of the attorney's 
records, and other information in the 
attorney's hands, to enable it to audit the 
return generally, even assuming that the 
estate foregoes all deductions. See generally 
United states y. Lawless, 83-1 USTC !13,527 
(7th Cir. 1983); and White, 88-2 USTC 113,777, 
supra; cf. United states y. Arthur Young k 
Co., 84-1 USTC 19305 (Sup. ct. 1984). 
1. The Seventh Circuit in Lawless, supra, 
for example, held that the attorney-
client privilege did not prevent the 
Internal Revenue Service from obtaining 
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the information that the client had 
transmitted to the attorney to enable the 
attorney to prepare the estate tax 
return. 
a. Although a distinction exists 
between (i) material that the 
attorney prepared and (ii) material 
that a client transmitted to the 
attorney, an attorney's records and 
files easily can integrate the two. 
b. The attorney should consider 
preparing records and files so that 
compliance with the rationale of 
Lawless will not force the attorney 
to disclose his work product even if 
the estate is willing to forego a 
deduction for the cost of its 
preparation. 
2. White, itself, is unclear about whether 
it presented the situation in which the 
Service's request for records was for the 
purpose of undertaking a general audit. 
a. The estate had paid the deficiency 
that resulted from the Service's 
denial of deductions for a fee and a 
commission, but the Second Circuit 
nevertheless ordered enforcement of 
the summons. 
b. The information that the Service had 
requested was not limited to that 
which might have justified the 
deductions. 
c. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit's 
opinion focused solely on the 
Service's ability independently to 
det~rmine the deductibility of the 
attorney's fee and the executor's 
commission. 
C. Percentage-Based Fees. 
Much of the support for imposition of time-
oriented fees and some of the challenges to 
deductions apparently are based partly upon an 
erroneous assertion that percentage- oriented 
fees are illegal or unreasonable, per se, as a 
matter of federal law. Cf. Goldfarb y. 
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Virginia state Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Any 
implication that percentage fees are 
unreasonable, per se, probably would be a 
shock to the many fiduciaries and attorneys 
that, consistently with the laws of the states 
in which they operate, always or often charge 
on this basis. 
Ad Hoc Challenges. 
An effective attack against the disallowance 
of an executor's.commission because it is 
based on the size of the estate might include 
a showing that most corporate fiduciaries 
render a percentage-based charge for services, 
that the disallowance solely of the commission 
of the particular fiduciary is ad hoc and 
unprincipled and that other corporate 
fiduciaries might have a significant interest 
in the dispute. 
1. The charge is based upon the rate 
schedule of the particular bank. 
2. While each of the schedules is based upon 
the size of the particular estate, each· 
generally is somewhat different as to 
amounts. 
3. Some banks consider other factors 
including, without limitation, 
complexity, special problems, expertise 
and responsibility. 
4. Each bank charges (or reserves the right 
to charge) additionally for any 
extraordinary work. 
5. This writer's experience is that the 
corporate fiduciaries with which he works 
often maintain records of time expended, 
but they generally use these records for 
internal accounting rather than for 
calculating a fee in a particular case. 
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WORKSHOP 
1. X, a person who is unknown to the lawyer, telephones 
the lawyer and says, solely, (i) (a) can the lawyer 
write a "will", or, alternatively, (b) X needs two 
wills, two living trusts, two powers of attorney for 
property management, two living wills, and (ii) what 
will it or they cost. How should ~he lawyer respond? 
2. Repeat #1, except X additionally asks if the lawyer 
will meet with X for one hour at no charge. How should 
the lawyer respond? 
3. Repeat #s 1 and 2, except X does not ask what the work 
will cost. How should the lawyer respond? 
4. Repeat #s 1, 2 and 3, except X additionally says that 
he has a "simple" situation and that his assets 
approximate $80,000 including face value of life 
insurance. How should the lawyer respond? 
5. X, a person who is unknown to the lawyer, telephones 
the lawyer, says he would like to hire the lawyer to 
plan his estate and wants to know the cost. How should 
the lawyer respond? 
6. If the lawyer wishes to charge a particular rate per 
hour for planning the estate of'a particular client but 
believes that the fee will aggregate a particular 
amount, how should the lawyer present the fee to the 
client? Should the lawyer present the fee on the basis 
of a number of dollars per hour or on the basis of the 
total fee or on the basis of both? 
QuestIons-similar to these were used for a workshop 
conducted at the Philip E. Heckerling University of Miami 
Estate Planning Institute in January, 1990. 
7. If the lawyer wishes to charge a particular number of 
dollars for planning the estate of a particular client, 
how should the lawyer present the fee to the client? 
(a) Should the lawyer render separate charges (for 
different services and documents) that aggregate 
the amount? 
(b) Alternatively, should the lawyer render a single 
charge for the amount and list (without separate 
charges) the services and documents for which the 
single charge is rendered? 
(c) If the former, should the lawyer (i) submit, in 
advance, a menu of "unbundled" services and 
products, and their costs, (ii) merely estimate, 
in advance, the aggregate fee, or (iii) not give 
any estimate in advance? 
(d) If the latter, should the lawyer estimate the fee 
in advance? 
8. Judge Y is known to limit lawyer fees for probate work 
to $85 per hour. X wants to hire the lawyer to perform 
probate work in Judge Y's jurisdiction and is willing 
to pay the lawyer's charges of (i) $250 per hour or 
(ii) Z percent of the estate's assets (which rate 
aggregates more than $85 per hour). Can the lawyer 
charge more than $85 per hour? Consider: 
(a) Agreement between X and the lawyer that the lawyer 
will perform the work at a rate of (i) $250 per 
hour or (ii) Z percent of the estate's assets 
(which rate aggregates more than $85 per hour). 
(b) "Quick" probate. 
(c) Avoidance of probate. 
(d) Charge of (i) $250 per hour·or (ii) Z percent of 
the estate's assets (which rate aggregates more 
than $85 per hour), presentation of the fee for 
approval, justification of the fee, appeal of 
adverse decision. 
9. During the audit of an estate tax return, the Internal 
Revenue Service tells the lawyer that it wishes to 
review each of the following, in the alternative: 
(a) The lawyer's time records; 
(b) All material that the executor submitted to the 
lawyer; 
(c) The lawyer's "matter" file; and 
(d) All of the lawyer's information concerning the 
matter. 
How should the lawyer respond? 
10. Repeat #9, except a probate court, not the Internal 
Revenue Service, is making the inquiry. 
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1. Where To Begin. 
a. As estate planners, we use tools of many different kinds to help our 
clients reach their estate planning goals. These tools include wills, trusts, and 
direct interests such as life estates and remainder interests. Sometimes, 
corporations have been employed when an entity was desired, often to allow 
transfers of increments of value while retaining unity of title and management 
control. But corporations tend to be somewhat rigid, and moving in and out 
of a corporate vehicle can be both difficult and expensive, and the repeal of 
the "General Utilities" doctrine in 1986 and resulting increase in tax cost of 
transferring assets out of corporations has led to an increased interest in 
partnerships for this purpose. 
b. Family estate planning often means dealing not only with an individual 
but also with a spouse and other family members. When a closely held 
business is a part of the picture, it is not unusual for other family members 
to be involved. Often the level of participation varies substantially among 
those family members who are involved in the family business. Sometimes, 
their involvement is direct, in that there is active participation in the business 
management or its operation. However, it is not unusual to find objects of 
the client's bounty who are not involved in the business at all. This can lead 
to a need to separate the value and benefit of assets from their management 
or control. In such situations, an entity between the assets and owners is 
necessary. Trusts are frequently employed, but their use is generally confined 
to investment assets. Corporations, partnerships, and, now, limited liability 
companies, are better suited to operating businesses than trusts. 
c. In determining whether an entity would be helpful in a given setting, 
it is important to focus on the client's purposes, goals and abilities. The most 
intricate and technically competent plan is useless if it does not help reach 
the client's goals. Once it is determined that the estate plan could benefit by 
the establishment of a new entity, the process of developing and implement-
ing a plan should be systematic, with careful attention being given to the 
selection of the entity, the structuring of the entity, and the implementation 
of the plan. 
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2. Overview of Partnerships. 
Partnerships are familiar organizations, with almost everyone being a partner 
in some enterprise at some time. Partnerships fall into two broad categories, 
general partnerships and limited partnerships. If the requisite formalities are 
observed, some of the partners in the organization may have their exposure 
to business risks limited in a limited partnership. If those steps are not taken, 
. the result is a general partnership, and each of the partners will have full 
responsibility for all of the obligations of the organization. 
a. General Partnerships. 
(1) General. The Uniform Partnership Act defines a general 
partnership as the association of two or more persons to carry on a business 
as co-owners for profit. Joint ventures are sometimes described as partner-
ships with a singular purpose or activity, but they are, nevertheless, 
partnerships . 
. (a) For many purposes, a general partnership is treated as a 
separate business entity; a general partnership may own its own property and 
conduct its own business in its own name. However, for other purposes, the 
partnership is treated as an aggregation of the individual partners rather than 
an independent unit in and of itself. 
(b) Due to the mixture of individual and aggregate characteris-
tics associated with partnerships, partnership law can be described as a case 
of multiple personalities. 
(2) Formation. The formation of a general partnership is relatively 
simple and often happens as a result of the conduct of the parties or other 
informal arrangement rather than by written agreement. Because of the ease 
and informality of formation, general partnerships are a popular form for 
conducting business. Generally, except for any requirements for registration 
of assumed or business names and local business licenses, no formal filing 
with any public office is required and the arrangement among the partners 
~ 
~ 
can be very simple. Partnership agreements need not be written, but written ~ 
partnership agreements are always recommended; a dear written record of 
the arrangements between the partners is strongly suggested, so that the 
rights and relationships of the partners among themselves are well defined. 
Each partnership agreement should at least address issues as term, continuity, 
management, contributions to capital, and sharing of profits and losses. 1 
.~ 
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(a) Under the Uniform Partnership Act, generous flexibility is 
allowed in the development of the governing structure for a partnership. 
Notwithstanding general rules requiring the agreement of all partners for 
many important matters, the partners may agree that those general rules be 
modified or customized to fit their particular needs. Partnership agreements 
range from very short and simple arrangements to very lengthy and highly 
technical agreements incorporating precise and detailed provisions dealing 
with matters such as governance, delegation of authority, and other matters. 
(b) Management and participation in control rights are often 
addressed in great detail; in large partnerships, ,there is likely to be some 
form of centralized management. 
(3) Control. Management authority and control in a general 
partnership is dispersed among the partners rather than centralized. Each 
partner is treated as the agent of all other partners and the partnership. 
(4) Fiduciary Duties. General partners have important duties to each 
other in connection with their partnership activities. These fiduciary-like 
obligations of good faith, loyalty, and fairness balance the broad authority 
each individual partner has to bind the other partners. These responsibilities 
also reflect the degree of trust required in order to create and operate an 
effective partnership. 
(5) Liability. A consequence of the mutual agency concept is 
unlimited liability of all partners for partnership obligations and the acts of 
the other partners. The impact of one partner's conduct on the treatment of 
other partners can be both surprising and severe. 
(6) Transferability. The interests of the partners in a general 
pat;tnership are seldom transferable with any degree of freedom. Because of 
the close relationship arising out of the mutual agency of partners, many 
events, such as the admission of a new partner, occur only with the approval 
of all partners. As a result, an interest in a general partnership is illiquid and 
cannot be sold or transferred without the approval of the other partners. 
Even in large partnerships where many management functions are centralized 
by agreement, it is unusual for partners' interests to be freely transferable. 
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(7) Continuity of Life. Although the life of a partnership may be 
extended by agreement of remaining partners, it remains finite. Dissolution 
of a partnership occurs in a variety of circumstances, such as a death of a 
partner, but dissolution does not necessarily lead to a termination of a 
partnership if the business is continued by the remaining partners. On the 
death of a partner, the decedent's estate succeeds to the decedent's interests 
in the partnership but does not become a partner. Of course, surviving 
partners have a duty to account to the successors of the deceased partner. 
Buy-sell arrangements can and are used to simplify this process and provide 
for greater certainty. 
(8) Income Taxation. Partnerships are largely transparent for federal 
income tax purposes, in that partnership income or loss is passed through the 
partnership to the respective partners based upon their agreement for sharing 
such matters. Code § 702. As noted, substantial flexibility is allowed and the 
partners may vary their respective interest in different items. 
(a) The determination of whether a state law partnership will 
be characterized as a partnership for income tax purposes is made under 
Code § 7701. In general, finding an organization to have a majority of the 
corporate characteristics set out in the Regulations results in the organization 
being treated and taxed as a corporation, even though it is a partnership 
under local law. The testing process examines the following characteristics: 
(i) centralization of management, (ii) limited liability, (iii) continuity of life, 
and (iv) free transferability of interests. Regulation § 301.7701-2. 
(b) Ordinarily, there are no tax consequences in the contribu-
tion of property to a partnership or in the distribution of property by a 
partnership to a partner. Code §§ 721 and 731. Special rules are provided 
for contributions of appreciated property, so that the inherent gain or loss in 
such property is allocated to the contributing partner, and for contributions 
of encumbered property. Code §§ 704 and 752. Special rules for accounts 
receivable and appreciated inventory are provided at Code § 751. 
(c) Their great flexibility makes partnerships a very common 
form of business organization. In cases where one partner contributes capital 
while another contributes services and the partners agree to share the income 
or loss of their venture equally, the individual accounting for capital used in 
partnerships rather than accounting for capital for the entity as a whole easily 
accommodates the arrangement. 
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(d) Within the framework of the extensive Treasury Regula-
tions dealing with allocations among partners and whether the provisions 
have substantial economic effect, profits and losses and other interests in the 
partnership may be allocated and shared among the partners in a variety of 
different ways within the same partnership. See Regulation § 1.704. 
(e) Notwithstanding the general rules that gain or loss is not 
recognized upon the contribution of property to a partnership, a shifting of 
capital contributed by one partner to the credit of a partner providing 
services looks like and is likely to be treated as compensation to the service 
partner. Regulation §1.721-1(b)(1). On the other hand, in the context of 
a family partnership, the shifting of a capital interest may be viewed as a gift. 
(9) Raising Capital. Broad mutua.lity and joint and several liability 
limit the ability of general partnerships to raise capital from unrelated 
sources. By definition, ownership of an equity interest in a general 
partnership equates with the status of a general partner. And outside 
investors generally insist that their exposure to business risks be limited to 
no more than their investment . 
. (a) To the extent adequate capital cannot be borrowed by the 
partnership, expansion of businesses organized as general partnerships must 
rely upon the income generating power of the partnership or the ability of its 
partners to fund such capital needs from personal assets or from personal 
borrowings. 
(b) Capital needs may dictate a different form of organization. 
(10) Securities. Ordinarily, securities law issues do not arise in the 
context of general partnerships, as an interest in a general partnership does 
not usually meet the tests for finding a security. 
(a) The fundamental test of whether an interest is a security 
is called the risk capital test; one statement of this definition is stated as an 
"investment made in an enterprise with the expectation of making a profit 
from the efforts of others". 
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(b) As a result of the mutual agency and the rights of all 
partners to be involved in management and control, and the resulting 
absence of separation between capital from control, an interest in a general 
partnership usually is not a security. Thus, the disclosure and registration 
requfrements of state and federal securities laws do not generally apply to 
interest in a general partnership. However, because of the broad flexibility 
allowed in partnership agreements, it is possible to tum a general partnership 
interest into a security governed by such law. 
(c) When forming a partnership with centralized management 
features and limited management participation by most partners, inclusion of 
investment representations on the part of the capital partners is recommend-
ed. 
b. Limited Partnerships. 
(1) General. Limited partnerships are a form of partnership having 
both general and limited partners. General partners retain the same mutual 
agency and broad responsibility for partnership obligations 9iscussed in the 
context of partners in general partnerships. On the other hand, limited 
partners are prohibited from participation in the management of the business 
and are not responsible for the obligations and debts of the business beyond 
their agreement to contribute capital to the partnership. 
(2) Formation. Formation of a limited partnership is more objective 
and formal than with a general partnership; formation requires the prepara-
tion and filing/recording of a certificate of limited partnership with a 
designated public office. Ordinary practice is to limit the certificate to the 
elements required by statute and to gather the substantive provisions dealing 
with the relationship among the partners, such as term, management, 
capitalization, and sharing of profits and losses in a separate limited 
partnership agreement which need not be filed or recorded. 
(3) Control. Management of a limited partnership is centralized in 
the general partner or partners, and the limited partners are not permitted 
to participate in the management of the partnership's business without losing 
their protection as limited partners. This separation of ownership and 
management is one of the principal differences between limited partnerships 
and general partnerships. Some limited participation through voting on 
major issues is generally permitted. 
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(4) Fiduciary Duties. As with general partnerships, the general 
partners in a limited partnership have important duties to each other and to 
their limited partners in connection with their partnership activities. 
Fiduciary-like obligations of good faith, loyalty, and fairness balance the 
broad authority of the general partners to bind the other partners. These 
responsibilities also reflect the degree of trust required in order to create and 
operate an effective partnership. 
(5) Liability. While the general partners in a limited partnership 
retain the same full responsibility for partnership obligations of partners in 
a general partnership, limited partners ordinarily are at risk only to the extent 
of their agreement to contribute to the partnership's capital. 
(6) Transferability. While the interests of limited partners are more 
readily transferred than is the case with general partners, free transferability 
of those interests is seldom allowed in order to protect the income tax status 
of the partnership. As is the case with general partnerships, free transferabil-
ity of the interests of general partners in a limited partnership is rarely 
provided. 
(7) Continuity of Life. Although the life of a limited partnership may 
be extended by agreement, its life remains finite. Continuation of a limited 
partnership by the terms of the agreement does not necessarily indicate an 
unlimited life. 
(8) Income Taxation. Like general partnerships, limited partnerships 
are largely transparent for federal income tax purposes. 
(a) While most limited partnerships organized under local law 
will be characterized as partnerships for income tax purposes, the character-
ization for tax purposes of a limited partnership can be a closer question than 
with a general partnership and it is possible to be too clever in drafting. 
(i) Because only the general partners participate in 
control, centralization of management is present in a limited partnership. 
Regulation § 301.7701-2(c). 
(ii) Limited liability for this purpose does not exist even 
with a limited partnership if any partner is personally liable for the 
partnership's obligations. Regulation § 301.7701-2(d). Use of a shell 
corporation owned by the limited partners as the general partner in a limited 
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partnership may change the result and yield a finding of limited liability. 
Regulation § 301.7701-2(d)(2). 
(iii) Limited partnerships formed under the Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act generally lack continuity of life for these purposes. 
Regulation § 301.7701-2(b). 
(iv) Where the limited partnership agreement restricts 
the transferability of limited partner interests by not allowing the transferee 
the benefits of being a limited partner in the absence of the approval of the 
other partners, free transferability of interests should not be found to exist. 
Regulation § 301.77-1-2(e) 
(b) Once characterized as a partnership, the tax attributes of 
a limited partnership are much the same as for a general partnership. 
(9) Raising Capital. The separation of ownership or capital interests 
from management and liability works in favor of the limited partnership when 
it comes to raising additional capital. The standard requirement of outside 
investors that their risks be limited to their invested capital can generally be 
met using a limited partnership. 
(a) In some businesses, notably the operation of rental real 
estate and others which can easily be operated through hired management, 
the limited partnership form of conducting business has been used often due 
to the transparency of the entity for income tax purposes while retaining 
liability protection for investors uninvolved in management. 
(b) However, excesses in earlier decades with syndicated real 
estate limited partnerships have led many to dislike the limited partnership 
form for doing business. 
(10) Securities. At least as to the limited partners, the risk capital test 
addressed earlier is met in the case of a limited partnership, as the limited 
partners by definition make their investment seeking a profit through the 
efforts of the general partners. As a result, federal and state securities laws 
generally do apply to those interests and, unless an exemption is found, 
limited partnership interests are required to be registered under applicable 
securities laws before they are sold. Note that exemption from these 
registration requirements is not an exemption from the disclosure and anti-
fraud rules of state or federal securities laws. 
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(a) The most often relied upon exemptions from the registration 
requirements of federal securities laws include the intrastate exemption and 
private placement exemption. State securities laws generally provide similar 
exemptions from registration requirements. For example, Tennessee 
securities laws exempt placements involving $100,000 or less and placements 
to 15 or fewer persons for investment purposes from the otherwise mandato-
ry requirement for registration. 
(b) Inclusion of investment representations on the part of the 
limited partners is· recommended. 
(c) Once an interest is characterized as a security, the anti-
fraud provisions of the various securities laws must also be addressed in 
connection with the sale of any limited partnership interest, as there are no 
exemptions from those requirements. 
3. Making the Choice. 
a. The decision to use an entity and the choice of which form of entity to 
use in the context of estate planning is a highly subjective process. Some 
considerations in selecting the entity are: 
(1) When the nature of the assets or business or other reasons 
suggest a need for limited liability, use of an entity is indicated. If ownership 
is already separated from management, a corporation may be suitable. 
However, if the client and! or family members are directly involved in 
operations, a partnership may also prove suitable. Low risk investment 
activities and passive operations with readily insurable risks favor selection 
of more flexible partnerships over corporations. When a trust is involved, a 
limited partnership or corporation is generally indicated to separate the 
fiduciary from operations. If the business is already operating in corporate 
form, a limited partnership with the owner/donor as the general partner may 
be indicated as a means of facilitating gifts without loss of control. 
(2) Separation of ownership from control can be achieved with trusts 
and corporations as well as with limited partnerships. However, while trusts 
are very effective when funded with investment assets, they tend to be 
cumbersome vehicles for the operation of a business. Also, retention of 
valuable interests by the donor yields adverse estate tax consequences. With 
corporations, a shift in voting control can result from a systematic gift making 
program involving the transfer of stock. Limited partnerships allow control 
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to be lodged with the general partner(s) without regard to the amount of 
value shifted through transfers of limited partner interests. A limited 
partnership can also be useful where it is important to vest control of the 
family business in one group or to isolate others from management while 
providing them with the benefits of ownership. 
(3) It may be necessary to fragment value in order to engage in a 
regular gift making program. When a client's business is most of the client's 
net worth, or when the growth of the business hampers available liquidity, 
the ability to engage in a routine gift making program is reduced. Organiza-
tion of the business into limited partnership form provides the means to make 
gifts without impacting liquidity or control. 
( 4) Capital structure and income allocation goals of the client are 
important factors to consider. Within a class, stockholder interests in a 
corporation are necessarily uniform. However, the interests of each partner 
in capital and income can be tailored to fit specific needs or circumstances. 
Some limited shifting of income may be achieved within the limitations of the 
family partnership rules; retention of income for the donor partner through 
employment and similar arrangements can provide further benefit. The 
flexibility of individual capital accounting in partnerships facilitates contribu-
tions and distributions of property by partners. 
(5) Protecting operating assets from creditors of a participant can be 
important. Creditors of a limited partner are in much the same position as 
the creditors of a shareholder; distributions made can be reached but the 
creditor generally has no ability to reach the assets and properties of the 
entity. Limited partnership agreements typically place tight restrictions upon 
the transfer of general partner interests, but the protection for assets of a 
transferor general partner is not as complete. 
(6) Basis and other income tax aspects on formation, operation, and 
termination of an entity vary widely between corporations and partnerships. 
Most important among those differences is the "inside tax" upon the 
disposition of assets by a corporation, whether from a sale or upon a distribu-
tion to shareholders or at liquidation, without regard to the "outside" basis 
of the equity owner in the shares. Upon the death of a partner, the step up 
in the "outside" basis of the partner can be shifted to assets without an 
"inside tax". 
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(7) Without any doubt, the client's ability and willingness to observe 
the requisite fonnalities and details of the recommended plan is an important 
factor in selecting an entity. Some clients simply don't belong in the middle 
of a complicated entity of any kind. Careful explanations can assist the 
unfamiliar client and be the difference between success and failure. Licensing 
requirements and the dictates of existing loan and other contracts should be 
carefully reviewed to discern their impact on planning alternatives. 
(8) Reduction in estate settlement costs can be a significant benefit 
of using an entity in estate planning. Bringing multiple assets under a single 
umbrella can greatly relieve the executor. When a trUst is desirable for other 
reasons, the use of a limited partnership for the ownership of an operating 
business can separate the difficulties of managing that business from an 
otherwise reluctant fiduciary. . 
(9) Obtaining discounts in valuing interests from the value of the 
underlying assets is an important aspect of estate planning for clients. 
Discounts increase the leverage of gift making, but don't forget they are 
allowed because they are real. With the bunching of taxes at the second 
death for a married couple, the ability to shift increments of ownership at 
reduced value can result in significant tax savings even when the discount is 
small. 
b. When considering use of a family partnership as an estate planning 
tool, the basic characteristics of partnerships should be considered along with 
these factors and more traditional estate planning goals in fonnulating a plan. 
Selected Partnership Income Tax Issues. 
a. Family Partnership Rules. The provisions of Code § 704(e) were 
originally intended to prevent the shifting of income among family members 
at a time when income tax rates were substantially higher than today. These 
rules are applied to detennine the validity of the partnership on a partner-by-
partner basis for income tax purposes. The application of these requirements 
and transactions among family members may receive close scrutiny. 
Regulation § 1.704-1 (e) (1) (iii). 
(1) While the transfer of a naked interest in the profits of a 
partnership may not be respected, a person holding an interest in partnership 
capital will~recognized as a partner for income tax purposes if capital is a 
material factor in producing the partnership's income. Code § 704(e)(1). 
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(2) Capital is a material factor in the production of a partnership's 
income if a substantial part of the partnership's gross income is derived from 
capital employed in the business, whether in the form of inventory, equip-
ment, or plant. Regulation § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iv). 
(3) When capital in not. a material factor in the production of the 
partnership's income, allocation of partnership income to non-participants 
may be challenged under the provision requiring income to be allocated to 
those who earn it. Regulation § 1.704-1(e)(1)(i). 
(4) Under the Regulations, separate capital accounts are established 
for each of the partners. Beginning with a zero balance, these capital 
accounts are then credited with contributions made by a partner to the 
partnership's capital and with the partner's share of partnership profits; the 
capital account is also debited with the amount of distributions made to the 
partner and with the partner's share of partnership losses. Regulation § 
1. 704-1 (b) (2) (iv) (b). 
(a) By providing in the family partnership agreement for the 
transfer of a proportionate amount of capital with any transfer of an interest 
in the partnership, proportionality between interests in the partnership's 
capital and its profits can be maintained. 
(b) Purchases of partnership interests by one "family" member 
from another are treated as if acquired by the purchaser by gift from the 
seller. Code § 704(e)(3). 
(c) For these purposes, "family" includes a person's spouse, 
ancestors, and lineal descendants. Code § 704(e)(3). 
(5) Even if the foregoing tests are satisfied, a donor's retention of 
excessive control can result in the partnership not being recognized as to the 
affected partner. Regulation § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii) provides a listing and 
discussion of various factors to be considered in judging whether a donee is 
to be recognized as a partner. 
(6) When the subject of the gift is an interest in a limited partner-
ship, restrictions and limitations consistent with those applicable to other 
limited partners and with those found in ordinary business relationships 
should not prevent recognition of the donee as a partner. Regulation § 
1.704-1(e)(2)(ix). 
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b. Disguised Sales. Under Code § 707(a), a partner may engage in 
transactions with a partnership and obtain the same tax treatment that would 
be obtained without the relationship. Thus, a partner may sell or lease 
property to his own partnership and be treated as a seller or landlord. 
However, in the context of an estate planning partnership, properties are 
usually contributed to the partnership and sale treatment is neither intended 
nor desired. As noted earlier, contributions of property by a partner to a 
partnership and the distribution of property by a partnership to a partner 
generally are non-recognition transactions for income tax purposes. 
(1) In general, Code § 704(c) directs that any unrealized apprecia-
tion at the time of the contribution of property to a partnership is to be 
suspended and then in effect specially allocated to the contributing partner 
when the partnership disposes of the property . 
. (2) And, notwithstanding the general rule for non-recognition of 
gain or loss on the contribution of property to a partnership, the distribution 
of contributed property by a partnership within 5 years of its contribution to 
a partner other than the partner who made the original contribution may be 
treated as a sale of the property by the original contributing partner at its 
then fair market value. Code § 704(c)(1). 
c. Investment Company. The general rule of non-recognition of gain or 
loss by a partner upon the contribution property to a partnership is also not 
available where the transfer is to an investment company. Code § 721(b). 
(1) To be an investment company for these purposes, more than 
80% of the partnership's non-cash and non-debt assets must be readily 
marketable stocks or securities or interests in regulated investment companies 
or REITs. Regulation §1.351-1(c)(1)(ii). 
(2) To be a transfer to an investment company, the transfer must 
also result in diversification of the transferring partner's interests to be denied 
non-recognition treatment. Regulation §1.351-1(c)(1)(i). Transfers of 
identical assets do not result in diversification. Regulation §1.351-1(c)(5). 
This has led to the suggestion that when marketable securities are involved 
in the formation of a family partnership, the diversification element can be 
avoided by pre-contribution gifts of the same securities to the other partners, 
who then contribute the securities to the partnership. 
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d. Taxable Year. Special rules establishing the taxable year of a 
partnership are set out in Code § 706. 
(1) When planning for any transfer of an interest in a partnership, 
careful attention must be paid to special rules for closing a partnership's 
taxable year with respect to a partner and the rules for allocating partnership 
items between the transferor and transferee. Code § 706(c). 
(2) Note that the taxable year of a partnership does not close due to 
the death of a partner. Code § 706(c)(1). Thus, partnership income or loss 
for the entire taxable year of the partner's death will be reflected on the 
decedent's estate income tax return and not on the partner's final individual 
return. Regulation § 1.706-1 (c) (3). ' 
5. The Special Valuation Rules of Chapter 14. 
a. Code § 2701. Gifts are frequently contemplated as a part of an 
estate plan. That is especially true in those estate plans which invoke the use 
of a family partnership as a tool, as the reason for doing so is often to 
facilitate making "gifts by the slice". 
(1) Generally, whether a gift has been made is determined under 
Code § 2511 and the value of a gift is determined under Code § 2512 by 
reference to the value of the interest transferred to the donee. However, 
when the subject of the gift is an interest in a partnership and the transfer 
is to a "member of the family", the application of the special rules of Code § 
2701 must be considered. 
(2) The provisions of Code § 2701 are directed at partnerships which 
have been structured to allow the shift of future growth while "freezing" the 
value of the interest retained by the donor partner at a fixed amount. 
(a) Such "freeze" partnerships are structured with preferred 
or senior interests and common interests. Like in the case of their corporate 
counterparts, the preferred interests may provide for preferential distributions 
in a fixed amount, which mayor may not be cumulative, and for a priority 
claim on the distribution of assets at liquidation. Such interests may also 
include the right to cause the interest to be redeemed upon certain events. 
These "senior" interests tend to depress the current value of the junior or 
common interests, allowing such junior interests to be given to other, usually 
younger, family members at a reduced value. 
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(b) The purposes of Code § 2701 are accomplished by 
preventing the use of unreasonably low valuations of such transfers through 
a mandated subtractive valuation methodology. Regulation § 25.2701-3(b). 
In simplified form, the value of a gift subject to Code § 2701 is determined 
. by first valuing the interests in the partnership held by the transferor and 
then subtracting the value of certain qualified retained interests after the gift 
is made; all retained interests other than certain qualified interests are valued 
at zero, increasing the value of the interest transferred to the donee. Code 
§ 2701(c)(3). 
(3) By using two distinct definitions of various family members, the 
application of Code § 2701 is limited to transfers by the transferor to a 
member of the same or a lower generation as the transferor, "member of the 
family", in which a member of the same or a higher generation as the 
transferor, "applicable family member", is left with an "applicable retained 
interest". 
(a) "Members of the family" includes the transferor's spouse, 
lineal descendants of the transferor or the transferor's spouse, and the 
spouses of such descendants. Code § 2701(e)(1). 
(b) "Applicable family member" is separately defined to include 
the transferor's spouse, ancestors of the transferor and transferor's spouse, 
and the spouses of such ancestors. Code § 2701(e)(2). 
(c) In general terms, an "applicable retained interest" is a 
senior equity interest, involving either a liquidation, put, call, or conversion 
right or a distribution right. 
(4) Notwithstanding the complexity of these prOVISIons, the 
exceptions to the application of Code § 2701 provide relief to many family 
partnerships. 
(a) Though not usually of significance in the context of a 
family partnership, exception is provided if either the transferred interest or 
the retained interest is readily marketable on an established securities market. 
Code § 2701(a)(2)(A). 
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(b) Exception is made when the interest retained by the donor 
partner is of the same class as the transferred interest. Code § 2701(a)(2)-
(B). Thus, gifts of limited partner interests by a partner who holds limited 
partner interests after the transfer are excluded from Code § 2701. 
(c) Exception is also made when the interest retained by the 
donor partner is proportionately the same as the interest transferred. Code 
§ 2701(a)(2)(C). In applying this exception, the Code directs that non-
lapsing differences in management and limitations on liability be ignored. As 
the principal differences between general and limited partner interests are 
their differing rights as to management and limitations on liability, the effect 
is to except from the application of Code § 2701 those straight partnerships 
having only general and ordinary limited partners. Regulation § 25.2701-
1(c)(3). 
(5) To balance the impact should Code § 2701 apply, provision is 
made for appropriate adjustments to be made to prevent double taxation 
upon the later transfer of a retained interest artificially valued at zero. Code 
§ 2701(e)(6). 
b. Lapsing Rights. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 14, the Tax Court 
allowed a substantial valuation discount for estate tax purposes of a 
partnership interest where the partnership agreement provided that the 
decedent's right to cause the liquidation of the partnership lapsed at his 
death. Estate of Harrison, 52 TCM 1306 (1987). 
(1) Code § 2704 now directs that the lapse of voting or liquidation 
rights is to be treated as a gift or transfer at death if the holder of the right 
at the time of its lapse and such holder's family control the entity before and 
after the lapse. Code § 2704(a)(1). 
(a) In the case of a family-controlled partnership, the lapse of 
voting or liquidation rights of one partner arising from an amendment to a 
partnership agreement would be treated as a gift. 
(b) Members of the family for this purpose are defined to 
include the holder's spouse, ancestors and descendants of the holder or the 
holder's spouse, siblings of the holder or the holder's spouse, and any spouse 
of any such ancestor, descendant, or sibling. Code § 2704(c)(2). 
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(c) As under Code § 2701, control in the case of a partnership 
is defined as a 50% or larger interest in partnership capital or profits or, in 
the case of a limited partnership, any interest as a general partner. 
(2) The value of the transfer is to be the value of the interest 
immediately before the lapse reduced by its value immediately after the lapse. 
Code § 2704(a)(2). As a result, a partnership agreement provision convert-
ing a general partner's interests in a partnership at death to a limited interest 
with reduced voting and! or reduced liquidation rights, would not provide any 
reduction in value for estate or generation-skipping transfer tax purposes. 
(3) Note the grant of broad rule making authority to apply this 
treatment to other restrictions. Code § 2704(a)(3). 
c. Valuation Adjustments. Transfer tax schemes are generally based upon 
the application of a progressive rate structure to the fair market value of the 
interests transferred. Code §§ 2512 and 2031. And, the valuation process 
often relies upon comparisons to transfers of similar assets between other 
persons, whether that marketplace is large, such as with listed stock, or much 
smaller as with real estate. 
(1) Discounts for minority interests are allowed in order to properly 
reflect the impact of fragmenting ownership upon the value of an asset as a 
whole. 
(2) Premiums have been accorded to interests in corporations which, 
even though representing less than 100%, constituted control. Estate of 
Chenoweth v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1577 (1987). 
(3) Discounts for lack of marketability are allowed in order to 
properly reflect the impact upon the value of an asset of restricting the 
marketplace for its disposition. 
( 4) Reversing a long held position, the IRS now allows minority 
discounts in transfers without regard to the family relationship of the donees. 
In a transaction where the donor gave a 20% interest in the entity to each of 
his five children, the interests of the donees were not aggregated and a 
minority discount was allowed for each of the five gifts. Rev. Rul. 93-12, IRB 
1993-7, 13. 
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(a) Although Rev. Rul. 93-12 involved corporate shares, it 
should apply equally well in the case of gifts of partnership interests. 
(b) Note the Rev. Rul. 93-13 is also a two-edged sword, 
effectively reducing the amount of a deductible transfer, such as a bequest 
otherwise qualifying for a marital or charitable deduction, when the gift is 
funded with a minority interest. TAM 9403005. 
6. Control Related Issues. 
a. Present Interest Exclusion. Concern has been expressed about whether 
the gift of a limited interest in a limited partnership qualifies for the present 
interest exclusion under Code § 2503 when the donor is a general partner. 
(1) In LTR 9131006, the IRS held that when the donor does not 
retain any dominion or control over the limited interest, the gift is complete 
and qualifies for the annual exclusion even when the donor remains a general 
partner. 
(2) The same result was reached in LTR 9415007. 
b. Retained Powers. Concern has also been expressed about whether a 
transferred limited interest in. a limited partnership would be includible in the 
donor general partner's estate under Code § 2036 or § 2038 on the basis of 
retained control in the donor's capacity as general partner. Citing u.s. v. 
Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), and referring to the fiduciary duties of a 
general partner, in LTRs 9131006 and 9415007 the IRS held that the 
interests transferred were not subject to Code § 2036 or § 2038 and, thus, 
that the transferred limited partner interests remained outside the donor's 
estate at death. 
7. The Family Partnership. 
a. Ethics. As with any estate planning matter, careful attention 
should be focused upon all applicable ethical considerations. By definition, 
each situation where a partnership might be considered in the context of 
estate planning will involve at least two partners. Identification of the client 
can be difficult in these circumstances. While the difficulties may be no more 
than ordinarily encountered as long as the only partners are husband and 
wife, once interests are given to others, the complexities can escalate 
dramatically. It is suggested that at a minimum each person involved should 
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be provided with a written description of the plan and transactions and of the 
potential for future conflict. 
b. Implementation. Once developed, implementation of the plan should 
take into account the client's goals and the outcome of considering the 
various planning factors noted earlier. Documentation should be complete 
and all necessary formalities should be followed. 
(1) Exposition of the principle goals and purposes of the plan in the 
preamble or recital portion of the partnership agreement will not only assist 
the client to keep these factors in mind but also will help establish the 
business purpose of the transaction. 
(2) Structure the provisions for allocating income and loss among 
the partners with a view to Code § 704, both as to "substantial economic 
effect" and as to the family partnership rules of Code § 704(e). 
(3) Consider restrictions and other provisions needed to implement 
the client's intent as to matters such as the circumstances and method for 
removal of a partner, rights of first refusal and other restrictions on 
disposition of interests in the partnership, and management. 
(4) Determine to what extent outside appraisals are desirable and 
make recommendations to client. 
(5) Carefully review all documents for compliance with local 
requirements and to assure that the entity created is indeed a partnership, 
both under local rules and for income tax purposes. 
c. Follow-up. Once organized, follow through with all necessary 
conveyances to the partnership. In the event of gifts, gift tax valuation and 
return requirements should be addressed. 
d.· Caveat. Family partnerships have received a great deal of attention 
in recent years. Articles have appeared in Business Week, Forbes, and other 
business publications in addition to increasing attention in professional 
publications and programs. This atmosphere leads me to suggest that careful 
attention be paid by the practitioner to basics in each family partnership, 
because the Internal Revenue Service will be doing just that. For example, 
remembering that partnerships are based upon business and profit purposes 
and the recital of those purposes and generalized goals in the agreement may 
E - 19 
be wise steps in the event the client taxpayer is called upon to demonstrate 
the business purpose behind formation of the entity. Such care should go far 
in avoiding the result in Estate of Murphy where the Tax Court held that 
transactions with no purpose or effect other than their tax impact should be 
disregarded for those purposes. Estate of Mm:phy, 60 TCM 645 (1990). 
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FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF OPERATING AS A LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY 
Charles J. Lavelle, Esq., Greenebaum Doll & McDonald and 
Lady E. Booth, Esq., Ogden Newell & Welch 
I. INTRODUCTION TO CLASSIFICATION ISSUES 
The structure and usefulness of a Limited Liability 
Company ("LLC") is usually dependent upon the determination 
that it will be treated as a partnership under federal tax 
law. Therefore, a practitioner must be familiar with the 
rules governing classification in order to structure an LLC 
tha t meets the needs of the owners without unwittingly 
triggering corporate taxation. 
The Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") recognizes and 
provides rule for the taxation of four general categories of 
taxpayers: 
a) Individuals;l 
b) Corporations (which includes "associations taxable as 
corporations") ; 2 
c) Partnerships;3 and 
1 
2 
3 
I.R.C. Subchapters A and B. 
I.R.C. Subchapter C. 
loR.C. Subchapter K. 
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d) Trusts and Estates. 4 
Entities that do not clearly fall into one of these categories 
are classified to fit within one of these categories and taxed 
accordingly. 
The classification rules are embodied in the "Kintner" 
regulations. 5 These regulations distinguish between 
structures by reference to six characteristics: 
1) Associates; 
2) An objective to carryon a business and divide the 
gains thereof; 
3) Limited liability; 
4) Free transferability; 
5) Continuity of life; and 
6) Centralized management. 
Under the Kintner regulations, corporations and 
partnerships are deemed to share two of these characteristics: 
associates and an objective to carryon a business and divide 
the gains thereof. 6 Thereafter, in order to distinguish a 
partnership from an association taxed as a corporation, the 
structure is reviewed to determine the number of the four 
remaining characteristics that it bears. In a purely 
4 I.R.C. Subchapter J. 
5 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1) et seq. 
6 Treas. Reg. § 301. 7701-2 (a) (2). 
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mechanical test, if the structure bears more than two of these 
four characteristics, it will be classified as an association 
taxable as a corporation. 7 If, on the other hand, the 
structure has two or fewer of these characteristics, it will 
be classified as a partnership.8 Under this formulation, no 
characteristic is given greater weight than any other 
characteristic in the classification process. 9 
Within these broad outlines, it is necessary to 
understand what particular facts will and will not give rise 
to these characteristics. For that understanding, it is 
important to appreciate the environment in which the Kintner 
regulations were drafted. 
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE KINTNER REGULATIONS 
Throughout the 1940's and 50's, professionals were 
forbidden by statutes and professional rules from 
incorporating. However, during this same time frame, 
professionals sought to utilize tax favored employee benefit 
plans that were restricted to corporations .10 As such, 
7 
8 
9 
1. 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (3). 
Treas. Reg. § 301. 7701-2 (a) (3). 
Larson v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq. 1979-1 C.B. 
10 "The urge to incorporate personal service enterprises 
generally reflected the desire to take advantage of Code 
provisions that granted more generous deductions or other tax 
allowances for corporate employee benefit plans than for 
similar plans created by self-employed individuals." BITTKER 
F-3 
professionals sought to create structures which would be 
viewed as corporations for tax purposes, but would not be 
state law corporations which would run afoul of those 
professional rules and regulations. The Service 
unsuccessfully fought a series of ~ourt battles to treat these 
structures as partnerships, eventually culminating in Uni ted 
States v. Kintner.11 In Kintner, a group of physicians formed 
an unincorporated association with sufficient corporate 
characteristics to, under the prevailing tax law, cause it to 
be classified as a corporation. The Service sought to 
classify the association as a partnership but was unsuccessful 
at the trial and appellate levels. Unwilling to accept this 
loss and those which had preceded it, the IRS refused to 
acquiesce in the Kintner ruling. 12 
A year later, still without acquiescing in Kintner, the 
Service stated that so-called "Kintner associations" would be 
classified under the "usual test," and that a subsequent 
revenue ruling would further explain the "usual test. "13 The 
& EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS. i 
2.06 
11 216 F.2d 4018 (9th Cir. 1954), aff'g, 107 F.Supp. 97 
(D.Mont. 1952). 
12 Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 C.B. 598, obsolete by Rev. 
Rul. 72-92, 1972-1 C.B. 407. 
13 Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 C.B. 886. 
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promised revenue ruling was never issued; rather, the Kintner 
"regulations were proposed. 14 
Due to the environment in which they were drafted, these 
regulations demonstrate a clear bias in favor of partnership 
classification. This bias is demonstrated by the.need for a 
preponderance of the corporate characteristics in order for a 
structure to be classified as an association taxable' as a 
corpor a tion. 15 As limited liability can be obtained· only 
through a state organizational statute, an unincorporated 
entity could obtain corporate classification only if the 
association had continuity of life, free transferability of 
interests and centralized management. The response of 
professionals seeking to be recognized as corporations was 
largely to abandon the use of so-called "Kintner 
associations," instead persuading state legislatures to 
authorize the organization of professional service 
corporations. 16 
14 T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409. 
15 As observed by Judge Dawson in Larson, "I think the 
current regulations were drafted for the purpose of limiting 
the ability of a partnership or other entity to qualify as a 
corporation for tax purposes. In fact, it might even be said 
that the [Kintner] regulations are weighed against 
qualification for corporate status." 66 T.C. at 187 (italics 
in original) . 
16 McKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND 
PARTNERS <][ 3. 06 [ 1] . 
F-5 
III. LLCs.AND THE KINTNER REGULATIONS 
The first LLC statute passed by Wyoming in 1977 with the 
express intention that LLCs be taxed as partnerships. This 
objective was dealt a near death blow in 1980 when the 
Treasury Department proposed revisions to the Kintner 
regulations that would classify as a corporation any structure 
that enjoyed limited liability.17 DUring the pendency of this 
proposal, Florida passed a second LLC statute in 1982. In 
1983 the Treasury Department withdrew the proposed amendments, 
and announced a reexamination of the test used to classify 
unincorporated businesses. 18 Further development of the LLC 
languished until 1988 when the Service announced that it would 
not revise the classification methodology,19 and issued Revenue 
Ruling 88-76,20 confirming that Wyoming LLCs would be taxed as 
partnerships. 
For several years thereafter, the Service issued no 
binding rulings on the tax classifications of LLCs. Then, 
beginning in early 1993, the Service began issuing a series of 
addi tional revenue rulings addressing LLCs formed under a 
17 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a), 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 
(Nov. 17, 1980). 
18 Ann. 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 31 (January 10, 1983). 
19 Ann. 88-118, 1988-38 I.R.B. 26 (September 19, 1988). 
20 1988-2 C.B. 360. 
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variety of state statutes. 21 In addition, the Service has also 
issued numerous private letter rulings on the issue of whether 
or not a particular LLC will qualify for partnership 
qualification. 
Currently, the classification dispute has shifted its 
focus from whether an LLC can be taxed as a partnership to 
what facts and circumstances will or will not give rise to the 
existence of a particular Kintner characteristic. 
A. LIMITED LIABILITY 
As limited liability characteristic is the centerpiece of 
each LLC statute, there is no question that it is present in 
an LLC. 
It should be noted that the personal liability of an 
individual for· his or hers own acts does not support an 
argument that the LLC on whose behalf that individual was 
21 Virginia, Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-1 C.B. 227 (January 19, 
1993); Colorado, Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229 (January 19, 
1993); Nevada, Rev. Rul. 93-30, 1993-1 C.B. 231 (April 19, 
1993); Delaware, Rev. Rul. 93-:-38, 1993-1 C.B. 233 (May 24, 
1993); Illinois, Rev. Rul. 93-49, 1993-2 C.B. 308 CJuly , 
1993); West Virginia, Rev. Rul. 93-50, 1993-2 C.B. 310 (July 
19, 1993); Florida, Rev. Rul. 93-53, 1993-2 C.B. 312 (August 
2, 1993); Rhode Island, Rev. Rul. 93-81, 1993-2 C.B. 314 
(November 29, 1993); Utah, Rev. Rul. 93-91, 1993-2 C.B. 316 
(December 20,1993); Oklahoma, Rev. Rul. 93-92, 1993-2 C.B. 
318 (December 27, 1993); Arizona, Rev. Rul. 93-93, 1993-2 C.B. 
321 (December 27, 1993); Louisiana, Rev. Rul. 94-5, 1994-2 
LR.B. 21 (January 10, 1994); Alabama, Rev. Rul. 94-6, 1994-3 
I.R.B. 11 (January 18, 1994). 
F-7 
acting lacks limited liability. As defined in the Kiptner 
regulations, limited liability exists when the personal assets 
of the members are not liable to make up any shortfall of a 
claim against the entity and its assets. 22 The personal 
liability of the party whose actions or inactions give rise 
to a claim is separate and distinct from the liability of the 
entity (and its owners) to the injured party.23 
Contractual agreements, as contrasted with local law, to 
limit a creditor's recourse to the assets of the entity or to 
its insurance coverage do not give rise to limited liability.24 
B. FREE TRANSFERABILITY OF INTERESTS 
Free. transferability of interests exists if a member, 
without the consent of the other members, may transfer to a 
non-member all of the attributes of ownership of an interest 
in the entity.25 Free transferability is lacking, on the other 
hand, if a member may transfer to a non-member only the 
22 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1). 
23 Rev. Rul. 93-91 (personal liability of professional 
for his or her own performance does not abrogate presence of 
limited liability); Rev. Rul. 93-93 (personal liability of 
professional for his or her own performance or of that of 
those under his or her supervision or direction does not 
abrogate presence of limited liability) . 
24 
25 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 7951006 (August 21, 1979). 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (e) (1). 
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prospective economic rights of membership, but not the 
managerial rights. If the transfer of such managerial rights 
may be accomplished ~ with the approval of the other 
members, free transferability is lacking. 
1. The "Separate Interest" Test 
The separate interest test examines the degree to which 
the owners of an entity are independent of one another, that 
independence adding substance to the contingent nature of the 
vote o~ transferability. Where the relationship among members 
is overlapping to the degree that restrictions on . 
transferability are illusory, free transferability is deemed 
to be present. 
The separate interest test was first recognized in Rev. 
Rul. 77-214,26 wherein the Service considered the 
classification of a GmbH formed by two subsidiaries of a 
single corporate parent. The Service found that as one entity 
controlled the outcome of a vote on transferability and 
continuity, and as limited liability was indisputedly present, 
the GmbH should be classified as corporation. 
There is some question as to whether the separate 
interest test will be applied to LLCs. Although the Service 
has ruled that domestic and foreign entities are classified 
26 1977-1 C.B. 408. 
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under the same rules,27 in Private Letter Ruling 9404021 
(November 1, 1993), the Service held that an LLC lacks free 
transferability even though its sole members are two 
corporations, one the wholly owned subsidiary of the other. 
This ruling appears to conflict with Revenue Ruling 77-214. 
Revenue Ruling 77-214 was modified in Revenue Ruling 93-
428 to delete its application to continuity of life, and may 
be further restricted by the Service. 
2. Restricting the Right to Deny Consent 
The right to deny consent to a transfer may be restricted 
only at the risk of supporting a finding of free 
transferability of interests. In Larson v. Comm'r, the Tax 
Court found free transferability where the consent of a 
general partner to the transfer of a limited partnership 
interest could not be unreasonably withheld. 29 
3. Who Must Approve a Transfer 
It is not necessary that the approval of a transfer be by 
the entirety of the membership. Rather, it has been held 
proper to vest the authority to approve or disapprove a 
transfer in a group smaller than the entire membership, such 
27 Rev. Rul. 73-254, 1973-1 C.B. 613; Rev. Rul. 88-8, 
1988-1 C.B. 40; Gen. Couns. Mem. 36910 (November 4, 1976). 
28 
29 
1993-1 C.B. 225 (January 19, 1993). 
66 T.C. at 183. 
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as a majority in interest of the members. 30 The approval or 
disapproval must be by the members; this power may not be 
delegated to non-members. 
4 • Rights of First Refusal 
A right of first refusal in either the entity or other 
members to purchase an interest offered to a third party is 
not in and of itself a sufficient restriction to avoid free 
transferability. Rather, such a right of first refusal is 
defined in the Kintner regulations as "a modified form of free 
transferability. ,,31 Regardless of its "modified" form, the 
presence of this characteristic with two others will give rise 
to preponderance of the characteristics, leading to the 
treatment of the LLC as an association taxable as a 
corporation. 32 
Therefore, while a right of first refusal may exist in an 
LLC, it must be structured so that the failure of the entity 
or the other members to buy the interest will not authorize 
the current member to transfer anything more than the 
prospective economic rights of membership to the third party. 
30 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9210019 (December 6, 1991); Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 9218078 (January 31, 1992) . 
31 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(e) (2), -2(g) Examples 4, 5 
and 6. 
32 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8828022 (April 13, 1988) (right of 
first refusal in other stake holder in foreign limited 
liability company constituted a modified form of free 
transferability) . 
F -11 
5. Transfers Pursuant to state Law 
Depending on their nature, transfers pursuant to state 
law mayor may not give rise to free transferability of 
interests. For example, transfers pursuant to the laws of 
descent and distribution are permitted without giving rise to 
free transferability. 33 However, a transfer of an interest 
pursuant to a merger or consolidation of a member to the 
entity surviving the merger or consolidation will give rise to 
free transferability. 34 
6. What Interest Must be Restricted 
In order to avoid free transferability, it is not 
necessary that every interest be restricted. In Revenue 
Procedure 92-33,35 the Service took the position that, for 
advance ·ruling purposes, free transferability is absent if at 
least 20% of the interests are subject to restrictions on 
transferability. To date the Service is not responded to an 
effort by an LLC to use this provision. 
33 See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9253013 (September 30, 
1992) • 
34 Gen. Couns. Mem. 38012 (July 13, 1979) (the ability 
of one corporate member of a business trust to substitute 
another corporate member by merging the former into the latter 
or consolidating the former with the latter will constitute a 
modified form of free transferability.). 
35 1992-1 C.B. 782. 
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C. CONTINUITY OF LIFE 
For purposes of tax classification, continuity of life is 
lacking if the structure is subject to dissolution upon a 
"change in the relationship between its members as determined 
under local law. ,,36 An alteration in the relationship that the 
members may come about as a consequence of the "death, 
insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expUlsion of 
any member. ,,37 While such a disassociation may bring about a 
dissolution of the LLC, the LLC may be reconstituted with a 
new member relationship, permitting it to continue to carryon 
its business. The contingent nature of the vote to 
reconstitute and continue the business is the cornerstone of 
the continuity of life analysis. 
1. Maximum Duration 
LLC organizational statutes either permit or require the 
LLC to have a maximum period of duration. In early LLC 
statutes there is a mandatory durational limit of thirty 
years. It would appear these provisions were included as a 
fail safe measure to insure that the LLC would lack continuity 
of life. However, such a provision is not necessary, and in 
fact does not contribute to the argument that there is not 
continuity of life. An organization that has a limited life, 
36 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (b) (3). 
37 Treas. Reg. § 301. 7701-2 (b) (1) . 
F - 13 
but whose life may not be shortened by a dissolution brought 
by a member, will have continuity of life. 38 
2. The "Separate Interest" Test 
Under Rev. Rul. 77-214, the separate interest test was 
applied to questions of continuity of life and free 
transferability of interest. However, in Rev. Rul. 93-439 the 
Service amended Rev. Rul. 77-214 to provide that the separate 
interest· test would not be applied to continuity of life. 
3. continuation Vote Requirements 
It is clear that continuity of life can be avoided if the 
LLC requires the unanimous vote of the non-disassociating 
members to continue the LLC after a dissolution. 40 
Furthermore, the requirement of a majority of the members to 
continue after dissolution is sufficient to avoid continuity 
of life. 41 The question then becomes how the "majority" is 
measured. There is evidence, albeit no clear statement, that 
the Service will require that the majority be of the total 
38 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (b) (3); Treas. Reg. § 
301.7701-2(g) example (5); Gen. Couns. Mem. 36910 (November 4, 
1976) . 
39 1993-1 C.B. 225. 
40 Rev. Rul. 88-76,1988-2 C.B. 360; Rev. Rul. 94-6, 
1994-3 I.R.B. 11. 
41 Rev. Rul. 93-91, 1993-2 C.B. 316; Rev. Rul. 93-92, 
1993-2 C.B. 318. 
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interests, and not merely a majority of the members measured 
on a per capita basis, in order to avoid continuity of life. 42 
4. Limiting Events of Disassociation 
In order to avoid continuity of life, it is not necessary 
for the entity to undergo dissolution upon the occurrence of 
any and all of the events of disassociation listed in the 
Kintner regulations. Rather, an entity may limit the possible 
disruptive effects of a dissolution, and the consequent need 
for a vote on continuing the business, by making itself 
subject to dissolution only upon the occurrence of less than 
all, or even only one, of the events of disassociation listed 
in the Kintner regulations. 43 In the context of an LLC, the 
Service has ruled that there would not be continuity of life 
where dissolution is restricted to the disassociation by 
bankruptcy of a corporate manager-member. 44 
Another possibility for restricting the events of 
disassociation would be to limit dissolution to the 
42 Maj ori ty in Interest, and Not Maj ori ty in Number, Must 
Vote to Continue Partnership Business Under New Continuity of 
Life Regulation, 34 TAX. MGMT. MEMo. (BNA) 241 at 242 (August 9, 
1993) . 
43 MCA, Inc. v. U.S., 502 F.Supp. 838 at 842 (C.D. Ca. 
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 685 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1982) 
("if any one of these factors does cause dissolution of the 
organization 'continuity of life' is not present.") (italics 
in original, underline added) . 
44 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9210019 (December 6, 1991). 
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disassociation of members holding a certain percentage 
interest in the LLC. 45 
5. Business Continuation Agreements 
Another possible mechanism for limiting the potential 
disruption associated with dissolution and the need for a 
continuity vote is to contractually limit the member's freedom 
to reject continuation. Under such an agreement, the members 
bind themselves, in the event of a disassociation, to vote to 
continue the LLC. Breach of such an agreement opens the 
dissenting member to contractual damages, bpt the agreement 
cannot be enforced by an award of specific performance. Under 
this rationale, despite the agreement of a member to vote to 
continue the entity after dissolution, the power of the member 
to breach that agreement, thereby bringing about a failed vote 
to continue and the dissolution of the entity, is sufficient 
to avoid continuity of life. 46 
45 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7812058 (December 20, 1977) (limited 
liability partnership 'formed under Saudi Arabian law lacked 
continuity of life when dissolution limited ,to insolvency, 
dissolution or bankruptcy of a partner with at least a 50% 
ownership interest). 
46 Zuckman v. U.S., 524 F.2d 729 at 735 (U.S. Cl. ct. 
1975) (no continuity of life even though general partners of 
a limited partnership, as a condition to certain financing 
arrangements, contracted to continue the limited partnership); 
Foster v. Comm'r., 80 T.C. 34, 188 (1983), aff'd in part and 
vacated in part on other grounds, 756 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986) ("[a]lthough a 
partner who wrongfully dissolves a partnership may be 
answerable in damages and may forfeit his right to wind up the 
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The Service has informally expressed reservations as to 
whether an LLC with a business continuation agreement can lack 
continuity of life. v 
D. CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT 
Centralized management exists if any group not 
coextensive with the membership has the continuing exclusive 
authority to make management decisions necessary to conduct of 
the business. 48 Conversely, where all members of an entity act 
as agents of and take part in the management of the business, 
centralized management is lacking. 49 
In the context of LLCs, the Service has explained 
centralized management the least. One revenue ruling has 
affirmed the position, already clear from the Kintner 
regulations, that centralized management is absent when 
partnership's affairs, the fact remains that such a 
partner has the power to dissolve the partnership. And it is 
the power, not the right, to dissolve which is the touchstone 
of the regulation.") 
47 Letter from Paul E. Kugler, Assistant Chief Counsel, 
Pass Throughs & Special Industries, Internal Revenue Service 
to Edward 1. Cutler, Esq., Chair of the Uniform Limited 
Liabili ty Company Act Drafting Committee of the National 
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (July 26, 
1993) . 
48 Treas. Reg. § 301. 7701-2 (c) (1) . 
49 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (c) (4). 
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management and agency authority are reserved to the members. 50 
With only one exception, all other revenue rulings examine an 
LLC in which three of twenty-five members are elected 
managers, but without discussing the percentage interest 
represented by those three members. Under the centralized 
management test applied to limited partnerships, the 
determination of whether there has been centralized management 
has been dependent on the size of the interest held by the 
general partners. 51 This analysis is carried over into Revenue 
Procedure 89-12~ § 4.06, which, with respect to an advance 
ruling on the existence of centralized management, looks to 
whether the general partners hold an interest of at least 20% 
of the total interests in the limited partnership. The only 
other revenue ruling to examine a different fact situation was 
Revenue Ruling 93- 6. 53 There, the Service reviewed the 
somewhat unique Colorado LLC statute which, by its structure, 
does not permit management to be retained to the members. 
50 Rev. Rul. 93-38. 
51 Glensder Textile Co. v. Comm'r., 46 BTA 176 (1942), 
acq. 1942 -1 C.B. 8. 
52 1989-1 C.B. 798. 
53 1993-1 C.B. 229. 
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IV. ONE MEMBER LLCs 
A question currently under debate at the Service is 
whether an LLC may have only one member. The basis of this 
question is whether a one-member LLC can have "associates". 
A number of judicial decisions have held that an entity 
classified as a partnership must have at least two stake-
holders. 54 A one-member LLC would provide an alternative to 
the S corporation for instances in which a limited liability, 
pass-through structure is sought by a sole equity owner. 
V. REVENUE PROCEDURE 89-12 
One of the principle challenges facing particular LLCs 
seeking a private letter ruling on classifications has been 
Rev. . Proc. 89-12; an unincorporated entity seeking 
classification as a partnership must comply with this revenue 
procedure. 55 However, this revenue procedure was drafted 
primarily to address the classification of general and limited 
partnerships, and contains only minimal direction with respect 
to its application to other structures. On the issue of 
complying with Rev. Proc. 89-12, several requirements appear 
54 Morrisseyv. Corron'r., 296 U.S. 344 (1935); Corron'r v. 
Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Knoxville Trust Sales & 
Service, Inc. v. Comm'r., 10 T.C. 616 (1948); Hynes v. 
Corron I r., 74 T. C. 1266 ( 1980) . 
55 Rev. Proc. 89-12 1989-1 C.B. 798, §1.02. 
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inapplicable to LLCs. For example, sections 4.01 and 4.03, 
respectively, relate to allocations to and the capital 
accounts of the "general partners. " However, these 
requirements are inapplicable at least to those LLCs which 
have been chosen to be managed by a non-member. 
The Service recognizes the problems involved in requiring 
LLCs to comply with Revenue Procedure 89-12 and the need for 
a classification procedure tailored to the structure of LLCs, 
and is crafting a responsive Revenue Procedure. 56 
VI • ME THOD OF ACCOUNTING 
One early, and to a certain extent still lingering,. cloud 
over the use of LLCs has been whether such entities will be 
forced to use accrual method, rather than the often preferred 
cash method, of accounting. This issue arises due to the 
question of whether certain LLCs will, for purposes of this 
analysis, be treated as "tax shelters." 
As a general rule, taxpayers are permitted to calculate 
their taxable income either under the cash or accrual method. 57 
However, C-corporations, partnerships which have a C-
56 IRS News Release NB 2142, Partnerships, item 6 
(January 6, 1993); IRS Likely to Issue Limited Liability 
Guidelines Early. This Year, Official Says, DAILY TAX RPTR. 
(BNA) January 11, 1994, G-3. 
57 I.R.C. § 446(c). 
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corporation as a partner and tax shelters are requi~ed to use 
accrual method accounting.~ 
A "tax shelter" is defined59 to include a "syndicate, ,,60 
which in turn is defined. as a "partnership" or entity "other 
than a corporation which is not an S corporation" if more than 
thirty-five percent of the losses of such entity during the 
taxable year are allocable· to limited partners or limited 
entrepreneurs within the meaning of section 464(e) (2) .61 A 
"limited entrepreneur" is defined as "a person who has (A) an 
interest in an enterprise other than as a limited partner and 
(E) does not participate in the management of such 
enterprise. ,,62 Alternately, an entity may be a "tax shelter" 
if it meets the definition of that term. 63 
~ I.R.C. § 448(a). Professional service corporations 
structured as C-corporations are exempt from the requirements 
to use accrua~ method accounting (I.R.C. § 448(b) (2)), as are 
partnerships having a C-corporation PSC as a partner (I.R.C. 
§ 448 (a) (b) (2) ) . 
~ I.R.C. § 448(d) (3) refers to the definition of a "tax 
shelter" in I.R.C. § 461 (i) (3) • 
60 
61 
62 
I.R.C. § 461 (i) (3) (E) • 
I.R.C. § 1256(e) (3) (E). 
I.R.C. § 464 (e) (2) . 
63 I.R.C. § 6662(c) (ii) (An entity, partnership, plan 
or arrangement "if the principal purpose ... is the avoidance 
or evasion of Federal income tax.") 
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If LLC members are deemed equivalent to either limited 
partners or limited entrepreneurs, these rules would compel 
accrual method accounting by the LLC. If the LLC is deemed 
equivalent to a limited partnership lacking a general partner 
"there being no entity or individual generally liable for the 
obligations of the LLC," 100% of the losses would be allocated 
to deemed limited partners. Under this analysis an LLC would 
be considered a syndicate, and in turn a tax shelter required 
to use accrual method accounting. I f the Service were to 
analyze members under the limited entrepreneur provisions, it 
would be necessary to review the allocation of losses between 
tl~e manager and non-member managersiif more than thirty-five 
p~rcent of the losses are to be allocated to non-manager 
~embers, and if these non-manager members are determined to be 
"limited entrepreneurs," the LLC could be viewed as a 
syndicate. 
Regardless of the method of analysis applied, a 
determination by the Service that accrual method accounting is 
necessary would make an LLC a much less attractive vehicle for 
operati~g many types of businesses. 64 
64 This issue is especially sensitive to those 
professional practices which have sought to use the LLC rather 
than the general partnership or, more recently, the registered 
limi ted liability partnership. Cash method accounting is 
generally preferred by professional practices because of the 
time lag in collections and a broad unwillingness to charge 
and collect finance charges on late payments for professional 
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Several private letter rulings, all issued to 
professional LLCs, have st~ted that cash method accounting 
could continue to be used. 65 However, guidance with respect 
to non-professional LLCs has not been forthcoming. This issue 
remains particularly troubling with respect to the application 
of the limited entrepreneur provisions to manager-managed 
LLCs. 
VII. OPERATIONAL TAX ISSUES 
If the LLC is properly structured to be classified as a 
partnership for income tax purposes, it will be taxed under 
Subchapter K·of the Internal Revenue Code. 
services. Upon conversion from a. general partnership 
utilizing the cash method to an LLC required to use accrual 
method, the entity would be forced to accelerate into current 
taxable income all outstanding receivables, thereby giving 
rise to an immediate tax liability without necessarily 
receiving the funds with which to satisfy that liability. The 
relief from accrual of amounts that experience indicates will 
not be collected, while helpful,does not alleviate the tax 
liabili ty . on the remaining outstanding receivables. See 
I.R.C. § 448 (d) (5); Treas. Reg. § 1. 44.8:-2T. 
65 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9321047 (issued February 25, 1993; 
released May 28, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9328005 (issued 
December 21, 1992; released July 16, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
9350013 (issued September 15, 1993; released December 17, 
1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9407030 (issued November 24, 1.993; 
released February 18, 1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9415005 (April 
15, 1994) (100-year old law firm with consistent record of 
profitability held not a syndicate under loR.C. § 
1256(e) (3) (B) for any year in which it does not incur losses) . 
See generally, Banoff, Sheldon I., New IRS Ruling Encourages 
Professionals to Form Limited Liability Companies, 79 J. TAX'N 
68 (August, 1993); Use of Cash Method by Limited Liability 
Company Not Precluded by §448, 34 TAX MGMT. MEM. 242 (August 9, 
1993) . 
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A. CONTRIBUTIONS 
1. Contributions of Money or Property 
Generally, LLC members will recognize no gain or loss 
upon contributing cash or property to the LLC in exchange for 
a capital interest. 66 Even if a member contributes property 
encumbered with debt in excess of the property's basis, the 
member will 'be entitled first to a increase in its outside 
basis in the LLC to the extent of the member's share of the 
debt transferred plus the property's basis; the member then 
receives a deemed distribution, decreasing its outside basis, 
by the amount of the debt encumbering the property. Thus the 
contributing member will recognize gain only to the extent 
that the amount of the debt exceeds the member's share of the 
debt at the LLC level plus the basis of the contributed 
property. 67 
66 I.R.C. § 721. The basis of the contributing member's 
interest in the LLC ("outside" basis) generally will be the 
amount of cash and the adjusted basis of the property 
contributed plus gain, if any, recognized under I.R.C. § 
721 (b). I.R.C. § 722. 
But, beware of I.R.C. § 707(a) (2) (B) and the Treasury 
Regulations thereunder, wherein deemed distributions from 
contributions of encumbered property may trigger gain under 
the "disguised sale" rules. 
67 I.R.C. §§ 731(a) and 752(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(f). 
Note that the LLC differs from the S Corporation in this 
respect; shareholders contributing encumbered property to the 
latter will recognize gain to the full extent that the 
transferred debt exceeds the contributed property's basis. An 
S corporation shareholder may not increase his or her outside 
basis by an amount of debt assumed by the corporation. See 
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If a member contributes property with a fair market value 
in excess of or less than its adjusted basis upon 
contribution, the built-in gain or loss must be allocated back 
to the contributing partner. 68 
2. Contributions of Services 
The Internal Revenue Service issued guidance last year, 
in Rev. Proc. 93-27,69 providing that the receipt of a 
partnership profits interest in exchange for services to the 
partnership generally does not trigger ordinary income 
recognition by the contributing partner. 70 Prior case law had 
established that the receipt of a partnership capital interest 
in exchange for.services rendered to a partnership caused the 
immediate recognition of ordinary income by the contributing 
partner, and the case law had been somewhat divided over the 
issue of the taxability of receipt of a profits interest. 71 
These authorities should apply equally to LLCs. 
68 I.R.C. § 704 (c) . 
69 1993-2 C.B. 343 (June 9, 1993). 
70 Exceptions are for, inter alia, profits interests 
relating to a "substantially certain and predictable stream of 
income from partnership assets," or the receipt of a profits 
interest by a partner who disposes of the interest within two 
years -of receipt. Rev. Proc. '93-27. 
71 See Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 
1974), Campbell v. Comrndssioner, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991), 
St. John v. United States, 84-1 USTC i 9158 (C.D. Ill. 1983). 
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B. ALLOCATIONS 
Like partnerships, LLCswi11 not be subject to tax at the 
entity level. Instead, each member of the LLC must recognize 
on a current basis his or her distributive share of the LLC's 
income, gain, loss, deduction or credit. 72 The member's 
outside basis in the LLC is increased by income and gain 
recognized and decreased by losses and deductions recognized. 73 
Losses may not be recognized in excess of a member's outside 
basis in the LLC. 74 
The LLC's operating agreement may provide for the 
allocation of the LLC's profits and losses in accordance with 
the wishes of the LLC members, so long as the agreed upon 
allocations have substantial economic effect. 75 The 
substantial economic effect test applies to allocations that 
are not attributable to nonrecourse deductions (as will be 
discussed below), and generally requires that: (1) the 
members maintain capital accounts; (2 ) liquidating 
distributions be made in accordance with positive capital 
account balances; and (3) a member with a negative capital 
72 I.R.C.§§ 701 and 702. 
73 I.R.C. § 705. 
74 I. R. C. § 704 (d). other limits on a member's ability 
to recognize losses include the PAL (passive activity loss) 
limitations and the at-risk rules, as will be discussed below. 
75 I.R.C. § 704. 
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account have an obligation to restore the deficit in his or 
ber capital account under certain circumstances specified in 
the Treasury Regulations. 76 If the allocations provided for 
in the operating agreement do not have substantial economic 
-
effect, the distributive shares will be reallocated among the 
members according to their economic interests in the LLC. 77 
A different set of rules applies to the allocation of 
losses and deductions that reduce the basis of property 
securing nonrecourse debt below the principal amount of the 
nonrecourse note ( "nonrecourse deductions"). Because no 
member bears. the economic risk of loss if the LLC cannot pay 
the nonrecourse liability, the allocation of nonrecourse 
deductions cannot have "economic effect" under the prin"ciples 
of the regulations as applied to other types of losses and 
deductions. Thus the regulations provide an alternative safe 
harbor that deems allocations of nonrecourse deductions to be 
according to the members' economic interests in the LLC if: 
(1) the nonrecourse deductions are allocated among the members 
in a manner that is reasonably consistent with allocations, 
which have substantial economic effect, of some other 
significant distributive share" item attributable to the 
76 See I.R.C. 
1 (b) (2) (ii) . 
§ 704(a) 
77 loR.C. § 704 (d) . 
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& (b) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
property securing the nonrecourse debt; and (2) the operating 
agreement provides a minimum gain chargeback requirement, 
which requires that income be allocated eventually to the 
members that were allocated the nonrecourse deductions.78 
Nonrecourse debt of an LLC that is guaranteed by a 
member, or someone related to a member, is treated as "partner 
nonrecourse debt;" deductions attributable to such debt must 
be allocated to the member who bears the economic burden if 
the LLC cannot pay the liability. Additionally, minimum gain 
chargeback requirements must be imposed upon such member, 
78 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-2(e) and 1.752~2. Because the 
liability of all LLC members is limited under state law to the 
members' capital contributions, it would appear that all LLC 
debt is nonrecourse for purposes of the allocation r.ules, 
absent a guarantee of the debt by an LLC member. Even debt 
secured by all LLC assets should be considered nonrecourse 
under the regulations, which distinguish between recourse and 
nonrecourse debt according to whether any partner ultimately 
bears the "economic risk of loss" with respect to partnership 
debt. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2. Contrast the debt of a limited 
partnership that is secured by the general assets of the 
partnership; in that case the debt is typically allocated to 
the general partner or partners, who bear ultimate 
responsibili ty for repayment of the debt. The general 
partners only, and not the limited partners, may enjoy the 
basis increase brought about by the allocation of this debt. 
Similar debt of an LLC, treated as nonrecourse because all 
members have limited liability, will be allocated, and permit 
a basis increase, among all members according to their 
interests in the LLC. 
Although the IRS has not yet had occasion to rule on 
the application of these regulations to the LLC, commentators 
appear to concur in the appropriateness of this analysis as 
applied to the LLC. See, e. g., KEATINGE, ROBERT R. & RIBSTEIN, 
LARRy E., RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, Vol. 1, 
Ch. 17.07 at 17-33 (1994). 
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similar to the minimum gain chargeback rules applicable to 
"nonrecourse debt. 79 
c. DISTRIBUTIONS 
Liquidating and operating distributions of property 
usually do not result in recognition of gain to the members. 
Instead, distributions reduce the member's outside basis by 
the amount of money and the inside basis of property 
distributed. 8o Thus the LLC is not saddled with the General 
Utilities repeal tax burden that S corporations and C 
corporations must bear upon the distribution of appreciated 
property. 81 
79 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2 (b) (4) & -2 (i). 
80 LR.C. § 733. Exceptions are: (1) distributions of 
proceeds from a "disguised sale" of contributed property under 
I.R.C. § 707(a) (2) (B), which trigger gain; (2) distributions 
that represent a disguised fee for services performed in a 
third party capacity rather than a member capacity, taxed as 
ordinary compensation income under LR.C. § 707 (a) (2) (A) ;(3) 
certain distributions that alter the member's interest in the 
LLC's ordinary or capital assets, which trigger gain under the 
cjisproportionate distribution rules, I.R.C~ § 751(b); and (4) 
distributions that trigger built-in gain recognition with 
respect to contributed property under I.R.C. §§ 704(c) (1) (B) 
and 737. 
81 See I.R.C. § 331(b). The so-called General 
Utili ties doctrine allowed the corporate level tax on the 
appreciation in the value of property to be avoided by the 
distribution of the asset in kind (see I.R.C. §§ 311(a), 333, 
336 (1954)), or when the gain was realized by a sale incident 
to a 12-month plan of complete liquidation (see I.R.C. § 337 
(1954)). See General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 
296 U.S. 200 (1935), which gave its name to the non-
F - 29 
D. PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSS LIMITATIONS 
For LLC members that are individuals, trusts, estates, or 
personal service corporations, a distributive share of the 
LLC's losses from a "passive activity" that exceeds the 
member's income from the passive activity will be suspended 
until the member has passive income to offset the 10ss.82 The 
passive activity loss (PAL) rules prohibit taxpayers from 
using net losses from passive activities to offset other 
taxable income, specifically, portfolio income (e.g., 
interest, dividends, and certain royalties) and active income 
(e.g., salary, and wages). Passive activities include rental 
activities (except certain real estate rental activities in 
which a member "actively participates") and trade or business 
acti vi ties in which the member does not "materially 
participate. ,,83 Material participation is generally defined 
as active involvement in the operations of the business on a 
regular, continuous and· substantial basis. 84 Treasury 
recognition rules even though the Court had refused to rule on 
the issue of corporate gain recognition. 
Utilities doctrine, which had begun to erode 
was finally eliminated by legislation in 1986. 
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 331, 100 stat. 
The General 
years earlier, 
Tax Reform Act 
2085 (1986). 
82 I.R.C. § 469. The passive loss rules also apply, 
but in a less restrictive way, to certain closely held C 
corporations. 
83 I.R.C. § 469(c). 
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Regulations set out seven brightline, alternative tests that 
a taxpayer may use generally to establish material 
participation. 
However, the regulations apply a more stringent material 
participation test to limited partners than is applied to 
general partners and S corporation shareholders; the test 
requires that the partner participate in the activity for more 
than 500 hours during the year or during a certain minimum 
number of prior years. 85 The regulations broadly define 
limited partner to include all holders that are not personally 
liable for the entity's debts, even if the entity is not a 
state law limited partnership.86 Thus the question is raised 
whether this more stringent material participation test will 
apply to an LLC member by virtue of the broad regulatory 
definition of a limited partner. strong policy arguments can 
be made that the LLC member is more analogous fo a ge1.1eral 
partner or an S corporation shareholder than a limited partner 
for this purpose -- because the LLC permits active involvement 
by L~C members in the management of the business. Until the 
IRS addresses the issue, however, LLC members should plan to 
meet the stricter material participation test applicable to 
84 I.R.C. § 469(h). 
85 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-1T(e) (2) 
86 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(e). 
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limited partners to ensure that the losses flowing through the 
LLC are not subject to the PAL limitations. 
The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 liberalized the 
passive activity loss rules as applied to rental real estate. 
Rental real estate will no longer be a passive activity, per 
se, if the taxpayer satisfies two tests: (1) more than one-
half of the taxpayer's services must be performed in real 
property trades or businesses in which the taxpayer materially 
participates and (2) the taxpayer must perform more than 750 
hours of service during the taxable year in real property 
trades or businesses in which the taxpayer materially 
participates. 87 To be considered for the 750 hour and one-half 
of personal services requirements, participation in an 
activity must be material participation. Thus, an LLC member 
must materially participate under the restrictive· rules 
discussed above in each rental real estate activity that is to 
be counted toward the rental real estate material 
participation test. 88 
87 LR.C. § 469(c) (7) (B). Real property trades or 
businesses include development, redevelopment, construction, 
reconstruction, acquisition, conversion, rental, operation, 
management, leasing, or brokerage businesses. LR.C. § 
469(c) (7) (C). 
88 I . R. C. § 469 (c) (7) (A) . 
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E. THE AT-RISK RULES 
Another limitation on the ability of individuals and 
certain closely held C corporations that are members of an LLC 
to deduct losses flowing from the LLC is the limitation 
imposed by the "at-risk" rules. 89 Losses may be deducted by 
such a member of an LLC only to the' extent that the member is 
"at-risk" with respect to each separate acti vi ty of the 
entity. A member is considered at-risk to the extent of money 
and the adjusted basis of property contributed to the LLC, as 
well as any share of the LLC's debt for which the member is 
personally liable.~ 
Thus, a member will be at-risk with respect to its share 
of LLC debt that it guarantee·s. 91 The LLC member will not be 
at-risk, however, with respect to LLC debt that is nonrecourse 
and for which he or she is not personally liable unless the 
debt is attributable to a real estate activity and is 
"qualified nonrecourse financing."~ Qualified nonrecourse 
89 loR.C. § 465. 
90 I.R.C. § 465 (b) . 
91 The LLC member will be at risk with respect to such 
guaranteed debt only i:e the guarantee renders the member 
personally liable under state law and there are no 
contribution or subrogation rights to inherit from others. See 
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-24(a) (2); see also Edwin D. Abramson 
v. Comrn'r, 86 T.C. 360 (1986) (limited partner is at risk with 
respect to nonrecourse debt that he guaranteed) . 
~ loR.C. § 465(b) (6) (C). 
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financing is financing borrowed from a qualified person 
(generally a person in the business of lending money) for the 
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i activity of holding real property. Except as provided in 
regulations, no 'person can be personally liable for the loan. 
Thus, an LLC member will be at-risk with respect to a 
traditional nonrecourse loan secured by a particular piece of 
property, used for the activity of holding the real property. 
Note that it is unclear, however, whether a loan secured by 
all of the LLC's assets would qualify under these rules, given 
that no "person" can be personally liable for the debt (which 
person may include the LLC). This is another area in which 
many practitioners are eagerly awaiting IRS guidance on how 
these rules will be applied explicitly to the LLC. In the 
meantime, however, it appears that this exception to the 
general at-risk rules should make the LLC an attractive 
vehicle for real estate ventures. 
F. SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAXES AND OTHER ISSUES 
A limited partner's distributive share of income or loss 
from a limited partnership, other than a guaranteed payment, 
is excluded from earnings for self-employment tax purposes.g3 ~ 
The effect of this provision of the Code is that self-
employment tax is generally not owed by limited partners with 
93 I.R.C. § 1402 (a) (13) . 
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respect to income of the partnership that is not a guaranteed 
. payment; such income is also not included for purposes of 
determining the amount of contributions to or benefit from a 
qualified retirement plan, however. 
It is unclear how this provision will be applied to 
members of an LLC. The recurring issue is again revisited: 
whether a member of an LLC should be treated as a limited 
partner or a general partner for purposes of the self-
employment tax. The provision was designed to prevent passive 
investors from including investment income in earnings on 
which social security benefits are based. Thus, an LLC 
member, particularly an active member of a professional LLC, 
does not fall within the rationale of this rule. 94 No guidance 
has as yet been issued by the IRS on this issue. The recently 
proposed Clinton Health Security Act contains modifications to 
the definition of net income from self-employment that will 
affect both limited partners and shareholders in S 
corporations. Thus IRS guidance will likely await action on 
the Health Security Act. 
Other issues to be considered in planning or structuring 
an LLC are the following rules that currently are applicable 
to·partnerships: (1) a member may deduct one-half of self-
94 An LLC could avoid application of this rule by making 
guaranteed payments to its LLC members, as do limited 
partnerships. 
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employment· taxes paid;95 (2) members may not participate in 
'~ 
cafeteria plans;96 (3) a member may deduct 25% of health 
~ insurance benefits paid prior to January 1, 1994;97 and (4) a 
member will not be entitled to exclude group term life 
insurance benefits.~ 
G. MERGERS AND CONVERSIONS 
1. Partnership to LLC 
The IRS has ruled privately that the conversion of a 
partnership to an LLC will be analyzed as a partnership to 
partnership transaction. 99 The Service has recognized that 
general and limited partnerships can convert from one form to 
the other without causing a termination, if the old 
partnership's business is continued after the conversion .100 
The partners are deemed to exchange their interest in the 
partnership for a new interest in a partnership in a 
transaction covered by I.R.C. § 721. If the partners' shares 
95 I.R.C. § 164 (f) . 
96 Prop. Reg. § 1.125-1 (a) (4). 
~ 97 See Section 13174 of the Revenue Reconciliation Act 
of 1993. 
98 I.R.C. § 79. 
99 See, e.g., PLRs 9029019 and 9010027. 
100 Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157. 
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in the new partnership's liabilities are the same as their 
shares in the previous partnership's liabilities, their 
outside bases will not change and there will be no gain 
recognition. A reduction in a partner,' s share of the 
partnership's liabilities, however, is treated as a 
distribution of cash, and will trigger taxable income to the 
partner if the release from liabilities is larger than the 
partner's basis in his or her partnership interest. 101 
The IRS has ruled that partnerships converting to LLCs do 
not terminate if the above rules are met. Thus, a simple 
conversion of a partnership to an LLC should not result in the 
recognition of gain or loss to the LLC or its members unless 
a former partner's share of partnership debt is reduced beyond 
the partner's adjusted basis in his or her LLC membership 
interest as a result of the conversion. Note that this may 
happen to general partners to whom all recourse debt has been 
allocated, if the debt is converted to nonrecourse debt upon 
conversion of the entity to an LLC (pursuant to creditors' 
approval) . Assuming the former general partner re'mains 
personally liable for the debt after the conversion, however, 
the gain recognition can be avoided. 
101 I.R.C. § 752(b). 
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2. Corporation to LLC 
The conversion of a corporation to an LLC and the merger 
of corporations into LLCs are taxable events. Whether the 
transaction is structured as a merger under state law, or as 
a liquidation of the corporation followed by a contribution of 
assets to an LLC, gain will be recognized on the disposition 
of any appreciated assets. 102 The corporation must recognize 
gain or loss on the distribution of corporate assets as if it 
had sold such property and the shareholders of a C corporation 
must recognize gain to the extent of the excess of the fair 
market value of the assets (or LLC interest) they receive over 
their bases in the stock. If an S corporation is converted to 
or merged with an LLC, the corporation's gain is passed 
through to its shareholders who recognize their pro rata share 
of the gain and receive a corresponding basis increase in 
their stock. This prevents additional gain when the stock is 
exchanged for an interest in the LLC. Thus, S corporation 
conversions will incur only one level of tax whereas C 
corporations could potentially incur two levels of tax upon 
the conversion or merger. Again, this tax burden is incurred 
only if the converting entity in fact has appreciated assets 
102 I.R.C. § 336. Alternatively, the transaction can be 
structured as a contribution of assets from the corporation to 
the LLC in exchange for LLC interests which are then 
distributed to the shareholders. The tax analysis is the same 
under this structure as that described above. 
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(or assets that have been depreciated) . For professional 
. service corporations converting to LLCs, appreciated assets 
will likely include accounts receivable and goodwill. 
H. SELLING AN LLC INTEREST - 754 ELECTION 
If an interest in an LLC with appreciated assets is sold, 
exchanged or passed by inheritance, the transferee may make an 
election under I.R.C. § 754, which election gives the 
transferee a stepped-up basis (to fair market value) in the 
LLC's assets .103 The purpose of this election is to prev.ent an 
incoming member from recognizing taxable gain due to 
appreciation that occurred before its interest was acquired. 
I. CONTRAST OF TRANSFER OF A CORPORATE INTEREST VS. LLC 
INTEREST ON DEATH 
1. Corporation 
The estate of a decedent obtains a basis equal to the 
fair market value of the stock of the corporation on the date 
of· death (or alternate valuation date). The corporation 
continues to have its same basis in its assets. 
103 See I.R.C. § 743(b). This step-up in basis applied 
only to purchasing member's share of the assets' inside basis, 
of course. 
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2. LLC Treated as Partnership 
The estate of a decedent obtains a basis equal to the 
fair market lJalue of an interest in an LLC, LLP, limited 
partnership or general partnership on the date of death (or 
alternate valuation date) plus the decedent's share. of the 
entity's liabilities. If a decedent holds an interest in an 
LLC treated as a partnership, the LLC may make a section 754 
election which will permit it to step up (to fair market 
value) the basis of its assets attributable to the decedent's 
interest. Thus, assume such an LLC has depreciable assets 
with a zero basis; further assume that decedent's interest had 
a fair market value of 100. If the LLC made a section 754 
election, then the LLC's basis attributable to the estate's 
share of such assets is 100; and such basis in such assets may 
be depreciated. The depreciation will be allocated 100% to 
the estate. The same would apply if the decedent had an 
interest in an LLP, limi ted partnership or general 
partnership. The same applies to any transfer to any 
transferee (except for a redemption) The partnership may 
make the section 754 election. 
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J . CONTRAST OF CORPORATION VS. LLC ON PAYMENTS TO RETIRING 
EQUITY HOLDERS 
1 . Corpora tion 
A payment by a corporation to a retiring shareholder iIi-- ,-
exchange for his or her stock will normally be treated as a 
capital gain to the recipient and not be deductible to the 
corporation. A payment by a corporation to a retiring 
shareholder as reasonable compensation for services previously 
rendered is ordinary income to the shareholder and deductible 
by the corporation. 
2. LLC Treated as a Partnership 
A payment by a partnership to a retiring partner had 
traditionally been treated as a distributive share or 
guaranteed payment, thus effectively deductible to the 
partnership, unless it was for partnership property. Payments 
for partnership property are not deductible by the 
partnership. Previously, unrealized receivables and goodwill 
were not treated as partnership property for this purpose, 
unless the partnership agreement provided for a payment for 
goodwill. 
I.R.C. § 736 was amended by the 1993 Tax Act to provide 
that payments for unrealized receivables and goodwill would 
generally be treated as payments for property: thus, the 
payments would be nondeductible to the partnership. However, 
the amended I. R. C. § 736 will not apply i f capital is a 
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material income producing factor and the retiring partner is 
.a general partner. Thus, payments to a departing general 
partner should be deductible by a professional partnersbip. 
It is unresolved whether a member of an LLC will be treated as 
a general partner for this purpose. This is one area where 
there is a decided advantage to the LLP rather than the LLC in 
terms of certainty. 
K. USE OF LIFE INSURANCE 
Life insurance proceeds paid to a C corporation are 
generally not taxable under I.R.C. § 101. However, they are 
generally included in adjusted current earnings (ACE) for 
alternative minimum tax computations. Treas. Reg. §1.S6(g)-
l(c) (5). Life insurance proceeds paid, to an LLCtreated as a, 
partnership or LLP are generally not taxable for either 
regular tax purposes (I.R.C. § 101) or for alternative minimum 
tax purposes (because ACE only applies to C corporations.) 
Life insurance proceeds lose some of their tax-free status if 
the policy has been transferred for value to an impermissible 
transferee. It will be taxable to the extent that the 
proceeds exceed the transfer price and subsequently paid 
premiums. Permissible transferees include partners of the 
insured, but not co-shareholders. Accordingly, using an LLC 
treated as a partnership permits more flexibility ,than using 
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a.corporation. Such an LLC permits an insurance policy which 
. would fund a buy-sell agreement to be transferred to the 
= 
=sl 
:;;t 
~ members so that it can be used for a cross purchase 
arrangement. 
L. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN SELECTING AN LLC 
LLCs, like most other business entities, permit the 
di vision of the ownership among various entities. This 
permits the ability to transfer a portion of the ownership to 
family members. Fractional ownership interests are subject to 
discounts in valuation upon transfer, either during the 
transferor's life or at death. Available discounts may 
include a minority interest discount and a discount for lack 
of marketability. 
There is a broad ability to allocate income and expense, 
and determine distributions, among the different. classes of 
owners of LLCs that are treated as partnerships for federal 
income tax purposes. The limited liability of all members 
makes the LLC a superior vehicle to the general and limited 
partnerships and its ability for all members to participate in 
management make the LLC a superior vehicle to the limited 
partnership. After· the 1993 Tax Act, the desirability of 
accumulating funds in a trust is significantly reduced because 
the top marginal tax rate of 39.6% is imposed upon all taxable 
d 
F - 43 
income beginning at $7,500. LLCs treated as tax partnerships 
would be subject to the fami+y partnership rules if the 
requirements of I.R.C. § 704(e) are met. Similarly, they 
would also be subject to I.R.C. Chapter 14 (I.R.C. § 2701, et . 
.§..§iL..) • 
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An LLC, which has limited liability, m
ust avoid tw
o of the rem
aining 
three co
rporate characteristics in o
rder to be taxed as a partnership. 
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APPENDIX E 
MAY AN LLC USE THE CASH ME THOD OF ACCOUNTING? 
Code §448 (a) : 
These taxpayeJ:s cannot use cash method 
(must use the accJ:Ual method): 
1) C COl:poJ:ation (except certain PSC's) 
2} PaItLeIships with a C corpcration partner 
3) 'i!ax Shel tar 
I I Q: Is an LLC.a Tax Shelter? 
"Tax Shelter" (Code §461(i) (3» 
1) A J:egistered offeJ:ing entel:prise 
2) A §6662 (d) (2) (C) tax shelter (principal 
pUl:pose = tax avoidance or evasion) 
(PLR 9415005 held: an LLC is not a S 6662 (d) (2) (c) 
tax shelter solely by virtue of its LLC stJ:Ucture) or 
3) :Any ayndi.ca t8 
I (Q: Is an LLC a syndicate? 
"Syndicate" (Code S1256 (e) (3) (B» 
any for.m of business in which more 
than 35% of losses are allocable to: 
limi ted partnex. 
I (Q: Is an LLC membeJ: a "limited partneJ:-? 
PJ:obably Not. 
or limi ted entrepreneur. 
l -
Q:. Is an LLC member a limited entrepJ:eneur? 
"Limited Entrepreneur" (Code S464) 
peJ:son who: 
1) Is not a limited paJ:tner and 
2) Does not actively participate in 
managementl 
Q: Are·> 35% of LLC losses allocable to 
non-manager members? If so, ~t the LLC 
use the accJ:Ual method of accounting? 
See PLRS: 
F - 67 
l 
9415005 
.9321047 
.9328005 
9350013 
9407030 
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I. ASSET PROTECTION PLANNING 
A. Charging Order 
1. KRS Chapter 275, Section 52 
"On application to a court of competent jurisdiction by any judgment 
creditor of a member, the court may charge the member's limited 
liability company interest with payment of the unsatisfied amount of 
judgment with interest thereon. To the extent so charged, the 
judgment creditor shall have only the rights of an assignee of the 
member's limited liability company interest. This chapter shall not 
deprive any member of the benefit of any exemption laws applicable 
to the member's limited liability company interest." 
2. Analysis 
An unsecured creditor can obtain from a court a "charging order" 
which is similar to an attachment or garnishment against a member's 
interest. A charging creditor has the rights of an assignee. 
B. Other Statutory Provisions 
1. Member's interest in the LLC is personal property, not an interest in· 
specific LLC assets. KRS Chapter 275, Section 50. 
2. Member's interest is assignable. The assignee will not become a 
member of the LLC without the unanimous consent of all other 
members. KRS Chapter 275, Section 53. 
3. The assignee is entitled to receive distributions to which the assignor 
would be entitled. An assignment of an LLC interest does not allow 
the assignee to participate in the management of the LLC. KRS 
Chapter 275, Section 51. 
C. Analysis 
1. Adequate statutory foundation exists for use of LLC as an asset 
protection devise. 
2. Body of case law to be developed. 
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D. Comparison to Limited Partnership 
1. LLC member is not exposed to the internal liabilities of the LLC. 
2. However, the LLC may hold assets that are capable of generating 
their own liabilities. 
E. Current Drawbacks to Use of LLC as an Asset Protection Devise 
1. LLC statutes have not been adopted in all states. 
2. No uniform LLC statute. 
3. Limited operational experiences. 
4. Result: uncertainty. 
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II. CHOICE OF BUSINESS ENTITY 
A. The Essence of LLC 
B. 
1. Provides insulation from liability to the same extend as a 
corporation. 
2. Is treated as a partnership for tax purposes. 
3. Provides members the option of participating directly in management 
or electing other members or non-members as managers. 
Comparison to S Corporation 
S Corp. LLC 
1. Ownership interest one class unlimited 
2. Subsidiaries no yes 
3. Investors 35 unlimited 
4. Types of investors limited unlimited 
NOTE: LLC avoids the possibly burdensome requirements· 
of a subchapter S trust (QSST). All income of a QSST 
must be distributed. 
5. Basis for deducting losses 
6. Contributions of property 
7. Distribution of appreciated 
assets 
stock 
plus debt 
potential 
taxable event 
corporate 
taxation 
investment 
plus liabilities 
no gam 
or loss 
no gam 
or loss 
Conclusion: LLC is more flexible than S corporation. 
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C. Comparison to Family Limited Partnership 
1. IRC Section 2704(b )(1). 
Any applicable restriction is ignored in determining the estate or gift 
tax value of an interest in a corporation or a partnership transferred 
to, or for the benefit of, a member of the transferor's family. 
2. Applicable restriction is a limitation on the ability to liquidate the 
entity, in whole or in part, that is more restrictive than the limitation 
that would apply under state law generally applicable to the entity in 
the absence of the restriction. IRC Section 2704(b )(3)(B) and Reg. 
2S.2704-2(b). 
3. State law contains significant limitations on the transfer of a general 
or limited partner's interest absent a contary provision in the 
partnership agreement. 
The limitations may be more restrictive than the limits imposed on 
LLC's. 
4. The flexibility of LLC may create an applicable restriction under 
IRC Section 2704(b). 
G - 4 
~ 
III. BUSINESS APPLICATIONS FOR LLC 
A. In General 
The investor who wants more flexibility than what is available with an S 
corporation and who wants more control than what is available with a 
limited partnership. 
B. Businesses that Require Active Management 
1. All members can actively participate in the management of the LLC 
without loss of limited liability protection. 
2. Examples 
a. start-up businesses 
b. entrepreneurial businesses 
c. professional service firms 
d. joint ventures 
C. Businesses that Need to Accommodate Passive Investors 
1. LLC can be structured with centralized management. 
2. Examples. 
a. investment partnerships 
b. real estate investments 
c. theatrical and entertainment investments 
3. Consider passive activity loss limits. 
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D. Businesses where Retaining Control is Important. 
1. LLC member may not transfer membership interest without consent 
of a significant percentage interest of the remaining members, unless 
otherwise provided for in the operating agreement. 
2. Member rights to profits are generally freely transferable which 
provides some degree of liquidity. 
3. Examples. 
a. family businesses 
b. professional service firms . 
E. Situations that Cannot Accommodate the S corporation 
1. See IT B. 
2. Examples. 
a. use of trusts as LLC members 
b. multi -tiered corporate structure 
c. foreign investors 
F. Real estate transactions 
1. Investor objectives 
a. limited liability 
b. management control 
c. non-recourse debt 
2. Consider at-risk rules 
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IV. CONVERSION TO LLC 
A. Partnership to LLC 
1. IRS Ltr. Rill. 9210019. 
a. Partnership ceases to exist 
b. LLC succeeds to all of the partners' assets and liabilities 
c. Partners become members of the LLC 
d. Conversion is tax free 
2. Conversion of partnership to LLC is treated like conversion of 
general partnership to limited partnership. Rev. Rill. 84-52. 
a. IRC Section 721 exchange treatment 
b. IRC Section 708 no partnership termination 
3. Tax impact on partners/members 
a. If LLC classified as a partnership for tax purposes, and 
b. no change in partners'/members' shares of the entity's 
liabilities as a resillt of the conversion, then 
c. no gain or loss to 
(1 ) partnershi p 
(2) LLC 
(3) partners/members 
B. Corporation to LLC 
1. Requires a liquidation of the C or S corporation. 
2. Gain or loss 
a. shareholders. IRC Section 331 
b. corporation. IRC Section 336 
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C. Merger of Subsidiary into LLC 
1. Facts 
Parent owns all outstanding stock of Subsidiary, which Parent wants 
to convert to LLC. 
Parent forms Newco and contributes assets for Newco stock 
Parent and Newco form LLC. 
Subsidiary is merged into LLC in a statutory merger. 
2. IRS Ltr. Rul. 9409014 
a. LLC taxed as a partnership 
b. No gain or loss to either Subsidiary or LLC under IRC 
Section 721 
c. No gain or loss to Parent under IRC Section 332 
3. Result is the merger is treaded as 
a. contribution of capital to partnership, followed by 
b. distribution of a partnership interest to Parent in complete 
liquidation of Subsidiary 
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v. PROFESSIONALS AND SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS 
A The problem 
The operation of a service organization as a general partnership results in 
unlimited liability. 
Owners/professionals want protection from contractual and malpractice 
related liabilities. 
No form of business entity will protect the owner/professional from his or 
her own mistakes, negligence or malpractice. 
Professional corporations and partnerships of professional corporations 
have been used as a shield against potential legal liabilities and to create 
opportunities for settlements. The conversion from general partnership to 
professional corporation can be achieved without significant adverse tax 
consequences. 
B. The LLC solution ofLtr. Rul. 9350013 
1. Facts 
Law firm partners exchanged general partnership interest for LLC 
interest equal in value. 
LLC operating agreement requires written majority in interest 
approval for any transfer to a non-member. 
State law restricts transfer of ownership interests to lawyers. 
LLC operating agreement is specific about continuing the "practice" by majority 
in interest of the remaining lawyers. 
Death 
Insanity 
Bankruptcy 
Retirement 
Resignation 
Expulsion 
Liquidation 
Dissolution 
Termination 
Fail Safe Continuation 
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2. Results 
a. Partnership under Rev. Rul. 88-76 
1. No continuity of life 
2. 
Death of a member results in dissolution of LLC unless 
majority in interest of. surviving lawyers agree to 
continue the practice. 
Ownership interest not fully transferable 
Transfer of LLC interest to a non-member (new lawyer 
owners) required the approval of majority in interest 
(existing lawyer owners). 
b. No gain or loss on conversions from general partnership to 
LLC. 
See IV A 2 
3. Accounting method 
a. The typical law firm partnership is not 
1. C corporation 
2. partnership with a C corporation partner 
3. tax shelter 
b. So the cash method used by the law firm partnership can be 
continued by the law firm LLC. 
G - 10 
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VI. A PUNCTURE PROOF CORPORATE VEIL? 
A To what extent will courts pierce the corporate veil ofLLe limited 
liability? 
1. New statute 
2. No case law experience 
3. Injured and aggressive plaintiffs 
B. Will evidence of professional liability insurance be a requirement for 
continuing state registration and licensing? 
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PROCEDURE FOR CONTESTING A WILL: In circuit court, within 
two years of district court's probate action; must name 
all beneficiaries who are "necessary parties"; may 
restrain further distributions 
A. Filing The Will Contest 
KRS 394.240(1): "Any person aggrieved by the action of the 
district court in admitting a will to record or rejecting it 
may bring an original action in the circuit court of the 
same county to contest the action of the district court. 
Such action shall be brought within two (2) years after the 
decision of the district court." 
A person is "aggrieved" so as to create standing 
only if the will deprives the person of some benefit 
the person would otherwise receive, such as by 
intestacy or under a previous will. Wells v. Salyers, 
Ky., 452 S.W.2d 392 (1970); Egbert v. Egbert, Ky., 217 
S.W. 365 (1920). 
Although Kentucky law formerly required that all 
beneficiaries must be named as parties in a will 
contest, that is no longer required under KRS 394.260. 
West v. Goldstein, Ky.,. 830 S.W.2d 379 (1992) 
(contestant must only name a beneficiary who is a 
"necessary party" within meaning of CR 19.01). 
Statute further provides that "The parties may, in 
the same action, or in a separate action if the 
validity of the will is not in issue, seek 
construction, interpretation or reformation of a will." 
Thus, unlike previous statutory framework before 
Judicial Article was passed, a will contest suit is "no 
longer strictly limited to whether the particular 
instrument probated or rejected in the district court 
is the will of the testator." West.v. Goldstein, Ky., 
830 S.W.2d 379, 381 (1992). 
Cf. Mullins v. First American Bank, Ky. App., 
781 S.W.2d 527, 528 (1989) (upholding circuit 
court decision that it lacked jurisdiction to rule 
on validity of codicil neither admitted nor 
rejected by district court; "it should be clear 
that the statutes, read together, require (1) that 
all proceedings for the admission to probate of a 
will or codicil be commenced in the district 
court; (2) that the district court must either 
admit or reject the instrument; and (3) that the 
district court retains jurisdiction over the 
matter until such time as a will contest, or 
H -1 
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adversary proceeding, is commenced in the circuit 
court." 
Pursuant to KRS 394.240, contestant should lodge 
notice of the action "in the office of the county clerk 
of the county in which the will was admitted to probate 
or rejected," although failure to do so will not 
justify dismissal, Justice v. Conn, Ky. App., 724 
S.W.2d 227 (1987), discussed in West v. Goldstein, Ky., 
830 S.W.2d 379, 381 (1992). 
B. Restraining Further Distributions 
KRS 394.250: "An Action filed in the circuit court, pursuant 
to KRS 394.240, shall not, unless taken within twelve (12) 
months from the entry of the district court's order, prevent 
the appointment of an administrator or executor by the 
district court or the settlement, distribution, and division 
of the decedent's estate. The circuit court in which 
proceedings are pending may make an order restraining the 
further distribution and division of the estate. " 
II. CUSTOMARY GROUNDS FOR CONTESTING A WILL: Especially lack of 
testamentary capacity and undue influence 
A. Insufficient Age, Improper Execution or Revocation 
B. Lack of Capacity 
"The right of a testator to make a will according 
to his own wishes is jealously guarded by the courts, 
regardless of a court's view of the justice of the 
chosen disposition." Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 
772 S.W.2d 642, 645 (1989), citing New v. Creamer, Ky., 
275 S.W.2d 918, 920 (1955). 
"The inquiry as to capacity is three-fold. First, 
did the testator know the natural objects of his 
bounty, and his obligations to them. Second, could he 
make a rational survey of his estate. Third, did he 
dispose of that estate according to a fixed plan of his 
own. " Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S. W. 2d 642, 
.. ~.,,-...,,~ ..... .,,;.-
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645 (1989), citing Bennett v. Kissinger, 231 S.W.2d 74, 
75 (1950). 
"Testamentary capacity requires a lower degree of 
mental capacity than contractual or business capacity, 
especially so where the plan of the testamentary 
disposition in the will and codicil at hand was so 
simple and uncomplicated. [Citations omitted.] And 
mere weakness of mental power will not prevent a person 
from making a valid will." Warren v. Sanders, Ky., 
287 S.W.2d 146, 149 (1956) 
Evidence of "lucid interval" may permit probate of 
will by otherwise incapable testator; however, 
"evidence of the testator's mental status both before 
and after the execution of the will are admissible so 
long as they have a reasonable tendency to indicate his 
mental condition at the time of the execution of the 
will." Pardue v. Pardue, Ky., 227 S.W.2d 403, 405 
(1950), cited in Hendren v. Brown, Ky., 364 S.W.2d 329, 
331 (1962) 
c. Undue Influence 
"Undue influence is influence such that the 
testator's free agency is destroyed." ... It is not 
influence derived merely from acts of kindness, appeals 
to feeling, or arguments addressed to the 
understanding." Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 
S.W.2d 642, 645 (1989) 
[T]he undue influence must be exercised at the 
time of the will's execution." Fischer v. Heckerman, 
Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642, 645 (1989), citing Williams 
v. Vollman, Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 849, 850 (1987). 
"There have been listed certain so-called 'badges' 
of undue influence. They include[:] 
a physically weak and mentally impaired testator, 
a will unnatural in its provisions, 
H - 3 
a lately developed and comparatively short period 
of close relationship between the testator and the 
principal beneficiary, 
participation by the beneficiary in the physical 
preparation of the will, 
the possession of the will by the beneficiary 
after it was written, 
efforts by the beneficiary to restrict contacts 
between the testator and the natural objects of 
his bounty and 
absolute control of testator's business affairs by 
a beneficiary. II 
Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642, 645 
(1989), citing Belcher v. Somerville, Ky., 413 S.W.2d 
620 (1967) i Golladay v.Golladay, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 904, 
906 . (1955) . 
"Undue influence is a subtle thing and can rarely 
be shown by direct proof. In many instances the facts 
and circumstances leading up to the execution of the 
desired instrument must be relied upon to establi~h its 
existence. II Creason v. Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 69, 74 
(1965), quoting McKinney v .. Montgomery, Ky., 248 S.W.2d 
719 (1952). 
On the other hand, "Mere opportunity of the 
wife, even though coupled, as here, with an aged 
and physically weak condition of the testator, is 
not sufficient to establish undue influence." 
Golladay v. Golladay, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 904, 906 
(1955) (noting "There was no evidence of keeping 
the testator in seclusion, or of restriction of 
his contacts with his sons, such as to permit 
exercise of constant and undisturbed influence by 
the wife or to isolate him from the normal 
influences resulting from contact with this 
children. II ) 
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III. RELATED PRACTICE ISSUES: Burdens of proof; lay and expert 
testimony 
A. Burden Of Proof 
1. Initial Burden of Establishing Due Execution and 
Rationality of Disposition is on Proponent 
Proponent of the will must establish due execution 
of the will. Williams v. Vollman, Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 
849, 850 (1987). 
"If a will (or, in this case, a codicil) appears 
rational, proof of proper execution creates a 
presumption of its legality." Cruse v. Leary, Ky. 
App., 727 S.W.2d 408, 411 (1987), citing Simpson v. 
Sexton, Ky., 311 S.W.2d 803 (1958). 
2. When Distribution Appears "Unnatural" 
"The burden of proof is on appellees, as 
proponents of the will, to explain the disposition. 
Gibson v. Gipson, Ky., 426S.W.2d 927, 929 (1968); and 
Sutton v. Combs, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 775, 776 (1976). 
There is not, however, a per se unnatural will. Clark 
v. Johnson, 268 Ky. 591, 105 S.W.2d 576, 580 (1937). 
Instead, it is a factual issue which can be explained 
satisfactorily by proponents. Nunn [v. Williams, Ky.,] 
254 S.W.2d [698,] at 700 [(1953)]." Fischer v. 
Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642, 646 (1989). 
3. Contestants Next Bear Burden of Challenging Will 
The burden of proof is on contestants to overcome 
the presumption of capacity by substantial evidence. 
Wallace v. Scott, Ky. App., 844 S.W.2d 439 (1992); 
Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642, 645 
(1989), citing New v. Creamer, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 918, 920 
(1955); Cruse v. Leary, Ky. App., 727 S.W.2d 408, 411 
(1987) ("A testator is presumed to possess the 
requisite capacity, it being the burden of the 
challenging party to prove otherwise."). 
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~ "Again, the burden of proof is on appellants 
[contestants] to establish undue influence with 
evidence of substance. That proof must go beyond mere 
opportunity." Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 
S.W.2d 642, 645 (1989), citing Nunn v. Williams, Ky., 
254 S.W.2d 698, 700 (1953). 
4. Burden Easier to Carry When There is Evidence of 
Multiple Grounds for Contesting Will 
"There is authority for the proposition that mere 
assertion of challenges based upon both undue influence 
and lack of capacity makes it easier for contestants to 
get to the jury. Creason v. Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 
69 (1965) i and Gibson [v. Gipson, Ky.,] 426 S.W.2d 
[927,] at 928 [(1968)]. But the evidence presented 
must not merely be a scintilla. It must be of 
sufficient character, substance, and weight to furnish 
a firm foundation for a jury's verdict." Fischer v. 
Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642, 646 (1989) 
"When a contest is pitched on both mental 
incapacity and undue influence, evidence that tends to 
show both need not be as convincing as would be 
essential to prove one or the other alone." Creason v. 
Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 69, 74 n.1 (1965), quoting 
Roland v. Eibeck, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 37 (1964). 
"[A]n unequal or unnatural disposition by itself 
is not enough to show undue influence, but when coupled 
with slight evidence of the exercise of undue influence 
... it is sufficient to take the case to the jury." 
Williams v. Vollman, Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 849, 851 
(1987), quoting Bennett v. Bennett, Ky., 455 S.W.2d 
580, 582 (1970). 
"[W]here there is gross inequality in the 
disposition of the estate among the natural objects of 
testator's bounty, or where the will is unnatural, such 
facts, when unexplained and when corroborated by even 
slight evidence of want of testamentary capacity, or of 
undue influence, are sufficient to take the case to the 
jury." Pardue v. Pardue, Ky., 227 S.W.2d 403, 406 
(1950), quoting Allen v. Henderson, Ky., 184 S.W.2d 
885, 886 (1945). 
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B. Lay Witnesses And Expert Testimony 
1. Lay Testimony 
Declarations of the testator are generally 
admissible. Atherton v. Goslin, Ky., 239 S.W. 771 
(1922). The Dead Man's Statute, KRS 421.210(2), does 
not apply to will contest cases, so the parties may 
freely testify about their relations, conversations and 
transactions with the testator. Gay v. Gay, Ky., 215 
S.W.2d 92 (1948). 
Opinion testimony about capacity from lay 
witnesses is admissible so long as opinions are based 
on facts which themselves are both admissible and 
sufficient to support finding of capacity or 
incapacity. See Hendren v. Brown, Ky., 364 S.W.2d 329, 
332 (1962) ("opinion testimony as to the mental 
capacity of [the testator] is admissible to the extent 
it is based upon observable conditions"); Warren v. 
Sanders, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 146, 148 (1956) ("Opinions of 
witnesses are insufficient to take a will contest case 
to the jury, unless the facts upon which the opinions 
are based tend to establish lack of mental capacity."), 
quoting Tate v. Tate's Executor, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 597, 
600 (1955). 
A wide range of proof involving the testator's 
background and relations with the parties is allowed in 
undue influence cases. Welch's Administrator v. 
Clifton, Ky., 172 S.W.2d 221 (1943). 
2. Expert Testimony 
Johnson v. Liberty National Bank & Trust Co., Ky. 
App., 1994 Ky. App. LEXIS 48 (May 6, 1994) (not final), 
petition for discr. rev. filed (May 26, 1994) (Expert 
testimony not sufficient to sustain burden of proof 
where foundation facts not present; "the contestors 
place a lot of stock on the testimony of their expert 
witness; however, expert opinion testimony cannot by 
itself sustain the burden of proof required. There 
must be other probative facts conjunctive with expert 
opinion to satisfy the burden of proof to reform the 
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instrument. See Sloan v. Sloan, 303 Ky. 180, 197 
S . W. 2d 77 (1946)."). 
Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642 
(1989) (testator suffered heart attack and stroke on 
February 7, 1986, and executed will during hospital 
stay on February 14, 1986. He died on April 8, 1986, 
leaving none of $1 million estate to his two surviving 
relatives, who challenged will based on lack of mental 
capacity and undue influence by one or more of the 
beneficiaries. Court of Appeals ruled that expert 
testimony should have been permitted to address effects 
of medical developments on testator's capacity because 
those effects "are beyond the pale of common 
knowledge.") . 
IV. RELATED ISSUES INVOLVING ATTORNEYS' FEES AND DISTRIBUTIONS 
A. Who Pays Attorneys' Fees In will Contest 
1. Executor's fees 
a). Where executor retains counsel to defend will: 
"[I]t is the duty of an executor to defend any 
suit contesting the validity of the instrument he has 
been appointed to execute and .,. the expense of such a 
defense is a proper charge against the whole estate," 
Harrell v. Westover, Ky., 283 S.W.2d 197, 200 (1955) 
except: "(1) Where the executor was the sole 
beneficiary under the will or (2) where the 
executor acted in bad faith," Harrell v. Westover, 
Ky., 283 S.W.2d 197, 200 (1955) i accord, Creason 
v. Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 69, 75-76 (1965) 
(" [C]osts and attorney fees of the executor's 
attorneys ... are proper charges against the 
estate when incurred in good faith for the purpose 
of upholding a will. The fact that [the testator] 
was either mentally incompetent or that the will 
was caused to be executed by undue influence of 
the appellant, or both, indicates that appellant 
acted in bad faith from the beginning in obtaining 
execution of the will and deed. Under these 
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circumstances coupled with the fact that appellant 
was the principal beneficiary and the only one who 
stood to gain if the will was upheld, the 
appellant is not entitled to have the fees and 
costs charged against the estate.") i see also Clay 
v. Eager, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 124, 128 (1969) 
(executor/attorney may be individually charged 
with court costs if court determines that no suit 
should have been necessary) (settlement suit) 
(citing Hill v. Roberts, Ky., 311 S.W.2d 569, 572 
(1958) ) 
By contrast, in suit by executor to obtain 
declaration of meaning of will, executor's costs 
are chargeable to estate, even if executor would 
personally benefit from one interpretation of 
will, under theory that expenses were incurred to 
guide executor in final disposition of estate, 
Harrell v. Westover, Ky., 283 S.W.2d 197, 199 
(1955) . 
b). legal fees probably may be charged to heirs in 
different proportions than their actual beneficial 
shares: "There is authority for the proposition that 
one who involves an estate in unnecessary litigation 
should pay the attorney fees and costs incurred by the 
personal representative." Skinner v. Morrow, Ky., 318 
S.W.2d 419, 425-26 (1958) (involving settlement suit) 
2. Beneficiary's fees 
Beneficiaries may be required to pay proportionate 
share of attorneys' fees incurred by other beneficiary 
who obtains relief for all, Clay v. Eager, Ky., 444 
S.W.2d 124, 128 (1969) (citing KRS 412.070) i Skinner v. 
Morrow, Ky., 318 S.W.2d 419, 426-27 (1958) (in 
settlement suit, attorney for certain heirs awarded 
fees assessed against entire estate where he provided 
services that "benefited the entire estate, as 
distinguished from the personal interests of his own 
clients," even though fees limited because settlement 
suit by heirs "did accomplish very little that could 
not have been accomplished satisfactorily by the 
administrator"; court also indicates that in 
appropriate circumstances, fee award could have been 
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made against other heirs in different proportions than 
their distributive shares); Harrell v. Westover, Ky., 
283 S.W.2d 197, 200 (1955) (estate required to pay 
attorneys' fees incurred by beneficiaries in settlement 
suit) . 
Compare Johnson v. Ducobu, Ky., 258 S.W.2d 509, 
510 (1953) (no fee awarded where no showing of 
unreasonable delay by the administrator in the 
settlement of the estate, and it appeared that the 
settlement suit was fruitless and unnecessary) 
(discussed in Skinner v. Morrow, Ky., 318 S.W.2d 419, 
427 (1958)) 
B. Amount of Compensation for Counsel 
1. If counsel is not also serving as 
executor/personal representative: 
Attorney should be allowed "reasonable 
compensation," Morgan v. Meacham, Ky., 130 S.W.2d 992 
(1939); Harding's Administrator v. Harding, 116 S.W. 
305 (1909); see also Skinner v. Morrow, Ky., 318 S.W.2d 
419, 425 (1958) (fee of more than four percent 
permitted in addition to five percent for 
administrator; "It is true,as stated by the trial 
judge in his findings and conclusions, that much of the 
litigation was needless and useless, and that an 
unnecessarily large and invo.lved record was built up. 
However, this was not the fault of the administrator or 
its attorney. [I]t was necessary that the 
administrator participate in the proceedings through 
its attorney. The administrator had the duty to see 
that the estate was properly administered and 
distributed, and could not simply stand back and let 
the heirs conduct the litigation to suit themselves.") 
However, attorney's compensation not fixed by 
executor, but rather is subject to court review, 
Robinson's Executors v. Robinson, 179 S.W.2d 886 (1944) 
(executor does not have the authority to fix amount due 
to attorney he employs; instead, fee fixed by court in 
making a reasonable allowance to the executor to cover 
the attorney's fee) 
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2. If counsel is also serving as executor/personal 
representative: 
a). An attorney providing legal services for an 
estate may be limited to only one fee when he or 
she also provides services as administrator and 
executor, Clay v. Eager, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 124, 127 
(1969) i Slusher v. Weller, Ky., 151 S.W. 685 (--) 
unless: "the testatrix had designated 
[counsel] as attorney and executor and therefore 
contemplated that he would be reimbursed for his 
services in both capacities, 11 Clay v .. Eager, Ky., 
444 S.W.2d 124, 127 (1969) (distinguishing Morgan 
v. Meacham, Ky., 130 S.W.2d 992 (1939)) 
or possibly unless: the attorney who defends 
the will contest is deemed to have performed 
llspecial legal services" in addition to customary 
legal services performed for an estate, Clay v. 
Eager, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 124, 127 (1969) 
see KRS 395.150(2): 11 [T]he court may allow to 
the executor, administrator or curator such 
additional compensation as would be fair and 
reasonable for the additional services rendered, 
if the additional services were: (a) Unusual or 
extraordinary and not normally incident to the 
administration of a decedent 1 s estate... " 
b). An attorney providing legal services for an 
estate and also serving as executor and 
administrator is subject to the statutory maximum 
for fee, KRS 395.150, of five percent of estate 
plus five percent of the income collected by the 
executor, Clay v. Eager, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 124, 127 
(1969) 
liThe statute in other words establishes a 
ceiling, not a base," Clay v. Eager, Ky., 444 
S.W.2d 124, 127 (1969) 
11 [W]hen an administrator delays or neglects 
the settlement of an estate or the payment or 
distribution of funds in his hands when same 
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becomes payable, or otherwise neglects his duty, 
the Courts may disallow any commission or 
compensation, or allow a less compensation than 
would or should have been allowed if the 
administrator had properly administered his 
duties," Clay v. Eager, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 124, 127 
(1969) (attorney/executor allowed commission of 
three percent where "he made efforts to locate the 
beneficiaries under the will and also collected 
the sums owing to the estate ... [although] no 
unusual or extraordinary labors were imposed upon 
[him] in collecting the note"), citing Greenway's 
Administrator v. Greenway, 98 S.W.2d 283 (1936) 
(administrator allowed commission of one percent) ; 
see also Skinner v. Morrow, Ky., 318 S.W.2d 419 
(1958), award slightly in excess of five percent 
disallowed where estate consisted mainly of 
securities, and no extraordinary trouble or effort 
involved in handling of estate; only five percent 
permitted 
V. RECENT CASES INVOLVING WILL CONTESTS 
A. Wallace v. Scott, Ky. App., 844 S.W.2d 439 (1992) 
Widow involved in litigation beginning in 1955 
with her two children after she paid half of the 
purchase price but was made only one-third owner 
under the deed. Upon resolution of that 
litigation, she stated "That's the last they'll 
ever get off me." Shortly afterwards, man began 
working on the farm, and ten years later he moved 
into the house with her. In 1973, widow prepared 
will, and prepared codicil in 1975, leaving life 
estate to man, with remainder to Methodist Horne. 
After she died in 1988, two children challenged 
will based upon lack of mental capacity and 
exercise of undue influence. Trial court granted 
summary judgment and Court of Appeals affirmed 
(even after Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service 
Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991)). 
Court noted "appellants were unable to discover 
any evidence of sufficient probative value to 
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demonstrate even the slightest indication of lack 
of mental capacity." Court emphasized that "The 
burden of proof is on contestants ... to overcome 
the presumption of capacity by substantial 
evidence." Likewise r reviewing the "badges" of 
undue influence enumerated in Golladay v. 
GolladaYr KY.r 287 S.W.2d 904 (1955) r Court again 
noted that "the burden of proof is on appellants 
to establish undue influence with evidence of 
substance r " and found no basis for such a finding. 
B. Burke v. Burke, Ky. App., 801 S.W.2d 691 (1991) 
Husband widowed after 53 years of marriage in 
February 1985 r moved from Ohio to Pike County in 
June 1985 r and decided to remarry several weeks 
later to woman he had not known previously. 
Remarried on July 20; executed new will on July 27 
leaving everything to her; died August 17. Two 
children challenged new will on grounds of undue 
influence and lack of testamentary capacity; 
conflicting evidence concerning whether testator 
began drinking heavily and was incapacitated by 
grief after first wife's death. Jury found "the 
document probated was not the will of" the 
decedent. Widow appealed that there was a 
"complete lack" of evidence of either undue 
influence or incapacity. Court of Appeals 
affirmed r although acknowledging that "we are not 
unmindful of the possibility that the jury 
invalidated this will simply because it seemed 
unfair. " 
Court candidly notes "A survey of the law on this 
subject yields a series of contradictory 
statements and policies. On the one hand courts 
stoutly proclaim the policy of carrying out the 
wishes of the deceased r even if they are arbitrary 
or unfair .... The testator must have sufficient 
mind to know his propertYr the objects of his 
bounty and his duties to them .,. but he is 
perfectly free to ignore the latter if he is 
otherwise of sound mind. 'Every man possessing the 
requisite mental powers may dispose of his 
property by will in any way he may desire r and a 
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jury will not be permitted to overthrow it, and to 
make a will for him to accord with their ideas of 
justice and propriety. I .. , There must be some 
specific evidence of circumstances from which it 
can be reasonably inferred that undue influence 
was in fact exercised. . .. To justify setting 
aside a will the influence exercised must be such 
that it lobtains dominion over the mind of the 
testator to such an extent as to destroy his free 
agency in the disposal of his estate, and 
constrains him to do that which he would not have 
done if left to the free exercise of his 
judgment. I 
"After issuing these stern admonitions, 
however, the law reverses itself somewhat to lower 
the contestantls burden of proof when allegations 
of undue influence are coupled with an unequal or 
unnatural disposition, allegations of mental 
incapacity, or both. I [W]hen slight evidence 
of the exercise of undue influence and the lack of 
mental capacity is coupled with evidence of an 
unequal or unnatural disposition, it is enough to 
take the case to the jury. III (Citations omitted.) 
C. Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky. App., 772 S.W.2d 642 (1989) 
Decedent suffered heart attack and stroke on 
February 7, 1986, and executed will during 
hospital stay on February 14, 1986. He died on 
April 8, 1986, leaving none of $1 million estate 
to his two surviving relatives, who challenged 
will based on lack of mental capacity and undue 
influence by one or more of the beneficiaries. 
After trial court granted summary judgment to 
beneficiaries, Court of Appeals reversed on both 
grounds. 
As to lack of capacity, Court ruled that 
expert testimony should have been permitted to 
address effects of medical developments on 
testatorIs capacity because those effects "are 
beyond the pale of common knowledge. II Moreover, 
Court held that there was a genuine issue of fact 
about capacity presented by lay testimony. 
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D. Williams v. Vollman, Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 849 (1987). 
Testator died at 91 on February 19 t 1985. 
Both testator's wife and one daughter had died in 
May 1984 t and testator had never been told. 
Appellant t a granddaughter t challenged the will 
prepared four or five months before testator's 
death by her cousin t a grandson t on grounds of 
lack of mental capacity and undue influence. The 
will disinherited the testator's only living child 
and all of his grandchildren except one t to whom 
the testator left his house and an adjoining lot 
to the grandson. After trial court granted 
directed verdict to grandson on grounds that there 
was no evidence of probative value of mental 
incapacity or undue influence t Court of Appeals 
reversed on grounds that there was evidence of 
undue influence. 
Mere fact that testator did not know his wife 
and daughter had predeceased him -- which arguably 
showed he did not know the natural objects of his 
bounty -- was not adequate he did not have 
capacity to know the objects of his bounty. 
Otherwise t evidence showed his mental faculties 
were intact. 
"It is not sufficient that it be shown that 
there was merely an opportunity to exercise undue 
influence t but some evidence must be adduced 
showing circumstances from which it can reasonably 
be inferred that undue influence was exerted." 
Williams v. Vollman t Ky. App.t 738 S.W.2d 849 t 850 
(1987) t quoting Copley v. Craft t KY.t 312 S.W.2d 
899 t 900 (1958) (emphasis added in Williams) . 
VI. SAMPLE JURy INSTRUCTIONS: Taken from West v. Goldstein t KY.t 
830 S.W.2d 379 (1992) (Westerfield t Jeff. Cir. Ct~) t 
which are evidently drawn from 2 J. S. Palmore & R. W. 
Eades t Kentucky Instructions to Juries t § 50.01-.03 t at 
393-95 (4th ed. 1989). 
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Instruction No.1: For purposes of these instructions: 
1) A person has testamentary capacity in making a 
will if at the time of its execution she has such 
mental capacity as to enable her to know the natural 
objects of her bounty, her obligation to them, the 
character and value of her estate, and to dispose of it 
according to a fixed purpose of her own. 
2) Undue influence is any influence obtained over the 
mind of the deceased to such an extent as to destroy 
her free agency and lead her to do against her will 
what she would otherwise refuse to do, whether exerted 
at one time or another, directly or indirectly, if it 
so operated upon her mind at the time she signed the 
paper. [But any reasonable influence resulting from 
acts of kindness or from appelas to the feeling or 
understanding, and not destroying free agency, is not 
undue influence.] 
Instruction No.3: 
Do you believe from the evidence that [testator] lacked 
testamentary capacity at the time she executed the 
Codicil dated January 5, 1984 or that she was induced 
by undue influence exerted upon her by [executor] to 
sign said codicil? YES/NO 
Instruction No.4: 
Only if you have answered "yes" to anyone of the 
questions set forth in the Instructions above, you are 
further instructed to determine whether you believe, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that the transfers to 
[executor] and her family as set forth below were each 
fair and were freely and voluntarily entered into by 
[testator]. If you so believe, you shall answer the 
following questions Yes, otherwise you shall answer No. 
The check from [testator] 's Trust Account, 
ultimately used for the purchase of a certificate 
of deposit in the amount of $10,000 on December 
II, 1986. YES/NO 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, choosing among life insurance companies or products was like putting 
together a child's puzzle with big pieces. Advisors merely put together the same puzzle with 
the same pieces for each client. For many, the decision was narrowed to which company a 
participating whole life policy wO.uld be placed. 
Today all that has changed with company failures such as Executive Life, Mutual Benefit 
and of course Kentucky Central, great emphasis is being placed on due diligence. Not only on 
the company, but the products, marketing and proposals of those companies. The effects of 
Prudential Securities' limited partnerships and Metropolitan Life's Tampa, Florida office selling 
whole life insurance disguised as retirement accounts are only starting to be felt. 
Add to this the history insurers' have had with investments in long-term bonds in the 
early 1980's, junk bonds in ·the late 1980's and commercial mortgages and real eState in the 
early 1990's. Recent developments in CMOs and derivatives are equally disturbing and will 
almost surely bring more federal oversight to the industry. 
Combine the above with Risk Based Capital requirements, higher corporate income taxes (DAC) 
and the sharp drop in long-term interest and inflation rates over the past several years and you 
begin to realize the necessity for new and improved products. But these products are like new 
puzzles, much harder to put together with many smaller pieces and sometimes an unknown 
picture. 
This outline will attempt to help advisors review proposals using concepts and techniques 
quite peculiar in some instances and routine in others. Caution is urged for the inexperienced 
advisor using yesterday's guides in evaluating proposals and conducting due diligence on current 
products and company financials. Today it is possible to be sued over life insurance advise you 
didn't provide and considering the leveraged nature of insurance; where a small premium 
provides substantial coverage, the stakes are high. 
TI. . LIFE INSURANCE BASICS 
A. Proposalsvs Policy 
Relying on a policy illustration is an extremely hazardous way to buy life 
insurance. The most powerful sales tool an agent has is an illustration of future values or ledger 
statement. It shows how a policy is supposed to perform over a 20, 30 or 40 year time period. 
Suppose to, but almost certainly will not. Nothing obligates the insurer to deliver on the 
projected values, and almost nothing inhibits the imagination in making them. 
Suppose you'.re thinking of buying 1,000 shares of General Electric, and your 
stockbroker hands you a computer generated printout showing what the investment will be worth 
in 30 years. Ridiculous, right? Yet that's precisely how life insurance is sold. 
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There are three items a company may use to create or alter cash value and death 
benefits. These are; expenses, mortality and interest rate (investments) each will be covered in 
detail later. For now, it is only neCessary to know these items can be anything an agent or 
company wants them to be in an illustration - not what they actually are. 
The policy itself, on the other hand, is the contract and therefore will spell out 
in specific terms which elements are indeed factual. Comparing the differences between the 
proposal and policy will shed light on the vast discrepancies and provides an excellent beginning 
to explore them. 
B. Assumptions in Illustrations 
Small adjustments in assumptions can magnify into large numbers, particularly 
in the later years of a policy proposal. The magic of compound interest works well for a ledger 
statement as it will project values out 30 to 40 years. Advisors should instruct clients to pay no 
attention at all to far-out projections as they are at best, a guess. 
As an example, a 1 % interest rate increase assumed on an illustration would show 
a 30% increase in cash value in 40 years. For someone age 45 buying a permanent life 
insurance policy, this one percent would artificially create a 41 % increase in cash value at age 
95 on a ledger statement. 
Assumptions in interest rates, mortality and expense charges in illustrations need 
not be based on any actual expectation or reality. In cases where all three components have 
been artificially manufactured the results, although actuarially feasible, are mathematically 
impossible. This is not suggesting all illustrations are inherently skewed, but both agents and 
actuaries get caught up in a vicious cycle trying to make their policies look better than the 
competition's. 
Agents are competing, so they go back to their companies' marketing department, 
which then puts pressure on actuaries to build a better illustrating policy. Every few months the 
process starts over again as everyone is leapfrogging everyone else. In response to this 
gamesmanship, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in April decided 
to move ahead with a proposal to prohibit showing any future projections not guaranteed. 
Regulators voted to allow companies to illustrate past performance, but only by using a common 
index (yet to be developed) for comparison purposes. 
If regulators succeed in passing these changes it would mean a radical departure 
from current practice. At first glance, this appears to be beneficial - but some additional 
concerns soon surface. The common index to be developed may be as meaningless as the 
existing net payment cost and surrender cost indexes. Would current scales be allowed so 
consumers will not confuse past with future performance? What will showing the past 
performance - during a bull market offering rates of 10%-15 % - due to consumers 
expectations? Focusing all attention on illustration guarantees might well lead to companies 
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raising guaranteed values to a point where it is not fiscally prudent. illustration reform is needed 
but unlikely to be resolved soon. And while the current system makes it difficult for individuals 
to judge on their own, simply being aware of the problems may help you avoid the most obvious 
situations. 
c. Persistency From a Historical View 
The average life of a life insurance policy is between 5-7 years. A Life Insurance 
Marketing and Research Association (LIMRA) study of Whole Life policies revealed that after 
10 years, only 27% of those policies were still in force. (See Exhibit 1.) 
The late 1970s and early 1980s was the beginning of the "replacement era" and 
led to a phenomenal increase in lapses of low yielding Whole Life policies. Universal Life was 
much more attractive as the high current interest rates projected much higher values over an 
extended time period. This has obviously skewed the persistency statistics, but perhaps not as 
much as one might originally believe. 
Let's imagine a typical insurance sale to a 35 year old head of the household and 
follow an imaginary trail of subsequent events. P.J. was approached in 1975 by a friendly 
insurance agent and purchased a participating Whole Life policy. In 1982, P.J. was revisited 
and shown the benefits of replacing that policy with a high interest Universal Life policy. In 
August 1987,· the same agent returned to explain an even better opportunity - replace the U.L. 
policy with a Variable Universal Life contract. Then in 1993, our agent returns with the college 
funding concept of borrowing from the life insurance. P.J. is now 53, facing another child 
going to college in two years and is unsure of the market. Wisely, the friendly insurance agent 
suggests the safety of a participating Whole Life policy and completes the paperwork. 
Although fictional this is not an unrealistic picture of an event seen all too often. 
While the agents feel they have done a service for their client, in reality, after surrender charges 
and the foregone future dividends of the original policy, P.J. is actually worse off than staying 
in the first policy. The agent however is planning to send a postcard from his vacation home 
in Hawaii. Over the long run there should be little investment differences between whole and 
universal life, and therefore no significant advantages for the different types of cash value 
policies. Whole life policies may have higher dividend scales (compared to universal life) when 
interest rates are heading down, but the opposite is probably true when rates are heading up. 
Jumping from one type of policy to another due to presumed interest or dividend 
crediting advantages is not a good idea. Insurance, though illustrated for the long-term 
accumulation features for the consumer, is adversely affected by the short-term (first year) 
commission incentives for an agent. As long as current commission scales are used, with yield 
hungry consumers scrambling for high returns in a low interest rate environment, persistency 
will remain an issue for insurance companies. 
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III. PIECES OF THE PUZZLE 
A. Expenses 
The actual cost of owning a policy over a period of time is made up of expenses, 
including commissions and home office overhead - plus the mortality charges (cost of insurance 
protection). These costs are offset to some extent by the policy's investment return. These 
elements - expenses, mortality and investment are the primary components of all cash value 
policies and referred to as the "EMI" factors. 
1. Acquisition Costs 
Commissions make up the largest part of expense for insurance and include 
the selling agent and his general agent. Although these vary widely by the type of policy and 
company, first year commissions average from 55%-110% of the first year premium for cash 
value policies. Renewal commissions are typically much less and can be a flat percentage (5 %) 
of the policy life or graded - 10% years 2-5, 8% years 5-10 and 2% after 10 years. Another 
form of commission called expense reimbursement or allowance is in addition to the first year 
commission. 
Besides commlSSlOns, policies include marketing expenses - which 
basically are all costs of selling, excepting commissions, and include fringe benefits, 
underwriting, accounting and actuarial expenses. Office overhead, recruiting and training, 
advertising and investment management are also factors of the expense equation and affect policy 
performance. Policy expenses are usually 150%-200% of the first year premium and explains 
why there is little or no cash value in the early years. (See Exhibit 2.) 
2. Lapses 
A major indirect expense and a determinant of a policy's ultimate cost is 
policy lapses. It can take up to 20 years for an insurance company to recover the cost of issuing 
a policy, and when they terminate early, the remaining policyholders bear the cost of 
unrecovered expenses on those policies. Lapse rates vary dramatically among companies. Some 
encourage replacement - while others discourage it. Surrender charges are applied in an 
attempt to control the adverse financial repercussions. 
When evaluating proposals complications often arise in this area. 
Surrender charges result in no actual cash values for several years after issue. This may be due 
to high expenses that must be recovered, but it may also be a deliberate strategy to justify higher 
illustrated values in later years. In effect, the company withholds money from policyholders 
who surrender early to be distributed later to those who remain - a sort of sinking fund. If 
fewer people surrender then the company anticipates, there is less money to be distributed later 
to those who remain. Although the policy illustration may show higher long-term values, this 
only works if enough policies lapse in early years. 
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3. Policy Reserves 
Another indirect pricing factor (expense) is policy reserves, the minimum 
amount a company must keep on hand to cover future claims, and is mandated by state law. An 
average of 34 cents of each income dollar goes to reserves. Since these are not currently paid 
out to policyholders, it is important to know what the company's reserves are and what the 
minimum reserve requirement is. This isn't always easy to find out. Most of the home office 
personnel won't know what you're talking about and of those that do (or should) - many won't 
want to divulge the information. 
4. Expense Assumptions in Proposals 
Improvements in future expenses are often assumed in proposals and 
therefore it is necessary to determine what this assumption is based upon. One is to assume that 
economies of scale (more policies) will in the future reduce each policy's burden of overhead 
expense. Another is re-organization or re-engineering of a part of the field sales force or home 
office. The important thing to remember is this is an assumption only and can be made even 
in the face of rising expenses. Again, these assumptions are an attempt to reflect future 
expectations - but overly optimistic assumptions are usually the result of competitive pressures 
and future cash values or death benefits are then distorted. 
B. Mortality 
Current and guaranteed mortality charges are based on insurance company's own 
experience and mortality tables which estimate the cost of paying death claims for all 
policyholders of all ages for the same type of policy. The actuaries who devise these tables 
make certain statistical assumptions about death rates which allows the company to develop 
pricing that will, if accurate or conservative, bring in more revenue than paid out in death 
benefits. 
The table being used as the basis for a particular policy is paramount to predicting 
the future cash value. If the company has used an optimistic table, therefore underestimating 
costs, there is a chance more policyholders will die than expected. As a result, policyholders 
still living will have to make up the deficit resulting in lower cash values. This situation is quite 
common. Life expectancy increased steadily after WW II, but the rate of improvement has 
slowed to where it is almost flat on a graph and its future course is unknowable. Mortality 
charges are probably as low as they're going to be for the foreseeable future, yet proposals may, 
and do, illustrate the same rate of mortality improvement from the past 50 years for the next 50 
years. 
1. Financial Effects of Table Use 
There are various mortality tables used in the insurance industry today and 
their costs per $1,000 of coverage vary widely. One version is the non-smoker/smoker version 
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of the 1975-80 Select and Ultimate Basic Table NAB which is derived from actual industry 
experience and is a standard pricing table used by actuaries. The most common is the 1980 CSO 
table, which replaced the 1958 CSO table. A derivative of the 1980 CSO table is the 1980 CSO 
Basic Table, which is based on the same mortality experience but does not include the safety 
margins. Another table is the 1980 U.S. Life Table, which reflects the actual mortality 
experience of the entire U.S. population. 
For illustrative purposes, a quick calculation shows just how variable the 
costs in a policy can be, based solely on mortality tables. The cost per $1,000 for a 55 year old 
male using the 1980 CSO Basic Table is $8.28. The U.S. Life Table rate for the same person 
is $12.18 per $1,000. For a $1 million policy that is a difference of $3,900 which could be used 
to show a substantial (20%-25%) reduction in premium over a competing product. Or it could 
be used to inflate the cash values illustrated. The $3,900 could be assumed to be included in 
the cash value (as additional premium) and compounded at 8.5% would show an additional 
$1,251,181 at age 95. 
2. Rating Classifications 
a. Select. Super Select. Preferred 
Enhancements to the mortality tables or assumptions used by 
various carriers include rating classifications such as: select, super select and preferred. These 
are based on the assumption that recent insurance buyers are healthier than the rest of the 
population of the same age, because the rest of the population did not have to pass the 
company's medical exam or questionnaire. Proposals using a table with select or preferred 
factors will produce a less expensive premium, high cash values or both. 
Often agents will quote using only the best rating classification 
however unlikely the proposed insured is to actually receive the rating. The older the client the 
more likely the highest (best) classifications will fail to be achieved. Examples of some 
requirements are: no family deaths (parents or siblings) prior to age 60; no blood pressure or 
cholesterol history; strict height and weight guidelines; no more than two moving vehicle 
violations and the typical no-smoking, no alcohol and standard underwriting criteria. 
b. Non-Tobacco, Non-Smoking and No Cigarettes 
These are other rating classifications used by actuaries to further 
define risks for pricing of insurance costs. Note that each are separate and distinct from each 
other in that someone who smokes a pipe or cigars may qualify for the best rate in one company 
but not for another. Care must be taken in reviewing proposals to determine which company 
rating is being used vs another. 
The non-smoker/preferred risk classification is a relatively new 
category and no experience is available from any company over a 10 year period. This results 
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in the assumptions being more aggressive from a pricing standpoint and will have a tendency 
to increase the risk of future cash values not being attained or of higher premiums should actual 
experience be less than expected experience. 
3. Gender 
Another mortality issue that can affect the price of a policy is gender 
difference. Based on mortality experience which indicates women live longer than men, women 
would pay less for life insurance than men. Some states however consider it discriminatory to 
charge premiums based on gender. The issue is legislated by state, so it is critical for an advisor 
evaluating life insurance proposals to know whether mortality charges are based on a unisex or 
sex distinct table. Some states offer the choice of using either. Careful attention to this factor 
will sometimes expose a situation where one proposal using unisex rates is being compared to 
another using sex distinct rates. The effect will be to increase cash values or decrease the 
premium amount for a male using the lower unisex tables. 
C. Investments Qnterest) 
1. Portfolio Composition 
Assets in the portfolio of an insurer help to determine the interest rate or 
dividend scale declared for allocation to policy cash values or policyholders. Advisors must 
realize however that a company's net rate of investment income is NOT the rate that is credited 
to a policy. Nor is a company likely to have just one investment portfolio for all products. 
When a company offers multiple lines of product, investments are usually allocated to each line. 
Various products then have various portfolios which in turn will produce different rates of 
return. You could buy two products from the same company and get very different results. 
To understand the investment performance of a single company, it maybe 
helpful to begin with information about the industry as a whole. Although the specific asset mix 
in investment portfolios vary greatly among companies, the trends are clear. In 1975 
government securities made up 5 % of the typical portfolio, by 1985 this was up to 15 % and in 
1993 was 20%. At the same time, long-term mortgages dropped from 31 % in 1975 to 21 % in 
1985 to 17 % in 1993. Corporate bonds continue to be the largest single asset group with 34 % 
in 1975, 37% in 1985 and 45% in 1993. Stocks declined from 10% to 9% to 5% in 1993 
according to the American Council of Life Insunince and the 1993 Life Insurance Facts Book. 
The difference between portfolios of yesteryear and those of today reflect 
significant changes in the returns as well as for the mix. From 1950 to 1985, the net rate of 
investment income - gross income minus expenses - increased steadily from 3.13 % to 9.63 % . 
Net investment yield on mean invested assets in 1993 however was 8.04% as reported by the 
Townsend & Schupp Co. composite of 130 major companies. This reduction in net investment 
yield is explained by several factors: less junk bonds, less real estate investments and 
mortgages; the calling of high rate bonds and their replacement by much lower yielding ones; 
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increased capital requirements and higher corporate income taxes. Yet little change has been 
seen to date in the dividend projections of participating companies. 
We saw earlier the effect mortality alone could have on future projections 
in a policy illustration. Million Dollar Round Table magazine published a chart showing the 
effects interest rates and mortality have on a Universal Life policy, assuming all other factors 
being equal. These are illustrated in Exhibit 3 and are based upon four illustrations. Two 
assumed a credited interest rate of 9.5% and two assumed 8.5%. One of the 9.5% and 8.5% 
policies assumed a projected mortality table, where the other two assumed current mortality 
figures. Under the best assumption, 9.5% interest rate and projected mortality, the 40 year cash 
value was $525,000. Lowering the interest rate one percent, cash value dropped to $300,000 
close to a 43% reduction. The 9.5% interest rate and current mortality illustration produced 
$150,000 cash value, a 71 % decrease while the 8.5 % and current mortality generated less than 
$1,000 - a startling 99.8% reduction from the best assumption. Even seemingly minor 
differences among companies in the level of expenses, mortality tables or assumptions and 
investment returns on credited interest rates or dividend scales - become critical factors when 
they are.projected over a long period of time. 
2. Portfolio Changes 
As the composite of insurers' portfolios have changed over time, the 
effects of these changes must be viewed as to the results they have on policyholders and of 
course, the projections used in a policy illustration. The most obvious and somewhat recent 
example is the junk bond escapade of insurers and the financial impact on Executive Life, First 
Capital and Fidelity Bankers among others. These changes occurred as the marketplace became 
more focused on returns and companies responded by. seeking higher yields than available in the 
traditional bond market. The effects of this particular strategy on the industry in general and 
policyholders especially needs no more discussion. But what are some other areas which should 
be viewed with an equally jaundiced eye and grave concerns for similar, if not more sever, 
consequences? 
a. Real Estate 
Perhaps the Travelers Life story is best used as an example of how 
real estate and mortgage loan problems can impact a company. The ratio of problem mortgages 
and foreclosed real estate to total surplus for Travelers in 1992 was 151 %, as compared to a 
23 % composite of 30 companies. Travelers was taken over by Primerica as liquidity was 
impacted, asset values declined, vacancies rose and contract holders surrendered policies. 
Exhibit 4 shows the 10 companies with the largest dollar increase 
in holdings of foreclosed real estate in the first nine months of 1993 and their percentage change. 
The four largest dollar increases were by major insurers Metropolitan, Prudential, Principal and 
Teachers - but their percent changes were enormous - ranging to as high as 77 % by Met. 
This compared to an 11 % gain for the composite group. These 10 companies total holdings rose 
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$1.5 billion for the first nine months of 1993, while the other 120 companies in the Life 
Insurance Business Risk Analysis review had a $0.3 billion decrease. 
Foreclosed and delinquent real estate, and restructured and 
delinquent mortgages, result in lost investment income. This depresses investment yields, 
operating earnings and policyholder returns. Net investment yield for the life insurance industry 
dropped from 8.44% in 1992 to 8.04% in 1993. Of the top 10 companies in 1990, ranked by 
the ratio of mortgages and real estate to total surplus, (six with such assets equal to 8 to 10 times 
surplus) two are in conservation, one merged, one demutualized, one restructured and one 
received a $700 million surplus infusion. 
b. CMOs/Derivatives 
While junk bonds and mortgages have decreased as a percentage 
of surplus for the insurance industry, CMOs are the fastest growing area of new investments in 
the industry today and it has been predicted that they will present the next problem asset class 
for insurers. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has just issued a report, two years in the 
making, which calls for Congress to "bring the currently unregulated OTC derivatives activities 
of securities firm and insurance company affiliates under the purview of one or more of the 
existing federal financial regulators and to ensure that derivatives regulation is consistent and 
comprehensive across regulatory agencies." The report also found the growth rate of OTC and 
exchange-traded derivatives for insurance firms from 1990-1992 was 100 % and expected to rise. 
CMOs are a package of mortgage loans which have either been 
divided into tranches or where principal and interest payments have been stripped from the 
package and marketed as separate bond issues. If mortgage loans are split into components, a 
CMO may be an Interest-Only strip (10), a Principal-Only strip (PO), or a Residual strip. 
Although simplified, this definition will suffice for the purpose of a basic understanding of the 
concept. 
How great of a risk do CMOs poise to life insurers and/or their 
policyholders? An interesting comparison can be made between CMOs as a percentage of total 
surplus to the historical percentage to total surplus for junk bonds, and for mortgages and real 
estate. As of 12/31/93, the top 10 companies of CMOs with the highest percentage to total 
surplus, such assets equaling 5 to 8 times surplus, included some well known carriers as Aetna, 
Transamerica and IDS Life. Thirteen major life insurers had CMO bonds exceeding 472 % of 
total surplus or higher. In comparison, 12/31/90 figures for junk bonds and mortgage/real estate 
ratios to total surplus, shows that of the 4 junk bond holders and 2 mortgage loan holders that 
went into conservatorship, each had such assets equal to 9 times surplus. Whether or not a 
leverage ratio of CMO bonds equal to 5 times surplus is risky or sound will depend on the types 
of CMOs and remains to be seen. By any standard, it certainly raises an issue for concerned 
advisors providing insurance analysis or advice. 
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3. New Money or Portfolio Rates 
The traditional method of crediting interest on whole life and many 
universal life policies is the portfolio average. Under this method, new and old policyholders 
of a particular product line share one portfolio regardless of when their premiums were paid and 
investments were purchased. With this method, investments are not assigned to policyholders 
or tracked by investments made in any year. Someone purchasing a policy in 1994 will receive 
credited interest this year from investments made in 1990, 1991 and any other year the 
investment remains in the portfolio. The insurer using the portfolio average method will usually 
invest longer term than an insurer using another method. 
In some situations, the portfolio average method can be seen as a benefit 
for the insurance buyer. This is true when the average return on a company's investment 
portfolio is 10%, but new investments in 1994 are only paying 7.5%. When all previous and 
current investments are commingled, the portfolio average rate may be close to 9.5% - much 
higher than the rate on new investments. 
The other method of crediting interest to policyholders is called the new 
money method, which came into vogue with Universal Life - even though some Universal Life 
policies use the portfolio average method. With this method, many portfolios are created as 
policyholders who pay premiums in 1994 for example, receive interest based upon the 
investments made in that year. New policyholders do not receive returns on old investments. 
The new money portfolios are typically weighted towards sorter term investments. 
Which method is best? Obviously, the new money method will look better 
in an illustration when market rates are higher than the portfolio yield. As an example, 
remember in the mid-1980s when interest rates on U.L. contracts were being illustrated at 12 % 
and higher, but Whole Life credited rates or dividends were only 6-8 %? Now we see the 
opposite situation as interest rates have dropped from 9% to 5 % and lower on shorter maturities, 
the portfolio average rate will illustrate a much higher dividend or interest rate. Over a period 
of time there should be no significant advantage to either method as they will tend to average 
themselves. Illustrations however will not assume this and project the current economics (high 
interest or portfolio rate) over the next 30-40 years. 
IV. WHICH TYPE OF COMPANY 
A. Mutual or Stock 
After an insurance company receives income from portfolio returns, premiums 
and other sources, it pays its costs, takes a profit for itself and then credits the rest as interest 
or dividends. In a nonparticipating policy, after interest is credited to policy cash values, profits 
are sent to the company's shareholders as dividends. If the insurer is a mutual (participating) 
company the policyholders receive dividends. 
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1. Dividends vs Interest Rates 
Historically mutual companies have increased dividends regularly based 
primarily on the uninterrupted rise in portfolio yields. Portfolio yields are now decreasing based 
upon several factors, many of which have been discussed. Some others are risk based capital 
requirements, higher taxes, interest sensitive products, increasing expenses and decreasing profit 
margins. Based on these factors dividend scales will be reduced and some companies are doing 
so. Many others however are still illustrating in proposals, assumed continued increases as in 
the past or projecting current portfolio returns over the next several decades. This is no 
different than the assumption of 12 % interest rates over the life of a policy in U.L. proposals 
a few years ago. 
Questions which need to be addressed in this area are whether dividends 
or interest rates are based on gross or net returns; before or after deduction for taxes; before 
expenses or net of expenses, and of course if the portfolio average or new money methodology 
is used. 
2. Tax Status of Dividends 
Dividends are defined by IRe Section 72; "Dividends on a participating 
life insurance policy are tax exempt as return of investment. Dividends are considered to be a 
partial return of basis; hence they reduce the cost basis of the contract. This reduction in cost 
must be taken into account in computing gain or loss. upon sale, surrender, exchange or 
maturity. " 
Dividends to policyholders almost always are illustrated as purchasing paid-
up additions. This strategy has been shown to support the increase in cash values for illustrative 
purposes and face amounts for inflation purposes. It is often necessary for this technique to be 
used to substantiate the borrowing/loan scenarios as it obviously increases the cost basis of the 
policyholder and therefore reduces or eliminates any taxable event resulting from this practice. 
In contrast, dividends used to reduce premiums or paid in cash reduce the policyholders basis 
and using the illustration figures, could result in a taxable event. This strategy can negate the 
benefits of banding, as the purchase of additional coverage is at an older age and higher dollar 
amounts. 
Dividends can be compared to the overpayment of income taxes. Many 
individuals have more tax withheld than necessary in order to receive a "refund." Dividends 
paid to policyholders are tax exempt as return of investment - meaning policyholders have 
overpaid their premiums and have given the insurer an interest-free loan similar to the 
overpayment of withholding taxes. The insurer keeps the interest earned on this excess amount 
and returns, via a dividend, only the excess premium. The "dividend" would be reported as 
taxable income if it represented a return on capital vs a return of capital. 
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3. Dividend/Interest Payment History 
Mutual insurers have increased policy dividend scales since 1950 during 
uninterrupted increases in aggregate portfolio yields. They now are being faced with reducing 
dividends scales to reflect the need to build surplus to support sales growth and meet RBC 
requirements. Home office expenses have increased and interest-sensitive products require 
investments with much shorter durations than traditional products. These shorter time 
investments followed by the decline in interest rates, inflationary expenses in the group health 
business, AIDS and higher taxes are all causes for recent dividend reductions. 
Dividend scales rise by policy duration (as aggregate interest earnings 
grow) and by calendar year (if portfolio yields rise). But net investment yield for the life 
industry has fallen from almost 10% in 1985 to 8.04% in 1993. Net yield for the industry is 
expected to fall as investment income is lost on non-performing mortgage loans and bonds are 
acquired at much lower rates. Dividends peaked in 1990 but fell in 1992 and 1993 below the 
level paid in 1989 as interest rates (the key component of dividend scales) continued their 
downward mood. 
4. Dividends/Interest Determined by Marketing Strategy 
Most industries are finding the current economic environment difficult. 
Rising costs and an increased demand for quality have reduced profit margins. Consumers are 
looking for the best bargain and rarely abide to brand loyalty. The life industry is no exception 
to this reality, and because of the downturn in new sales, it may face worse than other 
businesses. Adjusted for inflation, new life premiums have decreased 23.7% since 1987 - a 
record period of decline. 
In an era of declining interest rates, such as we now face, some insurers 
will take discretions in setting interest rates or dividend scales. The effect is to temporarily 
subsidize new policyholders with interest earned on existing policyholders' money. This 
assumed rate is projected for the life of the policy - even though it is destined to average down 
over time. Assume an insurer sold many policies years ago when Treasuries were yielding 10%. 
Now rates have fallen to 8 %; causing old bonds to increase in value. In a mutual fund, old 
policyholders would get the higher rate and a windfall capital gain. But using the portfolio 
average method for a product the carrier wants to sell, the insurer blends the new 8 % bonds 
with the old 10% bonds and illustrates a 9.5% dividend rate. If a company wants to make a 
whole life product more attractive to potential customers, the carrier can simply assume and 
illustrate a higher dividend scale using the portfolio average. 
Another approach, used primarily with U.L policies, is to assume an 
interest rate bonus to be credited at certain stages in a policy. Interest rate bonuses of 112 % , 
1 % and 1.25% may be credited at the tenth, fifteenth and twentieth years, respectively. When 
it comes time to pay, the company may drop its current interest rate or raise mortality charges 
or increase the expense deduction. But some companies guarantee this bonus rate in their 
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contract, right? Well, imagine an employment contract that works like this: First year you get 
a salary of $100,000. Second year you are guaranteed a bonus of $50,000, but the salary is not 
guaranteed. So your employer could cut your base pay in half the second year at the same time 
it gives you a "bonus." What kind of guarantee is that? 
5. Dividends/Interest Paid from Earnings or Surplus 
In 1992, for the first time in eight years, every major mutual life insurance 
company earned its policyholder dividend payments based on information in The Mutual Life 
Insurance Industry Handbook. Each of 78 mutual life insurers with more than $100 million in 
assets had operating earnings (before dividends, income taxes and interest maintenance reserves) 
which exceeded their policy dividends paid in 1992. This score (78-0) benefited from excluding 
companies in conservation (Mutual Benefit & Fidelity Mutual) and by the conversion of 
Equitable Life from a mutual to a stock company. 
These facts give insight that dividends are sometimes not currently 
"earned" but nonetheless may still be used as assumptions in an illustration. The payment of 
dividends may indeed come from surplus, if investment or portfolio income is inadequate to 
sustain a high projected scale. Capital gains are often used to support dividend scales and the 
recent interest rate decline and corresponding call of high rate bonds has been used to prolong 
a dividend rate which is higher than the portfolio return. This explains why some companies 
have dividend or interest rates that make no sense in today's interest rate environment. Net 
capital gains of 6.1 billion were reported in 1993 up from 2.2 billion in 1992. 
B. Capital Structure 
1. Access to Capital 
Mutuals lack parent companies and access to capital markets to solve 
liquidity problems. Compared to stock life insurers, mutuals have a lower net investment yield 
rate, lower asset mix in investment grade bonds, higher asset mix in junk bonds, real estate and 
mortgages and lower net cash flow ratios - according to Townsend & Schupp, an investment 
banking and credit research firm specializing in the insurance industry. Poor liquidity 
exacerbated runs on the bank at both Mutual Benefit and Fidelity Mutual. From 1989-1992, the 
100 largest stock life insurers received surplus infusions of $.9, $1. 9, $3.8 and $3.7 billion 
respectively. Mutual companies conceptually have a large margin to absorb contingencies 
because policy dividend scales may be reduced, although companies are reluctant to do so. 
Policyholders then represent, at least from a historical perspective, the only access to capital for 
mutual insurers. 
2. Demutualization or Surplus Notes 
The lack of access to capital markets and poor liquidity spurred Equitable 
to demutualize and become a stock company. The need to raise capital is partly caused by the 
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RBC standards and can only be accomplished by mutuals by (1) demutualizing, which is 
expensive and slow or (2) issuing surplus notes. 
Surplus notes are unsecured debt securities approved as surplus in an 
issuer's state of domicile. Surplus notes, offer the advantage of being capital even though they 
are also debt - and people wonder why insurance is difficult to understand! Insurers pay 
interest on these notes only if the company has earnings, as well. Surplus notes enable mutual 
companies to access cheap money as current interest rates are low and the spreads are good. 
The issuance of surplus notes is not yet a trend but there has been 
increased activity. In 1993, Mass. Mutual, Prudential and Metropolitan issued notes for $250 
million, $300 million and $700 million, respectively. Reasons cited for the issues include 
raising capital at favorable rates, preparing for health care reform and in Prudential's case, for 
post-retirement employee benefit obligations. In the first quarter of 1994, six mutual insurers 
have issued surplus notes totaling $1.163 billion and two companies, Midland Mutual and State 
Mutual, are seeking to demutualize. The number of mutual life insurers has fallen 39 %, from 
171 in 1953 to 105 in 1993, according to American Council of Life Insurance data. This 
number is even less now due to recent demutualizations and to mutual failures and mergers. A 
June 6, 1994 editorial by National Underwriter editor, Stephen Pointek, raises the question of 
an outmoded mutual structure and exploring the idea of establishing stock companies as the 
industry norm. 
3. Risk Based Capital Requirements 
The RBC requirements are just being felt as the filing of 1993 statutory 
statements has just passed. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners' (NAIC) 
model law requires the filing of an RBC Report by all domestic life insurers before March 15. 
While only a few states have actually passed the modellaw, the law does provide any foreign 
insurer must provide the report to the insurance commissioner upon request. In the simplest of 
terms, RBC requires insurers to keep minimum levels of capital based on a formula that takes 
into account the amount of risk each company faces on its products and investments. 
Policy designs will be and have been impacted by RBC as well as new 
product offerings. Variable annuities and variable U.L. have experienced growth rates of grand 
proportions partly for tax deferral and partly because of potential increased returns in a low 
interest environment. Another cause is the planned marketing of these products by insurers 
because there are virtually no effects on RBC capital ratios. Since liabilities in the separate 
account exactly offset assets in the separate account, the only impact would be to the extent the 
company maintained surplus, which under normal circumstances is nominal. Fixed products 
would reduce the ratio by requiring higher capital levels. 
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V. WHICH TYPE OF POLICY 
A. Permanent. Term. Blended. Load or No-Load 
Once the decision is made on a stock or mutual company the selection of the right 
policy to use is next. With the myriad of products available today and the variety of client 
circumstances, what kind of policy should be purchased? Should the advisor use current 
assumption whole life, a convertible term policy with a disability waiver, variable (D.L. or 
whole life) or one of the no-load (no commission) products? The key to matching clients with 
policies is understanding the options, features, costs and benefits of each contract. Basic policy 
characteristics are outlined in this table: 
Least aoMost 
Cost Universal Whole Life Variable 
Cash Value Risk Whole Life Universal Variable 
Death Benefits Risk Whole Life Universal Variable 
I 
Client Involvement Whole Life Universal Variable 
Policy Modifications Whole Life Universal Variable 
1. Whole Life 
These policies may be either participating or non-participating as well as 
interest sensitive or non-interest sensitive; . that is, returns which are either directly tied to 
fluctuating interest rates (n~w m,oney method) or not (portfolio average). The most popular 
today are interest sensitive par and stock company fixed premium. With a non-participating 
policy, the owner will receive no more than the guaranteed cash value specified in the contract. 
The participating policy generally requires higher premiums, the diffe(ence used purely for 
investment purposes. The annual dividends are considered a return of premium and a reduction 
of basis, for tax purposes. Par products set the dividend scale retrospectively at the end of the 
policy year, while stock company products set interest rate and risk charges prospectively for 
the upcoming year. The "EMI" factors· are bundled in this type of policy and therefore 
impossible to determine separate costs. 
2. Universal Life 
U.L. policies are separated into the "EMI" elements with each easily 
measured and identified. This design allows the insured to vary the death benefit or premiums 
according to current needs. It is only necessary to pay enough premium to cover mortality and 
expense charges, if so desired. U.L. products have two death benefit alternatives - level 
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(Option A) or increasing (Option B). The Option B provides the cash value in addition to the 
face amount of the policy as a death benefit. 
The policy has guaranteed death benefits and cash values so long as a 
minimum premium is paid. The guarantees are typically much shorter, such as 5 years, and are 
referred to as no lapse guarantees. Investments made within the portfolio for U.L. products are 
more short-term than under the portfolio average method. This is necessary because the 
policyholder may vary premium payments, skip, or even stop them. The insurance carrier then 
must keep a larger portion of its investments liquid to be prepared for an unpredictable premium 
stream. The advisor must remember this factor and review the advantages or disadvantages of 
the new money method of interest crediting in a proposal. In times of low interest rates, this 
method may illustrate lower cash values than the higher portfolio average return assumed in a 
whole life proposal. . 
3. Variable Life 
In contrast to the other products discussed, where investment performance 
is a function of the company's general investment account, variable life allows the policyholder 
to choose from a menu of investments. The cash value is generally not guaranteed in that the 
values are tied to the performance of a particular investment fund which operates essentially as 
a mutual fund. They generally do offer some minimum guaranteed death benefit. Variable 
insurance can be Whole Life (either participating or non-participating) or Universal Life. 
Changes in policy values are directly a result of the performance of the 
fund into which premiums are directed, therefore transferring risk from the carrier to the 
policyholder. Fund performance then will determine the amount of cash values and of the death 
benefit. Wide fluctuations in returns can result in early lapse of a policy jf fund performance 
is inadequate or if a loss is sustained, especially in the early years. (See Exhibit 5 for VUL 
Analysis.) 
4. Survivorship or Second to Die Policies 
These contracts cover two insureds and mature at the death of the last 
survivor. They are most commonly used in estate planning situations where the proceeds are 
not needed until the later of the two deaths; are usually between a husband and wife, and used 
for payment of federal estate taxes. Survivorship policies place little to no emphasis on early 
cash values since the policy is intended to be held until the second death. The policies are 
usually less expensive than two individual policies as the expenses of the carrier are reduced by 
issuing only one contract. Mortality charges are often much less because of delaying the death 
claim until later. Some caution is urged in the assumption of mortality rates used by some 
companies. Second to die policies are generally larger policies, $1 million usually the starting 
point, and because of the purpose for which they are bought, have a low lapse rate. 
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In evaluating these contracts, some additional concerns are raised which 
must be addressed by the advisor. For instance, if the tax laws change - does the carrier allow 
or the contract permit the coverage to be split into two policies? Is there a charge for this option 
(rider) and is this charge reflected in the proposal? What if there is a divorce - can the policy 
be split? Is evidence of insurability required on a split for tax purposes, divorce or both? What 
is the chance of the client passing insurability standards at an advanced age? What is the 
carrier's history on this? Are there new commissions earned? Are mortality charges increased? 
Based on what table or assumption? What changes are assumed in the contract after the first 
death? Answers to many of these questions will disclose both interesting differences and 
additional issues for an advisor. 
5. 10-20-30 Year Term 
Originally, term policies were offered for a specified period of time, with 
annual renewable term the distinct leader in the sales mix. Convertible term policies were 
introduced which gave more flexibility and allowed for conversion to a permanent policy when 
desired or appropriate. Since then, the name "term" has become a bit of an anachronism with 
products that provide coverage to age 100. These products are usually term insurance in a 
Universal Life chassis, utilizing the same averaging of premium assumption of whole life, but 
paying only the mortality and expense charges. Because it eliminates the investment aspect, it 
results in lower costs .. 
This is soon to change as the long-anticipated "Triple X" regulations move 
closer to becoming reality. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NArC) is 
expected to adopt Triple X and go into effect January 1, 1995. It changes the reserving 
requirements for term products with long-term guarantees and so-called "U.L. term." Products 
with premium guarantees of more than 5 years will have higher gross premium deficiency 
reserve requirements. Companies are preparing to redesign their products and 5 year guarantees 
will most likely become the norm for long-term policies. 
6. Blended Policies 
The cost of whole life can be reduced by using term insurance to make up 
part of the face amount. For example, a policy consisting of 80% Whole Life and 20% term 
insurance would be less than a "pure" Whole Life policy. The approach used with a blended 
policy is using the dividends from the Whole Life portion to buy paid-up additions to replace 
the term portion of the coverage. The larger the term amount or percentage, the longer this 
process takes. 
The use of term insurance or term riders to increase the Whole Life face 
amount or reduce premiums for an equal face amount adds substantial risks to the policyholder. 
The entire concept is dependent upon the use of projected and non-guaranteed dividends. The 
larger the percentage mix of term insurance - the longer it takes to convert and the greater the 
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risk of dividend reductions. The time involved also will affect the pricing of the paid up 
additions as the insured is getting older each year. The other major risk is non-guaranteed 
mortality charges. Any increase in mortality charges in the future may require additional 
premiums - which, in effect, negates the original purpose of this concept. Term riders should 
not be more than 20 % of the face amount as the sensitivity to interest rate or dividend changes 
becomes problematic. 
7. No-Load or Low-Load Contracts 
The most dynamic change in insurance today is the development and 
marketing of "No Commission" life insurance, disability and annuity products. The term "low-
load is generally used if at least 88 % of premium goes toward cash value right away according 
to LIMRA. A "no-load" product has only a service fee and no separate charges for 
administrative or monthly fees. 
No-load and low-load are both no commission products generally described 
as traditional products which have stripped out commissions and bonuses, home office and 
agency expenses, recruiting and training cots,' as well as long surrender charges. These costs 
typically will make up 150%-200% of the first year premium. (See Exhibit 2). Since these 
products remove the traditional costs of cash value insurance policies, it results in immediate 
cash values of up to 97 % of premiums. Some contracts even provide guaranteed cash surrender 
values equal to the sum of premiums paid. 
These products are available in Kentucky only through Licensed Insurance 
Consultants (LIC) who charge a fee for their services. This fee must be included in the total 
cost for coverage, but virtually always represents substantially less than comparable commissions 
on a similar product. Several advantages to the buyer are presented by this approach; fees for 
this service can be deductible, insurance is bought directly from the insurance company and 
possible conflicts of interest are eliminated because commission scales of various products are 
not a consideration. The other advisors; attorney, trust officer or CPA can reduce or eliminate 
their liability exposure to either product selection or performance by transferring it to the 
independent LIC, who contracts directly with the client. 
B. Costs vs Benefits of Policy Selection 
1. Guarantees 
We reviewed a situation where a carrier guaranteed the bonus rate in 10, 
15 or 20 years but in reality, nothing prevented this company from dropping their credited rate 
to do so. Other situations exist similar to this which many agents, buyers and advisors assume 
to be guaranteed, but indeed are not. Today many mutual companies' dividend scales are higher 
than they will be next year, and yet many provide proposal illustrations assuming these larger 
dividends for 20 or 30 years. 
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Another assumption, which deceptively hides policy expenses, in a 
proposal includes a column referred to as the" Account Value." This account value cannot be 
borrowed, used as collateral or even obtained by surrendering the policy. This fictional account 
value shows the policy's value if there hadn't been any commissions paid to the agent and 
general agent. But there were. Therefore, the true value of a policy is the surrender value. 
For example, a proposal may indicate an annual premium of $10,000, first year account value 
of $8,000, and surrender value of O. The $8,000 account value only exists as ink on the 
proposal. 
It often is claimed that whole life has greater policy guarantees than 
universal life. This simply is not true. While it is true that whole life has guaranteed 
premiums, guaranteed cash values, and guaranteed death benefits, in order to be competitive 
these whole life policies depend on non-guaranteed dividends to enhance the policy values. The 
level of dividends enhancing the policy depends on the "EMI" factors discussed earlier. 
Therefore, whole life policies have the single mechanism (dividends) to adjust expense, mortality 
and investment experience. Universal life and interest sensitive whole life, on the other hand, 
have two mechanisms to adjust: mortality charges and interest rates. Whether a policy has only 
one mechanism (dividends) or two (mortality and interest) to adjust - they both depend on the 
same major pricing components. The element which U.L does not have is a guaranteed 
premium. 
A very large drop in projected values due to a change in policy pricing 
factors occurred in 1988 with a participating whole life policy from a major Connecticut based 
life insurer. In 1988, this insurer had a dividend scale of 10.75 %. By the end of the year the 
rate, without warning, dropped to 9.05 % . This 170 basis point drop resulted in a projected 
decrease in death benefits of 29 % and cash value decrease of 31 %, after 20 years, compared to 
the proposal of just one year earlier. This case is illustrative for two reasons: first, it indicates 
that participating whole life is as vulnerable to projected price changes as Universal Life and, 
second, it is dramatic evidence that policy pricing assumptions (dividends) must be carefully 
scrutinized . 
2. Flexibility or Liability 
Circumstances and needs of a policyholder vary over time and often this 
is the reason for life insurance being purchased to begin with. Yet invariably individuals end 
up with a policy with higher costs and least flexibility - severely limiting the options available 
for the inevitable changes which will occur. When asked to evaluate or approve a policy for a 
client this factor is most often overlooked. 
Whole life provides guaranteed premiums also meaning no flexibility to 
reduce or skip premiums. Whole life is also unable to reduce the face amount should this 
become a factor in the future, excepting a reduced paid-up policy option which also is fixed. 
These factors can pose dangers from a liability standpoint, especially to the trustee of a life 
insurance trust. On one hand, the guaranteed factors are attractive to the grantor - but the 
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inability to change or alter many aspects of coverage presents a dilemma for the trust on the 
other hand. As owner of the policy, is there a fiduciary duty required of the trust for the future 
interests of beneficiaries? 
Is the higher premium required by Whole Life worth the perceived benefits 
of the "guarantees" and to what extent is the fiduciary responsible for possible future needs? 
An interesting comparison is made between this choice and the investments a trustee would 
purchase for a client. Would it be prudent to invest 100% of a clients assets in guaranteed 
investments, i.e. government bonds, or is diversification and asset allocation of funds the 
fiduciary's primary responsibility? 
At the other end of the spectrum is Variable U.L. which allows complete 
flexibility on the cash value, death benefits and premiums. For this flexibility, the policyholder 
gives up the guaranteed aspects and transfers these risks to him or herself. In this case, are the 
benefits of the flexibility, lack of guarantees and potential investment returns worth the risk? 
What are the upfront costs and expenses incurred in a Variable Universal Life? Exhibit 5 
presents a diagram depicting the charges on a variable U.L. policy issued by one of the top three 
companies (in size) with the highest ratings. The costs break out as follows: 
Premium Tax Deduction 
Mgt. Fees & Expenses 
Mortality & Expense Risk 
Sales Charge 
Admin., Risk & Premium Charges 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS 
3.25% 
.65% 
.90% 
6.00% 
.50% 
11.30% 
The 11.30 % is deducted from gross returns to determine the net rate illustrated in a proposal. 
In other words, a 20.30% gross annual return would be required in order to show a 9% net 
return in a proposal. It becomes apparent the need for detailed analysis of the prospectus to 
determine the feasibility of projected returns. With this example, a government bond fund 
selected as the investment vehicle earning 8.30% would actually net the policyholder a negative 
3% return. 
VI. DUE DILIGENCE PROCESS 
A. Company Information and Sources 
Research on the background of an insurance company should include an analytical 
methodology not unlike the due diligence performed in evaluating a limited partnership and 
includes some basic questions. How well has the company's portfolios performed in the past? 
How stable is the company? What are the expenses of the company in relation to other carriers 
or industry norms? Answers to these questions can be found through two A.M. Best Co. 
publications. Best Insurance Reports and the Trend Report. The first gives comprehensive 
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statistical reports on the financial history and operating results of legal reserve life insurance 
companies. The Trend Report has 5 year results of profitability, leverage and liquidity tests. 
This may provide a better sense of where the company is going with past performance as a 
indication of future expectations. 
Information may also be obtained by consulting the Convention Statements (or 
"blue books") which are the annual reports filed with the insurance commissioner by all 
companies doing business in the state. These provide very detailed analysis of assets , liabilities, 
surplus, cash flow, income, expenses, reserves, claims and operations by lines of business. 
Companies are also required to include Schedule M in these reports, which applies to interest 
sensitive policies and provides answers to a series of disclosure questions about dividends and 
illustrations. Advisors may want or need to consult as well with other professionals who have 
done this· type of work or have knowledge about a particular company. When conducting due 
diligence on a company, remember that no one can guarantee a company's performance years 
from now. Other sources for determining the financial strength and claims paying abilities of 
a carrier are Moody's Investor Services, Standard & Poor's and Duff & Phelps. 
B. Product and Policy Comparison 
1. Statistical Measures 
Although we live in the age of information we remain mired in the Stone 
Age when it comes to obtaining data about insurers' practices so that policies may be understood 
and compared. Because of the compelling need to improve this, a new policy-disclosure and 
cost-measurement approach has been submitted to the NAIC and the Society of Actuaries. A 
Society of Actuaries task force investigating illustrations confirmed the need for improved 
information and comparison standards. The industry's primary tool for policy information -
interest adjusted index - is not only inadequate, but also regularly misused and misunderstood. 
For instance, comparisons of interest-adjusted indexes of dissimilar insurance plans are invalid 
and therefore a limited tool in today's times of policy diversity. This index is used as a 
comparison but is derived from illustrations that are not required to be reliable or even 
reasonable. As you have seen, there is little relevant information provided to facilitate an 
evaluation. 
Internal rate of return (IRR) calculations have also been used as a measure 
to compare policies in situations where premiums differed from one proposal to another. The 
IRR is the interest rate which, if credited to the annual premiums, would yield the cash 
surrender value at various points in time. Sometimes it is also used to calculate the return on 
death benefits although this produces a figure with no particular meaning, it merely depicts the 
leveraged nature of life insurance where small premiums provide substantial amounts of 
coverage. Since IRR calculations are based upon the cash values projected in an illustration, the 
underlying assumptions again, must be evaluated. The IRR method of evaluating life insurance 
proposals can be compared to evaluating the yield of a one-year CD projected over 20, 30 or 
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40 years - hardly an accurate procedure and dependent entirely on the assumptions made in the 
annual interest rate. 
Currently another approach, quite unique in many ways, is attempting to 
bring a new way to analyze proposals. Fungible present-value analysis begins with the 
observation that if the same stream of premium dollars invested in a life insurance policy were 
put into an investment vehicle earning the same annual compounding rate and tax advantages, 
the cash value in the alternative investment would exceed the policy's cash value because of the 
cost of life insurance components. Life insurance, after all, requires annual mortality charges 
to cover death claims, underwriting expenses and larger sales loads (commissions). Fungible 
present-value analysis states that these total costs are best understood by examining the difference 
between these future cash values - the policy's and the alternative investment - and 
expressing it as a present-value by using the compounding rate as a discount rate. 
This approach is called fungible present-value analysis because the use of 
the same rate for both compounding and discounting preserves the interchangability or fungibility 
of dollars at different times within the "investment/cost system." This fungibility is critical to 
the accuracy arid completeness of the approach. The system's compounding/discounting rate is 
defmed as the rate of return on the insurer's net interest or dividend rate credited on cash values. 
In essence, these figures show the present sacrifice - the policy's internal economic opportunity 
cost - that a policyholder would make for the insurance protection in the illustration. 
2. Sources for Proposal Information 
There are firms which have sprung up across the country that provide 
specific policy analysis. This can be useful but rather late for many policyholders who find out 
after their purchase the value of the policy. The service is also available from a number of fee-
based or fee-only insurance advisors although there are not many as this area is relatively new. 
It would be beneficial for this advisor to be a Licensed Insurance Consultant, a Registered 
Investment Advisor and not a captive or general agent of an insurance company. Actuarial firms . 
will often perform an audit concerning a policy or proposal and the Society of Actuaries can 
provide names of firms in your area. Either of these sources will be somewhat expensive; plan 
on spending $500 or more. For smaller face amounts and an inexpensive review the National 
Insurance Consumer Organization will provide one for approximately $40. Beacon Co. in 
Michigan uses a policy's values to compare with "benchmark" industry values for approximately 
$100. 
The American Bar Association - Real Property, Probate and Trust Law 
Section, publishes "The Life Insurance Counselor" and is an excellent source of information on 
life insurance products, illustrations and due diligence. Basic knowledge is provided as a guide 
to the elements of an insurance proposal and due diligence questions necessary for analyzing 
projections. 
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The American Society of CLU's and ChFC's has developed an illustration 
Questionnaire (IQ) as an analytical tool for its members. The IQ has 25 questions which can 
be sent to an insurer requesting detailed information on the assumptions behind the illustrations. 
The questions cover five areas: general, expenses, mortality, interest rate and policy persistency 
assumptions. This provides an interesting approach and results in agents rating the relative 
effectiveness of illustrations and assumes their credibility and capability to do so. Interpreting 
company responses to the IQ can be difficult without an actuarial background or experience in 
pricing policies. Approximately half of the major life insurers have agreed to answer the 
questions, leaving many unanswered. Mass Mutual is one carrier refusing to comply with the 
request for additional information stating, among other concerns, "One important point to keep 
in mind about dividends is that the choice of a dividend schedule is strongly influenced by short-
term considerations. There is no commitment or expectation that the given dividend schedule 
will remain in place indefinitely. The dividend schedule is not a prediction nor an estimation 
of future dividends. This is the major reason why illustrations should not be viewed as long-
term projections." These considerations are, of course, not unique to Mass Mutual but apply 
to all companies. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Life Insurance Marketing and Research Association 
(LIMRA) Study Of Whole Life Policies 
Statistics Regarding Persistency 
Year Policies in Force 
2 83% 
I 
3 64% 
5 50% 
10 27% 
20 13% 
"But to make their policies look as attractive as possible, 
some companies design them so that the cash surrender 
value by the 20th or 25th year will be immense. Agents 
sell life insurance on the basis of the 20th or 25th year 
numbers - which few policyholders will ever collect." 
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EXHIBIT 2 
Percentage of First Year's Premium Paid in Acquisition 
Ea II Cost for Traditional Cash Value Life Policies ~ d II --\sd ~ 
~--
~ 
~ 
Range 
~ II From To 
II ---
Agent Commission 55% 60% 
General Agent Override 30% 40% 
Bonus 10% 15% 
Trips/Meetings/Gift 2% 4% 
Fringe Benefits 5% 9% 
. Expense Allowance 10% 20% 
Home Office: 
Recruiting, Training, Promotions/Advertising 
Advanced Sales Department, Underwriting 
Actuarial & Accounting Depts. 20% 30% 
~ 
I 
_I 
II Other Home Office: 
Medical, Investment Mgt., Legal 18% 22% 
II 
d 
II 
Total 150% 200% 
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EXHIBIT ~ 
$500,000 Universal Life Policy 
Male - 40 Nonsmoker $3400.00 Premium for 20 years 
Projected Mortality Table 
Current Mortality Table 
This illustrates how powerful changes in just two of the 
variables (mortality and investment) can be on the policy-
holders cash values overtime. 
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EXHIBIT 5 
I Premium Payment I 
I 
• less charge for taxes 
attributable to premiums 
• less $2 processing fee 
I 
Invested Premium Amount 
• To be invested in one or a combination of: 
• The Investment Portfolios of the Series Fund described below 
• The Fixed-Rate Option 
• The Real Property Account 
I 
Daily Charges 
• Management fees and expenses are deducted from the assets of the Series Fund. 
• A daily charge equivalent to an annual rate of up to 0.9% is deducted from the assets of the variable 
investment options for mortality and expense risks. 
I 
Monthly Charges 
• A sales charge is currently deducted from the Contract Fund in the amount of VI ofl % 'of the primary 
annual premium. 
• The Contract Fund is reduced by a' guaranteed minimum death benefit risk charge of not more than 
$0.01 per $1,000 of the face amount of insurance. 
• The Contract Fund is reduced by an administrative charge of up to $3 per Contract and $0.03 per 
$1,000 of face amount of insurance; if the face amount of the Contract is greater than $100,000, the 
charge is reduced. 
• A charge for anticipated mortality is deducted, with the maximum charge based on the 
Non-Smoker/Smoker 1980 CSO Tables. 
• If the Contract includes riders, a deduction from the Contract Fund will be made for charges applicable 
to those riders; a deduction will also be made if the rating class of the insured results In an extra 
charge. 
Possible Additional Charges 
• If the Contract lapses or is surrendered during the first 10 years, a contingent deferred sales charge is 
assessed; the maximum contingent deferred sales charge during the first 5 years is 50% of the first 
year's primary annual premium but this charge is both subject to other important limitations and 
reduced for Contracts that have been in force for more than 5 years. 
• If the Contract lapses or is surrendered during the first 10 years, a contingent deferred administrative 
charge is assessed; during the first 5 years, this charge equals $ 5 per $1,000 of face amount and it 
begins to decline uniformly after the fifth Contract year so that it disappears on the tenth Contract 
anniversary. 
• An administrative processing charge of up to $15 will be made in connection with each withdrawal of 
excess cash surrender value or a decrease in face amour'lt. 
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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
IN ESTATE PLANNING 
Wiley Dinsmore 
I. OVERVIEW OF ETHICS 
A History: 
1. Canons - adopted by AB.A in 1908 - 47 Canons 
2. Code of Professional Responsibility - AB.A approved 1970 
a. Lawyers in Kentucky formerly were governed by the Code. 
Lawyers in Ohio still are governed by the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. 
b. The Code has a three part format. First, there are nine canons. 
After each canon, there are ethical considerations and after 
ethical considerations ('IECs") for each canon are disciplinary 
rules (IDRs"). 
c. ECs. Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and 
represent the objectives toward which every member of the 
profession should strive. They constitute a body of principles 
upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific 
situations. 
d. DRs. Disciplinary Rules are mandatory in character. They state 
the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall 
without being subject to disciplinary action. 
e. In Ohio, liThe code has the force of law ... " Kirschbaumv. 
Dillon (1991) 58 Ohio St. 3d 58, 567 N.E. 2d 1291. 
3. Rules of Professional Conduct - AB.A approved 1983. 
a. Adopted by Kentucky effective January 1, 1990 as S.C.R. 3.130. 
b. The Rules have a two-part format. First, there is a rule that 
usually begins with "a lawyer shall", "a lawyer may" or "a lawyer 
shall not." Each rule is followed by a commentary. 
4. Restatement of the Law of Lawyering - Currently being written by ALL 
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B. Relationship Between Code, Rules and Restatement 
Professor Jeffrey N. Pennell has written: 
"A practioner in a state that embraces the Model Code standards will 
benefit from a consideration of the more recently developed Model 
Rules, which establish minimum standards rather than the 
"aspirationar' goals of the Model Code. In this respect, the Model 
Rules should be regarded as a lesser obligation than the Model Code's 
Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations, although many attorneys 
would like to believe it is otherwise. Moreover, as rules of ethics, the 
professional is subject to being judged in the harshest possible light. 
consistent with preserving the profession's responsibility -- and 
opportunity -- to govern itself. More importantly, notwithstanding 
perceptions that self-governance has become ineffective, no responsible' 
attorney will rely on the "audit lottery" of ethics enforcement." 
Hess Lecture, October, 1990, The Record of the Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York, Vol. 45, No.6, pages 716 and 717. 
<;~ 
II. REASONS TO COMPLY 
A To Avoid Liability for Malpractice 
"While the failure to comply with general rules of conduct, like 
the rules of conduct involved in the case before us (DR 5-
101(A), 5-104(A) and EC (5-5)), will not ordinarily constitute 
negligence per ~ it is a circumstance that can be considered, 
along with other facts and circumstances, in determining 
whether the actor has acted with reasonable concern for the 
safety and welfare of others - that is with due care. 
Because the norms of behavior expressed in the Code of 
Professional Responsibility are directly relevant to the issue of 
what a reasonable person in Dillon's (the attorney) position 
would have done, we conclude that they are relevant to the 
issue of whether Dillon brought undue influence to bear upon 
Krischbaum (a client for whom Dillon was preparing a will from 
which Dillon would receive one-half the residue)." 
Krischbaum v. Dillon, 58 Ohio St. 3d 58, 567, N.E.2d 1291 (1991). 
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Comment: This case in the ethics and malpractice areas seems to stand for 
two important propositions. 
1. Even though Ethical Consideration are merely aspirational, the jury 
may consider them in determining whether a lawyer acted with due 
care. 
2. Undue influence by an attorney can be found from the failure by the 
attorney to comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility." 
But see Lazy Seven Coal States, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds, P.C. (1991) 813 
S.W.2d 400 holding the Tennessee Code does not establish a standard' 
of car .' 
B. To Avoid Disciplinary Action 
C. To Avoid Loss of a Gift or Bequest 
D. To Avoid Being Disqualified or Conflicted Out 
ID. COMPETENCE 
A Ru1es 
1. A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. 
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation. 
See Canon 6 of the Code. 
B. Comments 
1. In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and 
skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative 
complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general 
experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, 
the preparation and study the . lawyer is able to give the matter and 
whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult 
with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In 
many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general 
practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be required on 
some circumstances. 
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C. Discussion 
1. Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc. ("ALAS"), a malpractice 
insurance company that insures medium to large non-New York City 
law firms reported in the fall of 1991 that the trusts and estates area 
was the third most dangerous area for malpractice claims. It stated 
that their most common claim of negligence involved an estate tax 
issue. 
2. Although every lawyer feels competent to prepare a will, the tax impact 
of the provisions of the will are often not considered or understood. 
As a result Estate Planning and probate administration may be a 
particular field of law requiring expertise and not just the proficiency 
of a general practitioner. 
IV. DILIGENCE 
v. 
A Rule 1.3 
1. A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client. 
B. Comments 
1. Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than 
procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by 
the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, 
as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal 
position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not 
affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client 
needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer'S 
trustworthiness. 
C. Discussion 
1. This rule really is self-explanatory, but the comment points out a 
problem with regard to estate planning documents. What is a 
reasonable time for the preparation of a set of estate planning of 
documents? Two weeks? One month? 
COMMUNICATIONS 
A Rule 1.4 
J-4 
1. A lawyer should keep a client reasonably informed about the status of 
a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information. 
2. A lawyer should explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation. 
B. Discussion 
1. Again this Rule should not cause any substantial difficulty in the estate 
planning and probate areas. 
VI. SECRETS AND CONFIDENCES 
A Rule 1.6 
1. A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of 
a client. 
B. Discussion 
1. The commentary to the Rules makes it clear that the Rule relates to 
information whatever its source. The Code required the information 
to be acquired during representation. 
2. The Rules require the information to "relate to the representation". 
The Code is broader. 
3. Note that the information is did not come from the client. 
4. The Rules state that the lawyer should not "disclose" the information 
but he can "use" the information unless its use is to the disadvantage 
of his client (see Rule 1.8(b)). 
See discussions under conflict of interest below. 
VII. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
A Rules of Professional Conduct. 
1. Rule 1.7 
a. The Rule 
J-5 
1. A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation 
of that client will be directly adverse to another client, 
unless: 
(a) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation 
will not adversely affect the relationship with the 
other client; and 
(b) each client consents after consultation. 
ii. A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation 
of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or 
by the lawyer's own interests, unless. 
( a) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation 
will not be adversely affected; and 
(b) the client consents after consultation. When 
representation of multiple clients in a single matter 
is undertaken, the consultation shall include 
explanation of the implications of the common 
representation and the advantages and risks 
involved. 
b. Comments 
. ~.;\;. 
i. Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship 
to a client. An impermissible conflict of interest may exist 
before representation is undertaken, in which event the 
representation should be declined. If such a conflict 
arises after representation has been undertaken, the 
lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See 
Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved and 
the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after 
representation, whether the lawyer may continue to 
represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. 
See also Rule 2.2(c). As to whether a client-lawyer 
relationship exists or, having once been established, is 
continuing, see Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope . 
ii. A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, 
if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the 
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iii. 
arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of 
loyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). 
Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and 
estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to. 
prepare wills for several family members, such as husband 
and wife, and depending upon the circumstances, a 
conflict of interest may arise. In estate administration the 
identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a 
particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the 
fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or 
trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make 
clear the relationship to the parties involved. 
iv. A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is· 
. also a member of its board of directors should determine 
whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. 
The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in 
matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration 
should be given to the frequency with which such 
situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, 
the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and 
the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice 
from another lawyer in· such situations. If there is 
material risk that the dual role will compromise the 
lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the 
lawyer should not serve as a director. 
2. DRS-107 provides in part: 
3. 
4. 
a. Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, 
a lawyer shall not: 
i. Accept compensation for his 
legal services from one other 
than his client. 
ii. Accept from one other than 
his client anythiIig of value 
related to his representation 
of or his employment by his 
client. 
Rule 1.8 provides in part that ---
Rule 1.10 disqualifies a firm, its partners, associates, shareholders or 
employees if one of its lawyers is conflicted out of a matter. 
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a. A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client 
from one other than the client unless: 
i. such compensation is in accordance with an agreement 
between the client and the third party or the client 
consents after consultation; 
n. there is no interference with the lawyer'S independence of 
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer 
relationship; and 
iii. information relating to representation of a client is 
protected as required by Rule 1.6. 
b. Comments 
B. Discussion 
Person Paying for Lawyer's Services 
Paragraph (f) requires disclosure of the fact that the lawyer's 
services are being paid for by a third party unless such payment 
is provided for in an agreement between the client and the third 
party. Such an arrangement must also conform to the 
requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality and Rule 1.7 
concerning conflict of interest. Where the client is a class, 
consent may be obtained on behalf of the court-supervised 
procedure. 
Kentucky seems to follow that in transactions between a lawyer and a client, 
the burden of proof as to the fairness of the transaction shifts to the lawyer. 
Morgan v. Hibbard (1944) 299 Ky. 57, 184 S.W.2d 218. 
1. Rule 2.2. 
a. A lawyer may only act as intermediary between clients if: 
i. the lawyer consults with each client concerning the 
implications of the common representation, including the 
advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the 
attorney-client privileges, and obtains each client's consent 
to the common representation; 
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ii. the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be 
resolved on terms compatible with the clients' best 
interests, that each client will be able to make adequately 
informed decisions in the matter and that there is little 
risk of material prejudice to the interests of any of the 
clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and 
iii. the lawyer reasonably believes that the common 
representation can be undertaken impartially and without 
improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to 
any of the clients. 
b. While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each 
client concerning the decisions to be made and the 
considerations relevant in making them, so that each client can 
make adequately informed decisions. 
c. A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so 
requests, or if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no 
longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue 
to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject 
of the intermediation. 
C. Code of Professional Responsibility 
1. Canon 5 requires a lawyer to exercise independent professional 
judgment solely for the benefit of a client, free of compromising 
influences and legalities. Neither his personal interest, interests of 
other clients, nor desires of third parties should be permitted to dilute 
his loyalty. EC5-1. 
2. The ethical considerations are divided into three parts: 
a. Interests of a lawyer that may affect his judgment. 
b. Interests of multiple clients. 
c~ Desires of third persons. 
3. Interests of a lawyer that may affect his judgment. Interests that are 
particular to estate planning and probate lawyers are dealt with. 
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a. EC5-5 provides: 
"A lawyer should not suggest to his client that a gift be 
made to himself or for his benefit. IT a lawyer accepts a 
gift from his client, he is peculiarly susceptible to the 
charge that he unduly influenced or overreached the 
client. IT a client voluntarily offers to make a gift to his 
lawyer, the lawyer may accept the gift, but before doing 
so, . he should urge that his client secure disinterested 
advice from an independent, competent person who is 
cognizant of all the circumstances. Other than in 
exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should insist that an 
instrument in which his client desires to name him 
beneficially be prepared by another lawyer selected by the 
client." 
b. EC5-6 provides: 
A lawyer should notco:nsciously influence a client to 
name him as executor, trustee, or lawyer in an instrument. 
In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer as 
such, care should be taken by the lawyer to avoid even 
the appearance of impropriety. 
4. Interests of Multiple Clients: 
a. Ethical Considerations 
EC5-14 provides: 
Maintaining the independence of professional judgment 
required of a lawyer precludes his acceptance or 
continuation of employment that will adversely affect his 
judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client. 
This problem arises whenever a lawyer is asked to 
represent two or more clients who may have differing 
interests, whether such interests be conflicting, 
inconsistent, diverse, or other discordant. 
EC5-15 provides in part: 
IT a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue 
representation of multiple clients having potentially 
differing interests, he must weight carefully the possibility 
J - 10 
~ 
"1 
=.-=----J 
that his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided 
if he accepts or continues the employment .... If a lawyer 
accepted such employment and the interests did become 
actually differing, he would have to withdraw from 
employment with the likelihood of resulting hardship on 
the clients; and for this reason it is preferable that he 
refuse the employment initially .... 
ECS-16 provides in part: 
In those instances in which a lawyer is justified in 
representing two or more clients having differing interests, 
it is nevertheless essential that each client be given the 
opportunity to evaluate his need for representation free 
of any potential conflict and to obtain other counsel if he . 
so desires. Thus before a lawyer may represent multiple 
clients, he should explain fully to each client the 
implications of the common representation and should 
accept or continue employment only if the clients consent. 
b. Disciplinary Rules 
DRS-lOS provides: 
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the 
exercise of his independent professional judgment in 
behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely 
affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, 
except to the extent permitted under DRS-IOS(C). 
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if 
the exercise of his independent professional judgment in 
behalf of a client will be or likely to be adversely affected 
by his representation of another client, except to the 
extent permitted under DRS-lOS(C). 
(C) In the situations covered by DR5-10S(A) and (B), a 
lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that 
he can adequately represent the interest of each and if 
each consents to the representation after full disclosure of 
the possible effect of such representation on the exercise 
of his independent professional judgment on behalf of 
each. 
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(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to 
withdraw from employment under DR 5-105, no partner 
or associate of his or his firm may accept or continue such 
employment. 
VIII. CANON 5 - INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT - CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
A General 
Canon 5 covers several areas. The first area is where the representation of 
a client is "directly adverse" to another client. The second area is where the 
lawyer'S representation may be materially limited because of the lawyer's 
responsibility (1) to another client or (2) to a third party or (3) by the lawyer's 
own interest. 
DR 5-105 provides: 
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his 
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is 
likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered 
employment, except the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C). 
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of 
his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or 
is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client, 
except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C). 
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may 
represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately 
represent the interest of each and if each consents to the 
representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such 
representation on the exercise of his independent professional 
judgment on behalf of each. 
(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from 
employment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his or his firm 
may accept or continue such employment. 
B. Multiple Representations - Rules 1.7, 1.8 and 2.2, D.R. 5-105 and E.C. 5-2, 
E.c. 5-5 
1. Husband and Wife Wills, Asset Transfers, Divorce and Marriage 
J - 12 
== 
See the New Section Recommendations of the Real Property, Probate 
and Trust Law Section, ABA published in Probate and Property, July-
August, 1993, page 26. 
These recommendations state that the representation of spouses 
without any agreement is a joint representation and that Rille 1.7 the 
Model Rille dealing with Conflicts of Interests does not apply until 
facts come to the attention of the lawyer that indicate to the lawyer a 
conflict is arising. If those facts do arise, the lawyer must obtain 
informed consent from both spouses. "Mere difference in objectives . 
. . are not necessarily conflicts that require a Rule 1.7(a) waiver." DR 
5-105 of the Code also requires obtaining of such consent but such 
consent should not be required until the lawyers feels a conflict 
developing. 
The Conference on Ethical Responsibilities of Serving Older Client 
held at Fordham University School of Law on December 3, 4 and 5, 
1993 (The Fordham Conference") concluded differently. 
"In order to undertake joint representation, the lawyer must reasonably 
believe that the husband and wife both understand the implications of 
joint representation. To accomplish this, the lawyer should review the 
terms and implications of the representation with the husband and 
wife, preferably in writing." 
At the Fordham Conference seven of the ten members of the 
Committee that made the recommendations of the Real Property, 
Probate and Trust Law Section were present. 
In October, 1993 the Board of Regents of the American College of 
Trust and Estate Counsel adopted ACTEC Commentaries on the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct C'ACTEC Commentaries"). 
These ACTEC Commentaries are very similar in this area to the 
conclusions of the Fordham Conference. 
The writer has great difficulty with the Committee's recommendations 
because it only focuses on when the joint representation is "directly 
adverse" as required by Rule 1.7(a). The recommendation does not 
deal with the representation being limited by lithe lawyer's responsibility 
to another client" or to a "third party" or by the 11awyer's own interest" 
as required by Rille 1. 7(b) and Canon 5. An opinion of the Allegheny 
County, Pennsylvania Bar Association Professional Ethics Committee 
dated March 1, 1983 is widely cited as permitting a lawyer to represent 
both husband and wife in estate planning. 
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The Real Property, Probate and Trust Laws Section of the AB.A has 
recently issued Comments and Recommendations on the lawyers' 
duties in representing husband and wives. 24 Real Property, Probate 
and Trust Journal 765 (Winter, 1994). These comments and 
recommendations are a prescriptive guide prepared by trusts and 
estates lawyers experienced in the area. The articles suggests that 
representation may be "joint" or "separate". (Separate means separate 
simultaneous representation.) 
The comments state representation is joint unless made otherwise by 
the parties. There is no conflict until the lawyers discerns conflict. 
Once conflict is discerned, the lawyer consent should be obtained 
preferably in writing. The mere fact husband and wife want to 
distribute their assets differently is not a per se conflict. Confidences· 
disclosed must be evaluated. 
If a confidence is communicated by one spouse, the report suggests 
that the lawyer must determine "how best to handle the situation 
between two spouses at the time the confidence is imparted.1I Id. at 29. 
According to the report the lawyer must lIinquire into the nature of the 
confidence to permit the lawyer to determine whether the couple's 
differences that caused the information to be secret constitutes either 
a material potential for conflict or a true adversity. II Id. at 28. The 
report goes on to describe three broad types of confidences that may 
cause the lawyer to conclude that the differences between the spouses 
make the spouses' interests truly adverse: (1) Action-related 
confidences, in which the lawyer is asked to give advice or prepare 
documents without the knowledge of the other spouse, that would 
reduce or defeat the other spouse's interest in the confiding spouse's 
property or pass the confiding spouse's property to another person; (2) 
Prejudicial confidences, which seek no action by the lawyer, but 
nonetheless indicate a substantial potential of material harm to the 
interest of the other spouse; and (3) Factual confidences which indicate 
that the expectations of one spouse with respect to an estate plan, or 
the spouse's understanding of the plan, are not true. Because an 
unexpected letter of withdrawal may not protect a confidence from 
disclosure, the ABA Committee concluded that "the lawyer must 
balance the potential for material harm arising from an unexpected 
withdrawal against the potential for material harm arising from the 
failure to disclose the confidence to the other spouse.1I Id. at 30. 
If lawyer withdraws he can convert the representation into a separate 
representation but only with full disclosure and the consent of both. 
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The Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal articles argues that 
separate simultaneous representation is permitted under the Rules. 
This representation must be by specific agreement. However, the 
article points out the "overriding ethics" duty to provide independent 
judgment and the difficulty separate representation causes in exercising 
independent. Most persons who have examined this issue carefully 
have concluded that separate representation while theoretically possible 
in practically impossible. Teresa Stanton Collett has argue that -
No lawyer can serve two masters, for the lawyer will either love the 
first (preserving the client's confidences), and hate the second 
(betraying the other client's trusts), or hate the fist (disclosing the 
~lient's confidences), and love the second (protecting the other client's· 
ability to make informed decisions. This inherent conflict compels the 
rejection of separate simultaneous representation as a professional· 
norm. As reflected by the initial recommendation of the Professional 
Standards Committee of the American College of Probate Counsel, this 
model of representation should be permitted only on the rare occasions 
when exceptional circumstances require the heroic effort of building 
and maintaining a Chinese Wall within the lawyer's mind. 
Collett, "And the Two Shall Become One ... Until the Lawyers Are 
Done" 7 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 101, 143. 
The Fordham Conference concluded that in the initial conferences, the 
lawyer and the client should agree on the confidentiality of disclosures. 
The Conference set forth only two options: (1) the lawyer, in the 
lawyer's discretion, may disclose all information even if a client does 
not want it disclosed, or (2) the lawyer must disclose such information. 
The Conference felt the first option was preferred. The Conference 
rejected an option that the lawyer will hold the information to the 
lawyer alone . 
2. Parent-Child - Intergenerational Representation. 
a. The Fordham Conference also discussed the ethical concerns in 
representing multiple generations, e.g., father-daughter or 
mother-son. The Conference could not agree that a lawyer may 
represent a family group if there was a clear identification of the 
persons who would become clients if there was a splintering of 
the group and the persons to whom the duties of loyalty and 
confidentiality were owed. 
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b. Haynes v. First National State Bank, 87 N.J. 163, 432, A, 2d 890 
(1981). This case involved a will contest. The lawyer who 
prepared the will and trust of the decedent was also the attorney 
for the decedent's daughter who was the principal beneficiary of 
the estate. The court held that there was a presumption of 
undue influence by the daughter's attorney which could be 
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Did the daughter 
have a malpractice claim against the lawyer? 
3. Corporation and Shareholder, Officer or Director 
4. 
5. 
6. 
The law firm of Kirkland & Ellis sought attorneys fees in the Estate of . 
George Halas. The beneficiaries objected. The firm represented the 
fiduciary as fiduciary, the fiduciary individually, the fiduciary as CEO 
of the Chicago Bears corporation, the corporation, the sister of the· 
decedent, and her family. The court determined the firm's conduct 
representing so many interests showed an absence of good faith which 
resulted in a reduction in the fee. Estate of Halas, 159 lli. App. 3d 
818, 512 N.E.2d 1276 (1987). See also the ABA Informal Decision 
564 (1962) in which the attorney who represented the estate of a 
decedent was conflicted out because he also represented the 
corporation. 
Corporate Fiduciary & Client. An attorney who represents a bank 
should disclose this representation to a client thinking of naming the 
bank executor in the client's will. ID. State Bar Association Opn. 90-2. 
Insurance Agent & Client - Neb. St. Bar Assn. Opn. 81-10; Wisc. Prof. 
Ethics Com. 392-2. An attorney to whom clients are referred by an 
insurance agent should disclose that relationship to any clients who 
purchase insurance from the agent. Neb. State Bar Assn. 81-10. 
Fiduciaries and Beneficiaries. 
The Concept of Derivative Liability. The Fordham Conference was 
clear in its determination that the client of an attorney who represents 
a fiduciary is the fiduciary and not the beneficiaries of the estate or 
trust. Nevertheless, the Fordham Conference did decide that the 
lawyer for a fiduciary owes a derivative duty to the. beneficiaries. 
Case law supports this decision. Estate of Halas; Elam v. Hyatt Legal 
Services, 44 Ohio St. 3d 175, 541 N.E.2d 616 (1989); Fickett v. Sup. Ct., 
27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988 (1976) (Guardianship) 
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The Fordham Conference concluded that the lawyer for a fiduciary 
may, but is not obligated to, disclose secrets and confidences of his 
fiduciary to the beneficiaries of the fiduciary relationship. 
On May 9, 1994, the AB.A Standing Committee on Ethics issued 
Opinion 94-380 which clearly states that a lawyer who represents a 
fiduciary represents the fiduciary and has no obligation under Model 
Rule 1.6 to disclose to beneficiaries a breach of fiduciary obligations 
including fraud and other wrongdoing. But in Kentucky a lawyer may 
disclose confidential information to the extent necessary to prevent 
criminal conduct likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily 
injury. KB.A Opinion E-360 (9/11/93). See Rule 1.6(b )(2)(3). (The--
crimes/fraud exception). This version of the Rules would seem to 
mean that a lawyer for a fiduciary who is stealing from an estate or-
trust should not disclose the information because the client's criminal-
conduct does not relate to death or injury. Under Ohio DR4-
101(C)(3) the lawyer may realize the intention of his client to commit 
a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime. 
The opinion, however, does not address the other problem of the trust 
and estates lawyer. If the lawyer represents the trustee and the trustee.. 
is an individual, the other beneficiaries of the trust are likely to be . 
related to the trustee and either present or past clients of the lawyer.-
As a result, Rule 1.6(a) on information may apply requiring present 
client consent or Rule 1.9( a) requiring former client consent. 
7. Charity and Client 
8. Dual Representation Letter 
C. Pecuniary Interest 
1. Rule 1.8(a) - Draftsperson as Beneficiary: Also EC 5-5 
EC5-5 provides: 
"A lawyer should not suggest to his client that a gift be 
made to himself or for his benefit. If a lawyer accepts a 
gift from his client, he is peculiarly susceptible to the 
charge that he unduly influenced or overreached the 
client. If a client voluntarily offers to make a gift to his 
lawyer, the lawyer may accept the gift, but before doing 
so, he should urge that his client secure disinterested 
advice from an independent, competent person who is 
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cognizant of all the circumstances. Other than in 
exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should insist that an 
instrument in which his client desires to name him 
beneficially be prepared by another lawyer selected by 
the client." 
But Rule lo8( c) permits a lawyer to prepare giving the lawyer or a 
person related to the lawyer as a parent, child, sibling or spouse a 
substantial gift unless the client is related to the donee. 
2. Designation of Attorney Draftsperson as Executor or Trustee; E.C. 5-6 
EC5-6 provides: 
"A lawyer should not consciously· influence a client to 
name his as executor, trustee, or lawyer in an instrument. 
In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer 
as such, care should be taken by the lawyer to avoid 
even the appearance of impropriety." 
A lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him 
executor or trustee. State v. Gulbankian. 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972). 
Nevertheless, the Fordham Conference determined ... 
a. A lawyer is not be precluded from serving as a fiduciary. 
b. A lawyer may draft an instrument in which the client names the 
lawyer fiduciary. The client should be adequately informed by 
the lawyer. If the client is not adequately informed, the 
appointment will be denied. Estate of DeMarco, N.Y. L.J. 
3/1/88. 
c. If the lawyer fiduciary has represented another interested party 
in a substantially related matter, the lawyer can be forced to 
withdraw. 
The AcrEC Commentaries have similar conclusions. 
28 Real Property, Probate & Trust Journal (Winter 1994) contains a 
report on the "Preparation of Wills and Trusts that name Drafting 
Lawyer as Fiduciary." The report emphasizes Rule 1l.8(a) requiring (1) 
that the transaction be fair and reasonable as fully disclosed in a 
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writing that is reasonably understandable, (2) the client is given 
reasonable opportunity to seek independent advice and (3) the client 
consents in writing. The report concludes that Rule 1.8 does not apply 
to the draftsman. The report also mentions Rul 2.1 requiring the 
lawyer to exercise independent professional judgment and render 
candid advice. The report continues by saying disclosure is a good idea 
and the lawyer disclose the role and function of the fiduciary, 
alternative persons or institutions who could act; conflicts, 
compensation issues and arguments of undue influence, conflicts with 
other clients and competency. Also, the lawyer should not limit the 
liability of the fiduciary. 
3. Corporate Fiduciaries Policy of Using Draftsperson as Attorney for 
Estate - Rule 2.1 discussed above. 
4. Naming Draftsperson in Will as Attorney for Estate 
This does not mean the lawyer does not need to withdraw, he must 
withdraw! 
5. Clients of Diminished Capacity. 
The Fordham Conference concluded: 
IIWhere a client has diminished capacity to make decisions and 
lawyer believes client is at risk of harm, lawyer may disclose 
confidential information obtained in the course of the 
representation without client consent with the goal of protecting 
the client from harm. In determining whether to make such 
disclosures, lawyer must consider the following factors: 
i. Harm to the client that is likely to result if the lawyer 
does not disclosure the confidences. Harm may include 
damage to the physical, mental or financial well being of 
the client, or to a clearly stated interest of the client, or 
to the client's dispositive plan or to the client. 
ii. The degree to which the lawyer has knowledge of the 
situation. 
iii. The potential for harm to third parties, in so far as the 
client's interests are adversely affected. 
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IV. The nature of the confidence and the potential for 
embarrassing or stigmatizing the client in light of the 
client's personal values. 
-. .;'-
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RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Kentucky Excerpts With Commentaries 
Rule 1.3 Diligence 
Ru1e 1.4 Communication 
Rule 1.6 Confidentiality Of Information 
Ru1e 1.7 Conflict Of Interest - General Rule 
Rule 1.8 Conflict Of Interest - Prohibited Transactions 
Rule 1.10 Imputed Disqualification - General Rule 
Rule 2.2 Intermediary 
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RUU: 1.3 DILIGENCE 
A lawyer.h.aIl act with reuonable dUlgence and promptneu in representing a 
client. 
Comment 
(1) A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, 
obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever 
lawful and ethical measures are reqtiired to vindicate a client's cause or 
endeavor. A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the 
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. 
However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be 
realized for a client. A lawyer has a professional discretion in determining the 
means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. A lawyer's 
W'Orkload should be controlled so that each matter can be handled ad-
equately. 
(2) Perhaps no professional shortCOming is more widely resented than procras-
tination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage 
of time or the change of conditions: in extreme instances, as when a lawyer 
overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be de-
stroyed. Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, 
however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and 
undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. 
(3) Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer 
should carty through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a 
lawyer's employment is limited to a specific mattei, the relationship termi-
nates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over 
a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may 
assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless 
the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer 
relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in 
writing. so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking 
after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example, 
if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that produced 
a result adverse to the client but has not been specifically instructed 
concemlng pursuit of an appeal, the lawyer should advise the client of the 
. possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter. 
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RULE 1.4 COMMUNICATION 
(a) A lawyer .hoWd keep a client reuoaably informed about the .tatWi of 
• matter and promptly comply with reasonable requeau for informa-
tioa. 
(b) A lawyer .hoWd explain a matter to tbe erteat reuoaably aece .. ary to 
permit the cHeat to make infonned deci.ioaa regarding the repreaea-
tatioa. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Comment 
The client should have s..illkient information to participate intelligently in 
decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by 
which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to 
do so. For example, a laVi)"er negotiating on behalf of a client should provide 
the client with facts rele<.-ant to the matter, iniOrm the client of communica-
tions from another party and take other reasonable steps that permit the 
client to make a decision regarding a serious offer from another party. A 
lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a cMl 
controversy or a proffere:i plea bargain in a criminal case should promptly 
inform the client of its substance unless prior discussions with the client 
have left it clear that the proposal will be unacceptable. See Rule 1. 2(al. Even 
when a client delegates authority to the lawyer. the client should be kept 
advised of the status of the matter. 
Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or 
assistance involved. For exam.ple. in negotiations where there is time to 
explain a proposal, the lawyer should re<.iew ail important provisions with 
the client before proceed:i..."'lg to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should 
explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should 
consult the client on tactics that might injure or coerce others. On the other 
hand, a lawyer ordinarily cannot be expected to describe trial or negotiation 
strategy in detail. The gUiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill 
reasonable client expectations ill' information consistent with the duty to 
act in the cl1ent's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to 
the character of representation. 
Ordinarily. the informa.tnl to be provided is that appropriate for a client who 
is a comprehending and respoDSible adult. However. fully informing the 
client according to this standard may be impracticable. for exam.ple. where 
the client is a child or suffers from mental disability. See Rule 1.14. When 
the client is an organ1za.t!<:m or group, it is often imposSible or inappropriate 
to inform ~ry one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily. the 
lawyer should address co=.un.ications to the appropriate officials of the 
organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved. a 
sys tern of limited or QCCa;5ional reporting may be arranged with the client. 
Practical exigency may a1so require a lawyer to act for a client without prior 
consultation. 
Withhol~ Ia!ormatioD 
(4) In some very unusual cl'"CUIllSt.ances.. a lawyer may be justified in delaying 
transmission of information when the client would be likely to react 
imprudently to an imme::!me communication. Thus. a lawyer might with-
hold a psychiatric diagoosts of a client when the examining psychiatrist 
1ndicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold 
infonnation to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience. Rules or court 
orders goven1inglittgation may provide that infonnation supplied to a lawyer 
may not be disclosed to t."le client. Rule 3.4(c) directs compliance with such 
rules or orders. 
J - 24 
RULE 1.6 CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION 
(a) A lawyer .ball not reveal information relating to representation of .. 
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for di.clo-
sures that are lmpHedly autborUed in order to carry out the represen-
tation. and except as .tated in paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal .uch information to the extent the lawyer 
reasonabl, beHeves neceauy: 
(1) to preYeDt the client from committing a crlmlna1 act that the 
lawyer beHe~ ill Ukely to result. in Lmminent death or 
.uktantial bodily harm; or . 
(2) to establiah a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
contro-nny between the lawyer and the cHent, to estabH.h a 
defense to a crimJ.n.al charge or civil cWm against the lawyer 
based upon conduct in which the cHent was involved, or to 
respond to aIlegatioDiin any proceeding concemiDg the 
lawyer's repl"esentatioD of the cHent; or 
(3) to comply with other law or court order. 
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CoDUDeDt 
(1) The lawyer is part of a judicial system charged with upholding the law. One 
of the lawyer's functions is to advise clients so that they avoid any violation 
of the law in the proper exercise of their rights. . 
(2) The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate 
confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full development 
of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages 
people to seek early legal assistance. 
(3) Almost without exception. clients come to lawyers in order to detenninewhat 
their rights are and what is. in the maze oflaws and regulations. deemed to 
be legal and correct. The common la,w recognizes that the client's confi-
dences must be protected from disclosure. Based upon experience. lawyers 
know that almost all clients follow the advice given. and the law is upheld. 
(4) A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer 
maintain confidentlality of information relating to the representation. The 
client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the 
lawyer even as to embarrasSing or legally damaging subject matter. 
(5) The principle of confidentlality is given effect in two related bodies of law. the 
attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in the 
law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional 
ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings 
in which a lawyer maybe called as a witness orotheIWise required to produce 
evidence concerning aclient. The rule of client-lawyer confidentlality applies 
in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer 
through compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule applies not merely to 
matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information 
relating to the representation. whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose 
such information except as authorized or required by the Ru1es of Profes-
sional Conduct or other law. See also Scope. 
(6) The requirement of maintaining confidentiality of information relating to 
representation applies to government lawyers who may disagree with the 
policy goals that their representation is designed to advance. 
Authorized Dbclonre 
(7) A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when 
appropriate in canying out the representation. except to the extent that the 
client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority. In litiga-
tion. for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact that 
cannot properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a disclosure that 
facilitates a satisfactoxy conclusion. 
(8) Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each 
other information relating to a client of the firm. unless the client has 
instructed that partlcu1ar information be confined to specified lawyers. 
Di.cloaure Advene to CUcnt 
(9) 
(10) 
The confidentlality rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming privy 
to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends 
serious harm to another person. However. to the extent a lawyer is required 
or permitted to disclose a client's purposes, the client will be inhibited from 
revealing facts which would enable the lawyer to counsel against a wrongful 
course of action. The public is better protected iffull and open communica-
tion by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited. 
Several situations must be distinguished. 
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(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
F1rst, the lawyer may not counselor assist a client in conduct that is crtm1nal 
or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2!d1. Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under Rule 
3.3(a)(4) not to use false evidence. This duty is essentially a special instance 
of the duty prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) to avoid assisting a client in crtm1nal or 
fraudu1entconduct. 
Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct by 
the client that was crtm1nal or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer has 
not violated Rule 1. 2(d) , because to 'counselor assist" criminal or fraudulent 
conduct requires knowing that the conduct is of that character. 
Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective conduct that 
is criminal and likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily hann. 
As stated in paragraph (b)(l), the lawyer has professional discretion to reveal 
information in order to prevent such consequences. The lawyer may make 
a disclosure in order to prevent homicide or serious bodily injury which the 
lawyer reasonably believes is intended by a client. It is very difficult for a 
lawyer to "know" when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, 
for the client may have a change of mind. 
The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such factors as 
the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who 
might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the 
transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. Where 
practical, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable 
action. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no 
greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to the purpose. A 
lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b)(1) 
does not violate this Rule. 
Withdrawal 
(15) If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materlally furthering a 
course: of crlrninal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as 
stated in Rule 1.16(a)(l). 
(16) After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of 
the clients' confidences, except, as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6. Neither 
this rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1. 16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving 
notice of the fact of withdrawal, and upon withdrawal the lawyer may also 
withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like. 
(17) Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether 
contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the orgarilzation. 
Where necessary to guide conduct in connection with this Rule, the lawyer 
may make inquiry within the organization as indicated in Rule 1. 13(b). 
Dispute Concernint Lawyer's Conduct 
(18) Where a legal claim or disciplinaty charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in 
a client's conduct, or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representa-
tion of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonable 
believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to 
a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. The 
lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has 
been made. Paragraph (b)(2) does not require the lawyer to await the 
commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so 
that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party 
who has made such an assertion. The right to defend, of course, applies 
where a proceeding has been commenced. Where practicable and not 
prejudicial to the lawyer's ability to establish the defense, the lawyer should 
J - 27 
:= 
advise the cJ:i.ent of the third party's assertion and request that the client 
respond appropriately. In any event, disclosure should be no greater than 
the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate innocence, the 
disclosure should be made in a manner which limits access to the informa-
tion to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it, and 
appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the 
lawyer to the fullest extent practicable. 
(19) If the lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which the client's conduct is 
implicated, the rule of confidentiality should not prevent the lawyer from 
defending against the charge. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal or 
professional disciplinary proceeding, and can be based on a wrong allegedly 
committed by the lawyer against the client, or on a wrong alleged by a third 
person; for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer 
and client acting together. A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by 
paragraph (b) (2) to prove the setvices rendered in an action to collect it. This 
aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary 
relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary. As stated 
above, the lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary 
disclosure of information relating to a representation, to limit disclosure to 
those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make 
other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure. 
Dis<:losures Othenris-e Required or Authorized 
(20) TIle attorney--client privilege is differently defined in various jurisdictions. If 
a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony concerning a client, absent 
waiver by the client, paragraph (aj requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege 
when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court 
or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give 
information about the client. 
(21) TIle Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or 
require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. See 
Rules 2.2.2.3.3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these provisions, a lawyer maybe 
obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give information about 
a client. Whether another proviSion of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter 
ofinterpretatton beyond the scope of these Relies, but a presumption should 
exist against such a supersession. 
(22) Paragraph (b)(4) gtves the lawyer profesSional discretion to reveal such 
-information as the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to comply with 
a court order. 
Former Client 
(23) The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has 
terminated. 
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RULE 1.7 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: GENERAL RULE 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a cUent If the representation of that cUent 
will be directly adnrse to another cUent, unle .. ; 
(1) the lawyer reasonably beUeves the representation will not 
adTeBeIy affect the relationship with the other cUent; and 
(2) each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shaD not represent a cUent If the repi'esentation of that cUent 
may be materially Umlted by the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client or to a third penon., or by the lawyer's own interests, unle .. : 
(1) the lawyer reasonably beUeves the representation will not be 
adTCnelyaffected;aDd 
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of 
multiple clients in a single matter Is undertaken, the consul-
tation shall lDclude ezplanation of theimpUcatioDS of the 
common representation and the advantages and risks In-
TOlved. 
CollUDent 
Loyalty to a CUent 
(1) Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client. An 
impermissible conflict of Interest may exist before representation is under-
taken, in which event the representation should be declined. If such a 
conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should 
withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16. Where more than one 
client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after 
representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the 
clients is determined by Rule 1.9. See also Rule 2.2(cl. As to whether a client-
lawyer relationship exists, or having once been established, is continuing, 
see Co=ent to Rule 1.3 and Scope. 
(2) As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking represen-
tation directly adverse to that client without that client's consent. Paragraph 
(aJ expresses that general rule. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as 
advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even 
if it is wholly unrelated. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in 
unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such 
as competing economic enterprises, does not require consent of the respec-
tive clients. Paragraph (a) applies only when the representation of one client 
would be directly adverse to the other. 
(3) Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, 
recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client 
because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. The conflict in 
effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. 
Paragraph (b) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself 
preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a 
conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with 
thclawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives 
or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf 
of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to 
accommodate the other interest involved. 
Consultation and Consent 
(4) Ac1ient may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, 
as indicated in paragraph (aJ(l) with respect to representation directly 
adverse to a client, and paragraph (b)(l) with respect to material limitations 
on representation of a client, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude 
that the client should not agree to the representation under the circum-
stances, the lawyer Involved cannot properly ask for such agreement, or 
provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When more than 
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one client is lm'01ved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each 
client. Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make 
the disclosure necessmy to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer 
represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses 
to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an 
informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. 
Lawyer" lDtereats 
(5) The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect on 
representation. of a client. For example, a lawyer's need for income should 
not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled compe-
tently and at a reasonable fee. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the probity of a 
lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be 
difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Alawyer 
may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for 
example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an 
undisclosed interest. 
CoDflictlm UtitatioD 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
Paragraph (a) prohibits representation of opposing partisan litigation. 
Simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may 
conflict. such as copla1ntlffs or codefendants, is governed by paragraph (b). 
An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in 
the parties' testlmony,incompatibillty in positions in relation to an opposing 
party or the fact that there are substantially d1fIerent possibillties of 
settlement of the claims or l1abillties in question. Such conflicts can arise in 
cr1minal cases as well as ctvU. The potential for conflict of interest in 
representing multiple defendants in a· cr1minal case is so grave that 
ord1na.r1ly a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. 
On the other hand. common representation of persons having s1m1lar 
interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is m1n1mal and the require-
ments of paragraph (b) are met. Compare Rule 2.2 involving intermediation 
between clients. 
0rdinar1ly. a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer 
represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. 
However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate 
against a client. For example. a lawyer representing an enterprise wf,th 
diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the 
enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the 
1awyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both 
clients consent upon consultation. By the same token, government lawyers 
. in some c1rcumstances may represent government employees in proceeding 
in which a government agency is the opposing party. The propriety of 
concurrent representation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For 
example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a 
suit for a declaratory Judgment concerning statutory interpretation. 
A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal 
question that has arisen in d1fIerent cases, unless representation of either 
client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ord1nar1ly not improper to 
assert such positions in cases pending in different trial courts, may it may 
be improper to do so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate court. 
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Interest of Penoa Pa,.mc fOl' • LaWJ'U'1 Service 
(9) A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is ' 
Informed of that faCt and consents and the arrangement does not compro-
mise the lawyer's duty ofloyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8!fl. For example, 
when an insurer and Its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising 
from a llabtllty insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to provide 
special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special 
counsel's professional Independence. So also, when a corporation and its 
directors or employees are involved In a controversy In which they have 
conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds for separate legal 
representation of the directors or employees. if the clients consent after 
consultation apd the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professionalinde-
pendence. . 
Other Coafllct SltuatloDi 
(10) Conflicts of interest In contexts other than litigation sometimes may be 
difficult to assess. Relevant factors in determfnfng whether there is potential 
for adverse effect Include the duration and Intimacy of the lawyer's relation-
ship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the 
lawyer, the llkellhood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice 
to the client from the conflict if it does arise. The question is often one of 
proximity and degree. 
(11) For example. a lawyer may not represent mUltiple parties to a negotiation 
whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common 
representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in 
Interest even though there is some difference of Interest among them. 
(12) Conflict questions may also arise In estate planning and estate administra-
tion. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family 
members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circum-
stances,.a conflict of Interest may arise. In estate administration the identity 
of the client maybe unclear under the law ofa partlcularjurisdictton. Under 
one view, the client is the ftduciaIy: under another view the client is the 
estate or trust, including its beneftciartes. The lawyer should make clear the 
relationship to the parties Involved. 
(13) A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its 
board of directors should determine whether the responsibtllties of the two 
roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation In . 
matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to 
the frequency with which such situations may arise. the potential Intensity 
of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the 
possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in 
such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise 
the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not 
serve as a director. 
Coaflict Charged by aa Oppollag PU'tJ' 
(14) Resolving questions of conflict of Interest is primarily the responsibtllty of 
the lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court may raise 
the question when there is reason to Infer that the lawyer has neglected the 
responsibtllty. In a crtminal case, inquiIy by the court is generally required 
when a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is such as 
clearly to call in question the fair or efficient administration of justice, 
opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an objection should 
be vie\1l'ed with caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of 
harassment See Scope. 
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(I) 
(J) 
client without flnt admint that penon in writloi that independent 
repreaentation ls appropriate in connection therewith. 
A lawyer related to auother lawyer .. parent, ch1ld, aibling or apouse 
ahall not repreaent a cUent in a repreaentation directly adveraeto a 
penon who the lawyer knowsls repreaented by the other lawyer except 
upon consent by the client after conaultation reauding the relation-
ahip. 
A lawyer ahaIl not acquire a proprietary intereat in the cauae of action 
or aubJect matter of Utigation the lawyer ls conductint for a client, 
except that the lawyer may: 
(1) acquire a Uen aranted by law to aecure the lawyer'a fee or 
ezpenaea: and 
(2) contract with a cUent for a reaaonable contingent fee in a civil 
caae .. 
Comment 
Tranaactiona Between CHeat aDd Lawyer 
(1) As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be 
fair and reasonable to the client. In such transactions a review by indepen-
dent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable. Furthermore, alawyer 
may not exploit information relating to the representation to the client's 
disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has learned that the client is 
investing in specific real estate may not, without the client's consent, seek 
to acquire nearby property where doing so would adversely affect the client's 
plan for investment. Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply to standard 
commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or 
services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or 
brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed 
by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no 
advantage in deaIingwith the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are 
unnecessruy and impracticable. 
(2) A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general 
standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at 
a holiday or as a token of appreciation is pennitted. If effectuation of a 
substantial gift requires preparing a legal instnunent such as a will or other 
conveyance, however, the client should have the detached advice that 
another lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an exception where the 
client is a relative of the donee or the gift is not substantial. 
Literary Right. 
(3) An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning 
the conduct of the representation creates a conflict between the interests of 
the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the 
representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an 
account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer 
representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from 
agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the 
property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraph UJ. 
Peraon Paylnf for Lawyera Servicea 
(4) Paragraph (f) requires disclosure of the fact that the lawyer's services are 
being paid for by a third party unless such payment is provided for in an 
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agreement between the client and the third party. Such an arrangement 
must also confonn to the requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidential-
ity and Rule 1.7 concerning conflict of interest. Where the client is a class, 
consent may be obtained on behalf of the class by court-supervised 
procedure. 
Umitini Liability 
(5J Paragraph (h) is not intended to apply to customary qualifications and 
limitations in legal opinions and memoranda 
Family Relatiooabi~ Between Lawyers 
(6J Paragraph (1) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related 
lawyers in the same firm are governed by Rules 1. 7, 1.9, and 1. 10. The 
disqualification stated in paragraph (iJ is personal and not imputed to 
members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. 
Acqui.ition of Jntere.t in Litigation 
(7) Paragraph OJ states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited 
from acquiring a proprietaly interest in litigation. This general rule, which 
has its basis in common-law champerty and maintenance, is subject to 
specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these 
Rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees set forth in Rule 
1.5 and the exception for certain advances of the costs oflitlgation set forth 
in paragraph (eJ. . 
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RULE 1.10 IMPCTED DISQUALlFICAll0N: GENERAL RULE 
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm. none of them shall knowingly 
represent a client when anyone of them practicing alone would be prohibited 
from doing so by Rules 1.7, l.B(c), 1.9 or 2.2. 
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm. the firm may not knowingly 
represent a Person in the same or a substantially related matter in which 
that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was associated, had previously 
represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to. that person 
and about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 
and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter. 
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not 
prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially 
adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer 
unless: 
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the 
formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and 
(2) any lawyer remaJn1ng in the firm has information protected by 
Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter. 
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client 
under the conditions stated in Rule 1. 7 
Commeat 
DefiDitiOD of "FinD" 
(1) For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term "firm" includes 
lawyers in a private firm. and lawyers employed in the legal department of 
a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services organization. 
Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can 
depend on the spec1flc facts. For example, two practitioners who share office 
space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be 
regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the 
public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a 
firm, they should be regarded as a firm for the purposes of the Rules. The 
terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in 
determining whether they are a firm. as is the fact that they have mutual 
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(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
access to confldentlal infonnation concerning the clients they serve. Fur-
thennore. it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose 
of the rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm 
for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing 
parties in Htlgation. while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule 
that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. 
With respect to the law department of an organization. there is ordinarily no 
question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the 
meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However. there can be 
uncertainty as to the identity of the cHent. For example. it may not be clear 
whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidUuy-or an 
afilliated corporation. as well as the corporation by which the members of the 
department are directly employed. A s1m1lar question can arise concerning 
an unincorporatc!d association and its local afilliates. 
Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers 
employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm. 
but not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the case of 
independent practitioners. whether the lawyers should be treated as asso-
ciated with~hothercandependon the particular rule that is inVOlved. and 
on the specific facts of the situation. 
Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after h;ivtng represented the 
government, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11(a) and (b); whereaIawyer 
represents the government after having served private cl1ents. the situation 
is governed by Rule 1.11 (c)(l). The indMduallawyerinvolved is bound by the 
Rules generally. including Rules 1.6. 1. 7 and 1.9. -
Different provisions are thus made for movement of a lawyer from one prtvate 
firm to another and for movement of a lawyer betWeen a private firm and the 
government. The government is entitled to protection of its cHent confi-
dences. and therefore to the protections provided in Rules 1.6. 1.9. and 1.11. 
However. if the more extensive disqualiflcation in Rule 1.10 were appHed to 
former government lawyers. the potentlal effeCt on the government would be 
unduly burdensome. The government deals with all private citizens and 
orgaruzations. and thus has a much wider circle of adverse lega1interests 
than does any private law firm. In these circumstances. the government's 
recruitment of lawyers would be seriously impaired if Rule 1. 10 were applied 
to the government. On balance. therefore. the government is better served 
in the long run by the protections stated in Rule 1. 11. 
Principles of Imputed DisquaUficatloD 
(6) The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (~) gives effect to the 
principle ofloyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law 
firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of 
lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty 
to the cl1ent, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by 
the obHgation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is 
associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently asso-
ciated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another. the situation 
is governed by paragraphs (b) and (c). 
Lawyers Moving BetweeD Firms 
(7) When lawyers have been associated in a firm but then end their association. 
however. the problem is more complicated. The fiction that the law firm is 
the same as a single lawyer is no longer wholly realistic. There are several' 
competing considerations. First, the cHent previously represented must be 
reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the cHent is not compro-
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(8) 
m1sed. Second, the rule of disqualification should not be so broadly cast as 
to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. 
Third, the rule of disqualification should not unreasonably hamper lawyers 
from fOrming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a 
previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today 
many lawyers practice in firms, that many to some degree ltmtt their practice 
to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another 
several times in thetrcareers. If the concept of imputed disqualification were 
defined with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtaUment of the 
opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of 
the opportunity of clients to change counsel. 
Reconciliation of these competing principles in the past has been attempted 
under two rubrics. One approach has been to seek per se rules of disquali-
fication. For example, it has been held that a partner in a law firm ts 
conclusively presumed to have access to all confidences concerning.all 
clients of the firm. Under this analysts, if a lawyer has been a partner in one 
law firm and then becomes a partner in another law fIrm, there is a 
presumption that all confidences known by a partner in the first firm are 
known to all partners in the second fum. This presumption might properly 
be applied in some circumstances, espectally where the client has been 
extensively represented, but may be unrealistic where the client was 
represented only for ltmtted purposes. Furthermore, such a rigid rule 
exaggerates the difference between a partner and an associate in modern law 
firms. 
(9) The other rubric formerlyused for dealing with vicarious disqualifIcations 
is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the ABA Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility. This rubric has a twofold problem. First, 
the appearance of impropriety can be taken to include any new client-lawyer 
relationship that might make a former client feel anxious. If that meaning 
were adopted, disqualification would become little more that a question of 
subjective judgment by the former client &!mnd, since "impropriety" is 
undefined, the term "appearance of impropriety" is question-begging. It 
therefore has to be recognized that the problem of imputed disqualification 
cannot be properly resolved either by simple analogy to a lawyer practicing 
alone or by the vexy general concept of appearance of impropriety. 
(10) A rule based on a functional analysis is more appropriate for determining the 
question of vicarious disqualification. Two functions are involved: preserv-
ing confidentiality and avoiding positions adverse to a client. 
ConfidentiaUty 
(11) Preserving confidentialtty is a question of access to information. Access to 
information, in turn, ts essentially a question of fact in particular circum-
stances, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that 
reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A 
lawyer may have general access to rues of all clients of a law firm and may 
regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that 
such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. 
In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the rues of only a ltmtted 
number of clients and participate in discussion of the affairs of no other 
clients; in the absence of information to the contraxy, it should be inferred 
that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually 
served but not those of other clients. 
(12) Application of paragraphs (b) and (c) depends on a situation's particular 
facts. In any such inquixy, the burden of proof should rest upon the fum 
whose disqualifIcation is sought. 
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Paragraphs (b) and (c) operate to disq~ the firm only when the lawyer 
involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 
1.9(b). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge of 
information relating to a particular client of the firm. and that lawyer later 
joined another firm. rieither the lawyer IndMdually nor the second firm is 
disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter 
even though the interests of the two clientS conflict. 
Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm. a lawyer changing 
professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of 
information about a client fonnerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9. 
Adverse PositiolUl 
(15) The second aspect of loyalty to client is the lawyers obligation to decline 
subsequent representations InvoMng positions adverse to a fonner client 
arising in substantially related matters. This obligation requires abstention 
from adverse representation by the indMduallawyer involved, but does not 
properly entail abstention of other lawyers through imputed disqualiflca-
tion. Hence, this aspect of 1;he problem is governed by Rule 1.9(a). Thus, if 
a lawyer left one firm for another, the new afllliation would not preclude the 
firms involved from continuing to represent clients with adverse interests in 
the same or related matters, so long as the conditions of paragraphs (b) and 
(c) concerning confidentiality have been met. 
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RULE 2.2 Iln"ERMED1ARY 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
A lawyer may oal,. act u intermedluy betweeD cHeDts If: 
(1) the lawyer cODsu1ts with each c1leDt coucerDiDI the lmpHca-
tiou of the CODlmOD repreHDtatioD, includm, the adV&Dtaaa 
aud risb involved~ aud the· effect OD the attomey-cHeat 
pri'ri1eta, aDd obtains each c1leDt's CODRDt to the commOD 
repre.eutatioD; 
(2) the lawyer reuoDably beHeva that the matter caD be re.olved 
OD term. compatible with the clleDts' best intere.ts, that each 
c1leat wlll be able to make· adequately Informed declslou in 
the matter iUad that there h Httle risk of material prejudice to 
the interau of auy of the c1leDulf the coDiemplated raolu-
tiOD h uuucceuful; auel 
(3) the lawyer re .. ouably beHeva that the commOD repre.eDta-
tiOD CaD be uudertakeD lmpartlaUy aud without lmproper 
effect OD other re.poulbWties the lawyer h .. to au,. of the 
c1leats. 
While actiut u intermediary, the lawyer shall cODsu1t with each cHeat 
CODceJ'DlDC the elec:bloDa to be made &Del the coDsleleratloDs releV&Dt 
in making them, so that each cHeDt CaD make adequately lDformed 
dec:bloDa. 
Alawyer shall withdraw uintermedluy If&Dyofthe cHeDts so requats, 
or If au,. of the coDditioDa stateclin paragraph (a) h DO louger satisfieel. 
UPOD withclrawal, the lawyer shaJ1llOt CoDtiDue to repreRDt auy of the 
c1leats in the matter that .... the subject of the intermedlatloD. 
Commeut 
This Rule explidtlyrecogruzes the specta1 role of the lawyer acting as an intermedla1y. 
to be dist:tngu1shed from joint representation as an advocate. 
(1) A la-wyer acts as intermedla1y under this Rule when the lawyer represents 
two or more parties with potentially conflicting interests. A key factor in 
deftn1ng the relationship is whether the parties share responsibility for the 
la-wyer's fee. but the common representation may be inferred from other 
circumstances. Because confusion can arise as to the la-wyer's role where 
each party is not separately represented. itis important that the lawyer make 
clear the relationship. and obtain the cl1ent's consent, preferably in writing. 
(2) This Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting as arbitrator or mediator between 
oramongpartteswhoarenotclientsofthelawyer.even.wherethelawyerhas 
been appointed with the concurrence of the parties. In performing such a 
role the lawyer may be subject to applicable codes of ethics, such as the Code 
of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint 
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~ Committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration 
Association. 
(3) A lawyer acts as intermediaty in seeking to establish or adjust a relationship 
between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for 
example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are 
entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in 
which two or more clients have an interest, arranging a property distribution 
in settlement of an estate or a marital division or mediating a dispute 
between clients. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting interests 
by developing the parties' mutual interests. The alternative can be that each 
party may have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility in 
some situatioQS of 1ncurr1ng additional cost, complication or even litigation. 
Given these and other relevant factors, all the clients may prefer that the 
lawyer act as intermediaty. . 
(4) In considering whether to act as intermediary between clients, a lawyer 
should be mindful that if the intermediation fails the result can be additional 
cost, embarrassment and recrimination. In some situations the risk of 
failure is so great that intermediation is plainly impossible. For example, a 
lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients between whom 
contentious litigation is imminent or who contemplate contentious negotia-
tions. More generally, if the relationship between the parties has already 
assumed definite antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can 
be adjusted by intermediation ordinarily is not very good .. 
(5) The appropriateness of intermediation can depend on its form. Forms of 
intermediation range from informal arbitration, where each client's case is 
presented by the respective client and the lawyer decides the outcome, to 
mediation, to common representation where the clients' interests are 
substantially though not entirely compatible. One form may be appropriate 
in circumstances where another would not. Other relevant factors are 
whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing 
basis and whether the situation involves creating a relationship between the 
parties or tenninating one. 
(6) In some circumstances a lawyer will undertake representation of a party in 
litigation or negotiation, and be forced to deal with an unrepresented party. 
For example, the lawyer representing a spouse in a divorce case may deal 
with the unrepresented spouse within the limits of Rule 4.3. The fact that the 
lawyer negotiates with the unrepresented spouse does not make the lawyer 
an intermediary, or subject the lawyer to the special rule of disqualification 
contained in Rule 2.2(c). 
CoofidentlaHty and Privil. 
(7) 
(8) 
it. particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of 
intermediation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-
client privilege. In a common representation, the lawyer is still required both 
to keep each client adequately informed and to maintain confidentiality of 
information relating to the representation. See Rules 1.4and 1.6. Complying 
with both requirements while acting as intermediary requires a delicate 
balance. If the balance cannot be maintained, the common representation 
is improper. With regard to the attorney~lient privilege, the prevailing rule 
is that as between commonly represented clients the privilege does not 
attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the 
clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the 
clients should be so advised. 
Since the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented 
clients, intermediation is improper when that impartiality cannot be 
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maintained. For example, a lawyer who has represented one of the clients 
for a long period and In a variety of matters might have difficulty being 
impartial between that client and one. to whom the lawyer has only recently 
been Introduced. 
CoDau1tatloD 
(9) In. acting as intermeclliuy between clients, the lawyer is required to consult 
with the clients on the implications of doing 80, and proceed only upon 
consent based on such a consultation. The consultation should make clear 
that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other 
ctrcums~. 
(10) Paragraph (b) is an application of the principle expressed In Rule 1.4. Where 
the lawyer is intermediary, the clients ordtnarily must assume greater 
responsibility for decisions than when each client is independently repre-
sented. 
Withdrawal 
(11) Common representation does not diminish the rights of each client in the 
client-lawyer relationship. Each has the right to loyal and diligent represen-
tation, the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1. 16, and the 
protection of Rule 1.9 concerning obligations to a fonner client. 
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